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 This dissertation explores the complicated relations between Estonian, Latvian, and 
Lithuanian postwar refugees and American foreign policymakers between 1948 and 1960. 
There were seemingly shared interests between the parties during the first decade of the Cold 
War. Generally, Eastern European refugees refused to recognize Soviet hegemony in their 
homelands, and American policy towards the Soviet bloc during the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations sought to undermine the Kremlin’s standing in the region. More specifically, 
Baltic refugees and State Department officials sought to preserve the 1940 non-recognition 
policy towards the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. I propose that despite the seemingly 
natural convergence of interests, the American experiment of constructing a State-Private 
network revolving around fostering relations with exile groups was fraught with difficulties. 
These difficulties ultimately undermined any ability that the United States might have had to 
liberate the Baltic States from the Soviet Union. 
 As this dissertation demonstrates, Baltic exiles were primarily concerned with 
preserving a high level of political continuity to the interwar republics under the assumption 
that they would be able to regain their positions in liberated, democratic societies. American 
policymakers, however, were primarily concerned with maintaining the non-recognition 
policy, the framework in which all policy considerations were analyzed. I argue that these 
two motivating factors created unnecessary tensions in American policy towards the Baltic 
republics in the spheres of psychological warfare as well as exile unity in the United States 
and Europe. 
 Despite these shortcomings, I argue that out of the exiles’ failings was born a 
generation of Baltic constituents that blurred the political legitimacy line between exiles who 
sought to return home and ethnic Americans who were loyal to the United States. These 
Baltic constituents played an important role in garnering the support of the United States 
Congress, starting in the 1950s, but became increasingly influential after the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution, despite the seemingly less important role Eastern Europe played in the Cold War. 
The actions of the Baltic constituents not only prevented the Baltic question from being 
forever lost in the memory hole of history, but actually created enough political pressure on 
the State Department that it was impossible to alter the long-standing policy of not 
recognizing the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. 
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 Its deeper significance lay in the fact that the United States had been presented with a 
 choice and had made a decision. The Russian action had forced the issue of whether 
 the same yardstick should be applied to international morality in all cases or only 
 against governments with which the United States had clashed.1 
 
This excerpt from the New York Times on 24 July 1940 describing the American refusal to 
recognize the 23 July 1940 Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania offers insight 
into how the “Baltic Question” would be interpreted in the American political discourse 
through World War II and the Cold War.2 
 The failure to reach an amicable settlement between the United States and the Soviet 
Union over the political and territorial status of Eastern Europe was but one, of many discrete 
reasons that resulted in the Cold War. The Soviet Union was not only portrayed as an 
ideological enemy, but as a state that was willing to impose its political, economic, and social 
will upon its neighboring countries through overtly meddling in the internal political affairs 
of a country, such as Czechoslovakia, or if necessary, the military annexation and annexation 
of territory, such as in the Baltic case.  
 The 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact demonstrated Stalin’s willingness to change 
borders by the use of force. Within this Soviet-Nazi German non-aggression treaty, secret 
protocols existed that assigned the Soviet Union’s neighbors, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, to a Soviet sphere of influence. Although Finland was able to maintain its 
independence through the 1939-1940 Winter War, over the summer of 1940, the Soviet 
Union militarily occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania resulting in the annexation of these 
independent nations into the Soviet Union.  
                                                            
1 By BERTRAM D. HULEN Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES..  1940. U.S. LASHES SOVIET FOR 
BALTIC SEIZURE :Welles Sees Three States 'Deliberately Annihilated' by ‘Devious Processes' TEXT OF 
THE STATEMENT U.S. LASHES SOVIET FOR BALTIC SEIZURE Comments on Chilean Issue Important 
U.S. Decision Ministers to London Protest Three Envoys Protest in Berlin. New York Times (1923-Current 
file), July 24,  http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed August 9, 2010). 
2 For a description of the legalistic, historical, and political definitions of the “Baltic Question” see: John Hiden, 




 The territorial changes made in the east Baltic littoral were shocking in two aspects. 
First, it was one of the first instances where the world witnessed what the Soviet Union was 
capable of in respect to intimidating its neighbors. Second, in the early years of the Cold War, 
the elimination of independent Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania represented a nightmare 
scenario for policymakers concerned with hypothetical future Soviet aggression. In Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania, the Soviet Union sought not only to establish friendly regimes on its 
borders, but also to incorporate unfriendly nations as constituent members of the Soviet 
Union. Soviet actions against Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, compared to maneuvers before, 
during, and after World War II in other strategically important areas, were singular in their 
scope and brutality. The international response to the annexation in 1940 was singular and 
concise, compared to the rather ambivalent position to the political situation in postwar 
Eastern Europe. The vast majority of western nations, led by the United States, refused to 
recognize the Soviet annexation of the three Baltic States.  Second, despite the principled 
position that the United States assumed when Under Secretary of State Sumner E. Welles and 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to not recognize the Soviet annexation, the political 
and military realities of World War II exposed the limits to what the Americans were willing 
to do in order to uphold their principled attitudes towards the situation in East Europe. 
 As the east Baltic littoral became a contested region between Nazi Germany and the 
Soviet Union, many Baltic elites had hoped that the forthcoming world war would have a 
similar outcome to World War I. The signing of the treaty of Brest Litovsk in 1917 and the 
defeat of Germany by the Entente had created enough of a political vacuum in immediate 
post-World War I Europe for independent Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian states to come 
into being. In the early years of World War II, the defeat of both the Soviet Union and Nazi 
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Germany seemed to be the most viable way for the three Baltic States to regain their 
independence.3 
 When Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt met at Yalta in 1945, each wartime leader 
obtained what they had sought. The United States gained a Soviet promise to enter the war in 
Asia and an American-centric United Nations; the British sought a seat at the table for France 
and some level of protection for its colonial holdings; and the Soviets were able to impose 
reparations on wartime belligerents and guarantee that the Soviet Union could not be invaded 
by a revanchist Germany in the future. After the failure of the Soviets to hold free elections in 
their occupied zones, Yalta became a rallying cry for those who sought to blame the 
Roosevelt administration for selling out East Europe. In reality, however, “the ‘consensus’ at 
Yalta reflected the military and diplomatic realities at the moment.”4 Only through a third 
world war would it seem possible that the occupied Baltic republics could regain their 
independence. 
 Curiously, the United States continued to stand by their 1940 policy towards Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. One important feature of the history of World War II in the Baltic 
States was the creation of a large postwar diaspora spread throughout Western Europe, the 
Americas, and Australia, but largely focused in the United States. The continuation of the 
non-recognition policy created a situation where aspects of American foreign policy and the 
interests of the Baltic émigrés became inherently intertwined.  
 Traditionally, the significance of the non-recognition policy has been marginalized. 
Throughout the late Cold War period, the importance of the policy was seen as being merely 
symbolic and was only sustained to placate domestic political audiences. In the immediate 
post-Cold War period, the non-recognition policy has been used as an important piece of the 
                                                            
3 For a description of the Baltic Independence Process after World War I see: Toivo U. Raun, Estonia and the 
Estonians, 2d. Ed. (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2001), 99-111; Andrejs Plakans, The Latvians: A 
Short History (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1995), 113-120; David Kirby, The Baltic World 1772-
1993: Europe’s Northern Periphery in an Age of Change (London: Longman, 1995), 276-292. 
4 Thomas G. Paterson, American Foreign Relations, A History since 1895, 203. 
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narrative that the Soviet occupation was indeed illegal and there exists an explicit level of 
continuity between the interwar independent Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and the 
independent nations that reemerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union.5 
 Indeed, the non-recognition policy played a role in American domestic politics.  The 
1976 Presidential debate between Jimmy Carter and President Gerald Ford where Ford 
proclaimed that Poland was not under Soviet domination resulted in widespread criticism 
from the American media, the polity at large and most certainly from all East European 
ethnic groups in the United States.6 One can only imagine the political repercussions of an 
American administration during the Cold War conceding to recognize the Soviet annexation 
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It is also true that the continuity narrative has since 
significantly elevated the importance of the non-recognition policy. To date, however, a 
historical middle-ground has yet to be reached in the understanding of what broader 
American policy towards the Baltic republics during the Cold War consisted, and to what 
extent Baltic exiles had on the creation, sustaining, and cancelation of policy initiatives that 
impacted their homelands.  
 Exploring the Baltic question through the larger prism of American policy towards 
East Europe as well as exploring the relationship that developed between American 
policymakers and relevant actors and organizations firmly places this marginal, yet important 
issue in a larger historical narrative in American foreign relations. Further, through exploring 
the interaction and development of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians while in exile during 
the early Cold War fills in a missing blank in the national histories of the three small nations. 
                                                            
5 Since regaining independence, there has been a strong “restorative” narrative in the three Baltic States 
claiming that new independent countries had not been created, but there existed a legal continuity between the 
post-1991 governments and the pre-1940 governments. Most notably this “restorative” narrative has focused on 
citizenship policies in Estonia and Latvia. See: David J. Smith “Estonia: Independence European Integration,” 
72-74 and Artis Pabriks & Aldis Purs “Latvia: The Challenges of Change,” 72-73 in David J. Smith, et. al. eds. 
The Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
6 See: Leo P. Ribuffo “Is Poland a Soviet Satellite? Gerald Ford, the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine, and the Election of 
1976,” Diplomatic History 14 no. 3 (1990): 385-404. 
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 The framework of this study has several layers, beginning with the layer consisting of 
the interaction between American policymakers in various government agencies as well as 
the policymaking process. Although the Baltic issue became an important debate among 
interested audiences in the general public and Baltic émigré circles, American policy towards 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was ultimately decided in rather insular bureaucratic circles. A 
special Baltic Desk under the Office of Eastern European Affairs handled Day to day policy 
decisions towards the Baltic republics. Baltic desk officers intimately knew the important 
exile circles within the United States, but were occasionally neglected when it came to larger 
policy initiatives led by the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff; the National Security 
Council; or other agencies such as the CIA. This is a story not only of the decision-making 
process within the United States, but also of the occasionally chaotic and bureaucratically 
unwieldy nature of American foreign policymaking.  
 The second layer deals with the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian nations in general 
and the postwar national diasporas more specifically. For the Baltic nations, World War II 
was a war of annexation, occupation, total destruction, and widespread population 
displacement. During the first Soviet occupation from 1940-1941, property, businesses, 
capital, and services were nationalized while people who were viewed as enemies of the state 
were deported into the hinterlands of the Soviet Union or executed. During the German 
occupation from 1941-1944, the Jewish populations became Holocaust victims; everyday 
citizens were conscripted into the German Army or into forced labor service; and people 
were deported to central Europe. The return of the Red Army in 1944 ultimately resulted in 
more deportations and executions, but also the exodus of people to the West. Ultimately tens 
of thousands of Balts would reside in exile during the early Cold War years and would be 
directly impacted by the foreign policies of individual nations towards the Soviet Union. This 
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is the story of a generation of exiles who truly believed they could have a demonstrable 
impact on the future of their homelands and sought to return home. 
 The final layer is that of anti-Communist America during the Cold War. Despite the 
willingness of almost all western nations to refuse recognition of the Soviet annexation of the 
Baltic States, the singularly most important country for Baltic exiles was the United States. 
Not only was the United States the first country to make such a principled statement about 
their homelands, but also the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans provided a sense of distance from 
the dangerous Soviet Union. Most important, however, was the non-partisan durability of 
anti-Communism in the United States among both policymakers and the general public 
during the early Cold War.  
 The Democratic Party that had condoned and even promoted cooperation with the 
Soviet Union during World War II had shifted towards promoting a policy of containing 
Soviet expansion in the “universal struggle between freedom and totalitarianism.”7 The 
conservative anti-communists ultimately advocated the rollback of communism and the 
liberation of Eastern Europe. Although some politicians, such as Senator Glen Taylor, 
justified the annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as a response by Soviet Russia to 
reclaim breakaway areas integral to the Russian state, making comparisons of the potential 
future reaction by the American federal government reaction of a state seceding from the 
Union;8 the broader American political spectrum created space for the Baltic émigrés to feel 
safe and work towards assimilation, while simultaneously working towards promoting 
policies that would help their homeland. This is the story of how immigrant communities 
were able to guide and eventually monopolize public opinion on an increasingly marginal 
foreign policy issue. 
                                                            
7 Richard Gid Powers, Not Without Honor: The History of American Anti-Communism, (New York: The Free 
Press, 1995), 191.  
8 Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1960), 58.  
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 The primary concern of the dissertation is to attempt to fully describe and analyze the 
features of American foreign policy towards the Baltic republics during the first two decades 
of the Cold War. What did American policy towards Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania consists? 
Who were the most important actors in the initiation and implementation of policy? What 
transformations occurred in policy over the course of the early Cold War? 
 The few scholars that have attempted to deal with American policy towards Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania during the Cold War have almost exclusively focused on the non-
recognition policy.9 Frequently, only the non-recognition policy is addressed and is seen as 
an idiosyncratic anomaly in the history of American foreign relations that only has 
implications in the field of international law. While it is true that the central theme that 
guided all American initiatives directed towards the Baltic republics was the non-recognition 
policy, the Baltic issue cannot be separated from the larger policy that the United States had 
towards East Europe during the Cold War.  
 This study attempts to present a comparative approach to how the American Baltic 
policy augments our basic understanding of policy towards East Europe as a whole. Although, 
the policy towards the Baltic republics should be seen as one component of the larger policy 
towards Eastern Europe, the non-recognition policy indeed resulted in one crucial distinction 
- to whom were diplomatic credentials extended and to whom they were not? 
 The principal component of the non-recognition policy was to maintain diplomatic 
relations with the existing Latvian and Lithuanian ambassadors in Washington and the 
Estonian Consul General in New York. In addition, the United States shuttered all diplomatic 
missions to the Baltic republics and prohibited senior American diplomats in the Soviet 
Union from traveling to or establishing contacts with senior officials in the Soviet Baltic 
                                                            




republics. In contrast, The United States extended diplomatic relations to the majority of all 
East European countries including the Soviet Union, regardless of their political makeup. 
 This notion of diplomatic recognition had far-reaching consequences beyond where 
diplomats could be sent or who would be welcomed into the ranks of foreign diplomats in the 
United States. The non-recognition policy laid the groundwork for what the United States 
was not able to do with respect to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This carried both positive 
and negative implications. While the refusal of American diplomats clearly demonstrated that 
the United States opposed Soviet territorial aggrandizement, and this fact could serve to 
bolster the morale of Baltic nationals trapped behind the Iron Curtain; cultural and economic 
interaction between East Europeans and Americans that became a staple of American policy 
towards countries such as Poland, were initially precluded in the case of the Baltic republics. 
 Equally important was the vast potential that the United States had to combat 
communist aggression in the Baltic republics in a way that it was not able to do in the rest of 
East Europe due to diplomatic protocol. For instance, the United States technically had the 
opportunity to continually use their position towards the Soviet annexation against the Soviet 
Union in the United Nations General Assembly.10 Most important was the willingness of the 
U.S. Government to engage with Baltic exiled politicians and diplomats in a public manner. 
Each people’s republic had a corresponding group of exiles that sought to establish 
governments-in-exile. Diplomatic protocol prohibited the U.S. Government from any overt 
negotiations with exiled leaders. While the United States refused to recognize any exiled 
government from the Baltic republics, the continued relationship between the diplomats and 
the State Department provided exiled leaders, in a broader sense, access that other émigré 
communities simply did not have. 
                                                            
10 The issue of whether or not to take the Baltic situation to the UN is just one example of many potential ideas 
that were discussed by policy makers, but were ultimately not used.  
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 While the United States waged cold war in Europe during the late 1940s and 1950s, 
the Baltic policy was well within one aspect of mainstream policy towards East Europe - the 
use of political exiles in the attempt to undermine Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. George 
Kennan, one of many Soviet experts in the U.S. State Department is most well known for the 
doctrine of containment. Recent literature has also enlightened us that Kennan was an 
adamant proponent of using exiles in covert actions designed to rollback the influence of 
communism. Throughout the early years of the Cold War, exiles from all East European 
countries and the Soviet Union became dynamic actors in American covert paramilitary and 
psychological warfare activities. Although the coalition between American officials and 
émigrés failed to liberate East Europe due to greater geopolitical considerations, 
dysfunctional bureaucracies by the Americans, and lack of cooperation by the exiles, this 
relationship implied the tacit American acceptance of Eastern European émigré groups in the 
United States to promote their own policy interests within the United States. 
 Political Scientist Steven Garrett has argued “East European ethnic groups in this 
country have been exploited more often than they themselves have been exploitative as far as 
foreign policy is concerned and that their conscious efforts to influence diplomacy have been 
largely irrelevant.”11 Through an analysis of the relationship between the U.S. Government 
and the East European ethnic groups in the 1950s, the degree to which one group was being 
exploited and another group was exploiting ultimately becomes blurred. It cannot be argued 
that the United States was mainly altruistic in developing relationships with Eastern 
European émigré groups. Émigrés, however, were willing participants and while they 
attempted to maneuver the contours of American foreign policy as best as they could to assist 
the Americans, all émigrés, particularly Balts, had their own agenda separate from the United 
                                                            
11 Stephen Garrett, “The Ties that Bind: Immigrant Influence on U.S. Policy Toward East Europe” in Said 
Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy, 108. 
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States that they aggressively pursued. As the rather close relationship that was cultivated 
during the late 1940s began to unravel during the late 1950s, this process only accelerated.  
 Despite a wealth of literature that attempts to assess the effectiveness of ethnic groups 
lobbying the U.S. Government on behalf of foreign policy initiatives, there is not yet any 
perfect theoretical framework for assessing this phenomenon. The most vivid and varied 
selection of literature that addresses ethnic lobbying emerged during the 1980s, within the 
context of the growing interest in studying multiculturalism and the perceived increase in 
hyper-pluralism.  During this period, there are two very important academic works that 
address the ethnic question in American foreign policy making.  The first study is Ethnic 
Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy, edited by Mohammed E. Ahrari. 12 The second work is 
entitled Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy, edited by Abdul Aziz Said.13 Both volumes 
attempt to advance the understanding of the relationship between ethnicity, specifically 
ethnic groups, and the role they play, or do not play in the making of American foreign policy. 
They begin with a set of assumptions that are tested, the bulk of the volumes include chapters 
dealing with specific case studies, and try to find common threads among the case studies in 
the conclusion. It is vitally important, however, to consider the period when these works were 
written.  
 During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Cold War still dominated the international 
political landscape and the fall-out from Vietnam and the Watergate scandal dominated the 
American political mosaic. As a result, Ahrari is correct in his introduction that “the 
American political system underwent significant alterations in the decision making apparatus 
itself. In the foreign policy process, the traditional domination of the president has long been 
considerably modified by an enhanced participation in congress.”14 He continued, “long gone 
are the days when presidential predominance in foreign policy, as contrasted with sharing of 
                                                            
12 Mohammed E. Ahrari ed., Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987). 
13 Abdul Aziz Said ed., Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1981). 
14 Ahrari, XII. 
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this participation with Congress on virtually all domestic policy issues, creating an 
impression of ‘two presidencies.’”15 The long gone days that were referred to, however, 
proved to be ephemeral at best. Indeed, since the early 1980s, the executive branch has 
reasserted supremacy in foreign policy making. 
 Nevertheless, in the détente and immediate post-détente period, political conditions in 
the United States allowed for ethnic lobbies to renew their efforts to promote their particular 
agendas. Two well-known examples took place in 1972 and 1976. In 1972, Jewish-American 
groups played an important role in Congress’ passing of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. This 
legislation was aimed at tying the granting of Soviet Most-Favored Nation trade status to the 
Soviet Union’s willingness to allow Russian Jewish emigration to their country of choice.16 
 In Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy, Stephen L. Spiegel takes a generally 
contradictory attitude towards the importance of ethnic groups in his chapter: “Ethnic Politics 
and the Formation of U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Dispute.” He argues two main 
points. First, ethnic lobbies have only a muted and indirect influence on decision making in 
the executive branch.17 Their primary influence is on Congress and on the public debate. 
Second, their own advisers, their own personal experiences, and the global philosophies 
prevailing in the administration more directly influence policy makers.18 
 The end of the Cold War brought about a renewed interest in studying the role of 
ethnicity in foreign policy. The most important recent academic work on the topic is Tony 
Smith’s Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of Foreign 
Policy.19 In his introduction, Smith states that he is attempting to advance three major 
propositions. First, that ethnic groups play a larger role in the making of American foreign 
                                                            
15 Aaron Widavsky quoted in in Ahrari, XIV. 
16 See Henry L. Feingold. Silent No More: Saving the Jews of Russia, the American Jewish Effort, 1967-1989. 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 109-148. 
17 Stephen Spiegel, “Ethnic Politics and the Formation of U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Dispute in Ahrari, 
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policy than is widely recognized. Second, the negative consequences of ethnic involvement 
may well outweigh the benefit. Third, the contradictions of a pluralist democracy are 
particularly apparent in the making of foreign policy.20 
 Although Smith goes into detail about the philosophical attributes of a multicultural 
society and the historical development of ethnic lobbies in the United States, his most 
important contribution is attempting to “lay out the framework on which ethnic group 
preferences for American foreign policy can be subjected to open and rational debate.”21 In a 
manner similar to Ahrari’s, Smith applies general features of gaining influence in 
Washington DC to ethnic group lobbies. He argues that ethnic groups are able to exert their 
influence on American politics, and in turn foreign policy, through their efforts to “get out the 
vote”; actively participating in campaign financing for candidates who support their causes; 
strong organizational leadership; and finally – building coalitions and setting specific agendas 
for action. The most significant problem in establishing a workable framework for assessing 
the effectiveness of groups is brought up in Ahrari’s conclusion: “What both Congress and 
the President are likely to do is to consult with an influential ethnic group in the future, as 
they have done in the past, and use it to build support when the objectives of that ethnic 
group are in harmony with ones promoted by other branch.”22 A more cynical interpretation 
of the statement would imply that ethnic groups would be used more to mobilize public 
opinion for a policy decision that they had little role in influencing.  
 Inherently related to the issue that Ahrari addresses is the period when his volume 
was published. The case studies ranging from the Middle East to Eastern Europe were all 
contemporary issues where the source material was limited to what was available in the 
public record. Simply, it was impossible to gain archival access to attempt to establish any 
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way of determining how government bureaucracy truly managed relations with ethnic lobby 
groups. 
 Outside of the well-studied relationship between American Jewish groups and the U.S. 
government, in the long scope of relations between ethnic groups and the American foreign 
policy making establishment, it has generally been clear that there has been little positive 
impact of ethnic groups on the making of foreign policy. Smith outlines three main stages of 
the historical development of ethnic involvement in foreign policy making. The first stage 
began in the early twentieth century where the most active ethnic groups – coming from 
Germany, Scandinavia, Ireland, and eventually Italy acted had a net negative impact on 
foreign policy making. Although they were not the primary reason for American neutrality 
and so-called isolation from European affairs in the interwar period, there was concern 
among policy makers that the activities of ethnic groups would be inimical to American 
interests. Before American entry in World War I, the Ambassador to England, Walter Hines 
Page had rhetorically wanted to “hang our Irish agitators and shoot our hyphenates.”23 
 Smith’s third stage in the historical development of ethnic groups in American foreign 
policy takes place after the end of the Cold War where ethnic group internationalism has 
become quite pronounced – particularly concerning the relationship between the growing 
diasporas coming from the developing world. There has been concern that the interests of 
such groups are again inimical to the larger interests of the United States.24  
There are three similar trends to the early twentieth century and post-Cold War 
periods. First, there existed an explicit level of skepticism among politicians about whether or 
not the interests of ethnic groups should be taken into consideration in the making of policy. 
Second, there has been little interest in the broader polity in the activities and plight of the 
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ethnic groups. Third, the ability of groups to monopolize the creation and maintenance of 
information has been relatively weak. 
One particular time period and one particular group of ethnic lobbies is 
simultaneously of great interest and very difficult to study are East European groups during 
the Cold War.  When describing his second stage, Smith succinctly states: “the imponderable 
question is the extent to which the confluence of ethnic group commitment to the Cold War 
fueled Washington’s determination to stay the course, driving the competition to a successful 
conclusion that made impossible a global condominium with Moscow.”25 
During the Cold War, virtually all American ethnic groups concerned about foreign 
policy were internationalists; they backed an assertive American effort to stand up to Soviet 
communism, and promoted national self-government abroad. Most importantly, however, 
was that there was a high-level of convergence between the interests of the United States and 
the interests of the Eastern European ethnic groups on the highest order – the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The existing literature that specifically addresses the relationship between 
Eastern European ethnic groups and the U.S. Government during the Cold War is even more 
suspect. There are two traditional viewpoints that emerge in this literature. The first 
viewpoint argues that Eastern European groups have had little to no influence on the making 
of foreign policy during the Cold War. The second viewpoint argues that particular groups 
were effective in influencing the U.S. government. 
 The historical record is clear that neither the Americans nor the Eastern European 
diasporas played a primary role in the Soviet Union’s collapse. This gives credence to the 
arguments espoused by those most skeptical about the role that Eastern European ethnic 
groups played on foreign policy during the Cold War. Stephen Garrett is perhaps the most 
prolific scholar that has dealt with the topic. In several articles, Garrett outlines the reasons 
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for the failure of the Eastern European lobbies during the Cold War and the true dynamic in 
the relationship between émigré group and the U.S. Government. 
 Garrett relies on a study by Bernard Cohen who surveyed the opinions of high 
officials in the State Department and noted the multitude of their contacts with ethnic group 
demands. Cohen argues that the contacts are largely formalistic in character and designed to 
actually mute ethnic demand or to manipulate them rather than to respond positively to 
them.26 Garrett elaborates on the Cohen’s study by claiming there are three structural issues 
that prevent the ethnic groups from having any real influence. First, there is built-in 
reluctance to give a really concrete role in policymaking to groups that press for the attention 
of professionals. Second, there is a professional disdain for interest group activity as it relates 
to matters of information. While there is such a vast range of domestic policy problems that it 
is not improbable for Congress to allow a group to establish a monopoly of information, 
foreign policy professionals are usually less open such groups that might importune them. 
Third, the government is responsive to interest groups partially in terms of how directly such 
groups can demonstrate that a given policy or its alternative really does help or hurt its 
interests.27 
 Opposing Garrett’s position is literature that argues that particular Eastern European 
organizations have had success at having an impact on American foreign policy. The most 
studied organization is the Polish American Congress. One symptomatic article about the 
Polish American Congress is present in Ahrari’s volume entitled, “The Polish American 
Congress, East West Issues, and the Formulation of American Foreign Policy” by Z.A. 
Kruszewski.  The article points to successes in the United States Congress through the Katyn 
Massacre Congressional Committee, the promotion of a positive attitude towards Poles and 
Poland, and high-level contacts with policy makers as proof that “the close cooperation 
                                                            





between the Polish American Congress and the U.S. Government allows for considerable 
policy input.28 
 Although Garrett is correct that between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, Eastern 
European ethnic groups in the United States had little ability to influence U.S. policy as it 
was not in the American interest to actively roll back communism in East Europe; and that 
Kruszewski is correct that the Polish American Congress most likely did have close 
cooperation with many members of the U.S. government, there are some flaws in the manner 
that the studies have been conducted.  
First, Garrett treats all East European ethnic groups as a monolithic bloc. Although, 
he does rely on the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN), which was a 
consolidating house, funded by the CIA, for the interest of East Europeans residing in the 
West during the Cold War; it does a disservice to individual groups that functioned outside of 
the ACEN. Even within particular nationalities, there were competing factions for authority 
to speak on behalf of the group. Due to the vast number of nationalities and the expansive 
number of groups who spoke for each nationality, it is improbable to state that all Eastern 
European ethnic groups were unsuccessful. 
Second, Kruszewski almost exclusively relies on sources from the Polish-American 
media and the Polish American Congress’ publications.  James S. Pula states, “The Polish 
American Congress publicized at great lengths its ability to gain presidential audiences and 
appointments to ‘blue ribbon’ committees, but the committees were largely ceremonial.”29 
Although Kruszewski does state that there were structural problems that the Polish American 
Congress would eventually have to overcome in its relationship with the U.S. Government, 
he only describes how the Polish American Congress perceived its relationship with the U.S. 
government, not vice-versa.  
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To address the problematic frameworks that existing literature have attempted to 
establish, this dissertation will focus on two specific phenomena that seem to be easily 
apparent to Baltic ethnic groups during the first two decades during the Cold War. First, there 
is the process of transforming foreign policy issues into domestic political issues. Second, 
there is the process of managing expectations through taking advantage of influencing 
marginal aspects of American foreign policy from a group’s own marginal position. 
The primary relationship that the leaders of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian 
exiled ethnic groups had with the U.S. Government was with the State Department. While 
this relationship was useful when exile politics were seen as useful to policymakers, once 
fomenting revolution was dropped as a policy prescription, the State Department contacts 
were significantly marginalized. In correlation with the eventual assimilation of Baltic exiles 
into American society, the foreign policy issues that were important to the Baltic diasporas 
were gradually transformed from the domain of foreign policy to the domain of domestic 
politics. More specifically, the consciousness of the exiles shifted from dealing with the State 
Department in diplomatic terms to dealing with the U.S. Congress on electoral terms.  
Although in the post-war period the U.S. Congress has traditionally been seen as a 
secondary actor in the making of foreign policy, the institution became very useful in 
guaranteeing that aspects of American foreign policy that appeared to have little day-to-day 
value in the late 1950s remained in force. The non-recognition policy was by far the most 
important issue. The relationship that Baltic American organizations curated with members 
of the U.S. Congress applied enough pressure on the executive branch of government that 
there would be a heavy political cost for abandoning policies that were ultimately deemed as 
unimportant in the broad spectrum of American foreign policy priorities.  
The second concern of this dissertation addresses the question of political and 
institutional continuity from the interwar Baltic republics to the Cold War Baltic diasporas in 
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the United States. The initial question is to what extent did the political makeup of the 
interwar republics transfer to the diasporas? Second, did political continuity serve as a 
hindrance or a benefit to the interests of the Baltic ethnic groups in assisting their homeland? 
Finally, did the political activities of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian exile groups place 
them within the broader Baltic nations or merely show that they were promoting their own 
self-serving interests? 
A key feature of the understanding of many Balts living in exile was that the Soviet 
occupation was not only illegal but was a deviation from the traditional historical trajectory 
of their homelands. As a result, a historical narrative developed where the exiles were 
sustaining the homelands until the political atmosphere was right for them to return home. 
They carried the political memories of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with them into exile, 
supposedly recreated while residing in displaced persons camps in the immediate post-war 
years, and then transplanted with them in a perpetual state of exile. To carry the analogy 
farther, the collapse of the Soviet Union, reemergence of independent states, and the close 
relationship developed between the diaspora and the homeland resulted in the full restoration 
of Baltic independence.  
Continuity for the Baltic exiles can be seen through the prism of individuals and 
institutions as well as historical narrative. Many influential members of émigré communities 
inevitably were influential members of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian society during the 
interwar period. The development of both domestic and international politics for the Baltic 
States during the interwar period can be broken down into two main phases. From the time of 
independence to the early 1930s, institutions were highly democratic and were plagued by 
weak coalitions and infighting between political factions. Further, diverging interests in 
regional politics prohibited close rapprochement among the three states. During the late 
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1930s, all three Baltic governments slid into right-wing authoritarian regimes that resulted in 
a minimal amount of regional cooperation. 
Despite the fact that most Baltic exiles viewed their main objective to be the eventual 
liberation of their homelands, this potential convergence of interests did not prevent the 
revitalization of disagreements among old political groupings in the broader diaspora. 
Equally important was the ability of former elites to start recriminations against former 
members of the authoritarian regimes that most western countries continued to maintain some 
sort of relationship with through the diplomatic representatives. 
During the late 1940s and 1950s, continuity was not only rhetorically important to the 
Baltic exiles, but was a true reflection of reality. Political continuity, however, did not serve 
as a net advantage for the exiles who sought the liberation of their homeland. Instead it 
placed them at a disadvantage in earning favor with American policymakers. The mid-level 
bureaucrats that the exiles had to work with on a regular basis failed to grasp the historical 
gravity of old political disputes among the Baltic groups they worked with. Additionally, they 
were unwilling to play the role of mediator between competing groups. 
The development of a specific historical narrative was used by Estonian, Latvian, and 
Lithuanian exile groups to support their claims that they were the rightful heirs of future 
independent Baltic States. The axis that this narrative rotated around was the 1940 annexation 
of the Baltic States and that all exiles represented the democratic nature of the Baltic peoples. 
This carefully constructed narrative was particularly useful in promoting their usefulness to 
U.S. Government officials in combatting communism and in curating a positive image among 
the American people.30 
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However, through critically assessing the historical narrative that was developed, it 
exposes significant holes in this notion of continuity. The émigré communities attempted to 
white wash the authoritarian regimes of the 1930s by comparing them directly to the puppet 
governments that were installed in 1940. It is important to note that certain elements of the 
diaspora that were in marginal positions attempted to promote their own historical narratives 
that amplified the authoritarian regimes in order to bolster their standing with western 
governments.  
A central theme of this dissertation addresses the question of whether Baltic exiles 
were seen as active participants in American activities against the Soviet Union or whether 
they were seen merely as domestic pressure groups who were trying to exert pressure on the 
American foreign policy establishment. It’s self-evident that this is entirely dependent on the 
period of time that is being studied and what particular policies are being implemented. 
Throughout the duration of the Cold War, Baltic groups naturally viewed themselves as 
active participants in the struggle towards the restoration of independence for their 
homelands. This does not mean that an evolution in thinking about how their relationship 
with the U.S. Government developed did not occur. To analyze this issue, this study is 
deploying the terms “exiles” and “constituents” to focus on the most important dynamics in 
the relationship between the makers of foreign policy and those who were trying to play a 
role in the making of foreign policy. 
The term “exile” is used to describe Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian émigré 
diaspora members who initially saw no reason to assimilate into the nation in which they had 
settled in after fleeing the Baltic region. Such individuals and organizations perceived 
themselves as political leaders who were responsible for fighting for the liberation of their 
homelands; establish provisional governments-in-exile; and ultimately return home in order 
to reestablish governmental institutions that resembled those of the interwar period. They 
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were highly motivated to pursue policies that not only provided them with political 
legitimacy among their fellow émigrés, but also created an aura of political and social 
continuity. Finally, they were more than willing to assist any government that was also 
fighting for the liberation of Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union so long that such 
cooperation did not interfere with maintaining political legitimacy and continuity. 
The term “constituent” is used to describe Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian émigrés 
who happened to live in the United States. Generally, such individuals and organizations 
were naturalized American citizens who participated in the American political process 
through voting, lobbying, and attempting to monopolize information related to their particular 
political cause - the political and diplomatic status of the Baltic republics. While American 
bureaucrats drew concrete lines between their relations with American constituents and exile 
groups, to the general public, there was little to separate the activities of exiles who happened 
to live in the United States and Balts who had become naturalized citizens and shared a 
similar political agenda.  
The failure of America’s liberation policy could have meant the permanent 
marginalization of Baltic ethnic groups residing in the United States and the subsequent 
abandoning of the non-recognition policy as Americans sought to bring about evolutionary 
change behind the Iron Curtain. This did not happen mainly because a fundamental 
transformation took place in the leadership in the Baltic emigrations. Indeed, the exiled 
diplomats and older members of the diaspora continued to see themselves as people who 
were political exiles. More important to the making of foreign policy, however, was the 
growing role of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians in domestic political circles.  
Contacts with the State Department and White House continued into the 1960s, but as 
Cold War moved away from Europe, so did the importance of the Baltic question. As a result, 
Baltic groups began to diversify their activities and began to heavily involve members of 
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Congress in promoting interests that were important to them - ranging from maintenance of 
the non-recognition policy to hiring members of their own ethnic groups to government 
positions. Simply, the role of Baltic immigrants as constituents in the American political 
process became more significant than actively engaging in activities against the Soviet Union. 
The dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter One describes political 
developments in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania during the two decades of independence 
which they enjoyed between the two world wars; the basic relationship that was developed 
with the United States and the rationale for the 1940 non-recognition policy. Chapter Two 
analyzes the basic tenants American policy towards Eastern Europe during the early Cold 
War period and the impact that it had on policy towards the Baltic republics. Chapter Three 
analyzes the relationship between American policymakers and Baltic exile groups residing 
abroad and the issue of diplomatic continuity. Chapter Four addresses the role that Baltic 
émigré groups played in American psychological warfare activities directed at the Soviet 
Union. Chapter Five describes the role that Baltic émigré groups had on the development of 
anti-Communism in the United States and the establishment of contacts with the U.S. 
Congress. Chapter Six analyzes the changes in policy towards Eastern Europe after the 
Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and looks at the effectiveness of the experiment in creating 
rather strong relations between Baltic émigré groups and American policymakers during the 
early Cold War. 
 
Source Material 
 Nearly twenty years after the end of the Cold War, now is an appropriate time to 
revisit the themes that started to be studied in earnest over thirty years ago. Although Stephen 
Garrett was able to use surveys of government bureaucrats and the publications from the 
ACEN to make his arguments, he lacked access or the interest in going through the 
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publications and organizational papers of individual national groups. Garrett, Kruszenski, and 
indeed most of the early scholars on the topic have lacked access to U.S. government archival 
material. To date, there is not an academic study that looks at the combined Estonian, Latvian, 
and Lithuanian efforts towards lobbying the United States during the Cold War. One of the 
major aims of this study is to correct some of the sourcing problems that have plagued work 
on the issue of ethnic lobbying.  The majority of source material is unpublished archival 
documents.  The three most important archives are as follows: The United States National 
Archives at College Park, MD. and Washington DC, where the U.S. State Department 
documents and Congressional documents are maintained; The Hoover Institution Archives at 
Stanford University where the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Corporation documents and 
the personal papers of several Baltic exiled diplomats are housed; finally the Immigration 
History Research Center at the University of Minnesota where the organizational papers of 
the Joint Baltic American Committee, American Latvian Association, Estonian American 
National Council, Assembly of Captive European Nations, and Lithuanian American Council 
are kept. Additionally, archives from the Truman, Eisenhower, F.D. Roosevelt Presidential 
Libraries and the National Archives of the Republic of Estonia were used. 
 The intent and rationale for such sources should be clear. Only through looking at 
how the individual lobbying organizations attempted to influence the U.S. government and 
how the U.S. government reacted or did not react to such overtures can we get a clearer 
picture of how the relationship ultimately functioned and evolved. Several of the themes 
addressed in this study remain sensitive to American national security, particularly 
surrounding events in Hungary in 1956. As a result, some sourcing remains necessarily 
incomplete. Nevertheless, I believe I have collected enough material to accurately portray the 
relationships between exile organizations and American policymakers as well as the strategic 





 There are two main historiographies relevant to this dissertation: literature that 
addresses American foreign policy towards the Baltic Republics during the Cold War and the 
activities of Baltic émigré groups during the Cold War; and the role that East European exiles 
played in American foreign policy - particularly during the 1950s. 
 There is a notable lack of literature concerning the general history and related 
historical implications of the American policy of non-recognition. Most scholars have 
focused on the legal aspects of non-recognition. Perhaps the most well known study is 
William Hough’s book on the relationship between the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States 
and international legislation. Hough convincingly traces the origin of the non-recognition 
policy back to the Stimson Doctrine.31 
 Additional literature that addresses the Baltic question from the perspective of 
international law are represented by the works of Robert A. Vitas and James T. McHugh and 
James S. Pacy. Vitas primarily addresses the legal implications of the non-recognition policy 
from the American perspective while dabbling in some of the historical origins of the policy. 
McHugh and Pacy focus specifically on the implications that the non-recognition policy had 
on exiled diplomats; the specific policies that countries had towards Baltic diplomats, and 
useful biographic essays on the most important diplomats.32 
 More recent literature has attempted to add significantly greater academic rigor to the 
debate on the Baltic diplomatic situation during the Cold War. Lauri Mälksoo has specifically 
concentrated on the debate over state continuity and has attempted to ask the question as to 
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what was more important in the restoration of Baltic independence, great power politics or 
the principled non-recognition policy taken by many countries during the Cold War. From a 
more historical perspective, Kristina Spohr Readman has greatly contributed to the 
knowledge of how German foreign policy viewed the situation of the Baltic republics during 
the Cold War. Additionally, the edited volume by John Hiden, Vahur Made, and David J. 
Smith attempts to paint the “Baltic question” in as broad a historical landscape as possible, 
offering a survey of various international positions towards Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.33 
 Traditionally the history of American Baltic political activity has largely rested within 
the domain of those who were active participants in the struggle for independence.  
Although the monographs and memoirs written by the most important individuals and actors 
are useful in constructing a timeline of the activities that they were engaged in, the historical 
and scholarly quality of the works are inevitably mixed. Not only do they fail to account for 
alternative reasons for why American policy makers took certain positions, but quite 
frequently lack historical distance from events. Further, they are largely based on individual 
nations, failing to bring a comparative perspective to the three diasporas.34 
 In recent years, however, there has been a greater amount of attention paid to the 
political activity of Baltic immigrants in the United States during the Cold War. Latvian 
immigrants, or as sociologist Ieva Zake insists, American Latvians, despite being a much 
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smaller group than the Lithuanian community played an important role in Baltic diaspora 
political activities in the United States.  Zake’s most recent monograph American Latvians 
significantly advances the scholarly understanding of the experience of Latvian refugees in 
the United States during the Cold War. First, it demonstrates that there are clear differences 
between traditional immigrants to the United States and refugees that arrived in the United 
States during the Cold War. Second, it uses a multi-archival approach to look at how 
American Latvians navigated the American political landscape. Although Zake’s work 
exclusively focuses on Latvians and does not emphasize the diplomatic historic aspect of 
Balts during the Cold War; her current and former work on this topic is most relevant.35 
 Since the end of the Cold War, historians have gained access to archival material that 
has shed new light on the early years of the ideological conflict, particularly regarding the 
question of whether the United States actually sought to liberate Eastern Europe during the 
1950s or whether it was merely domestic electioneering. In the last fifteen years, there have 
been enormous strides in demonstrating that within the highest ranks of the American foreign 
policy establishment that a prolonged struggle with the Soviet Union was not desirable and 
that the political and territorial situation in East Europe should be changed utilizing all 
resources at disposal to the United States. 
 This growing body of literature that addresses the creation and implementation of 
American overt and covert actions against Soviet hegemony focuses on three specific themes. 
First, that containment was only the first step in a concerted effort to destroy Soviet power 
around the world. Indeed more aggressive activities that involved clandestine paramilitary 
actions, economic warfare, and psychological warfare were deployed against the Soviet 
Union. Second, that despite the eagerness of both Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. 
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Eisenhower to take more aggressive actions against the Soviet Union, bureaucratic infighting, 
the inability to create sustained policy proposals, and the geopolitical realities doomed any 
attempts to break Soviet hegemony in East Europe.36 
 Although paramilitary actions were part of American policy of liberating East 
Europe,37 the more significant activities can be classified as psychological warfare or public 
diplomatic activities. By 1949 there were two main vehicles for combatting Soviet 
propaganda, the overt Voice of America radio broadcasting and the covert Radio Free Europe 
broadcasting. To date, the history of these two organizations primarily consist of monographs 
and memoirs of former bureaucrats of the United States Information Agency (USIA) or 
National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE).38 The most important scholarly work that 
deals with American public diplomatic efforts during the Cold War is Nicholas J. Cull’s 
history of the USIA from 1945-1989. Cull gives an excellent overview of the internal 
operations of USIA, the bureaucratic struggles that it has had with the State Department, U.S. 
Congress, and private-public organizations such as the NCFE; and pushes the scholarly 
information of the organization beyond the 1950s when the raison d’être of American 
broadcasts were called into question.39 
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 One aspect that is revealed in recent literature dealing with American policy towards 
East Europe and the Soviet Union, and particularly literature dealing with covert broadcasts 
is the role that refugees and exiles played in the actual implementation of these clandestine 
activities. There are two significant points that reach a level of convergence in describing the 
relationship that developed between refugees and American policy makers. First, as early as 
1947 senior American officials actively sought out exiles for campaigns against the Soviet 
bloc. Frank Wisner, a Mississippi native and head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
in Southeast Europe during World War II had a long interest in the activities of refugees that 
culminated in touring DP camps in occupied Germany in 1947. In 1948, Wisner was selected 
to oversee the State Department’s Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). Wisner’s contacts 
with émigrés would be the perfect preparation for the covert pursuit of liberation in East 
Europe.40 Second, it has been argued that one of the main reasons that covert actions against 
the Soviet Union failed was due to the lack of cooperation among the various exile groups 
that had earned the patronage of the Americans. There were concerns that the exiles were 
more interested in supporting their own self-serving interests and would do anything to earn 
the trust of the Americans, that they were unwilling to cooperate with each other, and even 
worse were accused of “probably selling the U.S. Government a dangerous bill of goods.”41 
 Literature that deals with the longer lasting historical significance of the generally 
considered failed policy of using exiles during the early years of the Cold War has focused on 
the implications that it had on American policy and the pursuing debate about whether 
liberation was just a domestic political concern or a legitimate foreign policy objective.42 
Literature has also focused on the impact that America’s liberation policy had on East Europe 
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following the failed 1956 Hungarian Revolution.43 The historiography of the period has not 
significantly addressed the role that the exiles residing in Western Europe and the United 
States had in the implementation of covert actions nor has it addressed the myriad other 
activities that East European ethnic groups pursued during the early years of the Cold War. 
While Liberation has been demonstrably proven to have played a more important role in the 
making of American foreign policy than had previously been realized, there was a domestic 
component. While activities in pursuit of liberation did help in fomenting dissent in Hungary 
in 1956, ultimately it was a Hungarian activity. The history of those on the frontline of 
American liberation policies from 1947-1956 has yet to be told in detail. 
 Another general gap in the existing literature on the relationship between the exiles 
and the Americans was what were the precise dynamics of this relationship? Were the exiles 
mere clients of the American government and strictly beholden to American interests or did 
the exiles predominantly manipulate the American policy makers and pursue their own 
agenda? Hugh Wilford’s excellent analysis on the private-public network that the CIA 
created in both the domestic and international arenas of the Cold War attempts to address this 
very issue. Wilford argues that more often than not, collusion with the CIA afforded groups 
the possibility to pursue their own interests, much to the dislike of the CIA - as opposed to 
the traditional interpretation that the CIA was most responsible for all activities taken by its 
patron organizations.44 
 This dissertation fills a gap in the existing literature by analyzing American foreign 
policy through the perspective of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian ethnic groups during the 
1950s. This is important since this aspect of American foreign policy not only impacted 
American prestige and the communist territories that it was geared towards, but the 
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individuals and organizations that willingly participated in American liberation efforts. It will 
demonstrate that although Baltic exiles were more than able to align their own interests with 
those of American policy makers, more often than not, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians 
pursued their own agenda towards the liberation of their homelands. It will show that the 
access that the Americans gave to the Baltic organizations allowed access to other institutions, 
such as the United Nations. It will demonstrate that the regular contacts that Baltic exiled 
cold warriors had during the 1950s was a major component in the continuation of political 
activities by American Baltic constituents during the 1960s. Finally, it will argue that 
although the non-recognition policy of the Soviet annexation was one component of 
American policy towards East Europe, there was an inherent disconnect between what the 
non-recognition policy permitted and forbade the United States to do with regards to the 
Baltic Republics and what the United States actually pursued in the Baltic region. 
 Excluded from this study’s analysis are the developments of Estonian, Latvian, and 
Lithuanian organizations that revolved around cultural and linguistic development. A major 
component of the émigré communities’ vibrancies was the high-level of cultural and 
language training that took place in the United States. This is due to the existence of literature 
that focuses on cultural developments, the limits on the length of a dissertation, and the need 
to confine the research.45 
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 Although the Baltic exile experience in the United States was in many ways unique 
compared to other East European émigré groups, due to relatively small numbers of people 
involved and a specific U.S. Foreign policy directive focused on their home countries, their 
story within the political landscape of the United States should be brought forward to fill in a 
missing piece in the history of the three small nationalities. Equally important is that the 
approach taken in this study will foster debate on the role of exiles in American foreign 
policy, the nature of the symbiotic relationship between American policymakers and exiles, 
and stimulate new studies on the other larger nationalities that established vibrant political 




 LEGACIES OF THE INTERWAR PERIOD AND WORLD WAR II 
 
Security and Cooperation in the Interwar Baltic Region 
One of the most significant outcomes of World War I and the Russian Revolution was 
the emergence of small states in Central and Eastern Europe, notably independent Finnish, 
Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian countries on the eastern littoral of the Baltic Sea. The 
singular foreign policy concern of these newly independent states was how to address 
security.1 During the interwar period, the Baltic countries had a wide range of possibilities to 
satisfy their security concerns. Individual states could declare neutrality in the event of 
renewed conflict in Europe. Small states could place their security in the promise of 
international organizations, such as the League of Nations. States could try to establish very 
cordial relations with stronger European powers. The most promising means of meeting 
security concerns, however, was through the creation of strong regional institutions around 
the Baltic Sea. 
 In 1917, newspaper editor and future Estonian Prime Minister Jaan Tõnisson talked 
about the possibility of a Scandinavian-Baltic bloc that would have a union of 30 million 
people. Such a hypothetical union would have had significantly greater influence at the Paris 
Peace Conference and represented an enviable military position around the Baltic Sea. 
500,000 soldiers would have been at its disposal, compared to the 100,000 infantrymen that 
Germany was restricted to. From a geographical situation, such a union including Poland, 
Sweden, and Finland would have represented a radical redistribution of power in Europe. 
Tõnisson’s grand dream, however, proved to be illusory. The failure of a “Greater Baltic 
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Union” was partially a function of the region’s geopolitical realties and individual states’ 
actions.2  
 Finland and Poland, the region’s two largest states, assumed a reluctant approach 
towards regional security, which severely undermined the success of Tõnisson’s vision of a 
large Baltic Union. Despite Finland facing many of the same security challenges as Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania, its orientation towards the more risk-averse Scandinavian countries 
severely restricted any overtures of cooperation with its southern neighbors. The territorial 
dispute over Vilnius between Lithuania and Poland, and the fear of Polish hegemony in any 
Baltic Union prevented significant advances in a greater Baltic union.3 Nevertheless, 
historian Georg von Rauch points to three main periods where regional cooperation 
flourished: 1920-1925, 1925-1934, and 1934-1940.4 As time progressed and interests became 
more defined, the scope of negotiations around the Baltic Sea on regional cooperation 
became more and more narrow – with Estonia and Latvia assuming the leading position.  
 1921-1925 proved to be the most invigorating period of activity in working towards 
Baltic cooperation. As the newly independent nations were trying to determine their foreign 
policy paths and since the Locarno period was seen as a transition period in European politics, 
regular conferences – particularly among Estonians, Latvians, and Finns – developed. This 
“conference diplomacy” as vividly described by Marko Lehti clearly demonstrates that the 
process of working towards regional cooperation is as interesting as the results of regional 
cooperation.5  
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 Despite the periods of negotiations and conferences, however, the only concrete result 
of Baltic regional cooperation was the Baltic Entente’s establishment. The Baltic Entente’s 
predecessor was the establishment of a military alliance between Estonia and Latvia in 1923.6 
The final manifestation included Lithuania with a consultative treaty signed by the Estonian 
Foreign Minister, Julius Seljamaa, the Latvian Foreign Minister, Vilhelms Munters, and the 
Lithuanian foreign minister Stasys Lozoraitis on 12 September 1934.7 The Baltic Entente 
called for collaboration in foreign affairs, mutual support in international questions, and 
regular foreign ministers’ meetings. The latter resulted in a general streamlining and 
synchronization of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian foreign policies. Members of the 
international community even seemed willing to recognize the entente as a viable entity. 
Latvia was asked to represent the Baltic States as a non-permanent member of the League of 
Nations Council in October 1936. The Soviet Union even invited the general staffs of the 
Baltic armies to Moscow to attend a May Day Parade.8  
The two fundamental problems with the Baltic Entente, however, rested in its 
inability to foster solidarity among the three nations’ polities and the lack of any concrete 
joint military plans. Cultural and economic projects were planned, but rarely implemented. 
Those that were implemented were often delayed. The Baltic Review, based on a periodical 
dating back to 1918-1919 was supposed to be published, using the three Baltic languages as 
early as 1934, but did not make its debut until February 1940.9 Cultural, political, and 
perhaps most importantly, linguistic problems hampered deep military cooperation 
throughout the entente.10 
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In addition to fostering some level of regional cooperation, the nascent Baltic 
republics placed their hopes in pursuing policies of neutrality, as well as participating in 
international institutions and building relations with powerful global players. The weakness 
of the League of Nations, tentative efforts towards regional cooperation, and the precarious 
geopolitical situation left Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania seeking the assistance of great power 
states to secure their independence. Although individual countries had differing attitudes 
towards the nascent states, the Western Allies valued stability over the national aspirations of 
small nations in Central East Europe. Despite Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Point Address and his 
position on supporting national independence, the United States was the last major nation to 
grant de jure recognition towards Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. While the United States 
recognized Poland and Finland – two countries that gained territory from the former Russian 
Empire, the United States maintained its policy of non-dismemberment towards that same 
empire. After the departure of Secretary of State Robert Lansing, this policy manifested itself 
again in the Colby Note (named after Lansing’s successor.) It was not until there appeared to 
be no realistic way to reconstruct a viable, democratic Russian confederation that the United 
States extended recognition to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on 25 July 1922.11 
 Despite the delayed recognition of the Baltic States, the most important feature of 
relations between the United States and the three countries was that the American 
government viewed them as regular European nations and maintained normal, albeit minimal, 
relations with them. Immediately following the granting of recognition, the unofficial 
representatives of the new states were received as chargé d’affaires. Throughout the interwar 
period, the United States maintained diplomatic representatives in Tallinn, Riga, and Kaunas, 
with an embassy in Riga. In addition, most favored nation trade status along with myriad 
other treaties were signed between the two states. Equally important was the perception that 
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Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians had towards the United States regarding their own 
security. Regardless of the small but important role the American Lithuanian Diaspora has 
historically played in Lithuania, widespread thinking was that the United States was not a 
country that would secure their sovereignty. This contrasted with the Baltic assumption that 
the British view was always in favor of an independent Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the 
east Baltic littoral.12 
 
Total War: Annexation and Displacement 
 Between 1935 and 1939, Baltic State diplomacy conducted through the prism of the 
increasingly assertive foreign policies of the Soviet Union and Germany.13 Within the context 
of Hitler’s Ostpolitik, Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov offered Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania bilateral mutual assistance pacts. In response, Germany attempted a similar 
approach, seeking to conclude non-aggression pacts with all European states with the 
exception of Lithuania.14 The Baltic States rejected overtures of bilateral agreements with 
either the Soviet Union or Germany, preferring to maintain a policy of neutrality. Such 
policies of neutrality proved only to be effective as long as overt hostilities between the 
Soviet Union and Nazi Germany did not occur. 
 The conclusion of a Soviet-German non-aggression treaty on 23 August 1939 sent 
shockwaves throughout Europe.  The immediate surprise was that two nations that were seen 
as being in direct competition for the deepening of their influence in Eastern Europe were not 
formal allies.  More surprising in the long-term were the secret protocols attached to the 
treaty.  The Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement allowed for the Germans and Soviet Russians to 
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13 von Rauch, 189. 
14 Ibid., 190.  
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divide all of East Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence.15  Ironically, by the 
time that the Baltic Entente reached a level of intense and systematic collaboration during the 
winter of 1939-1940, the fate of their nations’ sovereignties were no longer controlled by 
Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians.  The inclusion of the Baltic States into the Soviet 
sphere meant that the “fate of all three Baltic States depended on the unpredictable whims of 
Stalin.”16 
 The military successes of Germany in Northern and Western Europe throughout 1940 
and the inability of the Baltic governments to manage their policy of neutrality vis-à-vis the 
Soviet and German governments created an instant change in Moscow’s policy towards 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that would geopolitically define the trajectory of these states 
for the next 50 years.  From May through July 1940, the Soviet Union embarked upon a 
concerted effort to absorb Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. 
  On 30 May 1940, the Lithuanian government informed Molotov that the Lithuanian 
foreign minister was willing to travel to Moscow to clarify the situation, but was ultimately 
rebuffed on the grounds that it would serve no useful purpose. As a result, the Kremlin 
instigated of a border dispute with the Lithuanian where the Lithuanian government was 
accused of arresting Soviet solders and coercing Soviet state secrets from them.17 At the end 
of May 1940, the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry distributed a document to its missions abroad, 
saying, “If a catastrophe occurs here, then consider Stasys Lozoraitis as the chief of the 
residual diplomatic representation abroad.”18 Latvian President Karlis Ulmanis extended 
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similar credentials to the Latvian Ambassador to the United Kingdom Karlis Zarins to ensure 
that Latvian diplomatic representation would continue should the Latvian government be 
unable to continue to function. The Estonians, however, failed to establish any extraordinary 
credentials for its senior diplomats abroad.19  
 On 14 June, the Lithuanian foreign minister received word from the Kremlin that the 
Soviet Union was prepared to settle the conflict, demanding that a new government be 
formed and immediate approval be granted for more Soviet troops be to be garrisoned in 
Lithuania. Despite initial negotiations about whether or not to lead an armed resistance 
against the Soviets, Smetona instructed the commander of the Lithuanian Army, General 
Rastikis to form a new cabinet. The hopes of all three Baltic governments by the middle of 
June 1940 were that the steps that were taken would somehow placate Soviet ambitions in the 
East Baltic. 
 
The American Response to Aggression in the East Baltic 
 Meanwhile, American diplomats in Moscow, Kaunas, Tallinn, and Riga, were 
sending regular diplomatic notes to the State Department in Washington, D.C. about the 
events transpiring on the Soviet Union’s western border.  In the afternoon of 15 June, the 
American Ambassador to Lithuania informed the State Department that Russian armored 
divisions had crossed the Lithuanian border following Molotov’s rejection of Rastikis.20  The 
arrival of Soviet troops on 15 June triggered the first high profile political displacement from 
the Baltic States when Smetona fled Lithuania via Germany to Switzerland, eventually to 
reside in the United States.21 With the Red Army fully stationed in Lithuania, Molotov made 
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similar ultimatums to the governments of Estonia and Latvia, with a time limit set at 8 
hours.22  
 The primary charge levied against the Estonians and the Latvians was that they broke 
their non-aggression pacts of 1932 and the 1939 mutual assistance pacts by amending the 
1923 Latvian-Estonian agreement to include the Lithuanians. An article in the March 1940 
Baltic Review on the Baltic Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of December 1939 was used as 
evidence that the governments in Kaunas, Riga, and Tallinn were plotting against Soviet 
interests. The Estonian and Latvian governments were forced to accept the Soviet ultimatum 
and the Red Army began to move into their territories. Within a few days, all areas of 
strategic importance were occupied.23 
 John C. Wiley, the American Ambassador to Latvia played a pivotal role in analyzing 
the situation in the Baltic States during June 1940. Before his arrival in Riga, Wiley served as 
a diplomat in Austria in 1938 and Czechoslovakia in 1939, witnessing at first hand the 
territorial annexations that had taken place by the Germans. It is no coincidence that when 
describing the situation in Latvia he stated: “Conjectures regarding the future are pessimistic. 
It is possible that the new governments of the Baltic States will be so constituted that 
Anschluss with the U.S.S.R. can be voted in due course in an endeavor to forestall any 
Hitlerian “new order in Eastern Europe.”24  Wiley continued, “It might be well for the 
Department to foresee the possibility that the Soviet authorities might shortly assume charge 
of the diplomatic and consular representation of the Baltic States and our entire establishment 
here might have to be liquidated on fairly short notice.”25 
 Following the dissolution of the Baltic governments and the arrival of special 
representatives of Molotov to Estonia and Latvia, Andrei Zhdanov and Andrei Vishinski, 
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respectively, the Soviet Union held parliamentary elections over the course of 14-15 July 
1940. The electoral laws were changed by decree, electoral procedures were cut short, and 
the principle of the secret ballot was abolished. As a result, the turnout and results of the 
fraudulent elections were highly favorable to Stalin.  On 14 July 1940, Wiley informed the 
State Department that the Soviet Union has decided on incorporating the Baltic States and 
that Molotov has said, “that the new Lithuanian Parliament will have only one question to 
decide, namely Anschluss.”26 
 Based on the memoranda arriving from Tallinn, Kaunas, and Riga, American 
policymakers at the State Department were busy deciding how to interpret the Soviet Union’s 
actions within the broader context of American policy on the outbreak of war in Europe. In 
an attempt to bridge the gap between domestic political opinion forcing the United States to 
maintain a policy of neutrality and the harsh reality that the United States government had to 
do something to at least have some moral claim on the situation in Europe, President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt instructed the State and Treasury Departments to begin a policy of freezing the 
assets of militarily occupied European states.27  Assistant Chief of the Division of European 
Affairs, Loy Henderson, was charged with establishing a set of principles in dealing with the 
events in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, based on the situation on the ground and a string of 
critical correspondences received from the Latvian Ambassador in Washington, Alfreds 
Bilmanis. 
 Henderson’s approach to handling American policy towards the Baltic situation 
revolved around three basic questions of principal that were explicitly tied to the rapidly 
degenerating situation in Europe. First, Henderson asked: “Is the Government of the United 
States to apply certain standards of judgment and conduct to aggression by Germany and 
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Japan which it will not apply to aggression by the Soviet Union? In other words, is the 
Government of the United States to follow one policy with respect to, say, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, and the German-occupied Poland, and another policy with respect to Latvia, 
Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland, which before the end of the year is likely to suffer the same 
fate as the Baltic States?”28  Second, “Does the Government of the United States desire to 
take steps to restrain the export of funds in this country belonging to the States of Latvia, 
Estonia, and Lithuania, as it has done recently in the case of countries taken over by 
Germany?”29  Third, “Are vessels of the Baltic States in American harbors to be permitted to 
depart freely or are they to be held up like the vessels of a number of countries which have 
been taken over by Germany?”30 
  Prior to this enlightening memorandum, Roosevelt amended EO 8389 on 10 July 
stating: 
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 5(b) of the Act of October 6, 1917 
(40 Stat. 411) as amended, and by virtue of all other authority vested in me, I, 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, PRESIDENT of the UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, do hereby amend Executive Order No. 8389 of April 10, 1940, as 
amended, so to extend all the provisions thereof to, and with respect to, the property 
in which Latvia, Estonia, or Lithuania or any national thereof has at any time, on or 
since July 10, 1940, had any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.31 
 
The presence of 500,000 Soviet troops on the territories of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 
along with the fact that Smetona fled Lithuania while Ulmanis and Päts were essentially 
prisoners in their own countries created a situation where the United States Government 
treated the Baltic States like the European nations that were under German military 
occupation. 
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 On 21 July, the new Estonian parliament met for its first session with four main 
planks to its agenda: the Sovietization of Estonia; Anschluss with the Soviet Union; 
nationalization of land in Estonia; and nationalization of large industries and banks.32 
Meanwhile the new Estonian President Johannes Vares proposed that the new Estonian 
Soviet should apply for membership to the Soviet Union.33  The new Latvian and Lithuanian 
parliaments ultimately undertook similar actions on 21-22 July, with formal declarations for 
admission to the Soviet Union made on 23 July 1940. The prepared text from the Estonian 
Parliament read: 
To request that the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. receive the Estonian Soviet 
Socialist Republic as a union republic into membership with the U.S.S.R. on the same 
basis with the U.S.S.R. as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the White Russian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, and other union republic. Long live Soviet Estonia. Long 
live the U.S.SR.”34 
 
Simultaneously, Päts and Ulmanis submitted their coerced resignations and were deported to 
the Soviet Union’s interior.35  
 As American policymakers had linked the Baltic issue with the broader European 
problem of military occupations, the news that the Soviet Union sought outright annexation 
fundamentally changed how the United States had to react to these developments. The United 
States was not in a position to offer any concrete assistance to change the geopolitical 
situation in the Baltic States, but neither were the Americans in a position to allow Soviet 
territorial aggrandizement to proceed without any renunciation – particularly as the 
legitimacy of American Baltic policy was intrinsically linked to the legitimacy of the larger 
American European policy. As a result, Roosevelt, his under-Secretary of State Sumner E. 
Welles, and Henderson reinstated the Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition and applied it to 
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the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.36  On 23 July 1940, Welles, serving 
as Acting Secretary of State, issued a press release stating  “The people of the United States 
are opposed to predatory activities no matter whether they are carried on by the use of force 
or by the threat of force.  They are likewise opposed to any form of intervention on the part 
of one state, however, powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other sovereign state, 
however weak.”37  Simply, the United States refused to recognize the territorial and political 
changes made in the Baltic States.38 
 The non-recognition policy did not prevent the Estonian Chamber of Deputies from 
convening on 24 August 1940 to consider a new constitution and to establish the future form 
of government for the Estonian SSR.39 The policy also did not prevent the nationalization of 
private property, banks, large industries, and the educational system. It did not even prevent 
the eventual liquidation of American diplomatic missions in the Baltic States.40  Nevertheless, 
the non-recognition policy was immediately consequential, and in a profound way. 
  For the United States, the non-recognition policy had potentially far-reaching 
consequences for the duration of World War II. Before the German invasion of the Soviet 
Union in 1941, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement formally created an alliance between 
Germany and the Soviet Union. It is through this prism of an alliance between two aggressor 
states that the United States viewed the European situation in 1940. A major component of 
                                                            
36 The situation that most closely resembled the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States was the Japanese 
expansionist policy toward China in the late 1920 and early 1930s. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson declared 
in 1932 that the United States Government would not recognize any territorial or administrative changes the 
Japanese might impose upon China. 
37 Press Release Issued by the Department of State on 23 July 1940 “Statement by the Acting Secretary of State” 
FRUS 1940 I, 401. 
38 For a detailed study on the origin of the Non-Recognition Policy see Jonathan H. L’Hommedieu, “Roosevelt 
and the Dictators” in The Baltic Question During the Cold War eds. John Hiden, Vahur Made, and David J. 
Smith. 38-41. 
39 See Raun, 149. 
40 The Kremlin mandated that all foreign diplomatic missions in Kaunas, Riga, and Tallinn by 25 August 1940. 
On 13 August, Welles instructed the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to request that the Embassy in Riga function 
until 1 October 1940 – until all American interests in the region were liquidated. In addition, there was 
consideration taken by senior American officials of terminating several Soviet consulates in the United States 
based on the premise of reciprocity. Ultimately a compromise was reached where the American diplomats were 




EO 8389, EO 8484, and the Baltic non-recognition policy were to deny Germany or the 
Soviet Union from assets held in the United States. The idea of former Estonian, Latvian, or 
Lithuanian flagged merchant ships in American ports being turned over to the Soviet Union 
was indeed a matter of national security interests.41  In addition, despite the minimal role that 
the Baltic question had in forging a wartime alliance between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, Roosevelt collected an additional East European question that would have to 
be mitigated – both domestically and internationally – at the conclusion of the war. 
 For the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, the non-recognition policy allowed their 
diplomatic missions to continue to function in exile throughout World War II in any country 
that stood with the Americans.42 The continued existence of the diplomatic missions allowed 
for a sense of legal continuity to exist during the uncertain wartime years and gave a sliver of 
confidence to the former political elite that should the World War I experience repeat itself, 
with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania emerging as independent countries again, that the wealth 
that they had acquired abroad would be preserved. 
 
World War II and Its Impact on Non-Recognition 
 Tony Judt has described World War II as primarily a civilian experience, as formal 
military combat was limited to the beginning of the war and the end. Indeed, it was a “war of 
occupation, of repression, of exploitation, and extermination.”43 Judt continued that for some 
countries the occupation lasted for most of the war.44 For Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 
however, it transcended the war. Due to the strategic importance of the Baltic Sea and the 
territory along the Baltic littoral, there were significant military campaigns throughout the 
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Baltic region, but the over-arching theme of the war for the Estonians, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians was occupation. From July 1940 through July 1941, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania had become constituent republics in the Soviet Union, and during this period of 
occupation experienced the slow Sovietization of its political, economic, educational, and 
civil societies.  
 By July 1941, however, the war forced the Red Army to evacuate the Baltic republics, 
opening the way for the arrival of the German Wehrmacht. Despite initial hopes by local 
populations that the Germans were liberating the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians from 
the Soviet Union, it became clear that Nazi Germany was also aiming for the complete 
annexation of the east Baltic coast to the greater German Reich.45 Long-term German policy 
was to expel two-thirds of the population and to forcibly settle ethnic Germans into the region. 
The first priority, however, was to win the war.46 As a result, the German occupation focused 
on supplying human and material resources for the Axis war effort. Feeding on the local anti-
Communist sentiment, yet never promising autonomy or independence, Estonians, Latvians, 
and Lithuanians had experience to the exploitation of both resources and humans. The Reich 
viewed the Baltic lands as a resource for agricultural goods and traditional industrial 
production. Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were subjected to forced labor and forced 
conscription into the German Army – another experience that would have long-lasting 
implications. Finally, the German occupation brought with it the Holocaust – decimating the 
large historical Jewish community in Lithuania and Latvia, and ruling Estonia the first 
country to be declared as free from Jews.47  
 The German occupation proved to be temporary, and German plans for forced 
migration were supplanted by yet another Soviet occupation beginning on 20 January 1944 as 
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the Red Army reentered Narva.48 The Red Army’s return marked the continuation of another 
feature of World War II for the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians – the experience of 
deportations and displacement. Although the Baltic States were annexed into the Soviet 
Union after the great Soviet purges, plans for mass deportations had been planned for the 
Baltic republics. The first Soviet mass deportation in the Baltic republics took place on the 
evenings of 13-14 June 1941.49 Although specific numbers are difficult to calculate, 
numerous studies quote that 15,081 Latvians, 10,205 Estonians, and 34,260 Lithuanians were 
forced into boxcars and sent to the interior of the Soviet Union. 
 Displacement and deportation only intensified once the Red Army crossed the Narva 
River in 1944. Unlike the calm and systematic annexation process that took place in 1940, the 
return of the Soviets was marked by chaos. On several occasions, the reoccupation was met 
with strong German resistance in an attempt to stabilize the eastern Front, but retreating 
German soldiers and Baltic citizens fleeing west with the Germans marked the scene. Unlike 
in 1940, the Baltic experience under Soviet occupation from 1940-1941 was a precedent for 
those who might face recrimination or future deportation by the Soviet Union. From 1942-
1945, roughly 60,000 Estonians, 100,000 Latvians, and 50,000 Lithuanians fled westwards 
and became one chapter in the very complicated story of displaced individuals in postwar 
Europe.50  
 Despite the series of minor demarches that occurred between the United States and 
the Soviet Union during 1940 over the legality of the American and Soviet positions on the 
status of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, in a broad sense, the Baltic question did not hamper 
the wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The wartime status of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should be clearly seen with the context of the East European 
question as a whole. John Gaddis has argued that officials in Washington knew exactly what 
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they wanted in East Europe: maximum self-determination for the peoples in the region, while 
not undermining the wartime alliance.51 The problem was that the two goals proved to be 
incompatible given that one of the wartime aims of the Soviet Union was to secure territorial 
gains in East Europe. America’s wartime leaders were placed in the precarious situation of 
trying to win the war and balance the domestic opposition to allowing Stalin to become 
dictator over large portions of Europe. Like the rest of the region, Roosevelt hoped to deal 
with the territorial situation at the conclusion of the war. Nevertheless, discussions over 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania at the wartime conferences shed light on how Roosevelt felt 
about the status of East Europe. 
 By 1943, the military situation on the ground made it impossible for the United States 
or Great Britain to consider fighting for outright territorial independence for East Europeans 
that were in the path of an expanded Soviet hegemonic presence in the region. As a result, 
American diplomatic efforts concerning the region were greatly limited. Partly out of 
principle and partly out of domestic politics, Roosevelt attempted to thread the needle on the 
Baltic question with Stalin. This is most evident at the Teheran Conference where the status 
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were briefly discussed between the two heads of state. On 1 
December 1943, Roosevelt gave his tacit acceptance of a Soviet sphere of influence over the 
Baltic States. He made it clear that the United States had no intention of going to war to 
prevent the Russians from reoccupying the country. Roosevelt, however, insisted, “the big 
issue in the United States, would be the question of referendum and the right of self-
determination.”52 
 Later on in the exchange, Roosevelt stated that the Baltic States would, in any future 
plebiscite, cheerfully ratify their incorporation into the Soviet Union as they had been 
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formerly been part of the Russian Empire.53  It is impossible to know whether or not 
Roosevelt truly believed that Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians would vote to ratify their 
incorporation into the Soviet Union or if it was mere politicking with Stalin. What is clear is 
that the major issue that surrounded the status of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was not 
spheres of influence or Baltic independence, but the means by which the Soviet Union 
exerted its will upon the Baltic States without a legitimate referendum. What is also clear, as 
Gaddis has argued is that Roosevelt admitted that the United States was not going to oppose 
territorial changes in East Europe and that Stalin left Teheran with the impression that 
Roosevelt’s main concern was putting Russia’s foreign policy in a more positive light before 
the American people.54 
 The principle of self-determination played an important role in two aspects of 
American domestic policy during the war. First, important members of the United States 
Senate explicitly linked American membership in a new international organization in the 
postwar period to the peace settlement reflecting the principles of the Atlantic Charter.55 
Second, conflicts between the attitudes of policymakers and American electoral politics 
proved to be problematic for the administration 
 The long-standing tension between American foreign policy makers and American 
ethnic groups continued through World War II. Although Polish-Americans, represented 
through the Polish American Congress were the most vocal and the group that the State 
Department was most concerned with, the Lithuanian-American communities, and smaller 
Estonian and Latvian communities in the United States were equally disenfranchised by the 
ambivalent attitude that Roosevelt and the Democratic establishment had taken towards the 
foreseeable political problems in Eastern Europe. The potential for deeper disillusionment 
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within Eastern European ethnic groups was used during the 1944 Presidential campaign as a 
wedge issue. Senator Arthur Vandenberg quickly realized this dynamic and proposed to 
candidate Thomas E. Dewey the inclusion of a plank in the foreign policy platform affirming 
that: “because this is the point at which the Roosevelt administration is deserting the hopes 
and prayers of all American nationals from Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, 
etc.”56  Although Dewey failed explicitly to play the Poland card during the election, it 
caused enough concern to Roosevelt that the issue had to be neutralized.  
 From 4-11 February 1945, Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill met in Yalta on the Black 
Sea. Despite the Cold War critique of the conference that was similar to the reaction against 
the Munich Accords, the agreements made at Yalta represented the realities of wartime 
Europe in 1945. Great Britain sought to protect its imperial holdings; the United States 
sought post-war cooperation through the establishment of the United Nations; and the Soviet 
Union sought reparations and further acceptance of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe.57 
Much of the concern about a postwar international organization rested on the shoulders of 
public opinion in the United States. As such, the issue of East Europe in general and Poland 
specifically, played a major role in allowing all parties at Yalta to “save face” politically. 
Despite the fact that the United States and Great Britain continued to recognize the Polish 
Exile Government in London, the Soviet Union refused to accept any agreement that did not 
involve the Communist government based in Poland. The American-led compromise allowed 
the Lublin Government to serve as the basis of the future Poland under the precondition that 
elections take place in the near future.58 
 The Yalta Agreements over Poland and the subsequent “Declaration on Liberated 
Europe” – that was agreed to at Yalta allowed Roosevelt to go back to Washington and state 
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that despite reaffirming his earlier acceptance of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe at 
Teheran in 1943, he had persuaded Stalin to agree to hold elections in Eastern Europe.59  For 
the time being, the administration had made the situation in Eastern Europe palatable to a 
majority of the American polity, and more importantly, to the United States Senate. Before 
Congress on 1 March 1945, Roosevelt argued “the Declaration of Liberated Europe had 
halted a trend toward the development of spheres of influence which, if allowed to go 
unchecked… might have had tragic results.60 
 Roosevelt’s death on 12 April 1945 may have secured passage of the United Nations 
Treaty but the deteriorating situation in Eastern Europe, coupled with President Harry S. 
Truman’s reliance on the State Department on matters concerning the Soviet Union, created a 
situation where the failures of Roosevelt in East Europe became a crucial component in the 
origin of cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union and a moment where the 
Baltic question remained quite alive. After a delay, similar symbolic one party and one 
candidate elections that had occurred in Poland, Romania, and Hungary in 1945 took place in 
the Baltic Republics from 1946-1948, with upper-90 percentiles voting “yes” for the 
Kremlin-backed candidates.61 The perception among American policymakers was that the 
Baltic republics had yet to voice their opinion about the future of their nations so the non-
recognition policy continued. 
 The failure of the Yalta Agreements to produce any meaningful and legitimate 
reflections of self-determination in Eastern Europe ultimately meant for senior officials in the 
State Department that the illegality of the Soviet presence in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
had still not fundamentally been mitigated in 1945. Paul Goble has argued, “… the USA 
never assumed that the non-recognition policy was something eternal. At the outset, 
Washington took the position it did on the basis of the clear argument that the people of 
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Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had not had the opportunity to freely express their views about 
occupation.”62 Had the Soviet Union held referendums in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that 
were perceived by American officials as legitimate, the principle that served as the 
underpinnings of the doctrine would have been undermined. Since the situation that brought 
about the non-recognition policy had not fundamentally been altered, even through warfare, 
maintaining non-recognition became a useful moral and political tool. 
 The new realities of the Cold War offered a new incentive for the United States to 
continue the policy of non-recognition. This new American rationale offered new legitimacy 
to the Baltic diplomats. In reality, they served as the legitimate protectors of Baltic state 
assets during World War II. In the immediate postwar years, they viewed themselves as not 
only the legitimate individuals responsible for the memory of the interwar republics, but as 
the main mechanism for continuity between the interwar republics and some future 
independent state. 
 
Displaced Persons  
 Although Antonas Smetona might have been one of the first prominent Lithuanian to 
flee the east Baltic region due to the threat of the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, population displacement became a central feature of the Baltic experience during 
World War II. Over the course of World War II, thousands of Estonians, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians made the conscious decision to leave their homeland rather than await an 
uncertain future in the Baltic republics. While nearly 45,000 Balts succeeded in making it 
across the Baltic Sea hoping to be granted refuge in Sweden in Denmark, the majority of 
Balts ultimately made their way to occupied Germany by the end of the war. A small number 
of Balts moved to Germany in 1941 and constituted a group of individuals who feared Soviet 
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deportation to Siberia after the first round of deportations had been carried out. Throughout 
the German occupation, thousands of Balts were forcibly moved to Greater Germany for use 
as slave labor.63  
 The largest number of Balts fled when the Red Army began its offensive against the 
Baltic region in January 1944.  Hundreds of thousands of Estonians, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians were well aware of what the political situation would be with the return of the 
Soviets and made the decision to confront an uncertain future as a refugee rather than the 
future that most likely awaited those that stayed in the Baltic republics. The flight west, 
whether on board a German naval vessel in the Baltic Sea or over land, was inherently 
dangerous. Although the individuals who personally experienced life as a postwar refugee 
have often been hesitant to document their experience, historians do have access to memoirs 
and personal accounts of the exodus. 
 Harry G. Kapeikis, an American Latvian recounts his family’s flight from Riga to the 
West in October 1944 via a German naval vessel in his 2007 memoir. Kapeikis writes: 
 We fled from Riga by truck to a water-driven flour mill in the country, and from there 
 to Liepaja. we crossed the Baltic Sea on October 14, 1944, on a German battle ship, 
 arriving in Germany the following day. The crossing was an adventure for me and a 
 scare for my mom. Our ship, one of five destroyers, was attacked by British Spitfires 
 and a Lancaster dropped bombs that fell close to the ship on both sides. My mom 
 screamed, and frankly, I, too, was scared. It was good to be on a solid shore, again. If 
 I was to die, I preferred the land over the sea.64 
 
For those that did not have access to a German naval ship or some other vessel, entire 
families traveled over land for over eight months eventually arriving in central Europe. In 
1995, George Berzins, Latvian Service Desk Chief of the Voice of America recounted his 
experience leaving Latvia as a child to his colleague, Alan Heil: 
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 Throughout their eight month flight to freedom, George and his one year old brother 
 Gunars, were sitting atop a farm cart full of household possessions. His father pulled 
 that green cart across Central Europe as his mother Austra pushed it… It was winter 
 most of the time. His father had to hide during the day for fear of being drafted into 
 the German Army and sent to the Russian front. At one point, he even buried himself 
 in a snowbank to escape detection. The Front, it seemed, was never that far away. 
 Should the Russian forces overtake them, the Berzins parents knew that his father 
 probably would be deported to Siberia. His name had been spotted on a list of 
 prospective exiles prepared by the Soviets when they briefly occupied Latvia until 
 1941.65 
 
One thing that Baltic refugees shared regardless of how they arrived in Central Europe was 
how they were going to survive the remainder of the war on the run in a Germany that was 
under a constant military barrage from the allies. In particular, the memories of Dresden were 
etched into the memories of both Berzins and Kapeikis. The reason why Berzins shared his 
story with Heil was that American National Public Radio had been airing a documentary 
commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the firebombing in Dresden, and Berzins 
exclaimed “That’s exactly the way it was.”66 Kapeikis remembers leaving Dresden on 12 
February 1945 on a crowded train and hearing the British and American bombers flying 
overhead on 13-14 February.67 
 Perhaps the greatest fear that Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian refugees shared was 
the lack of knowledge about what would happen to them when the war ended. Would the Red 
Army occupy the whole of the European continent rendering the decision to flee merely a 
tactic to delay the inevitable? If they were captured by the French, the Americans, or the 
British, would they forcibly repatriate them to the Soviet Union? After all, Stalin was 
Roosevelt and Churchill’s main ally in the war against Germany. Would they universally be 
categorized as Nazi sympathizers since they had fled from the Soviet Union and be punished? 
 At the end of the war, the eleven to twelve million displaced individuals were 
originally supposed to be quickly repatriated to their home country, but due to the physical 
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condition that many displaced persons were in (malnourishment, various ailments, and harsh 
living conditions) the rapid repatriation of displaced persons did not occur. Displaced Persons 
(DPs) were ultimately sorted by their nationality, given medical treatment, and those that 
were able and willing to be rapidly repatriated, were. The remaining DPs were interviewed to 
ascertain where they had come from, whether or not they had collaborated with the Germans 
during the War, given identity cards, and assigned to camps, which were based on particular 
nationalities.68 
 
In 1945, the interests of Eastern European DPs and the American occupying forces 
were in virtual opposition. Wartime planners had hoped to repatriate refugees and DPs in a 
quick and orderly fashion following the war, in part to reduce the burden in resources and 
personnel that caring for DPs posed for the postwar reconstruction effort.  At the end of 1945, 
the repatriation of DPs had been seen widely as a great success of allied cooperation. Nearly 
85% of all DPs were repatriated and agreements at the February 1945 Yalta Conference set in 
place the process of repatriating over two million Soviet citizens. A significant number of 
Polish, Ukrainian, Jewish, as well as non-Jewish Baltic DPs, however, refused to return to 
their Soviet occupied homeland. This tendency was exacerbated by the American 
understanding of the Yalta Agreements. American officials provided exceptions in the 
determining of Soviet citizenship, which excluded some Poles, Estonians, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians.69 By 1946 it became evident that the continued presence of non-repatriable DPs 
in the western occupation zones would require a shift in policy. 
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  Throughout 1946 and 1947, the status of DPs who refused to repatriate steadily 
became a contentious issue between the United States and the Soviet Union and was as much 
an early Cold War issue as it was a humanitarian matter. The continued presence of hundreds 
of thousands of displaced persons clearly burdened reconstruction efforts, yet it was 
politically untenable for the United States to forcibly repatriate Eastern European DPs to 
Soviet controlled territories. As a result, the debate shifted towards resettling these DPs in 
Western Europe or elsewhere. 
 In the American occupation zone, 39,000 Latvians, 28,500 Lithuanians, and 14,000 
Estonians resided in DP camps.70  General Eisenhower held the opinion that Estonian, 
Latvian, and Estonian DPs should repatriate, and attempted to persuade them to trust the 
Russians.71 The Soviet Union and its satellite states led a swift propaganda campaign in the 
DP camps to persuade “Soviet” citizens to return to the Soviet Union, and applied pressure to 
both the Americans and the United Nations to forcibly repatriate their citizens. Nevertheless, 
Baltic DPs refused to return to their home. UNRRA conducted a repatriation poll in May 
1946 demonstrating that only 25 Latvians in the American zone agreed to return to their 
Soviet controlled nation.72 By and large, the primary reason why Baltic DPs refused to return 
was political fear. Representing the tone of Balts who were able to escape their homeland, 
Jules Feldmans, Latvian Charge d’Affaires to the United States stated in the Chicago Tribune  
in 1947: “I’d go back to Latvia immediately, and so would every other exile, if we didn’t 
know that we’d be sent straight to Russia as slave laborers.”73 
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 The refusal to repatriate coupled with the indecisiveness of the occupying powers and 
international organizations created a situation where the non-repatriable DPs resided in DP 
camps much longer than UNRRA ever anticipated in 1945. The most important feature of 
Baltic DP life in the late 1940s was the self-perception of being exiled and the related 
activities of establishing cultural and political institutions that offered a semblance of 
continuity to life in the pre-1940 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Anniversaries, however, 
were the easiest commemorations possible, and proved to be very important. On the 
anniversaries of the declarations of independence of each nation, national councils passed 
resolutions to commemorate the date. One such resolution was passed on 26 February 1949 at 
the Fellbach camp commemorating Estonian independence, declaring that it was their “sacred 
duty to protest against the inhuman savagery of the bloody Soviet regime in the occupied 
Baltic States.”74  
 On the political side, national councils were created that were composed of 1/3 
representatives of the parties from the interwar parliaments; 1/3 composed of delegates of 
various social organizations, and 1/3 from the national central councils that were chosen 
directly by the refugees. The national central committees were based on the principles of 
democratic representation and free elections. Some of their responsibilities included cutting 
firewood, working in carpentry, providing basic services such as shoe and clothing repair, 
and participating in civic groups such as the police and fire-fighting. The creation of the 
Estonian National Assembly Centre (ENAC) was yet another means of maintaining cohesion 
of the group. Created on 15 October 1945 of various groups of Estonian DPs, the aim of the 
organization was to “organize a self-administration which, based on democratic principles 
and directed by the usage of traditions and principles of the Estonian period of 
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independence.”75 More specifically it was charged with the tasks of making education 
available in their mother-tongue, advance national culture in all possible fields and activities, 
and keep Estonians as a singular community and preserve the feeling of intimate union 
among Estonians. 
 One priority of the independent interwar republics was to move towards promoting 
education. In basic literacy, Estonia had made gradual improvements throughout the 1920s 
and 1930s. In 1922, 89.1% of Estonians were able to read and write. By 1934, 94% of the 
nation’s population could read and write.76 When Estonia’s main university, Tartu University, 
was reorganized as a new Estonian institution in 1919, the student enrollment was held at 374. 
Although the student population increased rapidly to 4200 by 1926, by 1939 the student body 
stabilized to be consistent at 3,000.77 The Soviet annexation naturally had a cumulatively 
negative effect on the agenda of the Baltic intelligentsia, academics, and the university’s 
ability to function. The widespread displacement during the war resulted in high-levels of 
academics residing in DP camps. 
 In October 1945 near Hamburg, a group of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian 
professors held a meeting to assess the situation of higher education of Baltic DPs. With 
consent of the military government in December 1945, a Baltic University, officially known 
as the Pinneberg Study Centre was created.78 Despite little resources and no remuneration for 
the staff, the first courses were held in March 1946. Over the next several years, the teaching 
staff reached 200 members, with an average of 700-1300 students enrolled.79 Further 
expansion of the program was limited only due to the lack of accommodations at the 
Pinneberg DP camp. The traditional structure of Baltic universities was replicated at the 
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Baltic University. Eight faculties comprising of seventeen departments were organized, with 
disciplines ranging from philosophy to medicine. 
 Despite holding nearly 30,000 lectures from 1945-1948, the university lacked 
accreditation from Germany and lacked the ability to confer degrees. As a result, students 
were merely issued certificates that were generally accepted by fully accredited universities 
in Germany. The Baltic University at Pinneberg represented a high point of cooperation 
among the Baltic DPs that should be viewed as representative of prior moments of intra-
Baltic cooperation and a model for cooperative efforts over the following decades. The 
experience of the Soviet occupation and subsequent flight served as a uniting element among 
the three nationalities. This, however, never replaced the strong national ties that each group 
had. The individual nationalities were well represented at the university through their 
languages, cultures, and academic traditions. 
 The success and diversity of the university created a situation where discussions 
began as to whether the university should be moved if the DPs were to be moved from the 
camps. One early committee in the United States took up this cause. Started by David Martin 
of New York, who was the Secretary of the American Refugee Defense Committee, the 
“American Committee for the Baltic University in Exile” sought to assist in the transfer of 
the university to the United States. Martin’s committee was joined by an appeal from fifty 
university presidents, headed by Christian Gauss of Princeton and Rev. Robert I. Gannon of 
Fordham. In correspondences between the Baltic University and members of the Committee 
it became clear that the idea that the continuity of the Baltic University would play a crucial 
role in the development of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian nations in exile. In a press 
release, Gauss stated: 
It would be a terrible tragedy if this unique institution were to go of existence… It is 
imperative that the cultures of the Baltic peoples, which are today being destroyed by 
a genocidal foreign regime, should be kept alive, and that there should be at least a 
 
 59 
small body of Baltic intellectuals prepared and able to assist in their countries’ 
recovery when they regain their independence.80 
 
Although the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian DPs were modestly successful in establishing 
a set of institutions that mimicked a sense of normality in everyday life, like the future of the 
Baltic University at Pinneberg, the DP camps from their very beginning, were ephemeral. By 
the late 1940s, a question of “what now?” had to be asked by the DPs and the occupation 
governments. 
 Through actions and words, the non-repatriable Baltic DPs made it clear that they 
would not voluntarily return to their homelands and the implication of the non-recognition 
policy made it clear that neither the Americans nor the British were going to forcibly 
repatriate the Baltic DPs. Balts, however, could not just stay in camps in occupied Germany 
and Austria. Resettlement, however, became a function of both domestic politics for the 
occupying authorities and of the changing international situation. Baltic DPs, particularly 
Latvians, were faced with the accusations of collaboration with the Nazis. During the German 
occupation, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians indeed did collaborate with the Germans 
(partly due to fighting the Soviets, rarely due to pure ideology). The problem, however, for 
the American and British authorities was determining which Baltic nationals volunteered to 
collaborate with the Germans and those who were forcibly conscripted into the Wehrmacht. 
When Eisenhower attempted to persuade Baltic DPs to return home in 1945, he remarked: “I 
do not think that Canada wants immigrants who collaborated with the Germans or who 
believed Goebbels’s lies about our Allies or were too unpatriotic to rebuild their own country. 
I do not think that South America wants such people. I am sure that the United States does 
not.”81 
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 The end of World War II might have created a tenuous peace on the European 
continent through the total defeat of Nazi Germany, but it did not bring about a satisfactory 
settlement for the parties that were interested in the political, economic, and social 
developments in Eastern Europe. The Baltic refugees who were residing in UNRRA 
administered DP Camps still faced an uncertain future since they had refused to be 
repatriated to the Soviet Union. American diplomacy had not been able to create the political 
climate in Eastern Europe that was required for the Baltic republics to truly demonstrate 
whether their populations sought a future as part of the Soviet Union or not. As a result, the 
Baltic refugees began to perceive themselves as political exiles and the American policy of 
non-recognition towards the Soviet annexation of the Baltic republics continued. 
 Throughout the years that Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians spent in the DP camps, 
they had carried many of the political and cultural practices that were important in the 
interwar republics with them. Political organizations were created around preexisting political 
parties. Academic traditions reasserted themselves through institutions such as the Baltic 
University at Pinneberg. Participating in choirs and other cultural activities provided a sense 
of community for the Balts as they waited what their future would hold. Equally important 
though were the new political traditions that were born in the DP camps. The anniversaries of 
declarations of independence remained important, but new commemorations, such as those 
surrounding the 1940 annexation of their homelands and the 1941 mass deportations were 
more important in establishing certain political traditions that were unique to the Baltic exile 
community that developed in the first few years after leaving their homelands. Political and 
cultural continuity to the interwar republics became a central goal of the DPs, but at the same 
time, something new had been created. 
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 By the late 1940s, the United States continued to recognize the exiled Baltic 
diplomats who were residing in Washington D.C. and New York City. The conflicts between 
the United States and the Soviet Union that took place during this period of time were as 
much a battle for maintaining international credibility and winning hearts and minds as they 
were about the discrete topic of the conflict. As a result, it was inconceivable that the United 
States would decide to abandon its policy of non-recognition or allow Baltic DPs to be 
repatriated to the Soviet Union. 
 The experience of the Baltic exiles from 1945 until 1948 and the experience of 
American policymakers during the same period of time resulted in the convergence of 
interests in the two parties. The non-recognition policy was useful to both Baltic exiles and 
American policymakers, not only on the symbolic level, but also on the practical level. 
Further, a shared vision would emerge that a determined effort should take place to try to 
reduce the influence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe as well as a shared rejection that 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were truly constituent republics of the Soviet Union. The 
following chapter analyzes the main features of American policy towards the Baltic republics 





AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II & 
CONTINUATION OF BALTIC POLICY 
 
  
 The traditional power relations that had dominated Europe in the first half of the 
twentieth century were shattered as a result of World War II. Despite its role as a victor, the 
United Kingdom had entered a state of decline since it took the totality of the British state 
and its resources to win the war. The United Kingdom’s customary guardian of continental 
affairs, France, ceased to play the role of a continental power. Germany was under military 
occupation. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged from the European conflict as 
the two most powerful states in the international system. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, 
the United States suffered no material damage and possessed nearly fifty percent of the 
world’s productive capacity.1 
 Despite the “preponderant power” that the United States had accumulated by 1945, 
American demobilization in Europe, coupled with the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to 
participate in postwar organizations designed during the war, resulted in senior American 
policymakers taking a pessimistic view of American power and future relations with the 
Soviet Union. By 1948, the U.S. Army had reduced its presence in Europe to a mere ten 
divisions and the American nuclear arsenal had yet to reach sufficient quantities to defeat the 
Soviet Union.2 Indeed, analysts did not question the Soviet ability to overrun Western Europe 
and the Middle East, but the ability of the United States to rapidly mobilize compared to the 
Soviet Union was seen to be an adequate deterrent. Meanwhile, American officials hoped to 
create a postwar order that was absent of political blocs with convertible currencies, and free 
trade, as envisioned at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference. The 31 December 1945 rejection 
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of the Bretton Woods system by the Soviet Union reinforced the growing feeling that the 
Kremlin was unwilling to cooperate in such a postwar order.3 
 From 1945-1948, the administration of Harry S. Truman shifted from a policy of 
maintaining World War II’s grand alliance and incorporating the Soviet Union into a postwar 
order to engaging the Soviet Union in a cold war and attempting to contain Soviet influence.4 
The most important aspect of American policy towards Europe during this period of time was 
shoring up American points of strength in Western Europe. Truman’s speech before Congress 
on 12 March 1947 provided military and financial support to combat the influence of 
communism in Turkey and Greece.5 Secretary of State George Marshall’s speech at Harvard 
on 5 June 1947 laid the groundwork for the European Recovery Program, which proved to be 
instrumental rebuild Europe – materially, politically, and psychologically.6 Finally, the CIA 
successfully undermined a possible communist coup in Italy during the 18 April 1948 
elections.7 
 American successes in obtaining some sort of diplomatic advantage in Eastern Europe, 
however, were far fewer. Although there was initial interest by Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania to participate in the Marshall Plan, the Kremlin’s political 
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pressure ultimately vetoed any such participation.8 At the same time, the February 1948 
Czechoslovakian Coup demonstrated inherent American limitations to influence political 
events in Central and Eastern Europe. Throughout the entire postwar period, the Soviet 
Union’s desire for security through establishing a geopolitical stranglehold in Eastern Europe 
proved to be a source of immense conflict with the American desire to create a postwar world 
free of zones of influence and maintain its rhetoric about the advancement of democracy and 
free trade. 
 The status of the Baltic States was just one of many issues that defined American-
Soviet relations over Eastern Europe after World War II. While preparing for the Paris Peace 
Conference, Llewellyn Thompson discovered that the Soviet delegation planned on including 
the three foreign ministers of the Baltic republics, indicating that the question of recognition 
of the three countries into the Soviet Union may be raised at the conference.9 Thompson 
conceded: 
It appears that we must sooner or later recognize de jure this development which has 
long since been accomplished de facto. In view of the categoric [sic] and 
uncompromising statement made by the Secretary of State at the time the Baltic States 
were absorbed, it would be easier for us to go along with the states represented at a 
large international conference in recognizing this development than to do so by 
independent action on our part.10 
 
Thompson, as well as John Hickerson and Dean Acheson thought that it would be logical and 
advantageous for the United States to settle the whole question in connection with concluding 
a peace treaty with Germany.11 The inability of deputies to reach an agreement with regard to 
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the publication of the texts of the draft treaties resulted in a situation where the Baltic 
question had yet to be answered and would be incorporated into broader American policy 
towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during the early years of the Cold War. 
 This chapter will examine the three main overarching American policy initiatives 
towards the Baltic republics during the first decade of the Cold War. First, the debate about 
continuing the non-recognition policy towards the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, where the United States continued relations with the existing Baltic diplomats 
residing in the United States. Little attention has been given to the very discrete policy 
discussions that took place on how the diplomats would continue their work while in exile 
and how the United States would or would not materially assist them. Second, the 
immigration debate, where tens of thousands of Baltic displaced persons refused to repatriate 
to the Soviet Union. An important feature of American policy towards the Baltic republics 
was the use of refugees. Whether or not the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian DPs would be 
allowed to immigrate to the United States had necessary implications for American policy. 
Finally, the establishment of a State-Private network with Baltic exiles through the National 
Committee for a Free Europe, which constituted the bulk of unofficial American policy 
towards the region, will be analyzed. 
 This chapter will also examine the role that the rhetoric of liberation had on the way 
that the most important actor sin policy towards the Baltic republics – the Estonian, Latvian, 
and Lithuanian exiles perceived American policy towards their homelands. I will argue that 
during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations there as an inherent asymmetry between 
the rhetoric behind calling for the liberation of the Soviet bloc and the confidence that exiles 
had in American willingness to follow through behind such claims. From the very beginning 
of serious discussions between Baltic exiles and American policymakers, the exiles were 
more than willing to be participants in American sponsored activities. The increased rhetoric 
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of liberation with Eisenhower’s election in 1952, I will demonstrate, also raised the bar of 
exile expectations of the United States, which ultimately complicated exile relations. 
 First, however, it is important to understand the basic foreign policy tenents that the 
United States laid out from 1947-1950 in how it would deal with the Soviet Union and its 
allies in Central and Eastern Europe. It is also important to understand the complicated 
public-private network that was developed in order to provide a sufficient level of plausible 
deniability for official American policymakers. Finally, the prominence of Eastern European 
exiles as a key issue for the success of the policy will be addressed. 
  
Tenents of American Policy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
 The containment of the Soviet Union, as described by George F. Kennan through the 
“Long Telegram” in 1946 and his 1947 article in Foreign Affairs, has traditionally been seen 
as the primary policy put in place by the United States to deal with the Soviet threat 
throughout the Cold War. Recent scholarship, however, has argued that containment was 
merely the first step in a “determined effort to destroy Soviet power.” Under the auspices of 
the containment doctrine, the United States pursued an aggressive policy to undermine Soviet 
power in Eastern Europe by “measures short of war.” American policymakers thought that 
through engaging in psychological (or political) warfare, the Kremlin could be compelled to 
alter its behavior in the international system or hasten the collapse of the Soviet system.12 In a 
nuclear age, both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations assumed that the deployment 
of psychological warfare could meet American objectives vis-à-vis the Soviet Union without 
having to rely on the armed forces. 
 The CIA’s success in leading covert operations against Italian communists in 1948 
encouraged Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff at the State Department to begin studying 
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whether or not the United States should inaugurate “organized political warfare” against the 
Soviet Union. During May and June 1948, the State Department, National Security Council 
(NSC), along with the Joints Chief of Staff (JCS) mulled over various drafts of policy papers 
on the establishment of a directorate that would oversee and execute covert operations. The 
major point of contention among the various bureaucracies was who would control such a 
body.13 Ultimately President Truman approved NSC 10/2 on 18 June 1948 and the 
establishment of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) would be the home for American 
psychological warfare and covert actions for the remainder of his presidency.14 
 While NSC 10/2 created the new administrative body that would oversee American 
covert operations going forward, perhaps the most significant component of the document 
was the stipulation that operations must be designed to be “deniable” or “planned and 
executed so that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to authorized 
persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any 
responsibility.”15 The important implications of “plausible deniability” (as it has become 
known today) are twofold. Concerning operational effectiveness, attempts to insulate 
presidential administrations ultimately undermined the chances that a particular policy 
initiative would succeed. On the organizational front, it is out of this doctrine that the public-
private network of institutions was established – the most famous being Radio Free Europe 
and Radio Liberty. 
 Throughout 1948, the Policy Planning Staff and NSC were engaged in a debate over 
what the Soviet Union’s international motivations were and how best to formulate American 
policy towards the Soviet Union. NSC 7, released on 30 March 1948, argued that Soviet 
power was growing so rapidly that it would surpass American power eventually and that 
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there were very few Soviet vulnerabilities that the United States could exploit.16 Although 
NSC 7 was canceled due to significant protestation in many circles over its hyperbolic nature, 
the document was significant since it shifted the policy debate from how to implement some 
of the most defensive aspects of containing the Soviet Union to a more offensive policy 
against Soviet expansionism.17 
 This debate shift allowed Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff to take the lead in 
formulating what, precisely, would be the strategic and tactical elements of policy to combat 
the Soviet Union. A historiographical consensus has been reached concerning the extent to 
which senior American officials believed in the likelihood of a Soviet attack against the 
United States or its interests. Kennan’s confidence in American military superiority 
convinced him that the Soviets would not deliberately start a global war, but that the Soviet 
Union would utilize its psychological warfare capabilities to undermine American interests in 
peripheral regions.18 It is through this understanding of the Soviet threat as something that 
was primarily rooted in a propagandistic and morale threat, that Kennan began working on 
the document that would define American policy towards the Soviet Union for the duration 
of the Cold War. 
 On 20 August 1948, Kennan submitted to the NSC the Policy Planning Staff paper on 
“U.S. objectives towards Russia.” The paper expressed two guidelines for the United States 
to manage the relationship with the Soviet Union. The United States should try to: 
1. Reduce the power and influence of Moscow to limit where they will no longer 
constitute a threat to the peace and stability of the world family of nations. 
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2. Bring about a basic change in the theory and practice of international relations 
observed by the government in power in Russia.19 
 
To achieve these objectives, American policymakers were to seek four main goals. First, the 
United States had to eliminate communist domination in the satellite area. Second, the United 
States had to foster nationalist sentiments in certain groups within the Soviet Union. Third, 
the United States had to attack Soviet credibility wherever possible. Fourth, the United States 
would have to compel the Soviet government to recognize the undesirability of its current 
policies in the international system.20 
“US Objectives Towards Russia” became known as NSC 20/1 within the NSC and 
received a considerable amount of criticism from key members of the NSC, most notably, 
Hickerson and Sam Reber of the Office of European Affairs, through being skeptical of the 
premise that would it be possible for a real change in Soviet behavior if there was not a 
change of regime in the Kremlin?21 Despite the skepticism, the NSC created several revised 
drafts, ultimately approving NSC 20/4 on 23 November 1948 and signed by Truman the 
following day. According to historian Gregory Mitrovich, “NSC 20/4 was in fact the 
definitive statement of U.S. objectives in the cold war and the document to which all 
subsequent Truman administration studies would refer for guidance.”22 
 Going forward, the United States would work towards the independence of Eastern 
Europe; the awakening of nationalist sentiments in the Soviet Union, rhetorically argue 
against the Soviet Union in international forums, while creating moments where the Soviet 
Union would be compelled to reassess its policies. Policymakers would deploy traditional 
diplomatic tools, economic tools, and covert actions to facilitate such desirable outcomes. 
While the most famous assertive policies towards Eastern Europe during the 1940s include 
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the paramilitary interventions into Enver Hoxha’s Albania and the economic and political 
tools used to further accentuate the Tito-Stalin split, parallels exist concerning the Baltic 
States.23 
 In all three Baltic republics, locally called “Forest Brothers” led national resistance 
efforts during World War II against both the Nazi and the two periods of Soviet occupation.24 
Beginning in 1945, British intelligence began hearing of ambushes against Soviet military 
patrols and of the communist Estonian Central Committee holding emergency meetings on 
what to do about the “bandits” in the countryside. As a result, British intelligence started 
building contacts with Baltic émigrés to make contact with the Forest Brothers. In 1948 the 
CIA joined the British effort to recruit Baltic émigrés. The United States ultimately had a 
large pool of recruits, some from DP camps and some from the United States, as a result, by 
1950 the first insertions into the Baltic republics began. 
 According to John Prados, Balts working for the CIA earned $125 per week for three 
months of training, $100 per day when on an operation, and $1,000 if they succeeded in their 
mission. “Few returned to claim the bonuses.”25 Early efforts at infiltrating the Soviet Union 
consisted of parachuting émigrés into the Baltic republics and most quickly succumbed to 
Soviet security troops before making contact with the partisans. By the time that the CIA and 
SIS were operating at a reasonable capacity of dropping people behind the Iron Curtain, 
Soviet security forces had defeated the Estonian and Latvian partisans. The Lithuanian Forest 
Brothers continued to function until as late as 1960, but received minimal assistance from the 
Americans or British despite their requests for munitions. The underground movements in the 
Baltic republics were not only unsuccessful, but also resulted in nearly 75,000 civilian 
fatalities. 
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 Like the paramilitary interventions elsewhere in Eastern Europe during the late 1940s, 
the paramilitary interventions into the Baltic republics constituted a relatively small 
component of American efforts to undermine the Kremlin’s authority in the region. 
Concerning the Baltic republics, two seemingly separate, but intertwined sets of policy were 
put in place. The State-Private network of supporting Eastern European exiles was also 
applied to how the American policymakers would deal with Estonian, Latvian, and 
Lithuanian exile groups. More important, however, was the debate about continuing its non-
recognition policy towards the 1940 annexation. 
 
Continuation of the Non-Recognition Policy and Accreditation of Diplomats 
 The single most important question for the State Department concerning Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania after the inability to reach a settlement with the Soviet Union over the 
Baltic States’ status at the Paris Peace Conference, was whether or not the United States 
would continue its policy towards the 1940 annexation. Despite Soviet insistence that the 
Baltic republics were constituent republics of the USSR and vital to the territorial integrity of 
the Union, the manner in which the republics were incorporated into the Soviet Union 
continued to be a useful rhetorical tool by the Americans to describe Soviet intentions 
internationally as Cold War tensions increased. Unilateral de jure recognition of the 
annexation would constitute a blow to American prestige internationally and reinforce the 
sentiment that the United States was exclusively pursuing a defensive policy against the 
Soviet Union.  
 The non-recognition policy at its core, however, was necessarily an exclusionary policy. 
The United States had not established consular relations within the republics; forbade 
American diplomats stationed in the Soviet Union from traveling to the Baltic republics; 
refused to promote any sort of cultural exchanges with individuals from the Baltic republics; 
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and lobbied aggressively against individuals of Baltic decent from representing the Soviet 
Union in the United States. At the same time, the United States refused to recognize any exile 
government in the names of the Baltic States. There existed a contradiction between a strictly 
exclusionary policy and an overarching policy towards the Soviet Union that sought to 
frustrate Soviet actions. Kennan explicitly discussed the problem of American policy towards 
the Baltic republics in NSC 20/1 in terms of the issues of borders as well as the issue of 
revitalizing nationalism within the Soviet Union. 
 While discussing the issues of Soviet border changes since 1939, Kennan 
acknowledged that border extensions “cannot in all cases be said to have been seriously 
detrimental to international peace and stability.”26 He continued, “In other cases, notably that 
of the Baltic countries, the question is more difficult. We cannot really profess indifferences 
to the further fate of the Baltic, peoples.”27 On current American policy in 1948 he stated: 
This has been reflected in our recognition policy to date with respect to those countries. 
And we could hardly consider that international peace and stability will really have 
ceased to be threatened as long as Europe is faced with the fact that it has been possible 
for Moscow to crush these small countries which have been guilty of no real 
provocation and which have given evidence of their ability to handle their own affairs 
in a progressive manner, without detriment to the interests of their neighbors. It should 
therefore logically be considered a part of U.S. objectives to see these countries 
restored to something at least approaching a decent state of freedom and 
independence.28 
 
Kennan conceded that short of war, it would be impossible to work towards the complete 
independence of the Baltic States as it would “raise an issue directly involving the dignity 
and the vital interests of the Soviet State as such.”29 As a result, Kennan proposed that the 
United States “should encourage by every means at our disposal the development in the 
Soviet Union of institutions of federalism, which would permit a revival of the national life 
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of the Baltic peoples.”30 Answering why restricting this aim to the Baltic peoples: 
Why do we not include the other national minority groups of the Soviet Union? The 
answer s that the Baltic peoples happen to be the only peoples whose traditional 
territory and population are now entirely included in the Soviet Union and who have 
shown themselves capable of coping successfully with the responsibilities of statehood. 
Moreover, we still formally deny the legitimacy of their violent inclusion in the Soviet 
Union, and they therefore have a special status in our eyes.31 
 
In NSC 20/1, Kennan reaffirmed that the Baltic republics constituted a special case in 
American dealings with the Soviet Union and the existing non-recognition policy. 
 Upon a first reading of NSC 20/1, however, there appears to be a contradictory nature 
in the policy prescriptions that Kennan lays out for the Baltic republics. At the same time as 
endorsing the non-recognition policy, by its nature an exclusionary policy, he argues that the 
United States should implement policies that would work towards establishing a federated 
place for the Baltic republics within the Soviet Union. Like much of Kennan’s writing, 
however, few specific policy initiatives are mentioned. Perhaps the only unequivocal 
statement that Kennan makes in NSC 20/1 is that “the Baltic States should not be compelled 
to remain under any communist authority in the aftermath of another war.”32 Given that the 
United States sought to avoid a future military conflict with the Soviet Union and absent any 
clear way that the United States could demonstrably compel Stalin to change the Kremlin’s 
attitude towards the Baltic republics, the only clear path forward for American policymakers 
towards the Baltic republics was to continue the non-recognition policy. 
 As a result, the non-recognition policy became the cornerstone of American policy 
towards the Baltic republics for the duration of the Cold War. The non-recognition policy 
should also be seen as the main framework through which discrete policy initiatives towards 
the Baltic republics were interpreted. Although there existed several ways that the State 
Department expressed its continued policy of non-recognition, all policy initiatives that in 






some manner might impact on the Baltic republics were considered through the non-
recognition lens.  
 The central component of continuing the non-recognition policy was the continued 
recognition of the existing Estonian Consul General in New York City and the Latvian and 
Lithuanian legations in Washington, D.C. The diplomats accredited to the United States 
before the annexation in 1940 continued to be accredited as long as the non-recognition 
policy continued. In a way, the non-recognition policy would abstract away the territorial 
states and the relationship between any centralized governments and the larger polities that 
represented the three nations. In addition, the non-recognition policy gave policymakers more 
latitude in using official American channels to launch attacks against the Soviet Union. 
 As it became apparent that the Cold War would last an undetermined number of years 
and consume an immeasurable amount of resources, there were significant challenges to the 
viability of continuing the non-recognition policy through the accreditation of diplomats. The 
most significant challenge was balancing the necessity of maintaining the fiscal solvency of 
the diplomatic missions when there was little consular revenue flowing into the missions’ 
coffers and the necessity of having the missions appear to be independent. In addition, there 
was the question of maintaining the relevancy of the missions through a period where it was 
unknown when Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would regain their independence. 
 In 1940 an agreement between the Estonian Consul General Johannes Kaiv, Latvian 
Ambassador Alfreds Bilmanis, a Lithuanian Ambassador Povilas Žadeikis and the U.S. 
Government was reached where a limited amount of blocked assets would be released for the 
Baltic missions to continue functioning. According to this agreement, “under Section 25 (b) 
of the Federal Reserve Act, the Secretary of State each year issues appropriate certifications 
for the release of the necessary funds, the amounts in each case being determined on the basis 
of a budget submitted by the respective missions in the United States for the Department’s 
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approval.”33 Generally speaking, the release of frozen assets was strictly reserved to meet the 
minimal funding necessary to allow the diplomatic missions to continue their work. In 1945, 
however, there was one major exception to this policy. The Americans released $100,000 to 
the Latvians, and $200,000 each to the Estonians and Lithuanians to assist in relief efforts for 
Baltic DPs.34 The use of funds outside of preserving the existence of the diplomatic missions 
was generally discouraged for fear of prior decisions being used as precedent for potential 
future decisions.  
 On 27 December 1946 in a memo from the East European desk officer C. Burke 
Elbrick to John D. Hickerson, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs:  
 EE feels that there are overriding political considerations which make it undesirable 
 to defrost Baltic assets in the United States at this time… It is felt that no action in 
 connection with defrosting should be taken before a general settlement of our 
 problems in the Baltic States is undertaken. It is not expected that such a settlement 
 will be discussed before the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministers, at the 
 earliest.35 
 
From 1946-1949, the Baltic diplomatic missions in the United States continued to submit 
annual budgets to the U.S. State Department for approval and continued to receive the 
minimum amount of money to function. As Cold War continued it became apparent to both 
the State Department bureaucrats and the Baltic diplomats that this model of funding was not 
sustainable. 
 While the Baltic missions were preparing their 1950 budget proposals, the first major 
instance where their sustainability was called into question was with the acknowledgement 
that the Lithuanians held very little currency. To this point, the Lithuanian legation had been 
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able to use frozen currency to pay for its annual budget. For 1950, however, the Lithuanians 
were faced with the prospect of converting gold to currency. In a 30 December memo, 
Žadeikis outlined this problem. 
 In connection with the adoption of the budget for 1950, amounting to $124,860 for 
 the maintenance of the diplomatic and consular offices abroad, this Legation is faced 
 with the procedure of the unblocking of an appropriate sum from the gold account of 
 the Government of Lithuania held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  
 
 Since the deposit balance of $4,639.48 in the dollar account in the Federal Reserve 
 Bank of New York, designated “the Government of Lithuania Dollar Account,” is 
 insufficient to cover the budgetary expenditure for 1950, it appears that there is an 
 inevitable need to use certain amount of gold from the gold account.36 
 
Since the non-recognition policy’s viability rested on the viability of properly functioning 
Baltic diplomats, the State Department was inclined to devise a program to help delay the 
exhaustion of Baltic frozen assets. 
 In May 1949, State Department officials began taking note of the fact that the 
Lithuanian dollar amount was insufficient to meet the projected 1950 budget, based on the 
prior year’s budget. The following represents the quantitative realities of the Baltic 
delegations in 1949. Latvia, the legation with the best financial situation, had a budget of 
$73,500. In accounts, the Latvians had $4,350 million worth of US Dollars and $3,450 
million worth of gold. The Estonian budget was $57,500. In accounts, the Estonians 
possessed $999,400 in currency and $2,880 million in gold. Lithuania’s operational budget 
was $110,000. In accounts, the Lithuanians had $4,639 in US Dollars and $2,806 million in 
gold.37 
 In internal memos, State Department officials began discussing the possibility of 
holding informal meetings with the Baltic diplomats to enquire whether they would be 
                                                            
36 Žadeikis Aide Memoire on 30 December 1949, Folder “B402: Blocked Funds,” Records Relating to the Baltic 
States, 1940-1961. Box 1, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department of 
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37 State Department Memorandum for the Investment of Baltic Blocked Funds in the United States on 8 
November 1949. Folder “B402: Blocked Funds,” Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 1, RG 
59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
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willing to invest the blocked Baltic funds in the hopes of preserving the accounts’ principal.38 
Simultaneously, scenarios were planned on how the investment would take place, using 
Latvia as an example (as it was the state that was most financially solvent). According to 
their most favorable scenario, The Chargé d’affaires would file a written application with the 
Office of Alien Property under Executive Order 8389 for a license that would authorize the 
sale of Latvia’s gold, through the Federal Reserve, to the United States Treasury, and 
authorize the Federal Reserve to use Latvia’s new dollar amount to purchase American 
Savings notes.39 After that, the individual legations would be responsible for the continued 
investment of the funds. What about the “blocked” nature of these funds? This proved to be a 
major policy consideration for the Americans, and was decided on 7 June that there was “no 
intention of changing the blocked character of the assets of these foreign states and that the 
transactions we are considering contemplate, merely, the conversion of the character of the 
existing assets now held, namely blocked dollars or gold into blocked US Treasury 
Certificates.”40 
 The first meeting between State Department officials and the Baltic diplomats 
occurred on 7 June over lunch between Žadeikis and Fred K. Salter of the East European 
Desk. Little was decided at this meeting and Žadeikis stated that he would let his views be 
known at a later time.41 Although the United States was particularly interested in making sure 
that there would be sufficient money for the Baltic diplomatic missions to continue, it was 
clear that the initiative for the investment of funds had to come from the Baltic diplomats and 
not the State Department. As a result, there was obviously the possibility that the plans 
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39 Ibid. 
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Žadeikis and Selter. Folder “B402: Blocked Funds,” Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 1, 
RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
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initiated by the Baltic diplomats would not match the hypothetical plan posited by the 
Department in spring 1949. 
 On 30 December 1949, the Lithuanian legation submitted an aide memoire to the 
State Department concerning their position on the liquidating of their gold held in the United 
States.42 As opposed to the general attitude among the Americans of selling the majority of 
the gold, the Lithuanians were far more reticent in doing so. In a meeting on 3 January 1950 
between Salter and Žadeikis about the initial Lithuanian proposal, when asked about the idea 
of only selling only part of the Lithuanian gold, he stated, “he and his Lithuanian diplomatic 
colleagues felt quite definitely that only a part of the gold should be sold.”43 He continued 
that if further developments proved that the sale of more gold would result in the greatest 
possible return, that “such a development might indeed change their views, but they would be 
very reluctant to sell all of the gold.”44 
 By April 1950, concrete plans for the investment of blocked Baltic funds began to 
materialize. Jules Feldmans presented the first cogent plan on 26 April 1950 concerning 
Latvian funds. Of the $4.176 million of Latvian assets, $2 million would be invested in long-
term U.S. Treasury Bonds; $1 million invested in short-term U.S. Treasury bonds; and $1 
million in U.S. Treasury Notes. The projected annual yield was $81,300, an amount relatively 
close to meet annual budgets.45 The Lithuanians faced the issue as to whether to transfer all 
of their gold in US Treasury Notes or to keep the funds in the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
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York.46 The Estonian situation was complicated by the fact that a large amount of Estonian 
assets has been deposited in the Bank for International Settlement in Switzerland. As a result, 
there was a significantly smaller amount of funds to work with in the United States. 
 During the investment negotiations of 1949-1950, American officials were very clear 
that the initiative that the investment of funds had to come from the Baltic diplomats. Indeed, 
throughout the early years of the Cold War the funding used to maintain Baltic diplomatic 
missions was Baltic money. In affect, this added to the legitimacy of the Baltic diplomats that 
they truly offered continuity to the interwar republics. The interwar republics granted their 
appointments; the interwar republics granted their wartime extraordinary responsibilities, and 
their funding was granted from Baltic assets. 
 Although the investment and maintenance of the funds was the Baltic missions’ 
responsibility, the fact that the funds remained frozen by the American government created a 
situation where the U.S. government effectively created a veto over the actions and autonomy 
of the Baltic missions. From the American perspective, constraints were naturally built into 
the relationship of funding the diplomatic missions. During the investment debate, Voldemar 
Johnson, in a handwritten note stated: “procedure for investment should be requested from 
the Baltic governments in a voluntary program within certain limitations.”47 Such limitations 
manifested themselves in the continuation of the policy of demanding the State Department 
to approve the annual budgets. 
 The majority of the budgets created by the Baltic legations were approved by the 
State Department, the overarching concern, however, of the American bureaucrats was to 
make sure that the legations were not spending unnecessary funding. Additional funding for 
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extra secretarial staff, or the expansion of additional unofficial officials in other countries 
were often met with staunch criticism by the State Department and were ultimately not 
approved. One notable example took place with the proposed 1953 Estonian budget. The 
initial budget of $72,000 was ultimately trimmed to $68,360. In a 6 November 1952 memo 
concerning this budget, Barbour of the East European Desk stated: 
The Estonian budget, as initially informally submitted, envisaged expenditures that 
appeared unwarranted both in view of the Estonian finances and because certain of 
the increases proposed did not appear justifiable per se.48 
 
Ultimately the increases for a new automobile and salaries were cut resulting in a saving of 
$7,500.49 
 The loss of sovereignty over their own funding, however, was not strictly inimical to 
the interests of the Baltic diplomats. Interwar Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, like most 
countries, had other states and private individuals to which they were indebted. From 1940 
the Soviet Union had occasionally instigated small demarches with the Americans over 
gaining access to Baltic assets in the United States. In addition, on occasion there were Baltic 
nationals who attempted to lobby on behalf of gaining access to Baltic funds to pursue their 
own goals. Such was the case in September 1949 when two Estonians, residing in France, 
attempted to say there were official members of the Estonian government and would like to 
start an export-import firm in Paris.50 The continuation of the State Department approval 
process assured that the assets remained secure, even from branches of the American 
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government trying to recoup claims against the Baltic governments.51 It is clear that a priority 
of the United States was to sustain the Baltic diplomatic missions for as long as possible. 
 While the fiscal solvency issue was resolved for the time being, two long-term trends 
threatened the diplomatic missions’ relevancy. Providing consular service to Baltic refugees 
was one of the most important tasks that the diplomats provided. Although by 1952, 34,800 
Latvians, 22,771 Lithuanians, and 9,811 Estonians were admitted to the United States, the 
processes of assimilation and age would take its toll on the necessity of consular services. As 
time went by, and it became clear that liberation was not going to be an immediate 
possibility, many exiles were forced to make a choice between maintaining their strict 
citizenship to the Baltic States or begin the process of naturalization and assimilation into the 
American landscape. At the same time, the growing number of unofficial organizations that 
represented émigré politics undermined the importance that the diplomats had for American 
psychological warfare against the Soviet Union. 
 
Baltic Immigration Policy and The Establishment of Baltic Political Organizations 
 The domestic debate about whether or not the United States would establish a new 
immigration regime due to the Displaced Persons problem in Europe was one of the first 
instances where the Lithuanian and relatively small Latvian communities in the United States 
would have the ability to influence American policy.52 The major disconnect between 
President Truman’s stated policy about DP immigration and the Congress’ opinion on more 
immigration to the United States enabled Lithuanian and Latvian organizations to apply 
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political pressure on the White House to continue pushing for new legislation while lobbying 
members of Congress in the hope of changing congressional attitudes towards the plight of 
the Displaced Persons 
 The Estonian and Latvian communities in the United States were relatively small. 
Surprisingly, very few Lithuanian American NGOs were interested in the DP question. The 
interest of most Baltic-American organizations were focused on mandating that the United 
States stand up to the Soviet Union in upholding the principles of the Atlantic Charter. On 22 
August, the Lithuanian American Council (LAC) and several other Lithuanian American 
organizations met with officials of the State Department to discuss the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter and whether the non-recognition policy was still in effect. On 19 September 
1945, Constantine R. Jurgela of the LAC of Greater New York, penned a letter to the editor 
of the New York Times arguing that the democracies of the world must compel Russia to live 
up to its commitments and adherence to the Atlantic Charter and declaration of the United 
Nations. While Jurgela did mention the DP situation, it was connected with the political 
situation in the Baltic republics and not the issue of return or resettlement.53 
The most active Lithuanian organization that dealt with the DP situation was the 
United Lithuanian Relief Fund of America (ULRFA). Rev. Joseph Koncius, President of the 
ULRFA, spent 10 months in 1946 visiting Lithuanian and other Baltic DPS in Western 
Europe. Based on meeting with 60,000 DPs, the organization held a convention in October 
1946 with delegates deciding to present the President of the United States with a 
memorandum on the situation in Europe. On 23 October 1946, Koncius asked the White 
House for an appointment with Truman in order to present the memorandum. White House 
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staff declined the request citing schedule problems, however, acting Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, who was consulted on the advisability of such a meeting stated that the “ULRFA is 
a political organization representing the anti-Soviet Lithuanian groups in the United States. I 
do not believe it would serve any good purpose for the President to receive a delegation from 
this organization at this time.”54 
 From 1945-1947, anti-communism was not the most important rhetorical discourse in 
the DP debate. Instead, the question of collaboration was paramount and was played out 
between the American media, American Jews, and primarily the exiled Baltic diplomatic 
representation in the United States.  In prominent newspapers throughout 1945, the issue of 
collaboration between Latvian DPs and the Nazis had become a regular narrative. Drew 
Middleton of the New York Times in a correspondent article stated that there were Latvian 
“fascist organizations” that welcomed the German occupation from 1941-1944. Kendall Foss 
of the New York Post on 25 October 1945 argued that if the UNRRA would isolate English-
speaking Baltic DPs, who had been contaminated by the Germans, the remaining Baltic DPs 
would naturally begin to migrate back to the Soviet Union. 
 The Latvian Legation in Washington, headed by Alfreds Bilmanis forcefully pushed 
back against these narratives put out by the American media through the regularly published 
Latvian Information Bulletin. In the November 1945 edition, the article “The Plight of 
Latvian Displaced Persons in Western Europe: Facts in Review” attempted to neutralize the 
negative attitude towards Latvian DPs in the American media. In response to Middleton’s 
article in the New York Times, the Latvian diplomats argued that it was the Soviet Union that 
attempted to slander the true activity of Latvian organizations as being collaborators with the 
Germans.55 Concerning Foss’ claims, the Latvian diplomatic corps stated that Foss’s informer 
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intended to “slander the displaced persons who refuse to return to Bolshevik occupied Baltic 
countries, and to throw suspicion in the English speaking displaced persons, because they can 
explain to American and British the real situation in the Baltic, and what they had 
experienced during the Bolshevik occupation.”56 
 In 1946 the situation had become more acute as the concerns about Latvian DPs had 
not been put to rest. On 3 February 1946, Jules Feldmans wrote to Arthur Hays Sulzberger of 
the New York Times defending the majority of Latvian DPs who were forcibly conscripted 
into the German Army. Feldmans conceded that there might have been a few pro-Nazis, but 
reaffirmed that the Latvian people were democratically-minded, were equally opposed to 
both Nazi and Bolshevik dictatorships, and maintained their belief in the principles 
proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter.57  
The most telling example of the collaboration argument is present in a private mailing 
correspondence between Bilmanis and David Berkingoff of New York City in 1947. On 8 
August 1947 Berkingoff wrote to Bilmanis stating that “You may say that the Latvians had to 
do the will of their masters, the Germans, why the peoples of Belgium, France, Holland, who 
had Nazis of their own were able to fight and protect the Jews of their country. In the light of 
civilization, justice, heroism, the Latvian nation proved to be a failure.”58 In a response, 
Bilmanis reasserted the claim that it was unfair to rashly accuse the whole nation of the 
misdeeds and atrocities committed by a minute fraction of the nation.59 
 By 1947, however, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian DPs had created their own 
narratives related to their day-to-day existence in exile that proved to be more powerful than 
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the reports of American journalists stationed in the occupation zones. The primary goal of 
Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian DPs was to return to their native countries as soon as 
possible in order to devote their strength and knowledge to its reconstruction.60 As this was 
not possible due to the geopolitical situation in the Baltic republics, creating a sense of unity 
among the nations while in exile was exceptionally important and the construction of a 
positive narrative of the character of the Baltic nations and the Baltic peoples became 
increasingly important. 
 One important aspect of the Baltic national narratives was to mitigate the issue of 
collaboration with the Nazis and to bolster the nations’ democratic tendencies during the 
interwar period. In a 1946 memorandum to the American forces in Germany, Alfreds 
Bilmanis stated: 
The Baltic peoples in the second World War remained faithful to the ideals of the 
Western Democracies, but as their national armies had been abolished by the Russian 
occupation authorities and most of the officers had been deported to Siberia, the 
Baltic States were unable to fight with armed forces in the ranks of Great Britain and 
the United States. Even the Baltic military units (so-called legionnaires) forcibly 
mobilized by the Nazis never fought against the armies of the Western democracies, 
but either joined the resistance movement or surrendered as soon they came into 
contact in Germany with the British, American or French armies. The Baltic peoples 
paid for their belief in the ideals of the Western Democracies and for their fight for 
these beliefs with the lives of tens of thousands of individuals, deportation to forced 
labor and concentration camps… The accusations frequently heard to the effect that 
the Baltic refugees and displaced persons are pro-fascist are false both in form and in 
content.61 
 
The Baltic DPs not only attempted to create a monopoly on information related to the issue of 
collaboration but backed up the rhetoric by being perceived as “good citizens” while in the 
occupation zones. 
 When Truman signed the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 into law, he authorized the 
entry of 200,000 DPs over the period of two years into the United States. An important 
                                                            





component of the DP Act was that those entering the United States were mandated to have 
“assurances” from an American sponsor who promised that the entering Displaced Person 
would not become a ward of the state.62 This stipulation provided Balts residing in the United 
States yet another opportunity to organize around a political cause that was important to 
them. Between 1948 and 1952, several important organizations were either created or 
morphed their existing platforms to provide assurances to Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian 
Displaced Persons. 
The large-scale immigration of Baltic DPs to the United States established relatively 
large communities that generally viewed fighting for the liberation of their homelands as an 
important political objective. These communities would have implications for electoral 
politics in the districts where they resided, as well as adding to the anti-communist landscape 
that was present across the country in the early 1950s. The political and cultural potential that 
the refugee communities could gather, however, was intrinsically linked to the ability of the 
communities to establish organizations that were both able to create a sense of unity among 
each diaspora and express a coherent message to external audiences. From 1950-1952, the 
Baltic diplomats, prominent exiles, and existing national organizations in the United States 
began a concerted process of forming politically active organizations that represented the 
interests of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian refugees living in the United States. 
 A major problem that confronted the Latvians once the refugees began arriving was 
creating some sense of unity between the new immigrants and the older, established Latvian 
American community. Throughout 1950, Feldmans had discussed his disappointment with 
the political immaturity of the various Latvian American organizations that were already in 
                                                            
62 The sponsor was responsible for meeting the DP at the port of entry, provide them with transportation, and 
ensure that the DP had suitable employment and safe living conditions. 
 
 87 
existence.63  As a result, Feldmans took it upon himself to take a leading role in establishing a 
Latvian organization in the United States that would represent the interests of Latvians and 
have a significant political force. Feldmans argued that the principal task was to reconcile the 
viewpoints of the two principal groups of the new Latvian community in the United States. 
First, “the members of the recent DP emigration who are actively anti-communist and who 
wish to pursue a vigorous program in this respect.”64 Second, “Latvian-Americans who have 
lived in the U.S. for a number of years and who, although are anti-communists, are more 
lethargic in their approach to the problem.”65 By 1 February 1951, Feldmans reported to the 
State Department that there had been general agreement that the Latvians should support the 
United States in its struggle against communism and that the structure for a new organization 
had been put in place. 
 On 24 and 25 February 1951, delegates representing 100 Latvian-American 
organizations met in Pierce Hall in Washington for the purpose of establishing an 
organization that would be known as the American Latvian Association (ALA).66 Delegates 
attending the Latvian meeting were selected on the basis of one delegate for each one 
hundred people, resulting in nearly 10,000 Latvians being represented in Washington during 
the congress.67 The main objectives of the ALA were to democratically promote social and 
cultural cooperation among Latvians; to encourage work for Latvia’s liberation; to protect 
and strengthen Latvian culture; to protect Latvians’ rights; and to organize all sorts of support 
to Latvians in exile. 
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 While Feldmans played an important role in the creation of the ALA, he quickly 
withdrew from having an active organizational role in the organization. The State Department 
made it clear that Feldmans should keep in mind the extent that a foreign diplomatic 
representative should properly play in the organizational activities of citizens in the country 
to which he was accredited.68 Feldmans acknowledged the State Department’s concerns and 
promised that he would not include his name as one of the organizers. Indeed, the ALA 
represented the interests of Latvians residing in the United States in highly democratic 
process. Local organizations chose delegates to the ALA’s annual congress in Washington in 
proportion to the number of ALA members in that particular organization and the annual 
Congress elected the organization’s Board and Chairman.69 
 The ALA was successful in speaking on behalf of the entirety of the Latvian 
community in the United States largely in part to the hierarchical structure of the 
organization.  Annual congresses were organized to suppress opposing opinions to the 
organization’s orthodoxy70 This resulted in giving the veneer that all Latvians were like-
minded when it came to pursuing policy initiatives concerning the status of Latvians in exile 
as well as the status of the Soviet occupied homeland. This appearance, nevertheless, had far 
reaching implications for the relationship between the United States and the Latvian 
community during the 1950s. On one hand, the ALA became a model of exile unity in a 
period of time where disunity was a major feature of exile politics. On the other hand, the 
ALA became an important constituent group in the United States that became a force that 
American politicians would have to negotiate with and that would keep the fate of Latvia 
alive within the American Cold War landscape. 
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 Due to the smaller size of the Estonian community in the United States, it was not 
until May 1952 that Estonian exiles organized the most important politically active 
organization in the United States. On 23 May, more than 4,000 Estonians arrived in New 
York to elect delegates to a new umbrella organization that would represent the interests of 
Estonians residing in the United States.71 The charter creating the Estonian National 
Committee (ENC) laid out its two main objectives. First, the ENC was “to provide a free 
voice for the Estonian people and fight for independence of Estonia and human rights for its 
people.” Second, the ENC was “to preserve the Estonian cultural heritage in the United States 
and provide mutual assistance for the ethnic group members.”72 
 Like the ALA, the structure of the ENC was relatively democratic in nature. Every 
three years, delegates representing various Estonian organizations would meet at an assembly 
in New York City and elect the organization’s executive council. The initial political 
campaign for the ENC leadership in 1952, between Rudolf Kiviranna, who was pastor of the 
largest Estonian Lutheran congregation, and Adolf Perandi, a prominent Estonian exile living 
in the United States set the political tone for the organization in coming years. Contemporary 
observers of the 1952 ENC elections commented that the various factions constituting the 
bulk of the organization were both of a democratic nature, as well as conservative.73 The 
ENC’s formation constituted the first step in the organizing of Estonians in the free World. 
 Unlike the Estonians and Latvians, Lithuanian refugees arriving in the United States 
had a vast political network that had already been established around lobbying on behalf of 
the Lithuania’s fate dating back to the early years of World War II. The annexation in 1940 
activated the political potential of the large Lithuanian American community and led to the 
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establishment of several thousand local organizations and over thirty Lithuanian language 
newspapers. Prominent Lithuanian Americans, however, realized that the balkanization that 
had taken place in the organization of Lithuanian Americans was diminishing the ability of 
Lithuanian Americans to promote the interests of their ancestral homeland. As a result, on 15 
May 1941, a delegation of Lithuanians representing the important organizations, met in 
Chicago to create the Lithuanian American Council or Amerikos Lietuviu Taryba (ALT).74  
 It was not until 8 January 1943 in New York that the structure of the ALT and its 
political aims were publicly laid out. The ALT was to be based out of Chicago, home to the 
largest Lithuanian community in the United States, and consist of an executive committee to 
act in the organization’s name. The establishment of the executive committee instituted unity 
among Lithuanian Americans in a top down approach. The ALT decided that its executive 
committee should comprise of the editors of the three largest ideological newspapers in the 
Lithuanian American media. Pijus Grigaitis, editor of the socialist newspaper Naujienos, 
Leonardas Šimutis, editor of the Catholic Draugas, and Mykolas Vaidyla, editor of the liberal 
nationalist Sandara made up the first ALT executive committee. While the organization’s 
structures expanded by incorporating more organizations under its umbrella, establishing 
local chapters, and creating a separate information distribution service based in New York 
City in 1944,75 the executive committee, which was elected annually, provided the large 
Lithuanian American community a single voice. 
 The ALT’s mandate shifted with the changing status of Lithuania during the 1940s. 
The initial rationale for ALT’s establishment was to lobby the American government to fight 
for the restoration of Lithuania’s independence after World War II. After it became apparent 
that Lithuania would not regain its independence, ALT’s political mandate shifted to 
lobbying on behalf of DP immigration to the United States and insuring that the United States 
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government would continue to maintain its policy of non-recognition towards the annexation. 
Unlike the Latvians where there were occasional conflicts between the older generation 
Latvian Americans and the newly arriving DPs, there was significantly less tension between 
the Lithuanian DPs and the established Lithuanian American community. This was in part 
due to the deliberate efforts of the ALT to absorb the DPs into their ranks as the 
organization’s mission shifted yet again, to being a sustained campaign to insure that the 
plight of Lithuania would remain in the American public’s sight through the long Cold War. 
Another important consideration is that the DPs political aims were met by the ALT. The 
process of settling in the United States involved very basic things, such as finding gainful 
employment, shelter, and adjusting to a new location.  
 During the 1950s, there was little interaction between the three central organizations 
representing the political activities of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians in the United 
States. The interests of the ALA, ALT, and ENC rested with pursuing activities that 
promoted their individual homelands with little consideration for the other two Baltic nations 
except where it was politically beneficial. All three organizations, however, contributed in 
similar manners towards the development of relations between the United States government 
and the Baltic émigré communities that were interested in combatting in the Cold War. 
 The ALA, ALT, and ENC served as a single voice for Estonians, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians to communicate with centers of political power in the United States, whether 
they were governmental agencies or non-governmental organizations. This singular voice 
resulted in political power through the monopolization of information, while it also obscured 
some of the political disagreements that played out in the 1950s within each diaspora, as well 
as, disagreements that would eventually break out among the three nationalities. In addition, 
it provided policymakers, particularly in the State Department, with the belief that it was 
possible for émigré groups while in a state of exile to create relatively coherent organizations. 
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The Baltic organizations would be used as examples for exile organizations around the 
United States and Europe on how Eastern European exiles should cooperate with each other. 
 The ALA, ALT, and ENC also provided Baltic exiles that were residing in the United 
States an advantageous position in creating contacts with the United States government that 
Baltic exiles residing in other countries simply did not have at their disposal. Official State 
Department policy was that the United States would not deal with organizations that could be 
misconstrued as governments in exile. The State Department did acknowledge that there were 
exiles in the ranks of the central Baltic organizations, but the ALA, ALT, and ENC were all 
viewed as organizations that represented the interests of American citizens who were fighting 
for the interests of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.  The distinction between an organization 
that was comprised of potential constituents, rather than exiles made a significant difference 
in how relations Žadeikiswith the United States Congress, State Department, and even the 
White House would develop. 
 
Establishment of Relations with the Free Europe Committee 
When describing one of the methods of engaging in psychological warfare against the 
Soviet Union in 1948, Kennan proposed that the United States should support the 
establishment of “liberation committees” that would serve as “foci of national hope” for 
political refugees; “provide inspiration” for popular resistance within the Soviet Union; and 
“serve as a potential nucleus for all-out liberation movements in the event of war.”76 Within 
the context of NSC 10/2, these proposed liberation committees should be overt operations 
guided by trusted American citizens and should then receive covert guidance and possible 
financial assistance from the United States government.77 By 1949 policymakers engaged in 
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serious debate about whether such liberation committees should be established and how they 
should function, it was decided that the United States would establish an organization that 
would organize émigrés into liberation committees, would receive “confidential or 
unvouchered [sic] fund” from the CIA, and receive policy guidance from the State 
Department. 
Joseph C. Grew, former American ambassador to Japan, held a press conference in 
New York City on 1 June 1949 announcing that the Committee for Free Europe had been 
created with the assistance of a number of noteworthy private American citizens on its board, 
including Dwight D. Eisenhower, DeWitt Wallace, publisher of Reader’s Digest, and Henry 
Luce, publisher of Time, Fortune, and Life magazines. The organization’s mandate was to 
“put the voices of these exiled leaders on the air, addressed to their own peoples back in 
Europe, in their own languages, in the familiar tones.”78  
Initially, the FEC divided its activities into three discrete units that managed general 
relations with exiles; worked towards beginning radio broadcasts towards Eastern Europe; 
and managing relations with the American public.79 Radio broadcasting was the most 
important FEC activity, but the organization also sponsored a plethora of other exile activities 
that ranged from the establishment of a Free Europe University in Strasbourg France to the 
Free Europe Press that published the prominent exile literature and scholarship.80 Perhaps one 
of the most important short-term projects that the FEC started was the Mid-European Studies 
                                                            
78 Richard H. Cummings, Radio Free Europe’s Crusade for Freedom”: Rallying Americans Behind Cold War 
Broadcasting, 1950-1960 10. The organizational papers were filed in April 1949 with the law firm that Allen 
Dulles worked, Sullivan and Cromwell. The Committee for a Free Europe was founded to “Help the non-fascist 
and non-Communist leaders who have fled to the United States from the countries of Eastern Europe to 
maintain themselves in useful occupations during their enforced stay in the United States.” On 11 April 1950, 
the National Committee for a Free Europe changed its name to the Free Europe Committee (FEC). 
79 Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty 
(Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky, 2003), 12. 
80 Ibid., 13. See “The Free Europe University in Exile” Pamphlet which describes the activities of the 
University. The purpose of the University was to establish an “invaluable reservoir of informed, trained, 
democratic leaders among the young people who successfully escaped to the free world.” “Folder: Free Europe 




Center (MESC) in New York. The MESC’s goal was to assist exiled academics transition 
into academic positions at American institutions of higher education.81 In return, the FEC 
hoped that its activities would foster a sense of political solidarity among Eastern European 
exiles that could be eventually tapped as a useful resource to combat the Soviet Union. 
The FEC’s initial contacts with exiles were limited to the largest Eastern European 
countries: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Despite the FEC’s 
ambitious agenda and soaring rhetoric, the organization was resource constrained. FEC’s 
covert funding was not limitless, resulting in its inability to hire American staff, exiles, or to 
meet the daily operational costs of more countries. Additionally, the State Department and 
CIA had an insufficient number of staff members who could oversee the FEC’s 
organizations. The FEC sponsored National Committees that were based on individual 
nationalities and attempted to include members that were representative of each exiled 
community’s political makeup.  
Considering that the FEC was viewed from the outside as an organization that private 
American citizens created to give a voice to Eastern European exiles and that the 
organization provided material assistance to prominent exiles through employment and 
transition assistance, it was inevitable that exile communities that were not initially brought 
under the FEC umbrella would rapidly begin lobbying all facets of American society for 
inclusion. By the spring of 1950, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians began pursuing such 
contacts. Although myriad Baltic organizations in the United States attempted to influence 
the FEC to open lines of communication with the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian exiles; it 
was the Baltic diplomats and the ALT that were most influential in this endeavor. The first 
contacts between the Baltic diplomatic missions and the FEC occurred during the late spring 




and summer of 1950.82  The main argument that the diplomats used with their interlocutors 
was that Baltic panels associated with the FEC would help unify the diasporas who were 
temporary refugees in the United States and hoped to return to their homelands as soon as 
possible to reassert “democratic standards.”83 
 On 17 March 1950, the LAIC submitted their first formal protest against the omission 
of the Baltic States from the activities of the FEC.84  The increase of material and promotion 
by the Crusade for Freedom escalated the ALT’s efforts to lobby on behalf of Baltic 
inclusion. On 24 September 1950, the ALT’s Congress passed a resolution stating that 
“Whereas, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, are in urgent need of support of the cause of 
liberation…” Therefore, “be it resolved that the Lithuanian Organizations of Chicago appeal 
and request the FEC to include Lithuania, and the other two Baltic States, in the Committee’s 
plans and National Program for the liberation of Soviet-enslaved and dominated Europe.”85 
 Simultaneously, the FEC had begun making plans for the beginning of collaboration 
with Baltic exile groups. PROJECT 1-1951 was created on 15 March 1951 with the intention 
of coordinating “Baltic States’ Activities within the FEC.”86 The initial proposal called for 
the creation of Consultative Panels and groups of individuals that would work with the Mid-
European Studies Center, American Contacts Division and Radio Free Europe. The plan 
proposed that after the successful creation of panels by 31 March 1951 that Baltic scholars 
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would be employed by the Mid-European Studies Center, Baltic lecturers would be hired by 
the American Contacts Division, and Radio desks would be established.87 
 Officials acknowledged to the Baltic diplomats the reasons behind their initial 
reticence towards initiated such projects. First, FEC officials viewed the non-recognition 
policy as having a net positive for the emigrations since they continued to have diplomatic 
representation of the “democratic side” as opposed to the “totalitarian side” as in the cases of 
Poland and Hungary.88  During the 25 May 1950, the FEC official asked Feldmans if it was 
in his interest to support a Latvian panel as it might prove to be inimical to his own 
diplomatic position in Washington.89 Second, FEC officials acknowledged that they had 
limited resources and had decided to give larger countries that lacked any sort of democratic 
diplomatic representation in the West the organization’s top priorities.90  Ultimately in 
August 1950, the FEC contacted the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff to give further 
guidance on the issue as their first impression was to “doubt the advisability of forming 
national councils along the lines of those in the satellite countries in view of the existence of 
diplomatic representation acceptable to us.”91 
 Despite the initial setback, Feldmans continued to make preparations to begin 
cooperative efforts with the FEC. On 25 July, the FEC received a letter from Feldmans with a 
list of potential Latvian exiles who could form a FEC committee.92 Although the list of 
names largely represented officials of the former authoritarian government, and not the pre-
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1934 democratic elements, on 5 October a meeting between the two factions of Latvian 
diplomats took place in London where it appeared as though there would be some 
reconciliation.93  Meanwhile, the FEC gave instructions to its staff to go ahead with 
preparations for the creation of Baltic panels. 
 On 2 October 1950, the FEC asked the State Department if it would be appropriate to 
informally approach Feldmans about creating an advisory body to utilize Baltic refugees 
more effectively. The FEC argued that such a solution would combine the legal continuity of 
the exiled diplomats with the broad-based representative nature of a national council.94  
Conditions were placed on how such an advisory body should be created if it was to receive 
FEC funding. As a way of promoting unity among the competing political factions in the 
émigré communities, financial assistance would only be granted to a  ‘genuinely 
representative’ group that represented both the official elements of the Latvian government 
and the pre-1934 democratic elements.95  The three consultative panels, as envisaged by the 
FEC, would consist of seven members and have similar functions to the National Councils 
that already represented countries such as Hungary. All panel members necessarily had to be 
exiles, but would exclude members of the Baltic diplomatic corps, and would not duplicate 
the activities of the Baltic diplomatic missions in the United States. Further, the panels would 
receive a budget of roughly $60,000 annually.96 
 FEC officials met with Feldmans on 28 December to propose the idea of creating a 
Latvian Consultative Panel. Feldmans considered it to be an excellent solution to the problem 
of fostering a closer relationship between the Latvian emigration and the FEC and agreed that 
no members of the Latvian diplomatic corps should be members. The question of broad 
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representation among the various political factions in the Latvian Diaspora proved to be 
contentious. Feldmans held the opinion that exiled political parties had absolutely no 
relevance to the situation existing in territorial Latvia nor to the political situation that would 
exist in a future independent Latvia.97  The FEC official stressed that if any political faction 
felt under represented, the resulting open hostility to the Latvian panel would undermine its 
effectiveness.98  Feldmans conceded the point, but stressed that political orientation should 
only play a minor part in creating the panel. 
 After receiving a positive answer from the Latvian diplomat, FEC officials 
subsequently contacted Kaiv on 12 January and Žadeikis on 25 January to discuss the 
creation of Estonian and Lithuanian consultative panels.99  Both Kaiv and Zadeikis confirmed 
their willingness to work towards the creation of their respective panels and were presented 
with suggestions relevant to their diasporas’ political situation. Kaiv argued that a 
consultative panel was a better idea than a national council due to the complicated political 
situation of the Baltic States and the FEC official suggested that one or two members of the 
panel should consist of members of the Estonian emigration residing in Sweden since the 
largest group of Estonian exiles resided in Sweden.100  During the meeting with Zadeikis, the 
Lithuanian diplomats submitted a list of eighteen names that he thought should be considered 
as members of the Lithuanian Consultative Panel, which was eventually reduced to seven 
members.101 
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 Meanwhile, Kaiv and Feldmans submitted lists of their own that should participate in 
the first iteration of the Estonian and Latvian Consultative Panels. On 19 January, Kaiv  and 
Kaarel Pusta submitted the names of Ernst Ein, Leonhard Vahter, Adolf Perandi, Ilma 
Raamot, and Aksel Mei to the FEC for consideration as members of the Estonian Panel.102  
The Estonians considered it wise to begin with five names and increase it to seven later on as 
they considered the option of including exiles that did not reside in the United States. 
Feldmans submitted eight names to the FEC on 22 January and reaffirmed his opinion that 
consultative panels were more appropriate compared to national committees as he was under 
a great deal of pressure from a plethora of Latvian nationals who viewed the creation of a 
national committee as an excellent way to promote a government-in-exile - a concept that 
Feldmans disapproved of as it represented nothing.103 
 In January 1951, the FEC gave both written and verbal approval that the Baltic States 
should be included within the scope of the organization’s activities.104 After the FEC and 
leading Baltic exiles completed the assembly of the consultative panels, the FEC promised to 
move forward with creating radio desks to broadcast to each Baltic nation and include Baltic 
exiles in the full portfolio of activities that the organization had created. Although the FEC 
had created its own independent list while deliberating internally over whether or not to reach 
out to the Baltic diasporas, the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian diplomats had a significant 
role in deciding who would ultimately sit on the consultative panels. For instance, the eight 
members of the Lithuanian panel, led by Vaclovas Sidzikauskas all were of the same 
generation - born in the late 19th or early 20th centuries; were all former members of 
government or members of interwar Lithuania’s academia; each represented a political party 
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that existed in Lithuania prior to 1926; and all had resided in the United States for less than 
three years.105 
 On 24 May 1951 permission was granted for the formal creation of Estonian, Latvian, 
and Lithuanian consultative panels, despite not having solved the radio funding issue. The 
primary goal of the Baltic consultative panels was to work “under the auspices of the FEC, to 
work hard for the emancipation of the Lithuanian people from aggressive Soviet imperialism 
and for the restoration of human rights in our country.”106 Although the long-term objective 
of the consultative panels was to prepare for the eventual liberation and re-democratization of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, there were three main activities that the panels participated in 
over the short-term that were of consequence. First, the Panels played a small role in helping 
to coordinate the activities of various exile organizations throughout the United States and 
kept the FEC abreast on exile politics. Second, the Panels cooperated with the other 
organizations that were affiliated with the FEC. Third, the Panels took it upon themselves to 
provide accurate information about the political, economic, and social conditions in the 
Soviet republics. 
 The primary rationale for the establishing of National Committees by the FEC, and of 
Consultative Panels (as they relate to the Baltic States) was to foster rapprochement among 
various political factions within each nationality in the hopes of promoting a unified 
opposition front of exiles against communism. Although the Baltic diplomats, leading exiles, 
FEC officials, and the State Department attempted to mollify political factionalism through 
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providing politically balanced charter panels, the initial attempts at fostering cooperation 
through each diaspora was decidedly mixed. 
 In response to the composition of the Estonian Panel, the World Federation of Free 
Estonians (VEKO) based in Stockholm issued a strong protest. VEKO argued that one of its 
members had not been included on the panel while two members of the competing 
organization in Stockholm, the Estonian National Committee (ERN) had been included. They 
continued by stating that VEKO has a larger membership than the ERN and that they were 
suffering from unfair discrimination. FEC officials responded to VEKO’s Chairman that 
members of the Estonian Consultative Panel do not serve as representatives of any party or 
organization. Discussions between Kaiv, the FEC, and the Estonian Consultative Panel in 
August 1951 resulted in an agreement that the Consultative Panel would directly negotiate 
with VEKO to insure that there would be a settlement that was satisfactory to all 
concerned.107 
 The Latvian exile community was equally displeased with the initial composition of 
the Latvian consultative panel. The most significant concern that Latvians had was that the 
Panel had too many members that were composed of Right-wing Latvians at the expense of 
the Left-Wing and the Social Democrats. Additional concern came from religiously devout 
Latvians. Lutherans were upset that the Lutheran Church as an institution was not represented 
on the panel and exiles from Latgale were concerned that Catholics were not represented on 
the panel. Finally, a small organization, the Latvian Liberal Union in Sweden was upset that 
there was not a member from their organization represented in the Latvian Panel. The FEC 
response to all of the concerns was that the political criticism was unfounded since the Panel 
was composed of liberals, the Peasant Party, and those not affiliated with a particular party, 
but held liberal or socialistic views. The Lutherans were told that all of the members of the 
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Panel were Lutherans. The Catholics were told that there were plans to have Bishop Rancans 
from Latgale sit on the Panel, but he had not been able to accept yet due to not receiving 
permission from the church’s hierarchy. Finally, the Latvian Liberal Union was told that that 
Consultative Panel did not represent any particular organization.108 On the other hand, the 
Lithuanian immigration was generally pleased with the composition of the Consultative 
Panel. FEC officials argued that this was the case because the Panel consisted eight members 
(opposed to the 5 Estonians and 7 Latvians) who represented each of Lithuania’s political 
parties and one individual from Memelland.109 
 On 27 February 1952, the FEC decided that the Baltic Consultative Panels had 
succeeded in their initial portfolios of advising the FEC on political questions; keeping in 
touch with all Baltic exile groups; advising the Mid-European Studies Center on scholarly 
activities connected with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; submitting a list of lawyers for the 
Mid-European Law Project; submitting preliminary recommendations and estimates and 
presenting candidates for the eventual broadcasting of Baltic languages in their countries; and 
finally supplying lecturers for the American contacts division. 
 The FEC argued that all of these objectives had been carried out and that they had 
achieved a position of importance in the Baltic exile communities and established a good 
working relationship with the diplomatic representatives in the United States. In addition to 
their regular function of contributing to the publications “News from Behind the Iron 
Curtain” and to other activities which RPS may wish to engage, the Baltic desk chiefs will 
contribute to RFE, not only should Baltic broadcasts materialize, but in providing 
information to existing radio desks about the fate of countries further advanced in 
Sovietization. The Consultative Panels have a large task in their advisory capacities, in 
corresponding with other exile groups and in sending lecturers throughout the country. In this 
                                                            




latter capacity, they have already done a good deal of work and their members are known 
personally to Baltic groups as far as Chicago, also in Western Europe. They have not 
achieved a position where it would be possible to no longer designate them simply as 
Consultative Panels to the Fund, but as National Committees for a Free Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. Such a designation would not meet with the objection from the diplomatic 
representatives, which they originally raised.110 
 The question whether or not the new National Committees for a Free Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania would be participating in FEC sponsored radio broadcasts had yet to be 
decided. Nevertheless, their efforts going forward were very important in all other FEC 
sponsored activities. The Committees laid the groundwork for publications in the three Baltic 
languages as well as the English Language; provided important analysis of raw data about the 
Baltic States for broader FEC publications; and worked towards fostering a sense of 
cooperation within their own exiled diasporas and with their other Baltic peers in the FEC. 
 
Liberation Policy versus Liberation Rhetoric 
 Dwight D. Eisenhower’s victory in the 1952 presidential election returned the White 
House to the Republican Party for the first time in nearly two decades. The domestic reaction 
to a series of international events during Truman’s second term provided Eisenhower the 
ability to cast a stark political contrast to his Democratic opponent, Illinois Governor, Adlai 
E. Stevenson. The “loss” of China and the Soviet atomic bomb in 1949, the stalemate in 
Korea, in addition to the advantage that the Republican Party had over the Democratic Party 
in claiming the anti-communist mantra during the age of McCarthyism, provided Eisenhower 
ample political ammunition when he accepted the Party’s nomination in the Summer of 1952. 
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 Eisenhower, along with his running mate, California Senator Richard M. Nixon, and 
his eventual Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles criticized virtually every facet of 
democratic foreign policy making since the end of World War II.111 Eisenhower claimed that 
he would “go to Korea,” promising American voters that he would be able to extricate the 
United States from the morass the Korean Conflict had become.112 The Republican ticket 
accused the democratic party of being soft on communism and selling out the Eastern 
European nations at Yalta in 1945.113 The 1952 Republican Party Platform claimed to “mark 
the end of the negative, futile, and immoral policy of ‘containment’ which abandons 
countless human beings to a despotism and Godless terrorism which in turn enables the rules 
to forge the captives into a weapon for our destruction.”114 
 Following the logic that containment was an immoral policy that would not continue 
under an Eisenhower administration, Dulles promoted a policy of rolling back the influence 
of communism internationally as well as liberating the nations of Eastern Europe from Soviet 
domination. After Eisenhower took the oath of office in January 1953 and Dulles became 
Secretary of State, there was the assumption that the rhetoric that Eisenhower’s campaign had 
used throughout the election would result in the wholesale change in how the United States 
dealt with the Soviet Union. 
 Despite the campaign’s rhetoric that Eisenhower would offer a drastic shift in 
American foreign policy, we have demonstrated that hastening the end of the Cold War and 
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attempting to liberate Eastern Europe had been a component of the Truman Administration’s 
policy since 1948 with the acceptance of NSC 20/4. Historians have had various 
interpretations on this issue. One such interpretation as described by John Lewis Gaddis is 
that “Presidents are rarely made by endorsing their predecessors… and Eisenhower soon 
came under pressure to put ‘distance’ between himself and the incumbent administration in 
the area of foreign affairs.”115 Another such interpretation, however, sees Eisenhower’s 
campaign promises in a much more sinister light. W. Scott Lucas argues that “the shrill 
rhetoric of Eisenhower’s Presidential campaign not only misrepresented the US position; it 
threatened to undermine a policy based on covert operations.”116 Nevertheless, there has been 
a historiographical consensus that a shift from containment to liberation never occurred when 
Eisenhower took office.117 
 Truman’s last year in office can be described as quixotic in relation to the 
recalibration of its policies towards combatting the Soviet Union in information campaigns. 
There was an incessant political turf battle between the CIA, the State Department, and the 
Psychological Strategy Board, which was established to streamline American covert 
operations against the Soviet Union.118 In addition there were very real debates about whether 
or not it was realistic to assume that the sorts of external pressures envisaged in NSC 20/4 
would be effective.119 
 With a new administration, however, came a thorough review of the prior 
administration’s policies. In the context of its broader policy reviews, Eisenhower ordered a 
committee led by former deputy director of the CIA, William H. Jackson, to assess the 
                                                            
115 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 125. 
116 W. Scott Lucas “The Myth of Leadership; Dwight Eisenhower and the Quest for Liberation” in T.G. Otte 
and Constantine A. Pagedas, eds. Personalities, War, and Diplomacy: Essays in International History (New 
York: Routledge, 1997), 160. 
117 See Bennet Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) is perhaps 
the starting point for the historiographical argument that there existed a discontinuity between the Truman 
policies of containment and the Eisenhower policies of liberation. 
118 Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 101.  
119 See the debate about Bohlen’s reentry into the scene and the roll of NSC 68. 
 
 106 
Truman Administration’s “information policies.”120 The so-called Jackson Committee 
released its report on 30 June 1953 broadly criticizing the misuse of psychological warfare by 
American policymakers on a host of issues ranging from the gap between announced policies 
and results to the inability of the PSB to coordinate various activities.121 As a result of the 
Jackson Committee Report, the PSB as well as the Consultants Group were replaced with the 
Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) that resided within the NSC and was charged with 
handling psychological aspects of American foreign policy. 
 Eisenhower’s foreign policy doctrine, commonly referred to as the New Look, had 
one main goal: achieve the maximum possible deterrence of communism at the minimum 
possible cost.122 Psychological warfare operations would play a prominent role in 
implementing Eisenhower’s New Look.123 In fact, early in his administration, Eisenhower 
explained his desire for a unified psychological strategy in the Cold War and many 
individuals who had become frustrated with the Truman Administration viewed the ascension 
of Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, and Allan Dulles as a means of rejuvenating American 
psychological operations against the Soviet Union.  
 1953 presented the Eisenhower administration a series of challenges concerning its 
ability to meet the expectations of those that had placed great hopes in its ability to capitalize 
on significant events in the Soviet space using psychological operations. Joseph Stalin’s 
death on 3 March 1953 provided the United States the moment that many American 
policymakers had hoped would lead to the destruction of the Soviet Union and for many 
believers in psychological warfare that it would be a moment that the United States would be 
able to exploit. Ultimately, Eisenhower did not viewthe event to be as significant as many 
                                                            
120 Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 124. 
121 Ibid, 125. The report disclosed that some plans “had failed to take adequate account of the capabilities of the 
United States and its allies.” 
122 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment,  162. 
123 See: Kenneth A. Osgood, “Form before Substance: Eisenhower’s Commitment to Psychological Warfare 
and Negotiations with the Enemy Diplomatic History 24, Issue 3 (2000): 405-433. 
 
 107 
bureaucrats and it took six weeks for the White House to decide whether or not the United 
States should adopt an aggressive stance. Ultimately, Eisenhower delivered an address on 16 
April entitled “The Chance for Peace.”124 
 Throughout Eisenhower’s first term there existed a fundamental tension in its position 
towards the liberation of Eastern Europe and the importance of psychological warfare. 
Although there was a remarkable level of continuity between the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations in how they dealt with the Kremlin, the Truman Administration did not 
publicly acknowledge that it was pursuing a policy actively to subvert Soviet influence in 
Eastern Europe in order to avoid causing alarm with West European allies. While such a 
policy opened up the Truman administration to domestic charges that it had become soft on 
communism, there was little gap between rhetorical policy and implemented policy. The 
Eisenhower administration, however, made itself potentially vulnerable because of the gap 
between rhetoric and its actual policy. The continued rhetorical claim to promote the 
liberation of Eastern Europe throughout the administration’s first year, in addition to the its 
commitment to total psychological warfare, elevated expectations that the United States 
would act when a suitable moment occurred. 
 Although Stalin’s death and the uprisings in Eastern Europe in 1953 did not 
immediately expose the tensions between rhetoric and reality, the fundamental question about 
the Eisenhower administration was whether or not United States remained committed to 
breaking up the Soviet bloc? Historians have argued whether or not the Eisenhower 
administration actually sought to break up the Soviet bloc or whether its adherence to a 
policy of liberation was a political ploy in order to build on the growing anti-communist 
sentiment in the United States. Contemporaries even claimed that the liberation rhetoric was 
exclusively geared at a domestic audience. The important point, however, is that rhetoric is 
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real and insofar as the Eisenhower administration promised to a wide audience that it would 
fight to liberate Eastern Europe and rollback the external borders of Soviet influence. 
 It is in this context of increased expectation that the United States would fight for the 
liberation of Eastern Europe that the relationship between Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian 
refugees and American officials should be understood. Those few exiles who had worked 
with the Truman Administration had a certain understanding that Americans were actively 
engaged in subverting the Soviet Union. Compared to Western European nations that had 
taken ambivalent positions towards the status of Eastern Europe generally, and the Baltic 
States more specifically, the United States was the only country with the potential 
demonstrably to change the situation in Eastern Central Europe. Eisenhower’s election was 
partially based on the dissatisfaction in the Democratic Party’s handling of the Soviet Union 
since the 1945 Yalta Conference, in addition to Eisenhower’s claim that the United States 
would fight for liberation. This only enhanced the faith that the exile groups had in the United 
States during the 1950s. Indeed, the interests of Baltic exiles and the United States 
Government seemed perfectly aligned after November 1952. 
 
Conclusion 
 From 1948-1952, highest-order interests of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian exiles 
and American officials converged around the idea that Soviet influence in Eastern Europe 
could in fact be curtailed by pursuing rather aggressive policies against the Soviet bloc. 
Although the Truman Administration sought to contain Soviet influence around the world, 
containment was by no means a purely defensive strategy. American officials subscribed to 
policies that were designed to foster discontent within Eastern Europe that not only hoped to 
prevent the Kremlin from utilizing resources externally against Western interests, but would 
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also cause deep political, economic, and social fractures in the Soviet Union and its satellite 
nations. 
 The hundreds of thousands of Eastern European refugees in postwar Europe provided 
the Americans with a unique resource to lead offensive efforts against the Soviet Union. Not 
only did Eastern European refugees appear to have the credibility accurately to describe their 
first-hand accounts with communism, but there was a shared belief that Eastern European 
political exiles continued to maintain a minimal amount of credibility in their homelands. 
Unlike the use of exiles in paramilitary operation in the Baltic republics and Albania, Eastern 
European exiles found a more sustainable and potentially more useful role as broadcasters 
over American covert radio channels beamed towards Eastern Europe and as exiled leaders 
who could create a sense of unity among each Eastern European diaspora through FEC 
activities. 
 Such policies would not have been possible had Truman not persuaded the United 
States Congress to pass the 1948 and subsequent 1950 Displaced Persons’ Acts. Although 
Truman initially thought that it was a matter of humanitarian interests to allow refugees from 
Eastern European to immigrate to the United States, it quickly became a politically important 
issue with far-reaching implications. The DP situation was a source of instability in a 
Western Europe that was in the process of creating a sustained post-war reconstruction effort. 
As the Cold War became a contest not only for spheres of influence, but a battle for hearts 
and minds, the repatriation of DPs to the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe would have been a 
substantial blow to American prestige. 
 The thousands of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian refugees who immigrated to the 
United States represented just a small portion of the human anti-communist capital that the 
State Department and the CIA would have at their disposal at the beginning of the 1950s. The 
continued American non-recognition policy towards the Soviet Union’s annexation assisted 
 
 110 
in providing a legal justification for the refusal of Baltic DPs to repatriate and provided the 
Americans the justification to allow large numbers of Baltic refugees to emigrate.  
 As the Cold War intensified, it appeared as though there would be an unknowable 
number of years before the Baltic people would have the opportunity to honestly express 
their opinion on being Soviet citizens. As a result, it became clear that the non-recognition 
policy had to continue to be credible. The main focus of continued non-recognition was to 
permit the accredited Baltic diplomats in the United States to continue their work. From 1940 
onwards, Baltic diplomats were able to fund their activities through withdrawing money from 
frozen accounts in the United States. The investment of funds provided a sense of stability to 
both the Americans and to the diplomats, as Baltic diplomats continue to function in 
Washington, funded by Baltic (and not American funds). 
 The non-recognition policy, however, should also be viewed as the main framework 
through which all policy decisions were viewed. This was immediately evident in the reticent 
movement by the FEC and the State Department in starting informal relationships between 
the FEC and leading Baltic exiles. While there were funding issues associated with starting 
services with relatively small exile groups compared to the Poles or the Hungarians, 
policymakers asked how the non-recognition policy could affect Baltic-FEC relations. The 
State Department was concerned that FEC-sponsored Baltic panels would undermine the 
authority of the exiled diplomats, and in turn undermine the non-recognition policy. FEC 
officials argued that the existence of “democratic” exiled diplomats as opposed to 
“totalitarian” diplomats of the satellite countries necessarily meant that there was less need 
for Baltic sponsored activities. 
 One possibly unintended consequence of the Baltic refugee migration to the United 
States was the establishment of highly-organized, politically active organizations that 
represented the interests of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. The pressure that the 
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organizations as well as the exiled diplomats exorted on both the FEC and the State 
Department helped in the establishment of Baltic Consultative Panels associated with the 
FEC. Although the FEC delayed discussions about commencing Baltic language radio 
braodcasts, the Baltic Consultative Panels were dilligent in participating in the other FEC 
sponsored activities, such as the Free Europe Press, the Assembly of Captive European 
Nations, and the Free European University in Exile. 
 The long-term hope that American officials had in the Baltic Consultative Panels was 
that the Panels’ activities would be able to create a sense of cooperation among the broader 
diasporas of each nationality and eventually establish some level of pan-Baltic cooperation. 
Such cooperation was seen to have a great amount of human anti-Communist capital that 
could be exploited at some point for future operations in the 1950s. Such hope, however, was 
immediately tempered by the reaction of many political factions within the Estonian, Latvian, 
and Lithuanian exile communities about the makeup of the extremely small Consultative 
Panels seated in New York. The major challenge for both the Baltic Panels and the FEC was 
how to use the Consultative Panels to create a sense of unity rather than have the 
Consultative Panels seen as a proxy political battlefield among competing exile factions. 
 The long-term hope that Baltic exiles had in the United States was that the State 
Department and the FEC would be reliable partners in helping to liberate their homelands. 
Eisenhower’s election in 1952 only increased the expectations among Baltic exiles that the 
United States was becoming more serious about actively liberating the Baltic republics from 
the Soviet Union. Such hopes only increased the possibility that the relationship between the 
exiles and the Americans would splinter at some point due to the asymetrical importance of 
the Baltic republics to each party. For the Americans, the Baltic States were a test of 
American international credibility dating back to its 1940 non-recognition policy, but was 
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never a central foreign policy issue. For the Baltic exiles, liberation of Estonia, Latvia, and 




THE QUEST FOR CONTINUITY AND COOPERATION 
 On 15 November, 1950, Harold Vedeler of the State Department’s Baltic desk met 
with Estonian Consul General Johannes Kaiv to discuss a number of issues pertinent to 
Estonian affairs. Rumors abounded that the Estonians were considering establishing a 
diplomatic mission to the French government in Paris and during the meeting Vedeler 
inquired whether or not the Estonians were intending to pursue the appointment of a diplomat 
to Paris. Kaiv pointed out that both the Latvians and Lithuanians had unofficial 
representatives in Paris who were working on an ad hoc basis to assist with refugee affairs 
and confirmed that he had been exploring the notion of an Estonian representative in Paris. 
Kaiv continued that he would like to send Kaarel Pusta Sr. to Paris, but that it would probably 
be Karl Selter, who had been serving as an Estonian liaison officer with the IRO in 
Switzerland.1 In concluding the meeting, Vedeler said that the State Department wished to be 
kept informed of developments, but had yet to formulate a policy opinion on the matter. 
 Over the next month, a series of correspondences between the State Department’s 
Baltic Desk and the American Embassy in Paris outlined the development of an initial policy 
towards the idea of a new Estonian mission in Paris that would function in a temporary 
capacity to assist in resettling Estonian displaced persons. The question of whether or not 
there would be any value for American policy came up. It was decided that there should be a 
discussion as to whether or not there would be any psychological warfare value in endorsing 
such an appointment. In concluding the discussion, Vedeler wrote to Joyce stating that the 
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Baltic Desk had no objections to such a development and that the mission could be used for 
any number of purposes and even “including possibly psychological warfare activities.”2 
 Throughout the next year, Baltic diplomats, but particularly the Estonians were 
cognizant of the fact that their existence represented a great source of ammunition for 
American psychological warfare against international communism. On 2 June 1951 when 
Kaiv met with Johnson to discuss the beginning of Estonian language Voice of America 
(VOA) broadcasts, he stated that the American policy of continuing to recognize Baltic 
diplomats served as an important example to other countries of the free world and that there 
was growing perception that the “influence” of American policy was becoming more 
evident.3 Kaiv explicitly coupled the inauguration of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian VOA 
broadcasts with a growing sense of hospitality towards the Baltic missions in countries that 
have access to the VOA broadcasts and that this increased the anti-communist sentiment in 
those countries.4 
 The existence of accredited Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian diplomats in the United 
States and abroad was important for both American officials and Baltic exiles. For American 
officials, diplomatic continuity for the Baltic republics meant that the non-recognition policy 
had real international credibility. For Baltic exiles, diplomatic continuity was one component 
of the larger exile narrative that they held political continuity and legitimacy dating back to 
the interwar Baltic governments.  
 Equally important for American policymakers was fostering a high level of 
cooperation within each Baltic émigré community and working towards establishing greater 
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contacts between the three diasporas. The establishment of Baltic consultative panels 
associated with the FEC was only one area that the State Department and other American 
agencies pushed for greater cooperation within each community. Establishing contacts with 
various exile organizations internationally as well as allowing Baltic exiles to discuss the 
expansion of diplomatic missions were technical ways that the State Department hoped that 
cooperation amongst the exiles would benefit American interests in Eastern Europe. 
 This chapter will examine three areas where the principle of political continuity 
among Baltic exiles created direct tension with the American interest to foster greater 
cooperation within the exile communities. First, the issue of diplomatic succession, where the 
death of accredited Latvian diplomats created a policy discussion in Washington as well as 
within the exile communities about whether or not and how diplomatic succession should 
occur. Second, the issue of governments in exile, where the primary goal of the largest 
Estonian exile community was to establish an exile government, despite the policy problems 
for the Americans and the political factions established within the Estonian community. Third, 
the political infighting among Lithuanian exiles in Europe, where the Lithuanian exiled 
diplomats were in direct political opposition to a CIA sponsored Lithuanian exile 
organization.  
 This chapter will also examine the impact that these conflicts had on the debate about 
whether or not the United States would actively pursue the expansion of Estonian, Latvian, 
and Lithuanian diplomatic missions internationally. During the early 1950s, the expansion of 
missions was a policy where Baltic exile interests and American foreign policy interests 
potentially aligned. I will argue that the quest for political continuity by the Baltic exiles 
ultimately undermined their ability to establish deep contacts with the American officials that 
could have provided demonstrable help to their political organizations and allowed them a 
greater voice in the policy making process. I will also argue that the furtive efforts that 
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American officials used to try to foster cooperation among the exiles only intensified conflict 
within the three exile diasporas. 
 
Baltic Diplomatic Succession: The Deaths of Alfreds Bilmanis and Jules Feldmans 
One of the most important issues that caused tensions between the Baltic exiles and 
the United States government concerned who would succeed one of the accredited diplomats 
when they passed away. For the American government, the continued credibility of the non-
recognition policy was rooted in the fact that the diplomats who represented Baltic interests 
were those who were assigned to the United States by the independent interwar republics. For 
the Baltic exiles, the continuation of having Baltic diplomats recognized by several countries 
in the free world provided both practical assistance for the refugees as well as providing a 
close sense of legitimacy of the exiles to the interwar republics. The fact that the State 
Department wished not to become heavily involved in intra-exile politics necessarily meant 
that disagreements regularly occurred when it came to succession plans for the diplomats. 
By 1948 it became clear that the Baltic republics were not going to regain their 
independence in the foreseeable future and the decision to continue the non-recognition of the 
Soviet annexation meant that at some point the United States government and the exiled 
diplomatic corps would have to make succession plans. This theoretical issue, however, 
became reality when Alfreds Bilmanis, Latvian Ambassador to the United States, died at his 
home in Rehoboth Beach, Delaware on 26 July 1948.5 Anatole Dinbergs, the Latvian 
legation’s attaché, contacted Vedeler that morning to ensure that American officials were 
aware of the situation.6 Bilmanis’ unexpected passing created a situation that threatened not 
only the ability of the Americans to legitimately argue that they continued to recognize 
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accredited Baltic diplomats, but also threatened the Baltic mission to preserve the memory of 
the interwar republics. 
Naturally, the diplomatic succession process had two requisites. First, the individual 
appointed as a successor would have to be accepted by the American State Department. 
Without the explicit approval of the American government, the individual selected by the 
Baltic diplomatic missions would play a particularly marginal role in their nations’ affairs. 
Second, the individual would have to be accepted by the national diplomatic corps, and 
hopefully by the majority of exiled diasporas. In the event that there would be conflict within 
the diplomatic corps or within the broader diaspora, the diplomatic selection process would 
have caused further disunity. 
 Of the three Baltic nations, the Latvians had the clearest succession plan for 
diplomatic representation while in exile. On 17 May 1940, the “last legal government of 
Latvia” appointed Karlis Zariņš with emergency state powers should the government in Riga 
be unable to perform the normal duties of operating the state.7 Of the various things that the 
emergency powers envisaged was the ability to appoint Latvian diplomatic representatives to 
various countries and to open and close legations.8 While this made things slightly more clear 
within the Latvian diplomatic corps, there were still issues about whether or not the 
Americans would recognize such extraordinary powers and whether the whole of the Latvian 
diaspora would feel well-represented. 
 After hearing about Bilmanis’ death, Dinbergs contacted Zariņš in London to make 
sure that the individual responsible for Latvian diplomatic appointments was made aware. 
Almost immediately, Zariņš sent a cable to Dinbergs stating, “Based on my Extraordinary 
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powers, I appoint you to take care of the Legation.”9 The following day, Dinbergs set up a 
meeting with Vedeler at the State Department building to discuss the succession plans, and 
inquired whether or not Zariņš had contacted the State Department about his nominating 
Dinbergs to be the placeholder at the Latvian legation. Dinbergs’ major concerns was that in 
the past, the United States Government had not recognized the legality of emergency state 
powers bestowed upon diplomatic official abroad, and that the American precedent could 
have a negative impact on the present situation.10 In an attempt to mitigate a potentially 
negative American position towards Zariņš’ declaration, Dinbergs presented Vedeler with a 
document signed by Bilmanis, while he was seriously ill, that would appoint Dinbergs as the 
legal successor to Bilmanis.11 
 Throughout the subsequent week, State Department policymakers led an internal 
debate about how to handle the succession issue. They were faced with a choice between 
allowing diplomatic representation from the Republic of Latvia to come to an end with 
Bilmanis’ death or they could extend credentials to another member of the Latvian exiled 
diplomatic corps. The failure to accredit a new Latvian diplomat would necessarily have 
consequences for the non-recognition policy, as the continued presence of Baltic diplomats in 
the United States was a central feature of the policy. The two big concerns were not to 
establish a precedent where any particular member of the diasporas could be appointed as a 
diplomat and secondly that the appointment of a diplomat would not cause unnecessary 
fractures within the diasporas. 
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 By 4 August 1948, the Office of European Affairs of the State Department decided 
that the United States would accept the credentials of Baltic diplomats so long as they are 
members of the independent nations’ diplomatic corps and did not cause any particularly 
deep fractures within the diasporas. The Director of European Affairs wrote to Under-
Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett arguing that the United States should recognize Dinbergs 
as the acting chargé d’affaires to the United States, and moreover, should recognize the 
extraordinary powers of Zariņš due to the fact that the United States “had wanted to continue 
the non-recognition of the Soviet annexation.”12 
 Dinbergs was able to consolidate his position as acting chargé d’affaires of the 
Latvian legation but Zariņš made it clear by the end of August that this was a temporary 
appointment. Due to the stature associated with being the Latvian minister to the United 
States, Zariņš began a debate about who should be the long-term Latvian appointed to the 
country who held the most unambiguous position towards Latvia’s annexation. The initial 
concerns of American officials about diplomatic appointments causing friction among 
Latvians were confirmed when Dinbergs began to assert his relationship with his American 
counterparts over the long-term Latvian representation in Washington. 
 Zariņš informed Lovett on 27 August that he was going to begin the process of 
appointing a permanent successor to Bilmanis who would be selected from former Latvian 
diplomats residing in Europe.13 The Office of European Affairs advised Lovett that there 
should be no objections to Zariņš appointing a permanent successor to Bilmanis.14 Zariņš’ 
extraordinary powers as chief of the Latvian diplomatic corps provided the Americans a 
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proper cover to shield themselves from criticism from other Latvians about the legitimacy of 
future appointments.  
 The idea of appointing another Latvian diplomat to the Washington post was of 
concern for Dinbergs who was most likely not going to be selected as Bilmanis’ permanent 
replacement. Throughout August and September, Dinbergs used his position as acting chargé 
d’affaires to try to influence the State Department in who would receive the diplomatic 
credentials. Dinbergs met with Johnson of the Baltic Desk on 30 August to inform him that 
he had provided Zariņš with a list of four Latvian diplomats in Europe who could be moved 
to the United States.15 When Dinbergs inquired whether or not he had acted properly in 
producing the list, Johnson refused to comment, stating that it was an issue to be decided by 
the Latvian authorities – not the Americans. Dinbergs also voiced his concern that in his own 
opinion Zariņš did not have the authority to appoint a new minister to the United States and 
that only the head of a Latvian government could make such decisions.16 Johnson responded 
by making it clear that the State Department would give proper consideration to whatever 
appointment Zariņš might make, but such technicalities would be dealt with should they arise. 
 Dinbergs’ overtures made it clear to the State Department that if it did not do 
something to assuage Dinbergs’ concerns, there could be future problems in the ability and/or 
the willingness of the Latvian legation’s staff to successfully work together once the new 
representative arrived. On 17 September, Johnson wrote to Salter about redrafting a 
memorandum intended for Lovett concerning the new Latvian representative. Johnson’s main 
argument was that the Latvian to replace Bilmanis should not have a rank higher than chargé 
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d’affaires and that Dinbergs should be strongly considered as the permanent replacement.17 
This seems to imply that American officials were concerned that unnecessary personal or 
professional tensions could arise by replacing Dinbergs with somebody new. From the 
American perspective, their only issue was that there was a Latvian diplomat in Washington 
that represented the interwar republic, not necessarily one who had the most prestige within 
the entire Latvian diplomatic corps.  
 Throughout the fall of 1948, Dinbergs continued to be the main contact that the State 
Department had with the Latvian diplomatic corps and competently worked on behalf of 
Latvian consular issues and anti-communist statements within the United States. As a result, 
he became someone that the Americans were comfortable working with and had begun the 
process of consolidating his position in the burgeoning American Latvian community. It was 
not until January 1949 when Zariņš intimated to Dinbergs and the Americans the direction 
that he would be taking in appointing someone to Washington. 
 Dinbergs met with Salter on 10 January 1949 to discuss the letter that Zariņš had sent 
to Washington elaborating on the criteria that he was using to select the new diplomat for 
Washington.18 Zariņš had not taken seriously the advice that the American ambassador in 
London had given him that Dinbergs was not one of the top choices.19 Dinbergs took the 
opportunity to explain to Salter in detail the various factions within the Latvian diaspora and 
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the implications that the selection of a diplomat would have on those factions. Dinbergs even 
raised the specter of Zariņš appointing Alfreds Valdmanis.20 
 Dinbergs left the meeting reiterating his opinion that Zariņš did not have the authority 
to appoint new heads of mission and that he might have had his official position in London 
undermined since the British had given de facto recognition to the Soviet annexation and that 
Zariņš and Bilmanis had discussions before his passing that should something happen to 
Zariņš then Bilmanis in Washington would assume the extraordinary diplomatic privileges. 
His thinking was that Zariņš had been compromised by the British official attitude towards 
the annexation and that the center of Latvian diplomatic activity should sit in the United 
States. Dinbergs also threatened that he would be compelled to resign “in protest” if the new 
diplomat was someone that he could not work with productively. Salter ended the meeting by 
saying that the United States still felt that Zariņš was entitled to exercise his special powers 
and that all parties should wait to draw conclusions until after Zariņš had made his 
selection.21 
 Ultimately Zariņš settled on appointing Jules Feldmans to be the Latvian chargé 
d’affaires to the United States in March 1949. Later in the month Dinbergs met with Salter to 
discuss the situation at the Latvian legation and ultimately apologized for his original attitude 
towards Latvian diplomatic succession. He thought that Feldmans was an excellent choice 
due to his relatively young age, but also his lengthy experience in the Latvian diplomatic 
corps.22 For the next four years, Feldmans proved to be instrumental in the development of 
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the Latvian community in the United States and serving as a vocal advocate on behalf of 
Latvian refugees in the United States and abroad.  
 Five years after Bilmanis’ passing, Dinbergs arrived at the State Department to inform 
Richard Johnson and Thomas Dillon of the Baltic Desk that Feldmans had died at his home 
on 16 August 1953.23 While Zariņš was quick to appoint Dinbergs as acting chargé d’affaires, 
the situation within the Latvian diaspora was markedly different. Unlike in 1948, there was a 
sizable and influential Latvian community residing in the United States and it was unclear 
who in the Latvian diplomatic corps would be as qualified and have the same prestige 
internationally as Feldmans.24 
 On 17 August, the same day that Dinbergs informed State Department officials that 
Feldmans had died, two prominent Latvians, Vaivada and Paul Hartman, met with Dillon and 
Johnson to discuss the State Department’s views on Feldmans’ replacement.25 Vaivada and 
Hartman’s real objectives, however, were to forward their own candidate for the replacement. 
The two Latvians suggested that Gunars Meierovics should be named the new Latvian chargé 
d’affaires to the United States. They argued that Meirovics’ father had been an outstanding 
Latvian patriot and the name had considerable appeal among all Latvians. Additionally, they 
stated that Meirovics’ had not been involved in any of the exile political conflicts that had 
been taking place and have never been a member of a particular political party. Nevertheless, 
he was currently acting on the board of the ALA. Finally, they pointed out that Meirovics 
was completely pro-Western in his sentiments, believed that the United States was the only 
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world power that could help in liberating Latvia, and could be seen as a unifying force among 
the various émigré factions.26 
 Johnson and Dillon responded that it would be problematic for Meirovics to assume 
such a position for two primary reasons. First, he had never been a member of the Latvian 
diplomatic corps and from both the American and Latvian position, appointing someone 
outside the corps would erode the legitimacy of the Latvian diplomats and the non-
recognition policy. Second, Meirovics had already started the process of politically 
assimilating into the United States by applying for American citizenship. Johnson stated that 
“the fact that Meierovics has his U.S. Papers would make him appear as an American 
stooge.”27 
 Over the course of the next month, the topic of who would replace Feldmans was the 
most important issue among Latvians residing in the United States as well as in Europe. The 
ALA put forward a number of other candidates who could be considered for the position.28 
Dinbergs also kept the Americans informed of the candidates that various Latvian 
organizations in Europe were pushing upon Zariņš. The frontrunner, however, most likely 
was Janis Tepfors, since he was considered in 1948 before finally settling on Feldmans.29 The 
issue of who would replace Feldmans also was broadly discussed when Zariņš made a visit to 
the United States in September 1953.30 
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 Despite the intrigue that had taken place in the Latvian diaspora over who would 
replace Feldmans, a more important debate was beginning to unfold among Latvians about 
the role that Latvian political history would have on the selection of the new representative in 
the United States.31 Within the Latvian diaspora there existed a split over the legacy of the 
1922 constitution. The 1922 constitution was perceived by Karlis Ulmanis and his supporters 
as defective in that it permitted the existence of too many small political parties. As a result, a 
string of unstable majorities formed governments in the parliament. Ulmanis disbanded all 
political parties and fashioned three new political parties: one for industrial laborers, one for 
farmers, and one for the middle class.32 
 By January 1954, Zariņš had decided that Roberts Liepins should be viewed as one of 
the frontrunners for the position in Washington. From 1936-1940, Lieipins served as Riga’s 
mayor. The point of contention between certain elements of the Latvian diaspora and the 
selection of Liepins as the new minister in Washington was whether or not Liepins had been 
elected mayor based on some sort of limited suffrage in 1936 or if he had been appointed 
mayor.33 The other primary candidate happened to be Grosvalds who had been residing in 
France and Switzerland during the early 1930s. Grosvalds qualifications were based on his 
lengthy diplomatic experience and his excellent command of English. Unfortunately, the 
Americans had got to know him quite well through the embassy in Paris. When Zariņš had 
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met with several American policymakers in October 1953, they made clear to Zariņš that 
Grosvalds would be a less than ideal candidate.34 
 Zariņš finally made his decision after a certain amount of fallout within the diaspora 
about the prospects of someone so closely tied to the Ulmanis regime becoming one of the 
most important diplomats among the Latvian exiles. Arnolds Spekke was selected in May 
1954, and was received by the State Department on 6 May 1954. Credentials were ultimately 
presented to Dulles on 24 May instead with Eisenhower who had other engagements.35 
 
The Estonian Exile Government: Exile Politics in an Unwelcoming Environment 
The first, and arguably most important, politically active Estonian exile organization 
established in Sweden was the Estonian National Council (ERN – Eesti Rahvusnõukogu). 
The ERN was established in 1947 by August Rei and claimed to be the center of the political 
struggle of Estonians living outside of their occupied country.36 Despite being based in 
Sweden, it was clear that the ERN’s objectives were not just limited to establishing a 
structure to Estonian political life in Sweden. Indeed, the organization’s four stated objectives 
highlight this fact. First, the ERN sought to “unite all Estonians living in the free world in the 
effort to secure freedom and a happier future for their people.” Second, the ERN hoped to 
“form a well-organized and firm link in the front of freedom, which is being erected in the 
entire world against the totalitarian tyranny of the East.” Third, the ERN wanted to “develop 
the most intimate collaboration with all national and international organizations opposed to 
international communism and to maintain close contact with the resistance movement of 
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Central and Eastern Europe.” Finally, the ERN was created to “form a coordinating center for 
the numerous Estonian political organizations in exile at present active in Sweden, England, 
the United States, Canada, and elsewhere.”37 
 A distinguishing feature of the ERN from other Estonian refugee organization was 
that it perceived itself as the only legitimate body to continue the institutions of the Uluots 
government. The membership of several former high-ranking government ministers including 
August Rei (Foreign Minister), Rudolf Penno, (Industry Minister), and Johannes Klesment 
(Justice Minister) bolstered ERN’s position within the broader Estonian emigration. In 
addition, ERN’s General Assembly was comprised of the four principal Estonian political 
parties in equal proportion: the Estonian Agrarian Party, the United Party of Farmers and 
Smallholders, the National Center Party, and the Socialist Associations.38 
 Certainly the ERN had some fundamental advantages over other Estonian exile 
organizations, such as having former high-ranking government officials as members, a 
majority of the diaspora residing in its home location, and the desire to create a mandate from 
as broad a cross-section of Estonian exile society as possible. The ERN, however, faced a 
number of significant challenges during the late 1940s and early 1950s to succeed in its 
mission of being a unifying force among Estonian exile society. Of primary importance was 
the necessity to overcome the marginal position that Sweden played in the anti-communist 
world during the early Cold War years.  
 The failure of the Swedish government to take a rhetorically forceful position against 
the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States meant that there was the possibility that the 
Swedish government would place restrictions on the establishment of politically active exile 
activities within their country. Such restrictions were indeed put in place immediately 
following the establishment of the ERN. Anything that could be misconstrued as establishing 





a government in exile was strictly forbidden. Considering the broad makeup of the ERN and 
their explicit statement that they represented the government that was in existence in 1945 the 
Swedish decision meant that ERN’s activities were necessarily curtailed. As a result, the 
ERN began to seek assistance from various NGOs, Eastern European exile organizations, and 
foreign governments, including the United States. 
 Throughout 1948 and 1949, Rei began a letter writing campaign to the State 
Department, White House, and certain members of the U.S. Congress that were known to be 
sympathetic to the Baltic cause. The bulk of the material was merely informative in nature, 
including pamphlets concerning ERN’s composition, with the hope that the country that had 
the most unequivocal position on the international status of the Baltic republics would 
support the ERN’s causes (at the very least boosting its morale.) While the American 
Embassy in Sweden kept the State Department informed of the various activities of Estonian 
exiles in Stockholm, American bureaucrats also relied upon information provided by Kaiv on 
political activities that would have an impact on the Estonian diaspora. 
 In January 1949, Harold Vedeler asked Kaiv to provide any information that he might 
have about the composition of the ERN generally, and the position that Rei had within the 
Estonian diaspora more specifically. Kaiv immediately replied stating that the ERN appeared 
similar to “the so-called liberation committees organized by some national groups whose 
countries are at present directly or indirectly under Soviet domination.”39 Kaiv continued that 
“the council is a patriotic organization,” but the memo has been composed and dispatched 
“without previous consultation with me.”40 From the very beginning of the ERN’s attempts to 
garner favor with the Americans, it is clear that Kaiv viewed the council’s makeup as being a 
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competing political bloc. After 1949, the ability of the ERN to earn any favor with the 
Americans was entirely dependent on the working relationship that Rei had with Kaiv. 
 One implication of the narrow constraints that the Swedish government placed on 
Estonian activities was that ERN was limited in its ability to raise funds and grant salaries to 
organizers. Throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, Rei received a stipend from the Swedish 
government to work as an archivist. During a regularly scheduled meeting between the 
Estonian Consul in New York and State Department Baltic desk officials, Kaiv inquired 
whether it would be possible to provide Rei with a $5,000 stipend from the Estonian frozen 
assets in the United States. While Kaiv was hoping to alleviate the possibility of Sweden 
ending Rei’s stipend and causing a blow to Estonian credibility internationally, he framed the 
question to the Americans in a manner that would place a salary for Rei within one of the 
larger American concerns for the Balts – unification within the diasporas. Kaiv suggested, 
“His personal relations with Rei might also be improved if it would be possible to provide 
some funds [for Rei.]”41 
 Even though Kaiv insisted that doing so would not lend any official character to Rei’s 
position in Stockholm in relation to the Estonian diplomatic corps, the primary importance 
for the Americans was to insure that the Estonian General Consul’s office remained viable. 
Johnson told Kaiv that the State Department would be reluctant to authorize an appropriation 
for Rei if it would substantially increase the Estonian consul’s annual budget.42 Kaiv’s 
inability or unwillingness to reduce his own expenses or the expenses of other accredited 
Estonian diplomats created a situation where there was no possibility of establishing 
rapprochement between Kaiv and Rei based on providing a salary for the former foreign 
minister. 
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 The ongoing problem of trying to circumvent Kaiv, however, was not the most 
important issue that the ERN faced while trying to establish itself as the preeminent Estonian 
organization in exile. As Cold War tensions increased, the political leanings of most 
Estonians in exile became more homogeneous. All major political parties in interwar Estonia 
secured maintained some popularity in exile, but a significant portion of Estonian refugees 
leaned more towards the Right as they were middle class and largely bourgeois in their 
homelands. August Rei, however, continued to be an unapologetic Social Democrat – even in 
exile. While by no means an agenda killer, it made Rei increasingly vulnerable to competing 
power blocs establishing themselves in Sweden. 
 In the early 1950s, a second major Estonian organization was established in Sweden. 
The Central Organization of Free Estonians (Vabade Eestlaste Ülemaailmne 
Keskorganisatsioon – VEKO) was comprised mainly of individuals who were less prominent 
in independent Estonia since they were younger, but decided that members of the old 
government no longer represented the attitudes of Estonians in exile. What the VEKO lacked 
in direct ties to the former independent Estonian government, it made up for in its youth and 
broad appeal across the increasingly single issued Estonian diaspora. For younger Estonians 
in exile it became less important to mimic every government institution and political party 
that was in place during the period of independence and more important to demonstrate to the 
international community that free Estonians were anti-communist and promoted the 
liberation of their homelands. 
 While a power struggle between ERN and VEKO began in earnest in the 1950s and 
VEKO quickly earned the sympathies of most Estonians in exile that lived in the United 
States and Canada, there was very little ideological difference between the two organizations. 
Foreign diplomats in Stockholm astutely noted, “The singly unifying motivation among 
Estonians is the struggle for an independent homeland. There are no important ideological 
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differences between the ERN and VEKO and both include representatives of all political 
parties.”43 Throughout 1951–1952 while the United States was trying to foster growing 
cooperation among Eastern European exile groups through the NCFE, the Estonians were 
splintering into even more political factions. 
 A general theme of meetings between Kaiv and his counterparts in Washington was 
how to bridge the divide between the ERN and VEKO. Vedeler pressed Kaiv on the issue 
during a September 1952 meeting and Kaiv mentioned the idea that a “Secretariat General” 
was being discussed between individuals representing Estonian organizations in the United 
States (mainly the Committee for a Free Estonia), Canada, and ERN, and VEKO. The new 
secretariat was supposed to be seated in New York and would consist of seven members, 
including two from Canada, one from the United States, Australia, Germany, and two from 
Sweden (ostensibly being one representing VEKO and one representing ERN.)44 This 
organization, intended to assist in unifying the Estonian diaspora in a way that the Committee 
for a Free Estonia had been unable to up until this point, however, never came to fruition. 
Simply, the primary concern of the Estonians in exile was not creating a unified front to assist 
in the liberation of their homelands, but to enhance their own position of power in the 
Estonian diaspora. 
 An important component of leading Estonian exiles’ ideology was that they were to 
be the foundation of any future independent, and democratic Estonia. The lack of a 
government-in-exile became one of the most pressing problems that faced the Estonian 
diaspora. The establishment of a viable government-in-exile would not only demonstrate to 
the international community that the Estonian diaspora was serious about returning home 
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once their country had been liberated, but it was also argued that it would establish a sense of 
unity among the exiles that had alluded them since entering into exile. 
 The rhetoric of establishing unity among the exiles, however, should really be 
interpreted as a desire by leading Estonian exiles to consolidate their power within the 
diaspora as opposed to an altruistic plan to foster rapprochement with exile groups that would 
be marginalized by the existence of such a government. Over the course of 1952, support for 
establishing an exiled government became more apparent across broad portions of the 
Estonian exile community. Even exiles, such as Kaiv, who could potentially be undermined 
by such a step, appear to have given tacit support for the government’s establishment. In July 
1952, Kaiv gave a speech before the ERN where he argued that since there existed a 
provision within the 1938 Estonian constitution to establish an exile government it might be 
an available option to further the objectives of combatting the Soviet presence in their 
homelands.45 
 Kaiv, however, warned that a government should only be established if it was able to 
garner significant support across the Estonian diaspora. If the government was unable to do 
so, then Kaiv feared that such an entity would never win enough international recognition to 
be perceived as a viable government. 46 While it is impossible to ascertain whether or not 
Kaiv’s tacit endorsement of the establishment of an exile government provided the necessary 
catalyst for one to be organized, historian Vahur Made has argued that Kaiv’s interpretation 
of the 1938 Constitution provided enough of an impetus for two competing Estonians to 
declare exiled governments in early 1953. 
 The ongoing debate over the establishment of an exile government focused on the 
existing split in the Estonian diaspora between those that supported Rei and the ERN and 
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those that supported VEKO, and its most prominent member who was a politician Edward 
Maurer. On 2 January 1953, Maurer and his VEKO supporters organized a meeting in 
Stockholm where they decided to convene the Electoral Body necessary to establish an exiled 
government. Sensing that the window was quickly closing on the exiled government debate, 
Rei traveled from Stockholm to Oslo on 12 January 1953 and established an Estonian 
government-in-exile. Rei’s claim for establishing the government was that he has served as 
Acting President of the Republic since he had been the oldest surviving member of the last 
free Estonian government.47  
Why did Rei travel to Oslo to establish the exiled government instead of Stockholm? 
Throughout 1951 and 1952, “friendly Norwegians” who offered to introduce him to key 
American military and civilian officials there had invited Rei to Oslo.48 While such overt 
support never materialized between Rei and his American interlocutors, the experience 
proved to be invaluable in ascertaining what the Norwegian attitude would be towards an 
exile government being declared on their territory. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry made it 
clear that it would not interfere in the establishment of such a government and that from the 
Norwegian perspective it had zero significance. The Swedish government, however, appeared 
to be quite sensitive to the idea of an Estonian exile government operating on its territory. 
Upon the exile government’s return to Stockholm, on 31 January, the Swedish Foreign 
Minister clearly informed Rei that the Swedish government would not recognize the newly 
created exile government and that Estonians residing in Sweden did not have the right to 
carry out political activities in the country.49 Simply, the Norwegians had less concern about 
exiles engaging in political activities within their border compared to the Swedes. 
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Rei’s actions, however, did not dissuade Maurer from moving toward the 
establishment of his government. On 2 March 1953, Maurer established a second Estonian 
exile government in Augustdorf, Germany based on the Electoral Body that had been 
mandated in Stockholm that January. Maurer nominated an Estonian cabinet, and attempted 
to appoint an Estonian from each of the major centers of Estonian exiles to the cabinet 
positions. As a result, by March 1953, the Estonian diaspora and its supporters in the West 
were faced with not one exile government, but two. 
The government in exile was supposed to add another tool to the Estonian diaspora’s 
arsenal against the Soviet Union, whilst providing a unifying force within the community, but 
instead ultimately created even deeper fissures. Logically, the Rei government refused to 
recognize the Maurer government, and visa versa. The power struggle between the ERN and 
VEKO that had been developing over the course of the early 1950s established two political 
camps over which group’s exile government would ultimately speak on behalf of the 
Estonian people. Ultimately, the legal issue of whether it was appropriate for an exile 
government to be organized was ultimately elevated to a political one between two émigré 
organizations. 
 Despite the general growing tensions between the ERN and VEKO, the rationale for 
the establishment of two exiled governments was rooted in conflicting interpretations of the 
1938 Estonian Constitution and how it would handle the possibility of an exile government. 
Yet again, political issues from the 1930s plagued political issues in the 1950s. The 
Constitution stated that should both the President and Prime Minister be unable to fulfill their 
responsibilities to the nation, the oldest member of the government should become acting 
President and Prime Minister. The imprisonment of the former president and deputy prime 
minister, and death of the prime minister meant that the 1944 Estonian government had no 
leader. August Rei assumed the titles Acting President and Prime Minister as he had been the 
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most senior member of the 1944 Estonian government and had gained the support of many 
other government politicians who successfully fled to Sweden. Maurer and other leading 
Estonian politicians who had fled elsewhere rejected this interpretation of the Estonian 
Constitution and claimed that should the President and Prime Minister be unable to govern 
than an Electoral Body consisting of politicians and civil servants should be established to 
elect the new president. 
 The minutiae of the arguments revolved around the interpretation of Article 46 of the 
1938 Constitution. The article stated that such a Constitutional Electoral Board would have to 
be appointed if the office of the President became vacant in times of war. Maurer and his 
supporters claimed that the President’s office had clearly become vacant because of World 
War II. Rei, however, argued that Estonia never entered a state of war despite everything that 
had taken place between 1944 and 1945. As a result, there was no need convene the Electoral 
board.50 
 The political context of the ongoing struggle between the two governments goes back 
to the rudimentary conflict between the ERN and VEKO. Rei was a social democrat who did 
not necessarily hold the same contemporary ideological stance of the majority of the Estonian 
exiles. Simply, some people “did not think it is appropriate for the Estonian Government in 
exile to be led by Socialists.”51 Matters were complicated by the opinion of many Estonians 
exiles who were not members of either VEKO or ERN who thought that it was best that there 
be an agreement between the two bodies so that only one government would function.52 In 
this one instance, Rei and Maurer agreed that this was a nonstarter. 
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 Perhaps the single most important question pertaining to the rationale for establishing 
exile governments is whether or not it was realistic for the Estonian exiles to expect there to 
be any widespread international support for such an endeavor? Clearly it was not expected 
that governments such as Sweden would tolerate an exiled Estonian government to function 
within their borders, so it is more likely that the Estonians would expect nations, such as the 
United States, to support such an endeavor. Unfortunately, the State Department had a long-
standing policy not to recognize exile governments.  
 A major concern of State Department officials once they began dealing strictly with 
Baltic exiles in the postwar period had always been that governments-in-exile would be 
established. Exile governments posed a profound threat to American aims of maintaining the 
non-recognition policy and fostering a growing sense of solidarity within each diaspora. In 
official policy briefings concerning the non-recognition policy, the State Department made 
clear that they continued to recognize the existing diplomatic missions from the 1940 
governments, but did not recognize any group that could be misconstrued as an exile 
government. The fear was that recognizing an exile government would call into question the 
continued recognition of the diplomatic missions. What would happen should the exile 
government decide to appoint a new diplomatic representative to the United States? 
Additionally, there was an acknowledgement among senior officials that exile groups were 
prone to rehashing old political arguments and an exile government would undermine any 
effort at national reconciliation. To what extent were the Estonian exiles cognizant of this 
American attitude? 
 Based on the reports of regular meetings between Kaiv and American diplomats, the 
State Department was quite unequivocal about its position on exile governments. As early as 
1949, the State Department became cognizant of the threat of Rei creating an exile 
government based on the structures of ERN. On 15 March, Marshall, a lawyer representing 
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Estonian interests in the United States contacted Salter and Johnson about the possibility of 
securing funds for ERN to establish an Estonian government-in-exile. Johnson tersely replied 
that while the State Department had sympathy for the work that Rei and the ERN were trying 
to accomplish in Sweden, the United States would not recognize that group as an Estonian 
government in exile.53 
 In the same meeting where Kaiv discussed the establishment of an Estonian 
Secretariat General in New York, he floated the idea of establishing a “legal government” 
that had been the preoccupation of much of the diaspora in Sweden, as a means of 
maintaining legal continuity for a future Estonian government. Vedeler used the opportunity 
to reiterate the point that Kaiv had already known perfectly well. The State Department’s 
position had not changed that they saw no practical functions for an exile government and 
that the United States would not recognize such an action.54 These discussions make it clear 
that Kaiv saw no possibility of any western government recognizing an Estonian 
government-in-exile. Nevertheless, the Estonians continued to pursue such a policy and Kaiv 
tacitly endorsed the policy by stating to Estonians in Sweden as well as American diplomats 
that the issue of recognition was not necessarily important, but that the question of legal 
succession of the Estonian interwar government was of principal importance for the Estonian 
diaspora. 
 Adolf Perandi, member of the National Committee for a Free Estonia, was consulted 
by his American interlocutors to analyze the reason why the Estonians pursued the idea of an 
exile government in the first place. Perandi referred to Uluots who wrote while still in 
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Estonia that “in the soul of the Estonian people is rooted a deep feeling for legality.”55 This 
strong allegiance to legality among the Estonian diaspora was one reason why there was such 
a demand by the Estonian exiles for a government to be put into place. The primary reason 
for the rush towards taking such actions, Perandi argued, was because the members of the 
government who are in exile will die sooner or later, and if they all died, it would be 
impossible to elect a Deputy Premier who would represent the legal continuity of the 
Estonian government.56 
 Although the two competing exile governments fell along general organizational lines 
between those who were members of VEKO and those who belonged to ERN, both 
governments had to consolidate their own legitimacy in the eyes of their own supporters and 
try to garner support from Estonians outside of their respective groups. Throughout the spring 
1953, both Rei and Maurer held regular meetings among their supporters to obtain explicit 
support for the sustainability of their governments. 
 Rei called a meeting of the ERN on 18 April 1953 to persuade the organization’s 
members to throw their support behind the Oslo exile government. Helder Tõnisson, son of 
Jaan Tõnisson, and leading voice in the Estonian Liberal Party had indicated before the 
meeting that the Liberal Party would not acknowledge Rei’s group as the legal Estonian 
government.57 Tõnisson threatened that the Liberal Party’s position within the ERN was 
strong enough that it would be possible to prevent the Council from fully supporting the exile 
government. Nevertheless, Rei moved forward with the vote and succeeded in gaining the 
backing of the ERN.58 
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 The ERN’s endorsement of Rei’s exile government had two implications. First, it 
caused a small fracturing within the Estonian diaspora within Sweden. All political parties 
associated with the ERN voted in favor of the exile government except the Liberal Party. 
This unnecessarily exasperated tensions within the ERN structure. Second, it reinforced Rei’s 
insistance that his government was the only legitimate government-in-exile. Had Rei been 
unsuccessful in obtaining ERN’s support, he might have been forced to reach some 
settlement with Maurer’s supporters in Germany. As a result of ERN’s support for the Rei 
Government, Maurer went ahead with appointing three cabinet members to his exile 
government: Ilmar Raamot as Minister of Agriculture, Nikolai Kütt as Minister of Trade, and 
Leonhard Vahter as Minister of Foreign Affairs. All three individuals resided in the Untied 
States, while Raamot and Kütt served as members of the Free Estonia Committee.59 
 The dispute between the two competing exile governments ultimately came to a 
conclusion when Maurer died in September 1954.60 Throughout the 1950s, meetings of the 
Rei government were continuously held in Stockholm and their activities primarily consisted 
of issuing declarations condemning the Soviet occupation of the Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania and attempted to assist in resolving technical matters between the Estonian exile 
community in Sweden and the Swedish government on things such as citizenship and 
passport issues.61 The government-in-exile, however, never gained widespread support 
among the worldwide Estonian community. The manner in which Rei consolidated his power 
within the ERN, coupled with his social democratic background and living in a country that 
had a contentious policy towards the Baltic States served to marginalize the exile government 
even further. 
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 Maurer’s death and the dissolution of the Augustdorf government-in-exile did not 
assuage the concerns of Estonians who did not recognize the ERN’s authority over the 
Estonian diaspora. The debate quickly shifted to the Estonian National Committee that had 
been established in the United States to organize Estonian political efforts in North America. 
During the ENC’s October 1954 meeting, Kaiv was asked to address the Committee’s body 
and directly addressed the issue of the exile government, which was on the organization’s 
agenda.  
 Kaiv backtracked from his earlier position that an exile government would be useful 
in maintaining the legal continuity of the Estonian government and made an argument that fit 
perfectly with the American attitude towards the idea of an Estonian exile government. He 
stated: 
In order that the acts of an exile government be valid in a foreign country, it is 
necessary that the exile government be recognized by that country. According to 
international practices, the exile government must also have permission to function 
from the country where it is staying. 
 
The Government of the United States does not recognize now any exile government, 
and I do not see any reason to assume that they would make an exemption in regard to 
Estonia… The Same position has been taken also by other countries. Notes of an 
unrecognized government or its ministers are not accepted by foreign governments, 
which means that an Estonian government without recognition cannot officially 
function even in the field of foreign affairs.62 
 
Kaiv made the point that the hopes had been placed on the exile government to provide a 
sense of unity among Estonian exiles and guide the activities of the many Estonian 
organizations that had been created to advance the cause of Estonian freedom. This, however, 
would only have occurred if  “we [the Estonians] had a harmoniously chosen government.”63 
As there had been allegations made by some prominent Estonians, such as Rei, that 
the diplomatic corps did not support the establishment of an exile government, Kaiv stressed 
                                                            
62 Kaiv Speech on 30 October 1954. “Folder: E801 General Political Affairs - External” Records Relating to the 
Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 5, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department 
of State, NAII. 
63 Ibid.  
 
 141 
that continuing assistance to establish a government-in-exile would only do damage to the 
unique diplomatic situation that the Baltic exiles had at their disposal – the continued 
recognition of diplomatic representatives in certain countries in the free world. He stated that 
the United States, along with other countries, accepted the appointed diplomatic 
representatives from the Päts government and only the Päts government. As a result, if there 
were to be any changes to the government that the United States recognized, i.e. an exile 
government based in Sweden, the legitimacy of the diplomatic representatives would be 
completely undermined. Estonians would then have an exiled government with little 
legitimacy and an exiled diplomatic corps with little legitimacy. 
 As has been pointed out, American policy officials were not excited about the 
prospect of an Estonian exile government coming into existence. State Department officials 
were concerned with maintaining legitimacy behind the non-recognition policy and working 
towards reconciliation within the Estonian diaspora. The government-in-exile was ultimately 
a threat to both of these positions. The continued push by leading political exiles for the 
establishment of a government-in-exile did not foster reconciliation, but represented a wedge 
issue within the communities. At the same time, there were fears that a government-in-exile 
would attempt to establish official diplomatic representation with individual nations, which 
would not only exacerbate tensions within the community, but undermine the non-
recognition policy’s legitimacy. 
 
The Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania and the Lithuanian Diplomats 
Of the three Baltic nationalities, the Lithuanian diaspora was in many ways the most 
organized. The ALT had been established in the United States dating back to the World War 
II period and had close contacts to influential Americans and the backing of the large 
historical Lithuanian community in the United States to back it. The Lithuanians had more 
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legations that not only worked in Washington and London, but also Paris, the Vatican, and 
Montevideo, with other consular offices throughout North America, Latin America, and 
Europe.64 The Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania (VLIK) was by far the 
most prominent Lithuanian organization in Europe and owed much of its perceived strength 
to its legitimacy as maintaining many of the political structures from the interwar period in 
place. 
 Although many other smaller organizations represented different cultural and political 
ideologies within the broader Lithuanian community, the relative size of the major players in 
Lithuanian exile politics created a situation where it would be possible for a coherent and 
unified diaspora to come into existence. Indeed, American policymakers had constant and 
regular contacts with all three major Lithuanian factions during the 1940s and 1950s. The 
possible benefits of having three powerful blocs within the Lithuanian diaspora, however, 
allowed for the possibility that the development of factions could have a very negative long-
term impact on unity within the diaspora. 
 The Red Army’s westward advance filled the void that was created by the retreating 
Germany Army during 1944. The VLIK felt it was imperative to maintain and preserve its 
own organization, so the leaders in Lithuania forwarded written authorization to Monsignor 
Mykolas Krupavičius, attorney Rapolas Skipitis, and diplomat Vaclovas Sidzikauskas to 
reconstitute the VLIK in Berlin during October 1944.65 When the Red Army forces began to 
approach Berlin, the VLIK moved to Würzburg, which was soon brought under the American 
military occupation forces.66  
While working at Würzburg, the VLIK’s agenda had three main initiatives. The first 
was to establish lines of communication with the Lithuanian diplomatic corps around the 
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world and the American occupation forces. The hope of quickly establishing dialogue with 
the two groups that were seen as most important to the liberation of Lithuania was to make it 
clear that the VLIK was the only political Lithuanian representative body in exile.67 Second, 
was to provide assistance to the 60,000 to 70,000 Lithuanian refugees who had fled to 
Germany. On one hand, the VLIK tried to make it clear to the occupation forces that 
Lithuanians were not to be repatriated, due to the position that western governments had 
towards the Soviet annexation. On the other hand, there were short-term practical things 
needed, such as obtaining material and medical assistance. To facilitate this, the VLIK 
reestablished the board of the Lithuanian Red Cross.68 Third, the VLIK began an aggressive 
memorandum issuing campaign to try to get Lithuania discussed at postwar conferences.69 
The VLIK’s role was not strictly limited to political fighting for the restoration of 
Lithuanian independence and caring for Lithuanian refugees in Western Europe. An 
important component of the VLIK’s mandate was to provide material support and 
intelligence to Lithuanian partisans in the Soviet Union. It is in this context that American 
intelligence officials first made contact with the VLIK’s leadership. From 1945-1947, the 
United States sponsored covert paramilitary operations into the Soviet Union and the VLIK 
played an important role. In exchange for financial support, the VLIK offered the Americans 
intelligence from within the Soviet Union, access to partisans who could engage in 
paramilitary operations, and a pool of recruits who could be utilized for future covert 
operations. Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact amount of funds that the VLIK 
received from the OSS and eventually the CIA due to document declassification, State 
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Department documents that deal with the VLIK do allude to the fact that the VLIK had 
“American friends” throughout the organization’s existence.70 
The VLIK expanded its contacts with Americans beyond the intelligence community 
by making a “goodwill mission” to the United States from January to May 1949.71 
Krupavičius and Sidzikauskas traveled to the most important locations in North America for 
the fight for Lithuanian independence, being Washington, Chicago, Ottawa, and other 
important cities such as Cleveland. The two sought to establish closer contacts with important 
foreign policy makers in the United States, exchange ideas with Žadeikis, discuss how the 
broader Lithuanian community in the United States could help towards the liberation of their 
homeland, and to give the American people a first-hand account of what had been taking 
place in the Baltic region since 1940. 
The ALT arranged an itinerary for Krupavičius and Sidzikauskas to visit important 
Lithuanian communities throughout North America. Commemorating the thirty-first 
anniversary of Lithuanian independence, a joint ALT-VLIK fundraiser took place in Chicago 
on 16 February 1949, which marked the point where a close connection between the majority 
of American Lithuanians and the exiles based in Europe came into being.72 Sidzikauskas also 
visited Ottawa where he was introduced to the leaders of the Lithuanian community in 
Canada, discussed with recent Lithuanian immigrants their experiences, and made contacts 
with the Canadian foreign ministry. 
The VLIK delegation’s most important task, however, was to make contacts with 
American policymakers and gain their support in establishing close relations with Žadeikis 
and the ALT. Krupavičius and Sidzikauskas, accompanied by the Lithuanian minister in 
Washington held an informal dinner on 31 January with Salter of the State Department’s 
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Baltic Desk.73 In addition to submitting the usual pro forma memoranda to the State 
Department on VLIK’s activities and the situation in Lithuania, the delegation was successful 
in making a good impression on the Americans.74 While discussing policy towards the Soviet 
Union, Sidzikauskas stated that “the work of his Committee was closely followed by 
Lithuanians at home and abroad and that he wished to be able to reassure his people that the 
United States was going to continue to stand with Lithuania.” As this clearly referenced the 
continuation of the non-recognition policy, Salter replied that there was no thought of 
changing American policy towards Lithuania and that the thoughts of the American people 
were with Lithuania.75  
Subsequent meetings over the next several months with State Department officials 
dealt with more substantive issues. Like most exile groups, the VLIK viewed the State 
Department as was one of many different sources of funding. On 20 May 1949, Sidzikauskas 
inquired if it would be possible to have access to frozen Lithuanian assets in the United States 
to continue their work. Sidzikauskas reminded Salter that VLIK had earned the support of 
most Lithuanians in the free world and represented the political structure of interwar 
Lithuania more than any other Lithuanian exile organization.76 The State Department’s 
response was exactly the same as it was to similar requests from Baltic exile groups – the 
funds were to be used exclusively for the continuation of the existing diplomatic missions 
and not used on the endeavors of various exile groups.  
Before leaving to return to Europe, Sidzikauskas also asked whether the State 
Department viewed it as advisable to relocate the VLIK’s headquarters as sovereignty was 
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slowly being restored to Germany.77 There was a great deal of consternation within the 
Lithuanian community living in Germany that once the United States began to end its 
occupation of Germany the Soviet Union might invade these territories. Johnson responded, 
stating that “if the Committee wished to move from Germany, it would nonetheless be well to 
remain as near at hand as possible to the bulk of the Lithuanian people. The Americans 
suspected that Sidzikauskas hoped that the State Department would make an explicit offer to 
assist the VLIK to move their headquarters from Germany to the United States. The first of 
two main rationales for such an interpretation was that the Lithuanians genuinely feared 
staying in Europe and moving the VLIK would expedite even more immigration to the 
United States. The second rationale was that the VLIK was attempting to consolidate its 
position among free Lithuanians and the United States had been the historical center of the 
Lithuanian diaspora.78 
There were two major problems with the State Department agreeing to move VLIK to 
the United States. First, the VLIK continued to play an important role for the American 
intelligence community by providing information transmitted by Lithuanian partisans and 
serving as a medium for supplying partisans through the use of American covert efforts. Any 
attempt to move VLIK away from relatively close proximity of the Soviet Union would 
undermine these efforts. Second, the State Department and other pertinent branches of the 
American government had already created close and reliable contacts to American Lithuanian 
organizations, such as the ALT that did not have all of the baggage associated with exile 
organizations, since it had largely been constituted by American citizens of Lithuanian 
descent. Although the ALT and the VLIK cooperated in a number of areas during the three-
month trip, there were two potential problems. Closer collaboration between the ALT and the 
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VLIK could mean that the ALT would become more deeply involved in émigré politics to the 
detriment of the organization being a reliable anti-communist group of American citizens. 
There was also the possibility that members of the VLIK would attempt to usurp power from 
the ALT within the United States and create a situation of friction where there had once been 
relatively close cooperation among all Lithuanians living in the United States. 
 In addition to the decision to create the VLIK Executive Council and who would 
make up the nucleus of the Lithuanian delegation to a peace treaty, the other important issue 
that leading Lithuanian exiles took up at the July 1946 conference in Bern, Switzerland was 
how to delineate responsibilities between the VLIK and the exiled diplomats.79 The two 
groups had worked as closely as possible during the war years on issues concerning the 
political status of Lithuania. As it became clear, however, that significant external pressure 
would be required for Lithuania to regain its independence after World War II, the overlap 
between what the exiled diplomats were pursuing in the countries where they resided and 
what the VLIK was trying to accomplish in Europe became more pronounced. Such issues 
were related to resettling displaced persons in the West and insuring that Western 
governments did not change their attitude towards the non-recognition policy. Such 
overlapping activities often raised problems of delegating tasks, assuming competencies, and 
coordinating efforts. 
 During the 1946 Bern Conference, Stasys Lozoraitis, Chief of the Lithuanian 
Diplomatic Service, was invited to negotiate incorporating the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service 
into the VLIK’s Executive Council. Krupavičius made the point that Lozoraitis would take 
charge of the new organization’s foreign affairs.80 The VLIK’s goal of making such an 
arrangement was to elevate the organization’s status to essentially an exiled Lithuanian 
government, without necessarily using that name. By incorporating the diplomats into the 
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Executive Council’s hierarchy and establishing a quasi-parliamentary institution, which 
would have the responsibility of appointing members to the Executive Council, VLIK would 
no longer be merely the most important Lithuanian exile organization, but would essentially 
serve as a reconstitution of independent Lithuanian political life in the West. 
 The VLIK’s leadership went forward and established the Executive Council at Bern. 
Lozoraitis refused to ratify the agreement between VLIK and the Lithuanian Diplomatic 
Service on the grounds that the diplomats owed their recognition by the governments that 
they were assigned to based on the appointments made by the Smetona government, so that 
any change in this relationship would be to the detriment to the continued recognition of 
Lithuanian diplomats. The subordination of the diplomats to the VLIK would be the exact 
type of situation where Lozoraitis would feel his position was threatened.81 Nevertheless, 
Lozoraitis stressed that he would continue to work with VLIK on issues that were important 
to Lithuania’s liberation. 
 Throughout the next several years a cold peace between the VLIK and the Lithuanian 
Diplomatic Service permitted these two powerful elements of the Lithuanian diaspora to 
work together on a number of issues. In August 1947, Lozoraitis and the VLIK’s Executive 
Council met in Paris to reconfirm political and diplomatic activities that were seen as 
important for Lithuania’s liberation, such as information and propaganda campaigns and 
fundraising.82 Most importantly, the question of where the Lithuanian DPs should be settled 
was discussed in Paris. By 1947, significant immigration to the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia, and various Latin American countries had already begun to take place. Both the 
VLIK and the Diplomatic Service were concerned that Lithuanian refugees would be 
scattered in myriad countries throughout the world and it would then be virtually impossible 
to reconstitute the Lithuanian nation once the homeland became liberated. The conference 
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decided that it was important to make every effort to promote immigration to countries that 
had old and well-established Lithuanian communities, namely the United States. As a result, 
there was an active campaign of making contacts with various Lithuanian-American 
organizations, such as the ALT, the United Lithuanian Relief Fund, as well as directly 
lobbying the American officials to change the quota system.83 In addition, every effort was 
undertaken to funnel Lithuanian immigration to countries where Lithuanians already resided. 
 The cold peace between the VLIK and Lozoraitis became a growing point of 
contention within the Lithuanian diaspora. As a result, by 1951 it became clear that some sort 
of a working agreement between the two groups would have to be reached. On 25 June 1951, 
Lozoraitis contacted the VLIK Executive Council proposing that the two groups meet to 
discuss the prospects of increasing the participation of all Lithuanians around the world who 
were working towards the liberation of Lithuania.84 The VLIK Executive Council accepted 
the invitation and on 4 September 1951, the head of the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service and 
members of the VLIK Executive Council met in Reutlingen, Germany to negotiate a 
framework for cooperation.85 By 13 September, an agreement was reached that would offer a 
broad framework for cooperation between the two groups and would preserve both groups’ 
autonomy.  
 The framework broadly defined the structure of Lithuanian exiled activity towards the 
liberation of the country. The idea that individual diplomats would report their activities and 
file disputes with Lozoraitis and that any subordinate VLIK officers would report their 
activities and file their disputes with the VLIK Executive Council was reiterated by both 
parties. More important, however, was that the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service and VLIK put 
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in place a structure where there would be joint sessions to consider all major political and 
diplomatic activity affecting Lithuania. In addition, a special separate body was to be created 
to coordinate connections with Soviet Lithuania seen as especially important once the time 
was right for aggressive liberation activities. Finally, both parties agreed that the VLIK 
Executive Council and the Diplomats would exert as much influence as necessary on various 
groups or prominent individuals within the Lithuanian diaspora to make sure that there would 
be no inconsistent messages sent to Western governments, polities, or to the homeland.86  
 The structure of the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service meant that once Lozoraitis signed 
the Reutlingen Agreement it would go to into effect on the side of the diplomats. This, 
however, was not the case with the VLIK Executive Council. During the Executive Council’s 
plenary meeting following the Reutlingen conference a vote was held on a motion to accept 
the Reutlingen Agreement. Surprisingly, the motion was rejected by a vote of five for, and 
five against.87 The vote exposed a growing point of contention within the VLIK Executive 
Council. On one hand, there were exiles strongly associated with Krupavičius who had 
wanted to maintain the status quo within the VLIK. On the other hand, there were those that 
were hoping to reorganize VLIK to better represent the current situation of Lithuania in the 
international system and the composition of the Lithuanian diaspora. The vote fell along lines 
that were tied to personal allegiance within the Lithuanian diaspora in addition to religious 
and political affiliations. 
 Over the following year, there were calls for more meetings between the Diplomatic 
Service and the VLIK Executive Council to negotiate some sort of a renewed agreement 
between the two factions. In June 1952, a meeting among prominent Lithuanian diplomats 
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was arranged where it was decided that Lozoraitis should maintain his present position 
towards the VLIK and prevent the diplomatic corps from becoming a subordinate to the 
Executive Council and that Lozoraitis should meet with VLIK officials at a meeting in Paris 
later in the summer. In July, Lozoraitis met with J. Kaminskas again to discuss some sort of 
way that the VLIK and the diplomatic corps could cooperate. Virtually nothing new was 
agreed upon and only a press release was issued that stated: 
Negotiations took place in Paris from 21-24 July 1952 between VLIK and the 
Diplomats. Matters concerning cooperation were considered. It was agreed to accept 
the proposal of the diplomats that such cooperation shall be effected by consultations 
between the President of VLIK and the Diplomats. It was agreed that the calling of a 
general Lithuanian Conference was necessary. Such conference shall be called by the 
Chief of the Lithuanian Diplomats and VLIK jointly.88 
 
Instead of fostering a greater sense of Lithuanian unity in exile, the initiative ushered a new 
period where growing recriminations within the diaspora became more and more vocal. 
While officially there were suppose to be continued negotiations between the diplomatic 
corps and the VLIK on issue such as organizing a greater Lithuanian conference, in reality, 
the very idea of having a greater Lithuanian conference in this political climate escalated the 
dispute between Lozoraitis and Krupavacius’ camp in VLIK.  
 The ongoing dispute between the Lithuanian diplomats and the VLIK was a major 
blow to the tacit American policy of trying to foster solidarity among the Lithuanian 
community. In theory, it appeared that the United States would have at least a minimal 
amount of leverage with the most important components of the Lithuanian exile community. 
The continued policy of using blocked Lithuanian funds to finance the Lithuanian diplomatic 
mission in Washington; close contacts with the American Lithuanian Council; and covert 
funding of the VLIK all gave American policymakers with at least the tools to have a positive 
impact on affairs. Following the VLIK’s rejection of the Reutlingen agreement, a senior State 
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Department official in Munich, Wayzada invited senior Lithuanian diplomats and VLIK 
Executive Council members to have a dinner with him in Munich. During the dinner, 
Wayzada made a very pointed speech and said that “either you people get together and settle 
your differences, or else…” He allowed both the diplomats and VLIK members to make their 
cases, but implied that any further violations of the Reutlingen agreement would bring 
“drastic reprisals to the offending party.”89  
Such “drastic reprisals,” however, were contingent upon American policymakers 
having the political will to bring about such actions and having proper information to base 
such decisions on. Unfortunately, the ability to gather good information was limited by two 
main factors. By 1951, the Lithuanian minister in Washington was in such poor health that he 
was unable to travel to important Lithuanian diplomatic conferences in Europe and when he 
did make appearances, his colleagues were shocked by his “poor condition.”90 Additionally, 
the nature of the relationship between American intelligence officials and the VLIK and 
between the ALT and the rest of the Lithuanian community meant that the ability to guide 
events was minimal. 
 Due to Žadeikis’ poor health, obtaining useful and timely information about the most 
important problems that plagued cooperation among Lithuanians was difficult. According to 
available documents, the State Department ultimately relied upon information provided by 
the inventory clerk at the American Embassy in Paris, John Mazionis. From the mid-1920s 
until 1940, he worked as a clerk at the American consulate in Kaunas and was able to escape 
to Sweden with the help of American diplomatic officials when the United States closed its 
Baltic legations during the fall of 1940. During World War II, Mazionis worked as a clerk at 
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the Embassy in Stockholm where he dealt with peripheral political and liaison matters. He 
eventually obtained his American citizenship, began his career as a Foreign Service Specialist 
and was assigned to Paris.  
 The willingness of the State Department to work towards the consolidation of 
Lithuanian exile activities was always subjugated to its ability to maintain the legitimacy of 
the non-recognition policy through the continued existence of a Lithuanian mission in 
Washington. As a result, in the State Department’s dealing with the VLIK-Lozoraitis feud, 
more deference had to be paid to Lozoraitis since he was the head of the Lithuanian 
diplomatic corps. The State Department’s ability, however, was also limited by the quality 
and type of information that they received from various Lithuanian stakeholders. 
 While Mazionis provided the State Department with invaluable information 
pertaining to Lithuanian exile activities in Europe, the information he gave was filtered by his 
own political opinions toward the VLIK and other exile groups. For example, on 23 
September 1952 Mazionis forwarded to Washington the opinion of a competing Lithuanian 
organization based in London, the Lithuanian Resistance Service, on the current situation 
within the Lithuanian liberation movement. Necessarily, the opinion criticized the attitude 
that the VLIK had about the liberation of Lithuania. Mazionis argued, “Lithuanian exiles take 
it for granted that when they return to Lithuania they will automatically be the leaders of the 
nation… and that although they constitute about 3% of the whole nation, they assume they 
are the national and administrative potential of the whole nation.” He continued that 
Lithuanians in the Soviet Union are not “ignorant of the intrigues and fratricidal political 
battled being waged between the exile political parties… while the real enemy, communists, 
is overlooked.” He closed by stating that the exiles now only have two main purposes. First, 
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they must attract the public opinion in the free world to Lithuania’s cause. Second, they must 
conserve Lithuanian ideals and the Lithuanian “spirit.”91 
Earlier in 1952 as the LRS became an increasingly important source of information 
for Mazionis; the American policymakers began making inquiries about the origin and 
politics of the organization. It was believed that the LRS dated back to September 1950, was 
based out of the United Kingdom and had a similar relationship with British intelligence 
services that VLIK had with their American counterparts.92 While the critique that Mazionis 
and his LRS interlocutors might have been apt, it provided little assistance for Americans 
trying to determine a way of mediating the Lithuanian exile political landscape since the two 
main groups that the Americans had to deal with were the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service 
lead by Lozoraitis and the VLIK lead by Krupavičius. 
While the American Embassies in Europe were highly critical of VLIK in the ongoing 
dispute, policymakers in Washington were obtaining contradictory information from their 
contacts in the ALT. On 16 January 1952, Allan of the Baltic Desk met with the leadership of 
the ALT, Šimutis and Grigaitis, as well as Mary Kizis of the Lithuanian American 
Information center for a lunch that was created “for the purpose of establishing closer liaison 
for the mutual benefit of the Lithuanian American Community and the State Department.” 
The lunch lasted over two hours and discussed a number of urgent issues that the ALT 
happened to be working on for 1952.  
Allan took the opportunity to ask what the ALT position happened to be concerning 
the ongoing dispute between Lozoraitis and the VLIK. All three Lithuanians unreservedly 
supported VLIK and condemned Lozoraitis. They described Lozoraitis as a “narrow-minded, 
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pigheaded, and ambitious fascist.” While they acknowledged that Lozoraitis might have been 
able to make himself to the more reasonable of the disputants, he was the main cause of 
disunity among Lithuanians.93 Allan prodded further asking why this was the case, Grigaitis 
stated “that dictator, Smetona, met with Lozoraitis in Switzerland following the Soviet 
occupation and gave Lozoraitis a document stating that Lozoraitis was to be Smetona’s 
successor and that over the last two years Lozoraitis has made himself obnoxious by 
brandishing this document in the face of the Lithuanian emigration.” Šimutis then stated that 
the VLIK is working “industriously” towards unity and liberation of Lithuania and that the 
VLIK has the support of at least 75% of all Lithuanians and 90% of all Lithuanian 
Americans.94 The ALT’s opinion of Lozoraitis was also reflected in the Lithuanian language 
press in the United States. Publications such as Draugas, Darmininkas, Teviske, and Ziburiai 
all labeled Lozoraitis as a “fascist,” “undemocratic,” and a “dictator.”95 
Responding to these accusations, Lozoraitis argued that he had always been a 
democrat and that the independent Lithuanian government, before the Soviet occupation, 
appointed him as chief of Lithuanian diplomacy should Lithuania be occupied by a foreign 
power.96 Indeed, when it came to diplomatic succession, Great Britain and the United States 
recognized Lozoraitis as the chief of Lithuanian diplomacy and that in the context of 
international politics in the 1950s, Lozoraitis was democratic in nature.  
Despite the widespread acknowledgement that the United States was going to deal 
with Lozoraitis due to the preeminent position of the diplomats in American policy towards 
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Lithuania, throughout 1952 and 1953, the conflict among Lithuanians only intensified. While 
Lithuanians in the United States strongly supported VLIK and accused Lozoraitis of being 
the tool of a dictator, accusations escalated to a feverish pitch after the breakdown of a 
meeting among the LRS, diplomats and VLIK in Paris and Rome in early 1953. VLIK made 
allegations that the Lithuanian Resistance Service was actually an NKVD operation. Further 
allegations were made that they were merely tools of British intelligence. In addition, 
Lozoraitis was attacked as being too pro-British and not giving Lithuanian interests top 
priority. Additionally, American Lithuanians withdrew from participating in a worldwide 
Lithuanian conference that should have taken place in the United States under the pretenses 
that they were busy with their own conference in Chicago that October.97 
By 1954, the Lithuanian exile diaspora was in a state of complete disarray. A 
coalition between the most prominent Lithuanian Americans and the VLIK had been forged 
through a growing reliance by the VLIK on ALT remittances. A feud between the Lithuanian 
exiled diplomats and the VLIK had reached the point where there was no possibility of 
cooperation among Lithuanians residing in Europe, only the prospect of a huge rift in the 
United States should a change in the diplomatic representation in Washington be necessary.  
On 7 May 1954, Žadeikis meet with Vedeler and Johnson at the State Department to 
inform him that Krupavičius and Zalkauskas were going to be making a trip to the United 
States. Žadeikis was not entirely certain why the leading VLIK officials were traveling to the 
United States, but expected that the visit would be concerned with either funding, recognition 
as an exiled government, or other matters such as radio broadcasts.98 Zalkauskas was 
ultimately unable to travel due to ill health, so Krupavičius traveled alone to the Washington 
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and other important American cities from June through August.99 The meetings that 
Krupavičius and his delegation had with State Department officials marked how the United 
States Government attempted to negotiate the separation between the domestic pressure that 
was placed on them by the ALT and the international problem that they found themselves in 
while trying to deal with the Lithuanian exiles. 
On 17 June, Krupavičius met with Merchant, Thurston, and Vedeler at the State 
Department where he thanked them for continuing the non-recognition policy and, 
specifically, the work of Eisenhower and Dulles on behalf of the Baltic countries. The two 
main issues that Krupavičius wanted to negotiate, however, were firstly if the United States 
would recognize the VLIK as the official body for conducting the struggle to win freedom for 
Lithuania and secondly if the State Department could fund VLIK’s future activities. While he 
argued that VLIK represented all of the various elements of Lithuanian society and that it had 
worked successfully in the past with the diplomats, Merchant stated that the United States 
could not offer any semblance of recognition. The United States “conducted diplomatic 
business with the Lithuanian diplomatic representatives here and we work closely with 
Žadeikis.” However, the VLIK should be sure that the United States would morally support 
any private organization that continued the struggle against international communism. On the 
issue of funding, Merchant said that blocked funds were exclusively to be used for diplomatic 
efforts and not on private organizations. Krupavičius made the point that the funds would be 
used to improve VLIK’s information services that surely would be important from the 
American perspective. Merchant retorted that USIA would be the body to deal with that was 
subject to Congressional authorization.100 
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What took place that day was a complete abdication by the United States from coping 
with the growing fragments within the broader Lithuanian diaspora. From 1954 onwards, 
American policy as it related to the Lithuanian diaspora was to deal with the ALT and to deal 
with the Lithuanian diplomats. The most important reason for American support for VLIK 
from the very beginning was to serve as intermediaries between partisans in Lithuania and 
American officials in the West. If the organization had been able to serve as a unifying factor 
among the Lithuanian diaspora this would have been an added benefit. By 1954, however, it 
was clear that the partisan effort in Lithuania was no longer effective against Soviet forces. 
Moreover, the age of VLIK members and the disputes with the diplomatic corps during the 
early 1950s diminished their effectiveness in unifying the diaspora.  
In addition, it did not help that by 1955 VLIK had become a security risk for the 
United States. On 7 June 1955, a prominent Lithuanian in the Free Europe Press in Munich 
went to the Consulate stating the he needed to contact a “Certain friend” in Frankfurt 
urgently.101 Rastinis stated that at a meeting in Paris on 5 June, President of the Lithuanian 
Community, Eduardas Turauskas, told him that Lithuanian intellectuals in Paris had been 
receiving Soviet publications urging them to return home to Lithuania. Upon inspection, it 
was determined that the mailing list had been obtained from VLIK. Rastinis stated that “until 
VLIK and its leadership are properly organized (and this can be done with proper prompting 
from the appropriate US agencies) I fear that the days of VLIK’s usefulness to them is 
rapidly coming to an end.102 
Indeed, similar criticism came from within American Lithuanian circles the same 
month when it was argued that VLIK has been reduced to a collection of “has-been 
politicians” who had been successful in creating discontent and antagonism among the 
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Lithuanian public and that it was impossible to understand why the United States had 
tolerated them for so long. The paper argued that once two American officials applied a 
minor amount of squeeze, the conversation immediately turns to “consolidation and unity.” 
Constant pressure and supervision could bring about a change in personnel, more efficient 
work, and a smaller security risk than was presently the case.103 
 
Expansion of Baltic Diplomatic Missions Abroad: The Bonn Debate 
By 1950 two important questions arose – whether or not the United States would 
support the expansion of Baltic diplomatic missions elsewhere in the world and whether or 
not the United States would permit frozen Baltic assets to fund missions outside the western 
hemisphere. From the perspective of the Baltic diplomats, the rationale for expanding Baltic 
diplomatic missions was crystal-clear. New Baltic diplomatic missions were vital to attend to 
the needs of Baltic nationals who were in the process of settling in new countries. Official 
diplomatic recognition from an increasing number of nations also gave the Baltic diplomats 
even greater ammunition to discredit the Soviet Union and to enhance their own legitimacy 
among their own communities. 
 American policy concerns about expanding Baltic diplomatic missions were 
necessarily more opaque and complicated. Fundamental questions involved who would fund 
the missions and what would funding the missions through blocked funds mean for the 
longevity of American policy? Would the United States aggressively push sovereign nations 
to change their attitude towards the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States? Finally, what sort 
of advantages were likely for American foreign policy through promoting the expansion of 
Baltic diplomatic missions? The American decision making priority for signing off on the 
expansion of Baltic diplomatic missions was based on whether or not it would harm the US-
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based non-recognition policy; whether or not it would harm relations with allies; whether or 
not it would cause undue damage to the ability of the United States to negotiate with the 
Soviet Union at critical junctures. 
 Over the next several years, the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian diplomats pursued 
a policy of trying to open more diplomatic missions in any country that would accept them. 
While the Americans were sympathetic to their cause, there were many policy traps and 
demographic trends that proved to be potentially problematic. The balance between the 
sustainability of the existing missions and the desire to open new missions was of paramount 
importance. The balance between American ideals behind supporting new missions and the 
policy prerogatives of bilateral relations also had to be negotiated. Finally, and not to be 
understated, was the fact that as the years wore on, an inherent paradox developed between 
the desire and/or necessity to open new missions and the fact that the diplomats who were 
qualified to oversee such missions were aging. 
 After Kaiv’s initial discussion about the expansion of Estonian missions to other 
countries beyond where they had been in 1950, it became a major Estonian policy goal 
throughout 1951. Kaiv had been in contact with August Torma in London about what would 
be important locations for Estonian missions to be established. Ultimately it was decided that 
the two locations that were of highest priority for the Estonians were in West Germany and 
France. This proposal was based on the knowledge that diplomats could only be accredited to 
countries that were willing to accept them and that the French and German governments “had 
shown increasing interest for the Baltic cause,” which they argued “boded well for the 
establishment of official missions.”104 Negotiations to create new missions, however, were 
not just between the two most senior Estonian diplomats, but also other important voices in 
the Estonian diaspora – namely August Rei in Stockholm, as well as the State Department. 
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 Due to the personal problems between Rei and Kaiv, Torma played the role of 
interlocutor between New York City and Stockholm. When Kaiv met with Allan in 
Washington on 19 December 1951, he stated that Torma had been in contact with Rei over 
the situation of who should be accredited to Bonn and Paris. Rei agreed that the problem was 
difficult, but in order to avoid embarrassment within the broader diaspora Rei would not 
question the diplomats’ authority so long as the person appointed was acceptable to the 
ERN.105 Before discussions between Kaiv and Torma commenced, Rei had been making his 
own list of potential Estonians who could be sent to Paris and Bonn. Kaiv was astonished by 
Rei’s willingness to cooperate on this particular issue. It is important, however, to stress that 
with Rei creating his own list of potential nominees the potential existed for a serious crisis 
over establishing new diplomatic missions. 
 When Kaiv began seriously discussing this issue during his meetings in Washington 
throughout late 1951, the Americans had two primary concerns. First, how much would new 
diplomatic missions financially cost the existing legations. Second, what would the debate 
over new diplomatic missions due to discourse and cooperation within the Estonian diaspora. 
During the 30 October 1951 meeting that Kaiv had with Johnson about the idea of expanding 
Selter’s role in Germany, Johnson explained that the Department was interested in this 
development principally because it would inherently pose the problem of increasing the 
Estonian consulate’s annual budget.106 The secondary question was whether or not other 
important components of the Estonian exile community had been properly consulted about 
Bonn and Paris.107 
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 The initial discussion among the Estonians about who should be accredited to Paris 
was whether the post should go to Aleksander Warma who was an ally in Stockholm, or Karl 
Ast, who had been more closely associated with Kaiv. Johnson asked Kaiv what his opinion 
was on this particular debate. Kaiv responded that Warma would be an excellent candidate 
for an Estonian legation in Paris, but due to the financial concerns, he would have preferred 
Ast to be appointed; the latter was already on the Estonian diplomatic payroll while Warma 
had no official connections with the exiled Estonian diplomatic missions.108 Johnson 
continued the discussion by asking whether or not it he was privy to Rei’s thinking that Ast 
would be an appropriate candidate to represent Estonia in Paris. The question, Kaiv noted, 
was in “the determination of the appropriate Estonian persons or group that had authority to 
establish the missions.”109 Unlike the Lithuanians, there was no hierarchical structure to the 
Estonian diplomatic corps once the annexation had taken place in 1940. 
 The Americans were concerned with the problem of who would have authority to 
name new diplomats and open new missions and if this would be a source of contention 
among Estonians. Johnson argued that the State Department would probably have to 
undertake serious deliberations over approving Paris and Bonn if the selection process were 
to be disapproved of by a majority, or even a substantial part, of the Estonian community. He 
continued by stating “the Department hoped the Estonian emigration would approach this 
problem in a spirit of unity which would indicate clearly that the emigration approved of the 
manner in which the missions were established.”110 While Johnson emphasized that whether 
or not the Estonians would act in a unifying way on this issue was purely an internal matter, 
there was a thinly-veiled ultimatum that the State Department would be reluctant to approve 
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expenditures for the contemplated missions unless the Estonians demonstrated at least a 
nominal amount of unity, which was desired by the State Department. 
 After the October meeting with Kaiv, Vedeler contacted Harrison at the Embassy in 
Paris to the effect that it seemed in the interest of the United States to allow the Estonians to 
work towards establishing missions in Bonn and Paris.111 In the correspondence, he provided 
some context behind the main American concerns about the intra-Estonian politics involved 
in this issue. He pointed out that from information that had been gathered from Estonian and 
American sources the ERN had been losing its standing among Estonian exiles in favor of 
VEKO. Taking into consideration Vedeler’s view that Kaiv did not have any great standing 
with ERN or VEKO, Kaiv would likely oppose any sort of diplomatic moves unless he had a 
significant personal part in the effort.”112 
 Kaiv’s outspoken assistant, Kaarel Pusta Sr. entered the discussion on Estonian 
diplomatic representation in Paris and Bonn when he accompanied Kaiv to the State 
Department to have a meeting with Allan and Vedeler on 12 December 1951. Before Pusta 
was assigned as the First Secretary of the Estonian consulate in New York, he had spent 
eighteen years in France in various official and unofficial capacities. As a result, he had 
accumulated a significant number of contacts in the French Foreign Office and he continued 
to maintain those contacts. According to Pusta, the French in 1951 were willing to resume 
relations with the Estonians on a limited scale and they would like to see Pusta be the 
representative to France.113 Vedeler continued by asking who would have the appropriate 
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authority in the Estonian diplomatic corps to open missions in Bonn and Paris. Pusta argued 
that it would just be easiest for either himself or another high-ranking Estonian to travel to 
Europe and that the question of appropriate authority “might be avoided by an unpublicized 
fait accompli.”114 
 On the question of whether or not Pusta Sr. would be willing to be the Estonian 
diplomatic representative in Paris, he stated that he would not be willing to leave the United 
States permanently since the United States is the most important country in the world from 
the perspective of Estonia. That said, he did say that Estonia could extend its representation 
and increase the protection of its citizens visits to the region on a part-time basis. He could 
see that he or someone else could spend several months in a year representing Estonia in 
Paris, Bonn, Rome, and possibly Madrid.115 
 The first few months of 1952 were dominated by debates among Estonians about who 
would have the legal accreditation authority and between the Americans and the Estonians 
about the cost that the new legations would incur. Initially, the prevailing opinion was that 
since neither Kaiv, Torma, Rei, ERN, or VEKO had clear legal authority, than all Estonians 
would approach the topic in a spirit of unity and collaboration.  By April, Kaiv informed the 
Department that both he and Torma felt that they could not assume responsibility for 
proposing a mission in Paris without consulting Rei and Maurer in Sweden and Germany.116 
Vedeler recapitulated on the notion that the Department would not approve the expenditure of 
funds from the extremely limited Estonian account “unless the Estonian emigration exhibited 
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real unity to the matter.”117 At this point Kaiv stated that the Estonians were going to move 
forward with a plan to appoint Pusta Sr. as the Estonian representative to Paris.118 
 Due to ongoing problems in the Estonian diaspora over the establishment of a 
government-in-exile, the diplomatic representation issue was placed on the shelf until on 4 
February 1953, Pusta Sr. met with Vedeler and Allan where he expressed his interest in 
obtaining approval from the State Department of opening a permanent Estonian mission in 
Paris and Madrid with a permanent seat for himself to be located at Madrid.119 Although the 
Estonian Minister to France and Spain had traditionally resided in Paris, the Estonians felt 
that French sensitivities from the Soviet Union might not favor the establishment of an 
official permanent mission in the French capital. On the other hand, Pusta Sr. stated that 
Spain was willing to grant full de facto and de jure recognition to Estonia.120 
 The State Department had hoped to finished negotiations with the Estonians on the 
issue of Paris and Madrid that February, but there were two lingering issues that Kaiv 
assumed responsibility for fixing. First, when his office was putting together the 1954 budget, 
he viewed the $16,200 per annum for Pusta Sr. to be excessive and unlikely to be approved 
by the State Department. 121 Second, Kaiv indicated that he did not believe any diplomatic 
move of this type should be undertaken without the informal acceptance of the two Estonian 
governments-in-exile. The State Department had hoped to finish negotiations with Kaiv over 
the budgetary situation associated with sending Pusta Sr. to Europe, but while the Estonian 
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consulate was drafting their annual budget the sum of $16,200 per year was deemed 
excessive.122 
 Vedeler called Kaiv on 24 September 1953 asking why he had yet to submit a 
memorandum on plans for Pusta’s trip to Europe. Kaiv stated that a settlement had been 
reached with Pusta and that a payment had been made to him from the 1953 budget. 
Additionally, he stated that the French and Spanish governments had been approached to 
obtain some sort of an agreement for them to receive Pusta Sr.123 Before this call, however, 
Pusta met with Merchant and Dillon on 1 September 1953 to state that an agreement had 
been reached where he, would receive an additional $6000 personally and that the new total 
of $14,000 would be used to fund the missions to Paris and Madrid.124 Pusta commented that 
he hoped that the State Department would urge the French government to grant the Estonian 
full recognition rather than the semi-official status that Pusta had at that point. On 2 
November 1953, the Spanish Foreign Minister Alberto M. Artajo received Pusta and 
confirmed his December 1952 declaration that the Spanish government, though unable to 
grant Pusta Sr. full diplomatic status, was willing to consider a formula of “Minister 
Plenipotentiary, in charge of the Protection of Estonian Interests in Madrid.”125 
 While the issue of accrediting Baltic (or Estonian) diplomats to France and other West 
European countries such as Spain largely hinged on the political situation within the 
diasporas and the financial limitations that faced each exiled diplomatic corps, the special 
situation that the Bonn government found themselves in during the early Cold War years 
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meant that American-West German relations and the Soviet position on the German question 
were critically important in determining whether it would be feasible for the Baltic exiled 
diplomatic corps to establish a working relationship with the West German government. This 
is one area where there existed a significant difference in perspective between the American 
State Department and the Baltic diplomatic corps. 
 Throughout 1951, all three Baltic diplomats in Washington asked the State 
Department if it would be possible for them to pursue the option of opening missions in West 
Germany. From the perspective of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian diplomats, a 
presence in Bonn would not only send a powerful symbolic message to the international 
community, namely that the aggression inflicted upon them by the Soviet Union would not be 
recognized by the country with the most precarious situation in Europe, but was of immense 
practical importance due to the relatively large number of refugees who still resided in 
Germany and who were unsure whether or not the Federal Republic would be considered 
their temporary home until it was possible to return home. 
 After the Estonians had approached the Baltic Desk with the idea in early 1951, the 
Latvians and Lithuanians made similar overtures. On 6 November 1951, the Latvian chargé 
Feldmans met with Allan and Johnson about the possibility of a Latvian diplomat being 
placed in Bonn. When the American officials asked what the official Latvian position was on 
the matter, Feldmans was reticent stating that they had not taken any definite policy position 
on the matter. He stated that the Latvians would prefer a full-fledged mission in Bonn, but 
realized that the West German government would make the ultimate decision and intimated 
that the Latvians would be more than willing to accept some sort of consular representation 
rather than a fully accredited diplomat if it meant having some position there.126 By early 
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1952, the Lithuanians also began making their moves in Bonn. Žadeikis met with Allan on 14 
January and stated that Lozoraitis, chief of the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service, was in Bonn 
to discuss with the West Germans about their willingness to accept a Lithuanian diplomat.127 
 The issue of pursuing Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian legations in Bonn became one 
of the pressing issues for the State Department’s Baltic Desk in 1951 and 1952.128 
Throughout 1951 and 1952, the State Department’s European desk contacted the French and 
West German foreign ministries about their attitudes about receiving Baltic diplomats in 
either an official or unofficial setting. While the Americans were more confident in allowing 
the Baltic representatives to negotiate directly with the French, the State Department was 
significantly more concerned about the implications that negotiations between the Bonn 
government and the Baltic diplomats might have on the relationship that Washington wanted 
with Bonn and how the Kremlin would perceive such negotiations.  
 Immediately following the Baltic desk’s meeting with Kaiv on the question of 
Estonian representation in Bonn, the State Department sent enquiries to the German 
government explaining the American position towards the Baltic States and asked if Bonn 
would be willing to explain the West German government’s policy on the Soviet annexation 
of the Baltic States was and if they were going to establish relations with the exiled diplomats. 
On 2 April 1951, the first letter dealing with this question was sent out, explicitly stating that 
“our interest in the matter is one of informing ourselves and that we did not wish to influence 
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them [the West German government.]”129 The Americans had wanted to contact the West 
Germans directly on this issue to insure that they were informed of the proper policy and not 
how the policy might be interpreted by the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians involved in 
the negotiations.  
 Dr. Hasse von Etsdorf, Deputy Chief of the Political Division of the West German 
Foreign Ministry contacted the American Embassy at Bonn on 11 February 1952 to discuss 
the complexities associated with the Baltic questions.130 During the meeting between the First 
Secretary of the American embassy and von Etsdorf, the most important theme discussed 
what distinguished the American position towards the Baltic States and the attitude that the 
West German government had to take. This was the distinction between an act that 
“maintains the status quo” and an “affirmative act.” What the State Department had done in 
1940 was to simply retain the names of the Baltic representatives that were on the list of 
accredited diplomats to the United States. The West German government did not have the 
same possibilities. Should the Federal Republic decide that it was in their interests to open 
diplomatic relations with the Baltic exiled diplomats it would require the establishment of 
new relations, not the continuation of existing ties.  
 Speaking personally, von Etsdorf acknowledged that such a relatively insignificant 
policy from a practical perspective was of small importance, but the official line of the West 
German government was that such an “affirmative action” could unnecessarily arouse the 
suspicion of the Soviet Union that West Germany was covertly (or overtly) sponsoring 
subversive activities within the Soviet territory. The West Germans were also concerned 
about arousing suspicions among the French. A strong West German policy towards the 
Baltic States was thought to reinforce French suspicions concerning the reliability of the 
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Federal Republic in promoting West European stability. He stated that the “present was no 
time to aggravate French anxieties.”131 The First Secretary of the Embassy understood the 
West German concerns, thanked him for the information and forwarded it to the State 
Department.132 Over the course of the next several months, the West German Foreign 
Ministry began the process of informing the Baltic diplomats who had been in Bonn that the 
Germans would be unwilling to extend full diplomatic representation to their nations.133 
 On 22 June and 3 August 1952, Pusta Sr. wrote to Vedeler, informing him that the 
West German government was not willing to offer the Estonians a full-fledged mission in 
Bonn and urged that the State Department intervene and “induce them [the West Germans] to 
establish formal diplomatic relations with the three Baltic States.”134 After having worked 
with Pusta Sr. for a number of years in official capacities, Baltic Desk officers acted under 
the assumption that this would not be the last time that the State Department would hear from 
him about the problems that the Estonians were encountering in Bonn. As a result, American 
policymakers used the opportunity to craft their own official policy towards Baltic diplomatic 
representation in Bonn. 
 Quite simply, the State Department decided that the cost of pushing the West 
Germans to accept Baltic diplomats would outweigh any benefits for the Baltic communities 
or the United States from a matter of policy. The United States had two main policy points 
they would develop on the question.  
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First, the United States truly did not wish to influence the West Germans. It was 
argued that if American policymakers raised the subject with the German authorities there 
might be unnecessarily “ripples of apprehension and perhaps action or reaction far out of 
proportion to the subject at hand.”135 There was a great concern that some German politicians 
or other European officials might interpret such pressure as a precursor to a major shift in 
American policy towards other European countries. Second, since the American position vis-
à-vis the Baltic States is rather clear and unequivocal, the Americans would gain very little 
for us by attempting to force allied governments to parallel their policies. The only gains that 
the Americans would gain were largely in propaganda policies, while the losses could be 
substantial through the potential loss of solidarity among the allies. It was even argued that 
from the perspective of the Baltic, the establishment of fully accredited missions would serve 
no substantial value or purpose for the Baltic States and that the only thing they might gain 
would be greater goodwill.136 
 Lithuanian diplomatic representation to West Germany became a proxy battlefield in 
the ongoing conflict between the VLIK and Lozoraitis. During early 1952 while Lozoraitis 
was in Bonn establishing contacts with the West German Foreign Ministry, the VLIK had 
designated one of their own members, Sakalauskas, to represent the Lithuanian Republic at 
Bonn.137 Although the German Foreign Office had indicated that it would prefer to deal with 
an accredited Lithuanian diplomat, such as Lozoraitis, and not someone from a private 
organization such as the VLIK, the VLIK felt that they were in an advantageous position vis-
à-vis Lozoraitis since the organization was based in West Germany and could somehow drive 
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the narrative in their favor on the domestic front. Essentially VLIK felt that if they pushed the 
West German Foreign Ministry hard enough on the issue, it would become a fait accompli.  
 Over the course of the next year, the issue of representation at Bonn would be one of 
the major sticking points preventing any sort of rapprochement between the VLIK and the 
Lithuanian diplomats. During the Rome meeting between VLIK and LDS, the Executive 
Council insisted that if there was going to be one diplomatic representative from Lithuania to 
Bonn that it would have to be agreed upon jointly between the VLIK and Lozoraitis. 
Lozoraitis refused this sort of arrangement since in his opinion, and in the opinion of 
Lithuanian jurists who supported him, the sole power of appointing diplomatic 
representatives belonged to the Chief of the Lithuanian diplomatic corps and was not 
something that could be negotiated with an organization such as VLIK. Although the latter 
had a great deal of political continuity with the Lithuanian republic it only had the de facto 
standing of a private organization.138 
 On 1 September 1953, the VLIK issued Lozoraitis with an ultimatum to the effect that 
unless the agreement over diplomatic representation in Bonn was agreed upon within a short 
period of time, the VLIK would continue to move forward with their own nominee to lobby 
the Federal Republic for the official representative to be appointed by VLIK and not 
Lozoraitis.139 The primary rationale for the VLIK wanting to have a say in appointing a 
diplomatic representative in Bonn was to undermine Lozoraitis’ position within the 
Lithuanian community and to consolidate all Lithuanian exile activities under the VLIK. In 
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essence, this gets back to the point of the VLIK wanting to function as the official Lithuanian 
government-in-exile without necessarily giving life to that particular label. 
 By the end of 1953, two Lithuanian diplomatic representatives were vying for the 
attention of the Bonn Government. Lozoraitis had appointed Gerutis on behalf of the 
Lithuanian diplomatic corps and Krupavičius had appointed Karvelis on behalf of the VLIK. 
Like the Latvian and the Estonian overtures to the West German foreign ministry, both 
Gerutis and Karvelis were informed by the von Etsdorf that the country would not be willing 
to extend diplomatic relations to either Lithuanian representative. They were informed that 
the internationally accredited diplomats such as Lozoraitis were free to visit Bonn from time 
to time to discuss issue such as consular services for refugees and other refugee welfare 
matters, while non-diplomatic leaders, such as members of the VLIK were free to contact the 
foreign ministry to discuss things concerning the status of Lithuanians residing in the Federal 
Republic.140 
 Neither Karvelis nor Gerutis, however, accepted this arrangement. The feud between 
the VLIK and the Diplomatic corps necessarily meant that the two sides would only escalate 
their pressure on the West German foreign ministry. During the spring of 1954, Karvelis 
contacted Otto Brautigen, Chief of the Eastern Division of the German Foreign Ministry and 
reinforced his case for wanting to establish a Lithuanian legation in Bonn. Brautigen 
reiterated the West German position by stating that it did not want to enter into a formal 
relationship with the Lithuanians since it “must hold itself free for the eventual establishment 
of relations with the Soviet Union.”141 In a last ditch effort; Karvelis requested the ability to 
open a consulate in lieu of a full diplomatic mission in Bonn.  
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 Upon hearing that Karvelis had made additional overtures to the Foreign Ministry, 
Lozoraitis made two quick decisions. First, he contacted Gerutis and said that he needed to 
move to Bonn immediately so that he might be readily available to the West German 
government and to prevent Karvelis from being the only prominent Lithuanian residing in 
Bonn. Second, he called Brautigen on 27 July and remonstrated against Karvelis’ efforts to 
obtain diplomatic representation by making the point that the VLIK was not an official organ 
of the Lithuanian government and that only Lozoraitis had the authority to establish or 
terminate diplomatic relations. In an attempt to alleviate the growing tensions between the 
two Lithuanian factions and the awkward position that it was placing the German foreign 
ministry in, Brautigen asked Lozoraitis whether he would be willing to nominate Karvelis as 
the official representative nominee to Bonn. Lozoraitis emphatically rejected this claim.142 
 Senior policymakers in Washington were slowly becoming aware of the Lithuanian 
situation in Bonn throughout July 1954 and asked the American Embassy in Bonn to send a 
resport on what was transpiring and what sort of policy implications that this might have. At 
the same time, Brautigen made contact with the American Embassy to discuss what should be 
done with the demarche between the two Lithuanian factions. The Embassy’s response on 28 
July to the State Department’s request included the questions that Brautigen wished to have 
addressed by the Americans.143 
 During the conversation between Brautigen and the Embassy’s First Secretary, he 
intimated that he had almost decided that no change would be made to German policy on the 
Baltic question. He continued by saying that he had not yet replied to Karvelis’ request for a 
consulate, but that he was glad that Lozoraitis had made contact at that time since he could 
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exploit the Lithuanian disagreement as a means of not negotiating any further with 
Karvelis.144 In closing, he said that if the United States government wished to recommend a 
particular policy the Foreign Ministry might wish to be guided. The First Secretary stated that 
it had been the continued American policy not to urge any course of action, but only to 
understand what was the present German policy towards the Baltic States.145 
 Not to be undeterred by the rebukes received by the German Foreign Ministry, 
Karvelis went to visit the United States High Commissioner’s office in Germany to discuss 
whether or not the United States would support the idea of VLIK having a consular agent in 
Bonn. He stated that he had contacted the Chairman of the West German Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Gerstenmaier, about the idea and wanted American support to push the “idea 
over the top.”146 The American diplomat stated that he would convey the information to the 
Commissioner himself and the State Department, but that there would be no guarantees. The 
diplomat forwarded the encounter that he had with Karvelis to the High Commissioner as 
well as the State Department. 
 On 31 August, the European Desk of the State Department sent their policy 
prescription to Bonn about how they should handle the Karvelis affair. He was supposed to 
be summoned to the American Consulate in Munich and told that the American government 
does not consider it appropriate to support or to oppose the petition to establish a consulate in 
the Federal Republic on behalf of VLIK.147 The policy also included that it should be made 
clear that the State Department has always considered the VLIK to be a private organization 
consisting of Lithuanian exiles and not a Lithuanian government in exile. As a result of this 
point and the fact that the United States Government had never recognized the Soviet 
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annexation of the Baltic States, the State Department would continue to recognize accredited 
diplomats such as Lozoraitis and Žadeikis and provide deference to the diplomats’ selection 
of Gerutis as representative to Bonn.148 
 Karvelis was eventually summoned to the American Consulate in Stuttgart where the 
message from Washington was given. Karvelis’ response was that in reality the idea was not 
just a VLIK power play against Lozoraitis, but was a joint proposal put together by the Baltic 
Council in Reutlingen.149 The Consul’s response was that this made no real difference since it 
had been American policy to deal with organizations, whether VLIK or the Baltic Council as 
private organizations; that the Americans had never encouraged them to expect recognition as 
“governments in exile” and that only a government-in-exile would have the authority to 
pursue diplomatic relations with another country. 
 When summarizing the events that transpired in the summer of 1954 with the 
Lithuanian representation in Bonn, the State Department made it clear that, “rather than make 
policy recommendations which the Federal Republic is not prepared to follow, it is preferable 
for this Government to see it proceed on its present course, if less favorable to Lithuanian 
interests than US policy, is still marked by sympathy for the cause of freedom and the welfare 
of Baltic émigrés in West Germany.150 
 The dispute demonstrated that there was an inherent conflict between the policy goals 
of the Lithuanian exiles and the American government. The Lithuanian exiles sought 
diplomatic representation not only to enhance the status of the Lithuanian nation in the eyes 
of the international community and to assist Lithuanian refugees who might need consular 
assistant, but also to consolidate their own position within the broader Lithuanian community. 
The Americans, however, were never willing to put the interests of the Lithuanian exiles 
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above the interests of the United States. When it came to negotiating with an important ally, 
the State Department was more than willing to intervene and undermine a particular policy 
prerogative of the Lithuanians. Even in 1954 the American belief was that Lithuanian 
independence could only be secured through solidarity in the free world with the United 
States and not by the actions by a handful of aging exiled diplomats.  
 American policymakers were forced to choose between two policies that were 
deemed to be contradictory. The relationship with the Federal Republic and the Federal 
Republic’s political situation in Europe was too fragile for the United States to play a 
particularly strong hand one way or another when it came to the question of Baltic diplomatic 
missions. During the debate, it became evident that the United States Government was 
interested in the “maintenance of the greatest possible unity among the Baltic exile groups 
and the closest possible collaboration between the Baltic diplomatic representatives and the 
Baltic émigré organizations.”151 The United States had an opportunity to leverage the 
Lithuanian exiles to come to some settlement on who would speak for the Lithuanians in 
Bonn, but chose not to since the bilateral German relationship was significantly more 
important. 
 Reflecting on the issue during a meeting between the CIA and the State Department, 
American officials determined that VLIK and Karvelis acted irresponsibly and partly out of 
spite towards Lozoraitis. They determined that both Lozoraitis and VLIK held each other 
responsible for the breakdown of negotiations between the two groups, but that Karvelis and 
VLIK went well beyond what was expected of them by VLIK supporters throughout the 
broader Lithuanian community and that this reflected their own ambitions and irresponsibility. 
They continued by stating that there is no question within the Lithuanian emigration of 
Lozoraitis’ authority on diplomatic issues and that it was hoped that the VLIK in the future 
                                                            




would function more as a “panel of elder statesmen” to provide leadership and moral 
authority in the struggle to preserve the national identity of Lithuania both inside and outside 
the present area of Soviet control. They also hoped that the VLIK might be encouraged to 
desist from any further purpose of seeking recognition as a “government in exile” and from 
competing with the Diplomatic corps and Vedeler, on behalf of the State Department, “would 
do whatever we could to encourage diplomatic representatives to cooperate with the VLIK.152 
 
Conclusion 
 The primacy that Baltic exiles residing in Europe placed on political continuity 
through the establishment of exile governments and engaging in intra-émigré political 
struggles demonstrates the disparity between the goals of the American policymakers and 
those of the exiles. While both groups attempted to create the correct environment to combat 
Soviet influence, the most important concern for both parties was pursuing their own interests, 
which proved to be inherently rife with tension. 
 For the Americans, anything that could question the legitimacy of the non-recognition 
policy was seen as inimical. For the Baltic exiles, anything that could enhance their political 
legitimacy while in exile was viewed as essential to the wellbeing of exiles in the hopes of 
being able to return home at some point in the future. While the continued recognition of 
diplomats in the United States had been a point of convergence between the two, interests 
outside of the United States diverged rapidly. The Americans decided that the best way to 
foster cooperation among the exile groups was to assume a minimalist attitude. The Baltic 
Consultative Panels were supposed to be offer a sufficient avenue for cooperation. 
Unfortunately, the Americans underestimated the willingness of the exiles to engage in 
infighting. Quite simply, the Americans offered enough policy guidance for exile groups to 
                                                            
152 Undated CIA Memo on Baltic Affairs Folder: B90.2 Policy Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-
1961. Box 10, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
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make the State Department and other agencies complicit, but not enough policy guidance to 
have a positive long-term impact. 
American officials had the opportunity to reach out to Estonian organizations based in 
Sweden in either an official or unofficial manner. As early as 1949, there was the question of 
whether or not the ERN should receive support from either the blocked Estonian funds that 
were used to continue the diplomatic missions. One of Rei’s reasons for traveling to Oslo 
throughout 1951 was potentially to build contacts with American military or civilian officials 
who happened to be in the country.153 Although the United States maintained that they did 
not create policies that would favor one faction within a particular diaspora, the very 
existence of the National Committee for a Free Europe meant that a handful of powerful 
exiles received salaries in return for their assistance from the American government. When 
Rei returned to Stockholm from Oslo, one method of trying to earn legitimacy for the exile 
government was to make thinly veiled claims that they acted upon the suggestion of “very 
powerful friends whose names cannot be revealed.”154 Who these “very powerful friends” 
might be is not revealed in any contemporary documents, but it is logical to assume that Rei 
was referring to either American or British intelligence organizations.  
The American Embassy in Stockholm was the natural source of information for the 
State Department concerning Estonian activities in Sweden, so avoiding complete reliance on 
their interlocutors among Estonians living in the United States. While Embassy officials were 
successful in gaining credible information about what the Estonians were attempting to 
pursue in Sweden, they were less successful in persuading Estonians to streamline their 
efforts within the larger American foreign policy structures. In many instances, diplomats 
                                                            
153 Paris to State on 27 September 1951, Folder: E701 Diplomatic Representation, Records Relating to the 
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were not informed of what other American operations in Europe were trying to pursue with 
other exile groups. Embassy officials very often were limited to holding conversations with 
their informants while unable to offer material assistance. Frustrated after the establishment 
of the Rei government over an “illicit weekend” in Oslo, one such American official, 
commented in frustration: “At any rate, we have listened to what they [Estonians] have to say 
and taken the opportunity for the 5,350th time to suggest that they stop fighting each other 
and proclaim universal sweetness and light.”155  
Frustration, however, was reciprocal. Many parts of the Estonian diaspora were 
equally frustrated with the lack of support that the Americans provided to the establishment 
of a viable, unified Estonian government-in-exile. A significant number of prominent 
Estonians, as well as most émigrés, failed to understand why the United States would see the 
establishment of a government-in-exile as a problem in the fight towards the liberation of 
Estonia from the Soviet Union. An encounter between an American Senior Information 
Officer in Frankfurt and an Estonian émigré temporarily living in Bad Nauheim in late 
summer 1954 is representative of the attitude that many Estonians had towards the exile 
government and the American attitude towards it. 
On 24 September 1954, James M. MacFarland and Willard Allan held a series of 
conversations with this Estonian, who was at the sanitarium to improve his health, on the 
state of affairs within the Estonian diaspora. The Estonian stated that the “most characteristic 
feeling in the Estonian emigration is one of boredom and active antipathy with regard to 
émigré politics.”156 He continued by acknowledging that “everyone agrees that the idea of 
having two Estonian émigré governments is stupid and that people just can’t be bothered with 
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politics anymore.”157 His criticism, however, was not just limited to intra-Estonian politics. 
When asked about the average Estonian attitude towards the Americans, he stated that 
Estonian “no longer have confidence in the sincerity of the opposition to communism by 
Western European nations. While these nations treat the émigrés has pariahs, they are 
beginning to come to terms with world enemy number one [the Soviet Union]; in so doing 
they are betraying more than 100 million Europeans.158






CONTAINMENT AND CONTACTS: PURSUING PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE 
AND PROPAGANDA 
 
 On 20 May 1949, prominent Lithuanian exiles and members of the VLIK, Vaclovas 
Sidzikauskas and his travel companion Mykolas Krupavičius met with American diplomat 
Jack Hickerson at the State Department before returning to Europe after a several month tour 
of the United States. While the point of the trip was to establish connections with the broader 
Lithuanian American community and with important centers of American political power, 
Sidzikauskas’ meeting with Hickerson focused on specific policy plans that the United States 
might put in place eventually to help liberate Lithuania. The most striking policy initiative 
was Sidzikauskas’ question as to whether or not the United States would be willing to start to 
Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts in the Lithuanian language.  
 Sidzikauskas hoped that Hickerson might be able to influence the International 
Broadcasting Division (IBD) of the State Department to commence Lithuanian language 
broadcasts. Unlike the Estonians and the Latvians, the Lithuanians were better equipped to 
continue contacts between exiled politicians and their Soviet occupied homeland. 
Nevertheless, the long-term prospects of continuing regular contacts with the Lithuanian 
underground were diminishing as the years had gone by. Sidzikauskas expressed hope that 
broadcasts by VOA might start as they “would greatly bolster their morale,” but a more self-
serving interest for Sidzikauskas and other Baltic exiles was that American sponsored radio 
broadcasts could be a useful tool to maintain contacts with their homeland, and as a result, 
maintain their political usefulness once liberation occurred. Hickerson replied, “I agree that 
such broadcasts would be most helpful to the morale of the Lithuanian people, but that matter 
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was complicated due to jamming and limited funds for VOA. In view of the fact that so many 
Lithuanians speak a second language, they could listen to other VOA broadcasts.”1 
 Although Sidzikauskas did not continue to press the issue at that particular juncture, 
throughout 1949 prominent Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, led by the exiled diplomats 
in Washington and New York City hoped that the United States would start broadcasting in 
the Baltic languages. Little did they know, but American policymakers in Washington were 
in the process of augmenting official VOA broadcasts with unofficial radio broadcasts 
sponsored by the FEC. The FEC’s initial plans were rather modest. Exiled leaders were to 
have access to a microphone and given free rein to speak to their countrymen.2 These 
broadcasting plans eventually become known as Radio Free Europe (RFE). 
 The expansion of American sponsored radio broadcasts into the Soviet bloc beyond 
VOA broadcasts is proof that propaganda and the establishment of strong public diplomacy 
were becoming more and more important to policymakers in the late 1940s. A situation 
developed where there were mutual interests between American foreign policymakers 
seeking to utilize Eastern European exiles for radio broadcasts and the Eastern European 
exiles who sought American broadcasting wavelengths to establish new virtual contacts with 
their homelands behind the Iron Curtain. The fundamental questions, however, were whether 
or not the United States would be willing to begin Estonian, Latvian, or Lithuanian language 
broadcasts over the official VOA or the clandestine RFE and whether or not the Baltic 
refugees would be willing to participate in such broadcasts. 
 This chapter will examine three areas of potential cooperation and conflict between 
American policymakers and Baltic refugees over public diplomatic radio broadcasting from 
1949-1956. First, the debate between VOA and RFE, which dominated discussions between 
                                                            
1 Memorandum of Conversation between Johnson, Thompson, and VLIK Delegation on 20 May 1949. Central 
Decimal File, 1950-1954, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, NAII. 860M.00/5-2049. 
2 Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom, 17. 
 
 184 
policymakers and Baltic diplomats as well as various organizations, affected virtually every 
aspect of relations between the State Department and exiles. A fundamental 
misunderstanding about the symbolic implications of the VOA – RFE debate drove a wedge 
between various Baltic leaders and their American counterparts. Second, intra-diasporic 
politics, where radio officials were caught between pursuing an official policy and managing 
disputes between exiles, took its toll on managing the expectations of all Estonians, Latvians, 
and Lithuanians. Finally, the staffing of radio desks, where a countless number of qualified 
refugees sought employment for a small and finite number of positions, exacerbated intra-
diasporic politics surrounding radio broadcasts.  
 The chapter will also examine the content that the United States broadcast to the 
Baltic republics and the limited feedback that policymakers received from refugee 
organizations as well as traditional intelligence matters. I will argue that while American 
policymakers and Baltic refugees were ultimately successful in portraying a positive image of 
the West and of Baltic émigré policy to the Baltic republics, the Baltic exiles placed too much 
importance on symbolism while the American policymakers were trying to manage a policy 
that was becoming increasingly paradoxical. The juxtaposition between attainable and 
unattainable, I will demonstrate, became more pronounced as the State Department tried to 
place greater constraints on the exile broadcasts. 
 First, however, it is important to understand the forces that shaped American foreign 
policy during the early years of the Cold War and led policymakers to embrace aggressive 
propaganda and public diplomatic efforts against the Soviet Union. It is also important to 
understand the basic rationale of Baltic exiles for participating in the American sponsored 
programs. In a period where the United States had the perception that it was falling behind 
the Soviet Union in “winning the peace” after World War II and where the Soviet Union was 
aggressively targeting American efforts through propaganda, it became increasingly clear that 
 
 185 
the status quo was becoming inimical to the American postwar effort. The same international 
tensions that created this feeling for the Americans also impacted. Would they be able to 
return at some point or were they going to be in a perpetual state of exile?  The idea of radio 
broadcasts in the Baltic languages were born out of the mutual interests between exiles and 
the State Department 
 
Containing the Soviet Union and the Desire to Maintain Contacts 
 Although there is much historiographical debate over the extent to which extent 
George F. Kennan supported the aggressive liberation of Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, a program of aggressive psychological and ideological warfare was an important 
component to containment.3 A crucial implementation of containment involved the 
acceleration of “fissiparous tendencies within the international communist movement” and 
within the Soviet bloc.4 This demanded that the United States do what it could to create a 
string of complications for the Soviet Union within their own sphere rather than expanding 
their influence elsewhere. Early efforts at public diplomacy were thought to keep the peoples 
of the Soviet bloc restive and as a result, the Kremlin would be obliged to maintain stability 
in their own backyard.5 
 Within the context of NSC 20/4 in 1948, propaganda and psychological warfare 
activities around the world and specifically directed at the Soviet Union and its satellite 
countries became a major component of American foreign policy throughout the late 1940s 
and 1950s.6 An aggressive psychological warfare campaign was thought to cause 
                                                            
3 See Chapter Two 
4 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 42-43. 
5 Ibid. It is important to keep in mind that the primary means of containment during the Truman Administration 
was through economic development and establishing political strength in Europe and Asia. 
6 See Chapter 2 for reference on NSC 20/4. 
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complications within the Soviet bloc that would focus the attention of the Kremlin on internal 
matters rather than international expansion.7 
 In broad terms, every American radio broadcast during the Cold War should be seen 
in the context of engaging directly with the Soviet Union. The unofficial broadcasts of Radio 
Free Europe and Radio Liberty offered American policymakers a layer of plausible 
deniability through being seen as private organizations rather than officially sanctioned. It 
was through RFE and RL that the United States was able to engage in potentially 
controversial and hard-hitting propaganda against the Soviet Union.8 Even though the Voice 
of America (VOA) sought to maintain its credibility as the official broadcasting arm of the 
United States Government through reporting the news “fairly and honestly,” it did have bold 
ambitions in its broadcasts against the Soviet Union.9 The VOA “sought to capitalize on 
every vulnerability of the Soviet thought control system, emphasizing the benevolence of the 
United States and the possibility of alternatives to the Soviet Way and quite simply delivering 
‘accurate information.’”10 
 The success of these propaganda and psychological warfare activities, however, 
hinged on the ability of the United States to coopt individuals who had the linguistic skills to 
broadcast in Eastern European languages, including Estonia, Latvian, and Lithuanian while 
also possessing a minimal amount of potential credibility with the hypothetical listener 
behind the Iron Curtain. Although the idea for building relations with postwar refugees from 
Eastern Europe to combat the Soviet Union came from Frank Wisner’s tour of displaced 
persons’ camps in the fall of 1947, the real relationship between the American government 
and refugees was not one where the United States had a difficult time coopting refugees, but 
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that the refugees had a difficult time earning the patronage of the United States.11 Indeed, 
Eastern European refugees of all nationalities actively sought to participate in American 
propaganda campaigns against the Soviet Union. 
 There were two main reasons why the refugees were more than willing to cooperate 
with American policymakers. First, there existed an economic rationale. Many leading exiles 
from the Baltic republics suffered a significant drop in their standard of living after having to 
flee from their homeland. They had at one time been important politicians, academics, and 
entrepreneurs. Upon entering exile, they were forced to abandon many of life’s luxuries. 
While the salaries associated with American psychological operations were modest, such 
positions were actively sought due to their prestige and relative security compared to other 
means of earning a living in the United States. Perhaps more importantly, however, many 
leading exiles still considered themselves as viable leaders in their home countries after they 
had become liberated from the Soviet Union. 
 Perhaps the only way that the exiles would be able to maintain some level of 
legitimacy with their homeland through a foreign occupation that had already existed for 
nearly a decade was if they were able to reestablish some level of communication with their 
fellow citizens behind the Iron Curtain. Although some exile organizations had nominal 
contacts with partisan movements in the Baltic republics, it was very difficult to get 
information into or out of the Baltic republics. As a result, there was excitement among exile 
communities upon discovering that radio broadcasts in their native languages that would be 
transmitted from the West – either by the FEC through RFE or the State Department via 
VOA. Such broadcasts would be a way for the exiles to reestablish regular contact with their 
homelands in order to let their compatriots know that the exiles were engaged in the struggle 
to liberate Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from the Soviet Union. 
                                                            
11 See W. Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The U.S. Crusade Against the Soviet Union, 1945-1956, 61. 
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 Quite naturally, Baltic exiles had a greater level of enthusiasm for participating in 
RFE broadcasts compared to VOA broadcasts. Whether or not an individual realized that the 
RFE was an American sponsored activity, it was widely accepted that the RFE was a station 
where East Europeans residing in the free world were communicating directly to those in the 
Soviet bloc with no interference from outsiders. Going forward, there were mutual interests 
between Baltic exiles and American officials in the area of psychological warfare against the 
Soviet Union. State Department officials believed that radio broadcasts could be an important 
tool in containing and possibly subverting the Soviet Union. Baltic exiles believed that radio 
broadcasts would provide them with the necessary means to reestablish direct lines of 
communication with their homelands without being perceived as mere pawns in great power 
politics. 
 
The Voice of America and Radio Free Europe Debate 
 Throughout 1950 and 1951 State Department officials and leading Baltic refugee 
figures were engaged in a vigorous discussion about the proper broadcasting avenue for the 
small Baltic languages. At the highest level, there was general agreement between the 
Americans and their Baltic counterparts that Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian language 
broadcasts were an important component of American policy towards the Baltic republics, 
but there were three main issues that proved contentious. First, American policy towards the 
Baltic republics, where officials felt that the non-recognition policy placed Baltic radio 
broadcasts in a separate category from other parts of the Soviet bloc. Second, funding, where 
the small size of the three Baltic republics relative to other Eastern European nationalities, 
meant that the United States had to make policy decisions based on efficient use of limited 
resources. Finally, symbolism, where a basic misunderstanding existed what radio broadcasts 
meant for the Baltic republics and their exiled compatriots. 
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 An important component of Baltic refugee lobbying the FEC about the establishment 
of Baltic consultative panels was the implicit understanding that closer cooperation between 
Baltic exiles and the FEC would result in eventual radio broadcasts under RFE. The FEC and 
State Department’s internal deliberations about formalizing a relationship with the Baltic 
exile community in January 1951 underscored the centrality of radio broadcasts in the project. 
Correspondences between the Baltic Desk and the PPS highlight that the core of FEC 
cooperation with Baltic exiles should be similar to FEC cooperation with other Eastern 
European exiles – that the cooperation should be centered on radio broadcasts that would 
occur in regular 15 minute intervals.12 
 Baltic organizations in the United States, along with the exiled diplomats, vigorously 
continued to push the FEC to establish Baltic radio desks when it was announced in May 
1951 that Baltic consultative panels would be created.  Although State Department and FEC 
officials sympathized with those that actively promoted RFE broadcasts to the Baltic 
republics, major policy concerns remained. Of primary importance was what would be the 
implications of RFE broadcasts for the policy of non-recognition? Additional questions 
included: What would the financial burden of Baltic broadcasts be? How would staff for the 
possible radio desks be assembled? 
 Parallel to the push for Baltic RFE broadcasts was an intense lobbying effort to begin 
Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts in the three Baltic languages. While RFE necessarily 
involved contacts between legitimate exiles and American interlocutors, the VOA was 
predominantly an American affair. Representative of the time period, the most 
organizationally strong and numerous Baltic nationality in the United States, the Lithuanians, 
took the lead in lobbying the State Department and the White House to begin VOA 
broadcasts. At the annual ALT meeting in New York City from 17-18 November 1950, the 
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Council passed three resolutions supporting the initiation of VOA broadcasts to Lithuania.13 
Vedeler responded to Grigaitis’ submission of the resolutions by updating him on the current 
status of Lithuanian VOA broadcasts. He stated that he had been in New York the previous 
week discussing Lithuanian matters with USIA officials and confirmed that broadcasts 
should start in the middle of February 1951.14 
 Lithuanian pressure, however, was not exclusively reserved for the State Department 
or White House. Republican Representative from Pennsylvania, Daniel J. Flood had a 
number of prominent American Lithuanians among his constituencies. In addition, he also 
had established a working relationship with Žadeikis. While the debate over whether or not to 
begin VOA broadcasts continued, Flood kept Žadeikis informed on the current state of affairs. 
He wrote to Žadeikis on 28 March 1950, informing him that while the present priorities were 
being given to a series of broadcasts in the Asiatic languages, he should be assured that plans 
were still underway for the Baltic languages.15 
Flood served on the House Appropriations Committee and was willing to use his 
influence over the State Department’s annual budget to apply pressure on behalf of Baltic 
VOA broadcasts. During the Appropriations hearings for the 1951 State Department budget, 
Flood asked the State Department’s representative, Kohler, a number of questions pertaining 
to Baltic broadcasts – particularly the importance of Lithuanian broadcasts. Flood asked: 
“With reference to your Baltic language programs of the VOA, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, your choice of course, as between the three, the one of superior importance is 
                                                            
13 Pius Grigaitis, Executive Secretary of ALT to Fred K. Salter, Officer in Charge of Baltic Desk, State 
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Secretary, ALT. 28 November 1950, “Folder: B891 VOA.” Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. 
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Lithuania?” Kohler replied, “Yes, due to the increased numbers and for other reasons such as 
geography, resistance movement, and the ability to organize a larger number of Lithuanians 
residing in the free world.”16 
 VOA Lithuanian broadcasts started on 16 February 1951 with a fifteen-minute daily 
program featuring Žadeikis along with Under Secretary of State Edward W. Barrett17 and on 
3 June 1951 in Estonian and Latvian, which featured the Estonian and Latvian diplomats and 
Barrett.18 While the Lithuanian broadcasts increased their broadcasting time to thirty minutes 
daily in June 1951 and the Estonian and Latvian broadcasts increased on 26 August 1951, the 
debate over RFE broadcasts continued to consume the time of American officials concerned 
with Baltic affairs as well as Baltic organizations.19 When the FEC first began formulating 
policy for Baltic broadcasts, there were no plans or appropriations within the IBD in New 
York to broadcast in these languages.20 The relative ease with which the VOA began 
broadcasting in Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian meant that policymakers and exiles faced 
significant policy hurdles if they sought in the future to begin Baltic language broadcasts over 
RFE. 
 Discussions between FEC and State Department officials reveal the two intrinsically 
linked policy reservations about continuing plans for Baltic RFE broadcasts. On the one hand, 
there were questions as to whether Baltic radio broadcasts would be a fortuitous use of the 
                                                            
16 Excerpt from “State Appropriations for 1951.” Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on 
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FEC’s perceived limited resources. Moreover, to debate how to fund Estonian, Latvian, and 
Lithuanian broadcasts exposed considerable implications for sustaining the Non-Recognition 
Policy.21 The total cost of the initial FEC Baltic plans was estimated at an initial $441,600. 
Ledgers suggest that the total cost could be reduced dramatically by reducing the 
broadcasting element of the Baltic proposal.22  
 Despite the existence of VOA broadcasts, FEC officials continued to seek approval 
for broadcast funding since it had been part of its negotiations with the Baltic diplomats and 
other Baltic organizations.23 The FEC, however, needed to find some way to justify 
continuing the plans to broadcast to the Baltic republics. Throughout 1951, regular 
discussions between State Department and FEC officials culminated in the FEC’s decision to 
propose that the Baltic diasporas should make a sizeable contribution towards the costs of 
FEC sponsored broadcasts to their homelands. Subsequently, FEC sent the State Department 
a memorandum asking whether it would be possible to ask for donations from Baltic 
Americans to subsidize broadcasts and for the State Department to unblock frozen Baltic 
funds in the United States to help fund the FEC’s efforts.24  
 Vedeler outlined the State Department’s position towards the use of frozen Baltic 
funds for radio broadcasts. “The Department can see no way clear to unblocking any of the 
Baltic frozen funds for this purpose.” He continued, “We do not wish to see the position or 
the operations of the Baltic diplomatic missions jeopardized by utilizing these blocked funds 
                                                            
21 While the FEC received most of its funding from the CIA, for appearances sake the organization did not have 
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22 “Baltic Radio Broadcasts” Kelley to Robert Joyce on 10 April 1951, “Folder: B801.5 RFE” Records Relating 
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in some other way. So long as these funds exist the representatives of the Baltic countries 
have some measure of independence which supports our doctrine of non-recognition.”25 The 
implications were clear that the State Department was not willing to allow radio broadcasts 
over RFE to jeopardize the cornerstone of its policy towards the Baltic republics – the Non-
Recognition Policy. 
 American officials found themselves in a precarious situation where there were very 
real policy and economic problems with RFE broadcasts as well as potential political 
problems with the Baltic exiles, to whom they had virtually promised access to the 
wavelengths of Radio Free Europe. Kohler wrote to Robert Bauer of the PPS in November 
1951 asking for documents from the Baltic desk chiefs of the VOA broadcasts for a rundown 
of what specifically they were broadcasting. Kohler was hoping to demonstrate that there was 
a sufficient amount of overlap between the VOA and RFE broadcasts to square the circles, so 
to say. Bauer contacted IBD personnel and several prominent Baltic exiles who were well 
disposed to VOA, as well as the new Baltic Consultative Panels to create his report. 
 Bauer responded to Kohler on 7 November arguing that the VOA program to the 
Baltic region had consistently implemented and carried out the clear-cut American policy 
towards the area. He continued by offering critiques by several notable Estonians and 
Lithuanians. August Torma, the Estonian Minister in London stated that he “backs without 
reservation the American policy toward the area and its implementation by the VOA. The 
three Baltic consultative panels all gave very specific recommendations to the VOA on what 
their broadcasts should include, and they were all fully implemented. Bauer concluded that 
Sidzikauskas (who had been promoted to Chairman of the Lithuanian Consultative Panel) 
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and Marzins (a member of the Latvian Consultative Panel) had all been actively involved in 
formulating VOA broadcasts to their respective homelands.26 
 Throughout November 1951, regular correspondences between FEC and State 
Department policymakers occurred to finalize what the official policy concerning American 
broadcasts to the Baltic region would be. In their final analysis, the State Department decided 
to argue that the Non-Recognition Policy ultimately was a benefit to American broadcasting 
efforts. One of the original rationales for separating RFE broadcasting from VOA 
broadcasting had been to allow the United States to transmit material that might not have 
been officially acceptable due to diplomatic protocol with other states. The non-recognition 
policy meant that the United States did not have to worry about increasing diplomatic 
tensions with regimes that they did not recognize. Kohler argued: 
To use a separate and distinct RFE operation to an area controlled by the USSR 
makes sense only if it can use medium wave facilities not available to VOA and if it 
can make use of political exiles in a manner denied to the VOA as an official arm of 
government policy. Neither of these criteria apply in the Baltic States. The 
contemplated competing shortwave operation of RFE could only serve to confuse 
target peoples. 
 
If it is deemed advisable to expand broadcasting to these areas – the logical thing to 
do would be to give VOA a directive to the effect and to provide the necessary funds 
for carrying on this expansion. In short, we feel that the funds available to RFE could 
be more profitably and with less confusion be expanded elsewhere.27 
 
Going forward the State Department was going to justify the cancelation of RFE broadcasts 
to the Baltic republics due to the broadcasts being too expensive and that the VOA would be 
able to provide the same policy initiatives to both the Americans and the Baltic exiles that 
RFE might otherwise be able to provide. 
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 RFE and OIB officials met on 5 December 1951 to discuss what help the State 
Department could provide RFE in liquidating their commitments over Baltic broadcasting. 
Looking back at the meeting, Kohler reported that there was clearly a great deal of 
suppressed resentment directed at the State Department, creating an environment that was 
less than cordial. The first point of contention was that that the RFE officials that were in 
charge of the Baltic programs had not received any specific long-term instructions about how 
to proceed, but only to suspend their activities pending a review and receipt of further 
instructions. The second, and perhaps most important point, was that they felt that it was the 
State Department’s responsibility to insure that the Baltic diplomats were made aware of the 
official policy line.28 Concurrently, the Baltic diplomats were beginning to express their 
displeasure about broadcasting delays during regularly scheduled appointments with State 
Department Baltic Desk officials. Throughout December 1951, the State Department utilized 
these meetings as opportunities to inform the Baltic diplomats of the official broadcasting 
policy. 
 Feldmans and Pusta Sr. met with Vedeler and Allan on 12 December to ask about the 
future of American sponsored radio broadcasts to Latvia and Estonia. Pusta stated in no 
uncertain terms that the failure to initiate Baltic RFE broadcasts would result in the 
appearance that the United States was slighting the Baltic States and that the only way to 
avoid such a falling out was to inaugurate broadcasts. Pusta intimated that this fact alone was 
significant enough to be a primary reason to begin broadcasts. Pusta and Feldmans asked how 
the State Department could explain to Baltic refugees in the West or to Balts behind the Iron 
Curtain why an American organization interested in opposing Soviet tyranny could broadcast 
to other places in Eastern Europe, but ignore the Baltic States? Vedeler asked “what tasks, if 
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any, could be performed by RFE, which are not being done by VOA?”29 Neither Pusta Sr. nor 
Feldmans were able to provide a specific answer. 
 One week later, Kaiv and Žadeikis met with Allan and Vedeler to double down on the 
Baltic diplomats’ position that RFE broadcasts were essential for the Baltic refugees as well 
as Balts in the Soviet Union. The diplomats strongly felt that the abandonment of Baltic 
language broadcasts by RFE would be misunderstood in the United States and abroad and 
that the decision would be interpreted widely as a change in the position of the United States 
towards Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Kaiv continued by stating that Baltic language 
broadcasts had been known and widely discussed among exile groups abroad as an excellent 
medium for providing support and morale for their compatriots fighting for their freedom. 
 Vedeler stressed that Balts should not attach any political significance to the decision 
not to support RFE broadcasts and that the decision was “strictly based on the desire to 
produce the most effective broadcasts in the Baltic languages by concentrating professional 
efforts in a single organization.”30 Vedeler continued by explaining that the unique 
relationship between the Baltic States and the United States allowed the Americans to take a 
much stronger line in its official broadcasts than it could take in broadcasts to countries in 
which the United States had accredited missions. From the American position, Vedeler felt it 
was logical to utilize official American foreign broadcasting in as efficient a manner as 
possible.31 Kaiv and Žadeikis viewed this reason as illegitimate and left the meeting under the 
assumption that the State Department vetoed RFE broadcasts due to VOA insistence rather 
than real policy considerations and that they would file official petitions with both the State 
Department and the FEC. 
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 The meeting between the Baltic diplomats and Vedeler did not solve the issue; it only 
inflamed tensions. Žadeikis submitted his official memorandum to the State Department on 
RFE broadcasting on 31 December 1951, followed by Feldmans on 3 January 1952 and Kaiv 
on 8 January 1952.32 Summarizing the diplomats’ argument, Vedeler wrote: 
One of the chief inducements for cooperating with the FEC had been the promise  that 
RFE would broadcast to the countries of Eastern Europe. Žadeikis stated that prior to 
approving of the affiliation of Lithuanian emigre leaders with the FEC through the 
establishment of a Lithuanian Panel he had received assurances from Poole that if the 
Baltic States were associated with FEC, would receive consideration equal to that 
afforded other East European countries.33 
 
Throughout January 1952, RFE officials complained that “the reaction of Baltic exiles to the 
decision against sending broadcasts is one of deep disappointment. No matter what stand the 
FEC and the Baltic Panels may take, it seems that Baltic organizations in the United States 
will strongly protest the present negative decision.”34 
 Kohler, Vedeler, and John Devine met on 17 January 1952 to discuss the memoranda 
that had been submitted by the diplomats as well as all other petitions received from 
primarily Lithuanian organizations around the country. The three decided that their initial 
policy was correct and that the Baltic Desk would assume the responsibility that the decision 
had been settled. They did, however, agree that should the whole question of RFE operations 
be reviewed by the State Department in the future that the question of whether or not to 
include Baltic broadcasts could be re-assessed.35 In subsequent meetings with the Baltic 
diplomats at the end of January, Vedeler concisely stated that “the problem had been 
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reconsidered from every standpoint by all officers with a direct interest in it and the various 
points raised by the Baltic diplomats had been carefully studied… but the Department could 
see no other course but to reaffirm its previous position.36 
 Ultimately Žadeikis’ most pressing concern was what sort of provisions were made 
for those who had been employed by the FEC to begin Baltic radio broadcasts. While 
Vedeler did not have a specific answer to the direct question, he commented that something 
probably could be done to take care of these matters through ongoing negotiations between 
the FEC and VOA representatives in New York. In closing, Vedeler hoped that the diplomats 
would be willing to cooperate with VOA administrators and the Baltic Consultative Panels as 
it was VOA’s “sincere desire” to receive and make use of helpful comments.37 
 Ironically, once the Baltic diplomats’ concerns were assuaged, the Baltic Consultative 
Panels that had fully endorsed the idea of streamlining all broadcasting activity through the 
VOA began protesting the American decision to supplant RFE broadcasts with the VOA. 
While many of the official memoranda that were submitted to the Secretary of State on the 
issue deal with the double standard involved, that is, other countries in Eastern Europe were 
receiving RFE broadcasts, they offer insight into the symbolic importance that RFE had for 
the Baltic exiles.  
The Estonian Consultative Panel submitted a protest to E. Acker of the FEC on 8 
January 1952 stating that “the Estonian Panel is of the opinion that broadcasting over the 
VOA cannot cover the field of broadcasting under the auspices of FEC because of the 
different approaches to the problem. The VOA is and will necessarily continue to be the 
spokesman of American official policy, while broadcasting under the FEC will express the 
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voice of Free Estonia and of the Estonians abroad.”38 In May 1952, the Latvian Panel wrote 
to Acheson that “the VOA cannot and does not act as the speaker of Free Latvians. It is for 
Free Latvians themselves, and not only for the Latvian Panel to take care of their specific 
problems designed to help their compatriots at home. Our speeches and features would be 
read not anonymously, but by the authors, known and respected in Latvia, themselves.”39 
The debate over Baltic language broadcasts over RFE would continue to be an 
important political issue for Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians residing in the United 
States over the next two decades. Regardless, in January 1952, as in August 1951, the VOA 
continued to be the sole broadcasting medium for the United States Government as well as 
Baltic exiles residing in the United States. Not all factions within the Baltic diasporas felt as 
if they had achieved anything substantive through the initial debate over radio broadcasts. In 
reality, however, the VOA was able to broadcast material to the Baltic republics and feature 
guests that VOA broadcasts in other languages were simply unable to, mainly due to political 
protocol. Nevertheless, the ongoing debate between Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians 
who were actively involved in the Voice of America and those who were not would play an 





Broadcasts to the Baltic Republics 
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 The inaugural broadcasts in all three Baltic languages shared two main features. 
Žadeikis, Kaiv, and Feldmans all released official statements on behalf of the exiled Baltic 
diplomatic missions and Assistant Secretary of State Edward W. Barrett represented the 
United States Government. The implications of this duality are clear. The Voice of America 
would not only be the official broadcasting arm of the United States government towards the 
Baltic Republics and the primary way that people living behind the Iron Curtain would find 
out about American policy directed towards the Soviet Union, but the VOA would also be an 
official way that the Baltic diplomats and prominent exiles would be able to maintain contact 
with their homelands. 
 Barrett outlined why the United States felt that VOA broadcasts to Lithuania, Estonia, 
and Latvia were important. He argued that they were “to convey to the Baltic people a factual 
and unbiased picture of the motives and aims which guide the United States in its 
international relations. These aims are: peace, freedom, and justice for all.”40 Barrett also 
took the opportunity to slam the Soviet Union by contrasting their policy of depriving the 
Baltic people “freedom and liberty since the fateful summer of 1940” while the United States 
“have consistently advocated the freedom of choice of the people of Estonia [Latvia, and 
Lithuania], as to their form of government and way of life.” In closing, he forcefully read the 
entire text of Welles Declaration.41 As promised, the United States was not encumbered by 
diplomatic protocol in criticizing the Soviet Union over VOA Baltic language broadcasts. 
 Although Kaiv did not pass up an opportunity to criticize the Soviet Union for 
“inflicting suffering upon the Estonian nation during the past eleven years,”42 he and his 
colleagues had markedly different objectives during their first opportunity to speak to their 
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homelands directly since the Soviet annexation. Kaiv stated to his Estonian compatriots: “The 
fact alone, that I can address you over the radio as the free recognized representative of the 
independent Republic of Estonia and that there are to follow regular broadcasts in the 
Estonian language, is proof that the freedom of the Estonians is not buried but that the great 
democracies… are continuing to recognize the democratic Republic of Estonia… The body 
of Estonians abroad as well as the official representatives of Estonia are continuing the fight 
for the freedom of the Estonians.”43 Later on the same day, the VOA broadcasted: “You are 
listening to Jules Feldmans, Latvian Charge d’Affaires in the United States… We are glad 
that you in this way will have contact with the free world, from which you have been 
separated for such a long time. You may be assured, therefore, that your interests are being 
actively represented before the Government of this great land of freedom.”44 
 It is notable that foreign nationals, such as the three Baltic diplomats were granted 
access to the VOA wavelengths. Most VOA language service broadcasters were born abroad, 
or were first-generation Americans that happened to be native speakers of their mother 
tongues.45 Baltic broadcasts, however were different in their staffing as well as their message. 
So far this chapter has demonstrated the policy set forth by the State Department that the 
Baltic languages would be serviced exclusively by the VOA, in lieu of duplicate broadcasts 
over RFE. While it was probably a foregone conclusion that the inaugural broadcasts would 
feature some of the most prominent Baltic exiles (such as the diplomats) as well as senior 
American policymakers (such as an Assistant Secretary of State), there remained two critical 
questions to resolve. Would the VOA broadcast desks be willing to cooperate with the Baltic 
Consultative Panels to develop and execute policy? Could the American policy of trying to 
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undermine the Soviet Union in the Baltic region coexist with the Baltic émigré policy of 
trying to reestablish contacts with their homelands? 
 Before the decision to indefinitely indefinitely the beginning of RFE broadcasts, the 
newly assembled VOA radio desks began working with their American supervisors to 
formulate broadcasting policy parallel to the Baltic Consultative Panels formulating their own 
broadcasting formulas. On 1 October 1951, the three Baltic Panels submitted a memorandum 
to the FEC, which was eventually forwarded to the State Department for policy 
considerations. The first priority of the Baltic panels was to strike a balance between 
“demonstrating support and encouragement of the hope among Estonians, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians remaining their homelands while avoiding the incitation to prematurely revolt 
against the Soviet Union. Second, the panels proposed that broadcasts should be specifically 
groomed for individual groups within Baltic societies, particularly agricultural workers, the 
youth, and the remaining clergy. Third, the broadcasts should highlight the fact that exiled 
Baltic nationals are doing “what they can to work for the independence of their homelands.”46  
 The State Department agreed with the FEC that the panels’ proposals were 
“reasonable and practical” and that their only major policy consideration that should be added 
was that there the American non-recognition policy should receive adequate broadcast time. 
This point highlights that even though the Consultative Panels and FEC broadcasts were an 
avenue for exiles to communicate with their homeland, the radios were indeed an American 
foreign policy initiative. As part of the debate whether or not RFE broadcasts were essential, 
Vedeler forwarded the Baltic Consultative Panels’ papers to the VOA radio desks to see 
whether or not the policies they were putting in place coalesced with the Panels’ policies. 
 Constantine Jurgela, chief of the Lithuanian VOA radio desk replied to his supervisor, 
A. Bauer of the North Europe Section, who in turn contacted Vedeler about whether or not 
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there were areas of agreement between the Consultative Panels and the VOA desks. Jurgela 
stated that “all of the groups mentioned in the memo of the Lithuanian Panel are the very 
groups for whom daily Lithuanian broadcasts are intended.”47 Jurgela continued by arguing 
that the broadcasts are rooted in a message of “hope, perseverance, patience, and loyalty to 
the national and Christian heritage of the Lithuanian people.”48 He recapitulated that indeed, 
Lithuania was one of the Baltic States whose continued independence is recognized by the 
United States and that the VOA broadcasts adequately reflect American policy to the region. 
 It was clear that there was ample policy room for the Baltic Consultative Panels and 
the VOA broadcasts desk to cooperate. Indeed, in the course of 1952 and 1953, the VOA 
broadcast panels not only used raw intelligence gathered by the Baltic Panels and broadcast 
academic writing that the Panels’ members engaged in, but offered the wavelengths directly 
to panel members. From January 1952 through 1954, a member from each Baltic panel was 
featured over Voice of America once a month. The Panel members spoke on topics ranging 
from the political developments of the independent countries to current initiatives to fight for 
liberation.49 
 While VOA broadcasts seemed to be a source of cooperation at the highest level of 
Baltic émigré politics, since the Baltic Panels, VOA radio desks, and the Baltic diplomats all 
at least tacitly supported the effort, the State Department and USIA officials were initially the 
ultimate arbitrators in what would be allowed to be broadcast over the official American 
broadcasting network. Ultimately, State Department officials and the VOA Baltic desk 
employees agreed on three main broadcasting topics to the region. The broadcasts would 
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focus on promoting freedom; regularly reference American policy towards the Baltic 
republics; and remembering anniversaries. 
 Calling to mind the value of human rights and freedom in the United States in 
comparison to Soviet totalitarianism was a universal feature of American public diplomatic 
radio broadcasts during the Cold War. In a period where the Baltic republics were 
experiencing repressive Stalinist terror that included deportations and summary executions, 
VOA broadcasters were able to offer a stark contrast to what life was like in the United States, 
particularly through referring the experiences of Baltic DPs who had found refuge in the 
United States. The Voice of America would feature refugees who recalled their memories of 
living in their Soviet occupied homelands and juxtaposing that experience with their lives in 
the United States.  
 The Lithuanian broadcast unit’s coverage of a trip to Chicago in October 1951 offers 
an excellent perspective on the VOA’s attempted depth of reporting. P.J. Labanauskas 
traveled to Chicago to interview several Lithuanians who had just arrived in the United States 
who had either been in Soviet prisons or witnessed massacres during the Soviet period. One 
such interviewee witnessed the massacre at Chervan where several thousand political 
prisoners were executed by the NKVD in June 1941. An interview with a Lithuanian who 
was imprisoned for eight years offered insight into what life was like in the Soviet prison 
camps in Siberia as well as Solovki Island.50 
 This experience was contrasted with coverage of the ALT Chicago Area Conference 
at the Lithuanian Auditorium in Chicago, where 385 delegates representing 197 Lithuanian 
organizations met. While they recorded excerpts of prominent Lithuanians such as the 
Grigaitis (Secretary General of ALT) and Šimutis (President of ALT), the more interesting 
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content included capturing the experiences of average Lithuanian DPs through interviews. 
These interviews ranged from shining light on the continuation of Lithuanian handicraft and 
folk dancing institutes that had been started to the entrepreneurial efforts of a Lithuanian who 
owned a farm and several summer resorts after arriving in the United States.51 
 The next important theme was the continual rebroadcasting of statements in the 
United States that were favorable to the cause of Baltic liberty and which underscored the 
American non-recognition policy, as well as the plight of political refugees around the world. 
Naturally this was an important policy prerogative for American officials as it highlighted the 
differences between how the United States conducted foreign affairs and perceived personal 
freedom and how the Soviet Union conducted foreign policy and established universal values. 
Any prominent American citizen or government official that gave commentary about the 
plight of the Baltic States was mentioned. In addition, important exiled leaders were 
frequently given airtime, including the diplomats. 
 The most important messages that American policy makers wanted broadcasted over 
the VOA were the annual statements that the Secretary of State made on the national days of 
independence commending the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian people on their 
achievements as independent countries; restating the continued American policy of not 
recognizing the Soviet annexation of their countries; and the hope that in the future their 
nations would live in an independent and democratic manner. VOA Baltic broadcasts, 
however, also included statements by American officials that were not Baltic specific, but 
were intentionally used to foment dissent within the Soviet bloc. 
 Though the Estonian VOA broadcasts in September and October 1951, American 
politicians and military officials received significant informatino over the plight of refugees 
who were trying to flee the communist bloc. On 22 September 1951, the Estonians broadcast 




a story about American High Commission Officials in Europe rejecting Czechoslovak 
demands for the return of 31 escapees aboard the “Freedom Train.” The broadcasts claimed 
that “American officials declared that political refugees will not be returned to countries 
where their freedom is in jeopardy.”52 On 21 October 1951, the VOA discussed a U.S. Senate 
group that proposed to find home for refugees. It broadcast then Senator Richard Nixon’s 
statement that “Many under-populated areas of the world, which either are benefiting or may 
benefit in the future from the point-four program, would benefit from immigration.”53 The 
message was clear to Estonians residing in the Soviet Union that should they feel inclined to 
escape from the Soviet Union the United States would not send them back to the Soviet 
Union and could possibly work to help settle them in a free country. 
 The final important theme consisted of remembering commemoration days and 
anniversaries. VOA broadcasts carefully feature two types of anniversaries. First, traditional 
anniversaries and birthdays were remembered. These included religious holidays, days of 
independence and older historical events. Second, anniversary dates of important 
contemporary political events were remembered. These included the peoples’ diet meetings, 
the Welles Declaration, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet invasion of Poland, 
Molotov’s Speech to the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1939, and the annexation dates of 
Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, and Bessarabia.54 
 During autumn 1951, the Latvian broadcasting unit juxtaposed the anniversaries of 
Latvian Independence and the Revolutions of 1917. Commemorating Latvian Independence 
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Day, Minister Zariņš from London announced “Latvian organizations in the United States 
will not be alone in the commemoration of the Latvian Independence Day. Nations who are 
friends of Latvia and Latvians will speak on November 18, because the Latvians are bound to 
western culture and because Latvians are a Western nation who is enslaved now by the 
Eastern barbarianism.”55 Lielnors of the Latvian VOA stated on 5 November 1951: “On the 
occasion of the anniversary of the so-called Communist October Revolution, let us begin, for 
the sake of clarity, with a few questions…” He continued by asking “What is the country 
where celebrations are held to commemorate the beginning of hunger? Who are the rulers, 
who celebrate bloodshed and slave labor camps with festivities, with champaign and caviar? 
What is the system where decorations are awarded for murder? It is the Soviet Union… It is 
the Kremlin… It is Moscow.”56 
 The Latvian broadcast unit effectively tried to contrast the political and cultural 
orientation of the Latvian nation, as being a Western nation, with the Soviet Union that 
functioned so far out of Western society that its “Eastern barbarianism” brought them to 
celebrate hunger, slave labor, and murder with medals, caviar, and social promotion. The 
message also attempted to tap into potential resentment over the lifestyle that members of the 
political echelon possessed in comparison to the severe economic dislocation that was 
transpiring in Soviet occupied Latvia. 
 The Voice of America, however, did not exclusively broadcast information that was 
pertinent to the Baltic republics or to the lives of Balts living in the United States. After all, 
the VOA was the main way that the United States broadcast about life and politics in the 
United States. On Estonian broadcasts over the course of several days through November 
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1951, the benefits of the Marshall Plan in Europe were fully explained. The benefit from 
mentioning the Marshall Plan was to demonstrate how the United States was actively 
assisting in the reconstruction of Western Europe in the postwar period, while the Soviets 
continued their campaign to destroy the Baltic nations.57 
For three days in September 1951, the Lithuanian broadcast unit covered President 
Truman’s Constitution Day Speech at the Library of Congress, delivered on 17 September.58 
The Lithuanian desk saw from the Soviet Press that it had a negative impact in Moscow, so 
continued giving it a post-event treatment for several days.59 American labor movements and 
agrarian reform policies were also highlighted.60 These references were used to try to contrast 
with the collectivization that had been taking place in the Soviet Union and to foment 
remembrance of the notion of small Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian farms that were a 
primary feature of life in the interwar republics. 
The material broadcast over the VOA highlights the relatively positive working 
relationship between the Baltic exiles who were a key component in making the broadcasts 
successful and the State Department, which ultimately had discrete foreign policy objectives 
in mind. At the highest level, there existed a convergence of ideology and interests between 
the Americans and the exiles. There was little room for the two groups to disagree over the 
regular employment of the non-recognition policy in broadcasts. The Policy remained the 
cornerstone of American policy towards the Baltic republics and the exiles owed part of their 
continued claims of legitimacy to the continued policy. It was both parties’ interests to 
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foment dissent in the Soviet Union to attempt to hasten the liberation of Eastern Europe. The 
United States rhetorically found it useful and the exiles placed their hopes and future 
prospects on policies that might be successful. Finally, highlighting the positive aspects of 
life in the United States allowed the Americans to underline a sharp contrast to the lack of 
freedom in the Soviet Union, and it allowed the exiles to carry a message to their homelands 
that they were prosperous enough and free enough to devote their time to the eventual 
liberation of the Baltic republics. 
VOA broadcasts were also a rare instance of significant amount of cooperation 
between some of the important forces of the Baltic émigré communities. While the Baltic 
Consultative Panels may not have been in charge of the broadcasts themselves, the VOA 
radio desks offered them enough of an opportunity not only to provide material for them to 
broadcast, but it gave them direct access to their homelands via the radio. More importantly, 
however, was that the Baltic Consultative Panels and the VOA desk chiefs were small 
enough in structure to facilitate effective cooperation and they were geographically close 
enough, both being located in primarily in New York City, for effective and regular 
communication to take place. Throughout the 1950s, however, other émigré organizations 
sought to impose their own influences upon VOA radio broadcasts, resulting in a mixed 
result in assessing whether or not the VOA was an avenue to foster Baltic cooperation. 
 
Internal Exile Politics and the Voice of America 
 For all of the cooperation that occurred among various components of the Baltic 
diasporas to provide thoughtful analysis about world affairs and émigré affairs over the VOA, 
the latter proved to be yet another forum for exile factions to compete for political supremacy, 
both within each community as well as for American sponsorship. VOA and State 
Department officials not only had to manage tenuous relations between individual 
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nationalities, but also faced considerable pressure within each diaspora in several areas. 
Staffing issues created significant tensions between officials and exiles where there were 
personal, generational, or ideological differences between factional elements of each diaspora. 
Critiques over broadcasting methods also created openings for competing exile organizations 
to attack each other. Finally, concerns about favoring one particular political party or 
geographic location dominated policy discussions. 
 The very nature of the VOA meant that there were a limited number of full-time 
employment opportunities for the development and transmission of broadcasts to the Baltic 
republics. Most VOA language service broadcasters were born abroad, or were first-
generation American citizens who were native speakers of their mother tongue. Generally 
speaking, more than half of all 800 or more total employees were non-citizens who were 
seeking American citizenship.61 Nevertheless, the longstanding policy was that American 
citizens would have priority over foreign nationals when it came to VOA language service 
broadcasters. Since Voice of America broadcasts were to be used as an outlet for exile 
broadcasts, a conflict developed between Baltic Americans who had immigrated before 
World War II and the newly arrived exiles. 
 This debate over the employment of recently arrived exiles and older members of the 
Lithuanian American or Latvian American communities was a source of potential animosity 
between the two generations. Indeed, the initial employment of older Baltic Americans fueled 
Feldmans’ and Žadeikis’ suspicions about the State Department’s decision not to pursue RFE 
broadcasts. During the 12 December 1951 meeting with Vedeler and Allan, Feldmans 
insinuated that RFE broadcasts had been delayed due to the personal issues between newer 
Latvian arrivals and older Latvian immigrants represented by Harry W. Lielnors.62 
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 Earlier though, Žadeikis wrote to Alfred Puhan of the International Broadcasting 
Division (IBD) of the State Department on 19 September 1950 informing him that he would 
like to submit a list of acceptable candidates to the exiled Lithuanian diplomats.63 Puhan 
replied that IBD was required by law to look for American citizens first. In the event that 
there were no qualified applicants, IBD had the authority to turn to the best-qualified aliens 
residing in the United States.64 He continued that Žadeikis should contact Richard E. 
Morrisey, Chief of the Personnel Section of IBD with his list, noting that they were 
specifically seeking people with journalistic or radio experience. The ALT’s existence and 
the generally high-level of cooperation between the older Lithuanian community in the 
United States and the newly arriving refugees meant that there was little dispute among the 
Lithuanians over the establishment of the Lithuanian VOA broadcasting desk. 
 Staffing questions, however, also exposed American officials to the occasional petty 
personal feuds that played out between prominent exiles in terms of their politics or even 
their family affiliations. While IBD began the process of interviewing Baltic Americans and 
exiles to staff the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian broadcasts desks, these became some of 
the most sought after positions for politically active Balts. Not only would they be the voices 
that their fellow citizens behind the Iron Curtain would hear, but would also be gainfully 
employed by the American government.65 One such leading Estonian exile, the son of Kaarel 
Pusta Sr, Kaarel Pusta Jr. became a leading candidate in 1950 and early 1951 to head the 
Estonian VOA desk. The possible appointment of Pusta became a problem for Kaiv. 
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During a meeting with State Department officials to discuss financial matters, Kaiv 
asked whether Vedeler or Johnson had been aware if Pusta Jr. was going to serve as Chief of 
the Estonian VOA Desk. Kaiv explained that this would be terribly problematic due to a 
wartime incident where “Pusta had met a group of Lithuanian officers who had appealed to 
him for assistance and Pusta helped. However, on a subsequent occasion in Germany on 
meeting a similar group of Estonian officers, Pusta had declined to give any assistance.”66 
Vedeler and Johnson asked for further information about the incident, and Kaiv 
diverged to reveal his personal dislike for Pusta’s father who he had felt was beginning to 
usurp his power at the Estonian Consulate.67 Kaiv was told that the selection of a person to 
act as Chief of the Estonian Desk was entirely based on the candidate’s professional 
qualifications, and that aside from the mandatory security clearance, political considerations 
did not enter into account. Vedeler attempted to assuage Kaiv’s concerns by mentioning that 
the VOA Desk Chief would not be in a position to formulate policy, but would be executing 
policies and directives handed down from superiors in New York and Washington. Kaiv 
ultimately conceded that VOA had the sole right to hire its employees based on its own 
criteria, but only wanted to avoid a situation that would “probably cause trouble.”68 
While it was true that the Voice of America hired its staff based on their professional 
qualifications, in reality when it came to the Baltic desks, it was policy to avoid taking on 
anybody who would be deemed as controversial to the majority of the national diasporas. 
Very naturally, Vedeler and Johnson looked at the question of whether or not Pusta Jr. would 
be an appropriate desk chief, and it decided that Kaiv had some sense of personal persecution 
by the Pusta family; that his attitude about the Pustas was not shared by an appreciable 
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number of Estonian exiles and that therefore his employment would not detract from the 
cooperation of the Estonian emigration at large when it came to Estonian language broadcasts. 
Ironically, the loudest voices that offered feedback and were critical of VOA Baltic 
language broadcasts were Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians residing in the United States 
and Europe. As early as 15 March 1951, the first American Lithuanian complaints started to 
reach State Department desks. Joseph Koncius of the United Lithuanian Relief Fund of 
America met with Val Johnson and Joseph G. Kolarek of the IBD to express his 
dissatisfaction with the VOA broadcasts. Koncius believed that over 75% of the speakers 
were radicals associated with the far Left or far Right of Lithuanian politics.69 
Kolarek emphasized that the Lithuanian VOA employees had not only to be loyal 
American citizens and competent professionals, but that VOA was first and foremost an 
American foreign policy project and that internal Lithuanian political interests and disputes 
were primarily matters for the Lithuanian people themselves to work out.70 It is important to 
note that Koncius’ organization was perceived by both American officials and the Lithuanian 
community as being marginal and not surprising that he would levy criticism against a 
project that had close collaboration between the State Department and prominent Lithuanians.  
Obtaining accurate information about what life was like in the Soviet occupied Baltic 
republics was a problem that VOA policymakers were confronted with on a regular basis. 
The United States did not have diplomats in the region due to the non-recognition policy and 
foreign visitors were barred from traveling to the area. As a result, exile groups that did not 
have regular contact with the State Department occasionally approached Americans and 
offered them allegedly better information about developments in the Baltic republics than 
what they were receiving. Naturally one of the ulterior motives such claims was to increase 
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their standing within their exile community, but also garner favor with the Americans. Often, 
however, such claims devolved into full-blown demarches within an exile community. 
One such incident started when S. Kuzminskas of the Lithuanian Underground 
approached Robert Bauer, an American diplomat in London during April 1951. Kuzminskas 
informed Bauer that regardless of jamming, the Lithuanians in Lithuania did hear some of the 
VOA broadcasts. Kuzminskas urged the Americans to consider adding one or two persons 
who had recently been in touch with present day Lithuania to the VOA’s staff.71 Kuzminskas 
offered a thinly-veiled threat that should the Americans be unwilling to cooperate this would 
cause some reluctance on the part of his group “to cooperate to the fullest, meaning that it is 
withholding some of the information about conditions in occupied Lithuania, which is as 
their disposal.”72 
Žadeikis was summoned to the State Department on 27 April 1951 to discuss the 
information that the Baltic Desk had received from London. Johnson asked whether this was 
a situation that could cause problems concerning unity within the Lithuanian diaspora. 
Žadeikis stated that the group in London was relatively small and unimportant. While 
Žadeikis mentioned that he was not surprised by the development, he reiterated that they 
were unimportant.73 Johnson took the opportunity to remind Žadeikis of prior conversations 
where it was highly desirable for “Lithuanian émigrés to forget their differences and work 
together as closely as possible.”74 
For the next several months, Žadeikis proved to be correct in suggesting that there 
was little for the State Department to be concerned the Lithuanian community’s willingness 
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to accept VOA as the focal point of American broadcasts in their language. While the VOA 
broadcasts were not perceived as being the same as RFE broadcasts, Lithuanians in the free 
world did have daily contact with Lithuania behind the Iron Curtain through the Voice of 
America. In addition, the hierarchical nature of the VOA desks meant that the Lithuanians 
who were in charge of broadcasting were for the most part executing policy that was handed 
down from American government officials. 
In January 1952, Jurgela was assigned to cover a special event for the local 
community in Lithuania where he interviewed Bronys Raila, a prominent Lithuanian exile 
associated with the Lithuanian Underground in London. Raila inquired whether Jurgela 
would be willing to include some statements about the Lithuanian Underground in London 
for the forthcoming VOA broadcast about the event. In response, Jurgela declined to accept 
such statements, since such material would need clearance by his superiors.75 While it was 
standard protocol for Jurgela to require proper approval from supervisors to include such 
material in the VOA broadcasts, it stands to reason that Jurgela merely used this as an excuse 
to marginalize the role of the LRS within the broader Lithuanian community. 
In the end, it was not the unwillingness of the Lithuanian Underground in London to 
participate with VOA that fomented discontent within the ranks of the Lithuanian diaspora, 
but the perceived reluctance of the Lithuanian VOA desk chief, Jurgela, to utilize the 
information that the Lithuanian Underground provided. A year after the first discussion 
between Johnson and Žadeikis over the role that the Lithuanian Underground could play in 
contributing to Lithuanian broadcasts, Žadeikis met with Kolarek to present intelligence that 
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the Lithuanian Underground in London was becoming increasingly frustrated over Jurgela’s 
reluctance to use its material over the Voice of America.76 
The demarche between the Lithuanian VOA desk operations and the London 
Underground must be seen in the context of the ongoing dispute between conservative 
factions of the Lithuanian diaspora that included the VLIK as well as the ALT, in which 
Jurgela was an active member, and the Lozoraitis/London faction of the Lithuanian diaspora. 
The VOA debate became yet another proxy battle between the two Lithuanian factions. By 
March 1953, prominent Lithuanians in London were calling for C.R. Jurgela’s dismissal as 
chief of the VOA desk.77  
 Throughout 1953, the dispute between the Lithuanian VOA Desk and the Lithuanian 
Underground in London reached a fevered pitch. There were open calls that the VOA had 
been reduced to the mouthpiece of Brazaitis, a prominent Christian Democrat and Member of 
VLIK. The London group criticized the VOA for calling for the liberation of Lithuania 
prematurely, refusing to broadcast in a responsible tone, and ultimately providing “free 
propaganda to the chosen one political party, instead of giving more attention to the contents 
of Lithuanian broadcasts.78 On 10 September, Jurgela attempted to combat the growing 
criticism his office faced from the broader Lithuanian community and to assuage the State 
Department concerns by composing a letter to Bauer of IBD as well as his Latvian 
counterpart, Harry W. Lielnors.  
                                                            
76 Memorandum of Conversation, Žadeikis and Kolarek, 21 April 1952. Folder: Li801.1 Emigre Organizations, 
Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 10, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, 
Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
77 Fund Memo #656 1953 March Monthly Report. B801.4 Consultative Panels, Records Relating to the Baltic 
States, 1940-1961. Box 2, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department of 
State, NAII. 
78 15 February 1952 Memo from Landreth Harrison in Paris to State on Lithuanian Reception of Broadcasts 15 
February 1952, Folder: Li801.1 Emigre Organizations, Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 
10, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department of State, NAII. There were 
ongoing rumors within the Lithuanian immigration that Brazaitis immigrated to the United States using covert 
American funds. Based on available documents, it is impossible to ascertain the versacity of such claims.  
 
 217 
 Jurgela stated that there was no substance whatsoever to the LRS allegations that had 
reached Johnson’s office at the State Department’s Baltic Desk. He continued by attempting 
to articulate clearly what the Lithuanian Desk’s operating guidelines for broadcasts truly 
were. VOA Lithuanian broadcasts were said to be “carefully edited to conform to policy 
guidance and to promote policy objectives in the target area” and that “the bulk of Lithuanian 
Service broadcasts are based on translations and adaptations of VOA house features and 
teletype newscasts.79 In response to accusations that VOA was engaging in calls for 
premature hopes of liberation at a shrill pitch, Jurgela referred to the broadcasting of 
President Eisenhower’s and Secretary of State Foster Dulles’ policy statements and contacts 
with Lithuanian Americans, stating that they could “hardly constitute” such tones. Finally, he 
repudiated the claims that the Lithuanian radio service was under the influence of VLIK by 
stating that they “maintain no direct or indirect contact with VLIK beyond receiving gratis 
copies of the latter’s ELTA bulletins in Lithuanian and German.”80 
 In comparison to the Estonians, using VOA employment as a way of undermining the 
position of fellow exiles who were on poor terms with the diplomats, or the way that the 
Lithuanians used VOA broadcasts and information sharing as a proxy battlefield for the 
ongoing VLIK-Lozoraitis conflict, the Latvians faced few challenges across the broader exile 
community when it came to broadcasts. While VOA continued to be a problem between older 
Latvians in the United States and the DPs, very little was discussed about the VOA among 
Latvian community abroad. So little, that American officials took it upon themselves to make 
sure that problems might not arise when the question arose of whether or not to cover an 
important speech given by the Latvian Social Democratic Party in Stockholm Sweden in July 
1954. 
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 The major policy question the Americans faced was whether or not it was prudent to 
carry the message of a single political party over the VOA airwaves. While officials agreed 
that it was preferable to “refrain from broadcasting speeches and statements devoted to a 
single exile party” George Lister of the State Department summarized the feeling that most 
Americans had about the general political sentiments of Eastern European refugees by 
stating: “I feel that most responsible anti-Communist émigrés and émigré groups have 
something to contribute in the fight against the USSR, and that it is our interest to bring out, 
and make use of their contributions and to avoid exacerbating quarrels.”81 Within this context, 
two main questions continued to be asked. What amount of coverage should be given to 
Latvian exile affairs in Sweden over VOA and what amount of coverage should be granted to 
the Latvian Social Democratic Party?  
Officials readily acknowledged that VOA Latvian broadcasts featured the lives of 
Latvians residing in the United States and that it would be exposing itself to criticism from 
the Latvian community if it failed to broadcast material pertaining to other locales. They also 
acknowledged that to an extent the VOA had been guilty of favoring the message of more 
conservative Latvian political groupings due to the prominent role of American Latvians. The 
Americans, however, decided that it was best that the Latvian Social Democratic Party in 
Stockholm be informed orally, and in a “pleasant way,” that the United States would refrain 
from documents devoted to a single party. Lister also stated that the American should avoid 
answering whether or not the VOA reports on Latvian activities in the United States and 
conclude that the “Latvian people would decide which party they prefer when they regain 
their freedom.”82 
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The personal, political, and geographic conflicts within each Baltic exile community 
created discrete problems that American officials had to either ignore or try to remedy. The 
conflicts, however, never had a direct impact on the ability of the Americans to broadcast to 
the Baltic republics on a daily basis and they did not reduce the Baltic exiles’ ability to 
maintain a nominal level of contact with their homelands. The regular problems, however, 
were not inconsequential. The inability of the most important Lithuanian exile organizations 
to cooperate over what VOA broadcasts should consist of and what intelligence is deemed to 
be fit for broadcast, as well as the willingness of Estonian and Latvian groups to superimpose 
personal vendettas upon the VOA debate was important. It colored the reactions that 
American policymakers had towards claims that various Baltic exiles made over the 
effectiveness, scope, and content of radio broadcasts. It also was important in determining the 
level of autonomy that the exiles would have in making broadcast decisions.  
 
Assessing Broadcast Feedback and Policy Corrections 
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of conducting public diplomatic efforts towards 
the Baltic republics during the Stalinist period was that information was primarily 
unidirectional. That is, VOA attempted to broadcast information into the Soviet occupied 
territories, but it was very difficult to get information out. Since one of the policy aims of 
VOA Baltic broadcasts was to provide Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians news, not only 
about global affairs, the United States, and the émigré communities, but also news about 
developments in the Baltic republics, getting information out was of paramount importance. 
There is no doubt that the covert connections that the United States had with the Baltic 
underground movements assisted in this matter. The other important rationale for extracting 
information out of the Baltic republics, however, was to gain valuable feedback from the 
listeners to the Voice of America. As the formal broadcasting mechanism of the United States, 
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the VOA was subject to budget oversight by the United States Congress and policymakers 
were mandated to justify their broadcasting expenditures. Feedback from the target was 
necessary. 
The early experience that State Department and USIA officials had with Baltic exiles 
demonstrated that while they were essential in producing high quality broadcasts to the 
Soviet occupied territories, they were potentially less useful in providing objective feedback 
on the way that Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians behind the Iron Curtain received the 
broadcasts. There were longstanding concerns that relying on émigré feedback would be a 
source of contention between competing factions. Indeed, as has been demonstrated, this did 
take place.83 Finally, and quite simply, the VOA was a career path for a handful of prominent 
Baltic exiles and it was highly unlikely that they would vote against their economic and 
political interests in a post-liberation Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania that they would claim that 
the broadcasts were ineffective. 
While the VOA relied on émigré feedback, to a certain extent, policymakers also 
relied on information from border areas of the Soviet Union that happened to receive Baltic 
language broadcasts and information that American diplomatic missions received from the 
few Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians able to escape from the Soviet Union. As early as 
February 1951, the State Department began compiling information concerning the 
effectiveness and reach of VOA broadcasts in the Baltic region. The initial reaction of most 
Balts residing in the free world was that the Baltic broadcasts were a welcome addition to the 
VOA. Latvians residing in West Germany and Australia expressed their appreciation in 
letters to the VOA in June 1951 writing “… we are glad about the Latvian broadcasts of the 
Voice of America, and we listen regularly… I referred in my address at the meeting (of 
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Latvian refugees) to the broadcasts of the VOA in Latvian, bringing home to those at 
home.”84 
Since the Lithuanian broadcasts had been ongoing, only a relatively small amount of 
information was received from Estonia or Latvia. The very rudimentary analysis they 
received offers insight into the broadcasts’ signal quality, how the broadcasts’ were received 
by certain segments of society, and how the regime responded. Information received from the 
Lithuanian-Polish border indicated that people not only listened to the Lithuanian broadcasts, 
but also the Polish and Russian language broadcasts. It was noted that of the three languages, 
the Russian broadcasts were of the highest quality, followed by the Polish and then 
Lithuanian. Policymakers decided that the Estonians and Latvians were also able to receive 
the Russian broadcasts and were willing to listen to them.  
 Listeners to the Lithuanian broadcasts suggested that the hours of the broadcast 
should be moved to the middle of the night since collaborators were tipping MVD officials 
off regarding the time of the VOA broadcasts. American sources stated that Russians were 
relentlessly conducting counter operations against the VOA and that the fear was not 
necessarily against individuals, but organized movements that might coalesce behind the 
radio broadcasts. Additionally, during interrogations conducted by the MVD, the question: 
“The Voice of America ordered you to raise a counter-revolution, yes?” was deployed on a 
regular basis. In the Latvian context, there was evidence that on a number of occasions the 
Latvian communist newspaper, Cina attacked the VOA by calling it “A Screaming, brazen, 
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boasting, and repulsive voice – the VOA – fills the ether day and night.”85 In addition, Riga 
Radio had attacked the Voice of America, Dean Acheson and Barrett in outlandish terms.86 
 Other ways that the Soviet media coped with VOA broadcasts perhaps offer a better 
way to assess the effectiveness of VOA Baltic broadcasts. The day before VOA broadcasts to 
Lithuania began, Radio Vilna began its own broadcasts. Radio Vilna warned Lithuanians not 
to listen to the VOA since they were parts of the “imperial aggression” against the Lithuanian 
People and that “America is looking for new victims near the Baltic, but the Lithuanian 
nation will give the right answer to American slave-traders and aggression.”87 This 
commentary was repeated on 16 and 17 February. After the beginning of Estonian broadcasts, 
the radio in Tallinn began broadcasting “Dangerous people stand behind the capitalist 
newspapers and radios. The VOA and BBC broadcasts to Estonia and the USSR to 
undermine the morals of our young people, to infect them with vicious qualities and brutish 
instincts, to train robbers and ravishers who can be used in aggressive ways.”88 
 The State Department acknowledged that they had almost no reliable information on 
the size of the audience reached by the VOA Baltic language broadcasts. In addition, they 
sent memos to American embassies and consulates around the world asking that should they 
come across Baltic refugees they should inquire about the status of American sponsored 
broadcasts in their homelands. The anecdotal information forwarded from American missions 
abroad seemed to reinforce the initial reports on the status of VOA broadcasts in the Soviet 
Baltic republics. Additionally, the frequent mention of the Voice of America made by Soviet-
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controlled press and radio in the Baltic area appeared to substantiated the reports, and at the 
very least strike a nerve with Soviet officials. 
 The evaluation of the actual broadcasting content, however, was significantly more 
complicated to assess. Escapees that were interviewed by American diplomats abroad 
provided some insight about how VOA broadcasts were interpreted by Estonians, Latvians, 
and Lithuanians residing behind the Iron Curtain. A prime example was an interview given 
by a Lithuanian escapee at the American consulate in Frankfurt. While the source refused to 
make any estimate of the number of people in Lithuania who listen to the Voice of America, 
he offered two important feedback points for the Americans. First, the bulk of listeners reside 
in the urban areas of the republic – naturally where there existed the largest number of 
receivers. Second, the source stated that most Lithuanians compared what the VOA 
broadcasts with what Radio Moscow broadcasts and can draw their conclusions. Anecdotally, 
the source stated that the VOA could be improved by providing more concrete news 
concerning the Lithuanian émigré community and international affairs in general.89 
After several years of broadcasting to the Baltic republics, there were two main 
problems relevant to augmenting and improving American policy towards Baltic broadcasts. 
First, two differing views towards the émigrés emerged within the State Department. IBD and 
USIA officials repeatedly failed to recognize the intricate exile politics that were being 
engaged in under their watch. Baltic desk officers were forced to try to mediate conflict 
among exiles groups that got into spats over radio broadcasts. The result was that the heads of 
the broadcast desks began to assert more control over the broadcasts. Second, the State 
Department still did not have a reliable source of information within the Baltic republics. The 
random interviews that were conducted at American embassies were helpful but totally 
anecdotal. The main source of information continued to be the émigrés. 
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IBD officials stated that they were not concerned with the internal politics of the 
Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian émigré communities since VOA broadcasts were strictly 
an American foreign policy initiative. This was the official line that policymakers took to 
deal with the Jurgela – London squabble during 1951. On the other hand, Baltic Desk 
Officers, such as Vedeler were quite sensitive to the impact that the VOA broadcasts had on 
the Baltic diasporas. Officials that strictly dealt with the radio broadcasts might not have paid 
particular attention to political intrigue within the émigré groups, but officials, such as those 
who worked at the Baltic desk, were keenly aware that the success of VOA broadcasts was 
often based on the availability of good intelligence of the Baltic republics and that one way of 
extracting good information was “keeping the peace” within the individual diasporas.  
One particular goal of VOA broadcasts was not only to counteract internal Soviet 
propaganda, but also to offer an alternative international news source about life in the United 
States and the activities of the broader diasporas.90 The focus on the diasporas was in the 
hopes of improving morale of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians residing behind the Iron 
Curtain through demonstrating that their compatriots were organized and fighting on their 
behalf for the eventual liberation of their homelands. The fact that the wider American 
foreign policy establishment viewed Baltic VOA broadcasts as a substitute for proper Baltic 
RFE broadcasts necessarily meant that there was a strong emphasis on the émigré 
communities. 
The disconnect between the VOA officials and the Baltic desk officials resulted in a 
situation where a handful of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian exiles exerted their own 
control over an official American foreign policy apparatus – the Voice of America – as it 
pertained to their homelands. The American government made broad distinctions between 
those who were American citizens and those that were in the process of becoming American 
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citizens, and those that were foreign nationals who had no contacts with the United States 
besides diplomatic contacts. On the other hand, individual members of the Baltic diasporas 
did not draw similar distinctions between Balts residing in the United States and working 
towards citizenship and Balts residing in other countries. This created a situation where the 
Baltic exiles were able to directly influence American policy over broadcasts, but also 
necessarily created factions within the diaspora that proved to be inimical to American 
interests.  
To deal with the exile problem, Harold Vedeler attempted to bring the Baltic VOA 
broadcasts back under close State Department supervision in April 1954 when he wrote to 
Pratt of IBD stating that he was looking for an arrangement where the Baltic Desk could be 
regularly informed about the daily contents of the Voice of America broadcasts. The Baltic 
Desk generally felt the lack of necessary information to best handle relations with the exiles 
as well as how best to provide policy guidance on broadcasts.91 Specifically, Vedeler sought 
more information to analyze the direct relationship between American policy towards the 
Baltic republics (radio broadcasts) and the level of cooperation among the various elite 
groups. From May 1954 onwards, the Baltic Desk began receiving three types of reports on 
VOA broadcasts. First, period memoranda briefly described the contents of the Baltic 
language transmissions. Second, monitors’ reports isolated one program selected among the 
many broadcasts over the course of several days. Third, USIA daily broadcast content reports 
provided headlines and titles relating to each of the Baltic language broadcasts.92 
 The Baltic Desk analysis suggested that the reports were adequate in providing 
information about the general nature of topics dealt with in VOA Baltic broadcasts, it was 
impossible to tell just how a particular topic was treated and the tone used. As a result, 
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Vedeler charged the Baltic Desk staff to establish a detailed policy paper on the functions, 
purposes, and particular problems that faced VOA Baltic broadcasts going forward. 
 By the end of May 1954, the policy paper was completed and forwarded to IBD for 
the Baltic radio desks’ staffs. Much of the paper reinforced existing broadcasting policy to 
the Baltic republics, namely VOA was to report objective material relating to developments 
inside and outside of the Baltic States; to report and comment on activities of the Baltic 
emigration, including the Baltic diplomats; and to disseminate authoritative statements of 
USG officials, legislators, and influential private citizens related directly or indirectly to the 
cause of Baltic independence. Several new specific concerns were addressed. First, Baltic 
radio broadcasts were to “present an encouraging picture of developments in the Baltic 
emigration despite the existence of various and sometimes mutually denigrating factions and 
personalities.” Second, broadcasts were to “describe the activities of Baltic émigré groups in 
such a manner as not to appear to favor one political current or party over another.”93 Third, 
broadcasts were to “encourage a spirit of resistance to the Soviet system without adding to 
the already considerable anti-Russian sentiment of the Baltic peoples, which could adversely 
affect our present relationship with the Russian people and prejudge a future establishment of 
friendly cooperation between independent Baltic and Russian peoples.”94 
To address the lack of solid information about how the broadcasts were perceived 
from within the Baltic republics, the Department sought to formalize the policy of having 
American missions abroad interrogate escapees on affairs within the Soviet Union. On 9 
February 1954, the Secretary of State sent a memo to all embassies abroad requesting that 
“should come to notice in the future any cases of visits of European commercial 
representatives, artists, or athletes to or through the Baltic countries, it is requested that the 
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Foreign Service post concerned endeavor to ascertain what the visitor observed, particularly 
in relation to the Voice of America.”95  
One notable example was the interrogation of a Lithuanian who fled from Vilnius to 
Tel Aviv, Israel in 1955. On 10 August, the State Department instructed the American 
Embassy to re-interrogate the Lithuanian to obtain “more information about radio broadcasts 
from the West.” Specific questions included “Just how serious was the jamming?” “Was an 
effort made to keep people from listening to the broadcasts?” What was the official attitude 
towards them?” What was the people’s interest in the broadcasts?” Did they make an effort to 
listen even if there was official disapproval?” 
Nevertheless, the émigré community continued to provide State Department officials 
with the most regular critiques of VOA broadcasting to the Baltic republics. During 
November 1954 as part of the celebrations of Latvian Independence Day in Lubwibsburg, 
Germany, James Pratt, an American diplomat in Frankfurt, met with Robert Liepins, perhaps 
the most well-respected Latvian in Europe to discuss the current state of affairs towards the 
liberation of the Baltic States. Radio broadcasts naturally came up in the discussion and Pratt 
solicited Liepins views on the broadcasts. Liepins replied that VOA programs are regularly 
listened to despite constant jamming. He personally felt that the broadcasts were too short in 
length, but that they reinforced the confidence that the Latvian people had in the United 
States, as they were “doing all it can to liberate them [the Latvians].”96 
This policy proposal by the Baltic desk exposed the inherent problems and 
contradictions in American public diplomatic policy towards the Baltic republics. While the 
VOA did provide more accurate information on world affairs than its Soviet equivalent in the 
Baltic region, the State Department was not unwilling to engage in negative propaganda 
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against the Baltic republics when it came to informing Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians 
what was occurring within their broader communities. Despite cooperation on many levels 
within the Baltic diasporas, there were too many factions that would have had a negative 
impact on Estonian, Latvian, or Lithuanian politics if they were to play an active role in post-
liberation activities. Additionally, the relatively isolated position of the individual Baltic 
desks within the bureaucracy suggests that one political faction could have been favored over 
another. Simply, VOA staff did not hire employees based on political orientation in a similar 
way that the Baltic Consultative Panels had been created. 
 Even more contentious was the policy of encouraging a spirit of resistance to the 
Soviet system without adding to anti-Russian sentiment. From the perspective of the Baltic 
exiles that were in charge of VOA broadcasts, encouraging resistance to the Soviet system 
necessarily meant increasing anti-Russian sentiment. Opposition to the Soviet system among 
Free Balts and Balts behind the Iron Curtain took on a nationalistic attitude throughout the 
entire Cold War where Soviet tyranny equated Russian colonialism. While it was 
understandable for American policymakers to desire a post-independent Baltic region where 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would be able to coexist with a democratic Russia, it 
demonstrates two competing interests in American policy towards the region. On one hand, 
the United States did not want to unnecessarily escalate tensions with the Soviet Union and 
wanted to foment better relations in a post-Cold War environment. On the other hand, the 
United States wanted to continue to combat Soviet aggression rhetorically by continuing to 
support the cause of the Baltic republics. It also demonstrates the hierarchy of American 
interests in the region – relations with the Russians were always preeminent over relations 





 The idea that public diplomacy could help hasten the dissolution of the Soviet bloc 
brought about a coalescing of interests between American foreign policy makers and Baltic 
refugees. American sponsored radio broadcasts to the Baltic republics through the VOA were 
ultimately successful for both the American government and the Baltic exiles. The brisk 
response that Soviet officials and its media outlets demonstrate, at least slightly, that the 
Baltic republics were sensitive to the American broadcasts. Meanwhile, the Baltic exiles were 
provided with a medium where they were not only able to explain what life in the United 
States was like and to report international news events, but were also able to describe the 
reorganization of Baltic life in exile and remind those left behind that Estonians, Latvians, 
and Lithuanians in the West were fighting for their freedom. This convergence of interests, 
however, was not immune to regular misunderstandings between Americans and the Baltic 
exiles. 
 For the State Department, radio broadcasts were a way of disseminating information 
into the Soviet bloc in the hopes that it would stir discontent among the polity, and as a result 
force the Kremlin to utilize resources that it would otherwise direct towards aggressive 
actions against the West on maintaining its own authority. Broadly, the utilization of exiles 
over RFE was a means of creating plausible deniability when it came to diplomatic protocol 
with various regimes. Policymakers, however, were unencumbered when it came to 
broadcasts in the Baltic languages due to the non-recognition of Soviet control over Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. The Americans viewed VOA and RFE as official foreign policy 
initiatives and the financial cost of such initiatives played a role in considering where to best 
utilize limited resources.  
 Once IBD authorized VOA broadcasts in the three Baltic languages and the State 
Department approved of allowing Baltic émigrés to play a major role in the broadcasting, the 
burden for justifying Baltic broadcasts over RFE dramatically increased considering the 
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additional costs involved. To put the costs of Baltic broadcasting over RFE in perspective, a 
study in 1952 compared a proposed Baltic budget to the Czechoslovakian broadcasting 
budget. 
Of the 1952-1953 budget, it is estimated that 25% can be attributed to the cost of 
operating the Czech desk.  This estimate of 25% is arrived at with the knowledge that 
the minimum cost would be 1/6 (six satellites now receiving broadcasts) of that total 
and that the maximum cost less the broadcasts to Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania 
would be 1/3 of the total.  It is felt that 1/4 or 25% therefore is a fair figure to assign 
to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary each, and to Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania 
as a group.  There are 2.7 million radio sets in Czechoslovakia.  Based on the above, 
RFE is spending $.762 per set annually to reach this target. 
It is conservatively estimated that to operate the same number of hours to each of the 
Baltic countries as we do to Czechoslovakia for one year it would cost $6,250,000.  
Assuming each of the Baltic countries will represent 1/3 of this cost and with the 
knowledge that in Estonia there are 78,000 radio sets, it can be said that RFE would 
be spending $26.70 per set annually to broadcast to Estonia.  There are 343,000 radio 
sets altogether in the Baltics.  To broadcast to all three countries, RFE would spend 
$18.22 per set annually.97 
 
Given the huge costs involved relative to other RFE broadcasts, American officials simply 
could not advocate continuing the plan for Baltic broadcasts since all policy considerations 
could be met via the Voice of America. 
 Individual exiles and émigré organizations that pushed for radio broadcasts to 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania realized that American sponsored broadcasts were indeed a 
policy initiative by the United States. During every meeting that organization representatives, 
individual exiles, and diplomats had with State Department officials, it was consistently 
restated that broadcasts were a component of American policy towards the Soviet Union. The 
ambiguous nature of the FEC and RFE, coupled with its strong rhetoric that it allowed free 
members of Eastern European diasporas to speak directly to their compatriots in the Soviet 
bloc created a situation where a feeling of American altruism was perceived. The two 
rhetorical components that Baltic diplomats used to lobby for RFE broadcasts was that 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were the first victims of communist aggression and that they 
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deserved to have access to the same broadcast medium that émigrés from other Eastern 
European countries had, and that anything short of RFE access would be interpreted as 
slighting the Baltic States. 
 The symbolism of RFE Baltic broadcasts was of high importance for almost all Baltic 
émigré groups. There was a universal belief that only a radio station designed around the idea 
of allowing Free Estonians, Latvians, or Lithuanians to design their own broadcasts was 
sufficient in meeting the émigré desire to reestablish contacts with their homelands. Clinging 
to this symbolism resulted in a significant amount of rejection of VOA Baltic broadcasts 
being an adequate substitute for RFE broadcasts. Upon finding out that the State Department 
believed that VOA broadcasts in Latvian could completely cover the needs of the Latvian 
nation and that there was no need for Latvian broadcasts over the RFE, Feldmans argued that 
it was not sufficient to merely allow the Latvian Consultative Panel access to the VOA radio 
desk. 
For the sake of clarity let it be said that the intention of the Latvian Consultative Panel 
had never been to duplicate the VOA broadcasts. VOA is an official agency of the 
USA created for the purpose of explaining to the peoples of the world the American 
policy, the American way of life and for an overall fight against communism. This the 
VOA has been performing with good results and the Latvian emigration has 
repeatedly expressed its gratitude for the inclusion of their enslaved compatriots 
among its nations to whom the great American nation is sending its message. This 
however covers only part of the Latvian needs – the VOA cannot and does not act as 
the speaker of Free Latvians. It is for Free Latvians themselves and not only the 
Latvian Consultative Panel to take care of their specific problems designed to help 
their compatriots at home.98 
 
Feldmans continued by outlining what specifically would be different about a Latvian RFE 
broadcast compared to what was being broadcast over VOA. The three features included 
presenting only news that directly or indirectly concerns Latvia or Latvians; programming 
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that included speeches by Latvian leaders told through their own voice and not an anonymous 
lector; and the constant reminding of Latvians that “the free world has not forgotten you.”99 
 The implicit rejection by Baltic émigrés of the Voice of America was a sufficient 
replacement for RFE broadcasts to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had two long-term 
implications. The decision to continue fighting for the FEC to include Baltic languages in 
their broadcasting program was something that virtually all Estonians, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians living in the West could agree on, regardless of their nationality, political 
ideology, or geographic locations. It provided a platform for Baltic organizations to organize 
and demonstrate to American policymakers, as well as the polity that Balts were an organized 
force against communism. At the same time, however, this sent a strong message to State 
Department officials that Balts were extremely sensitive to the smallest change in policy 
towards their homelands. While it became difficult to change existing policy, it made it more 
difficult to create possibly more ambitious policy that could help the Baltic republics in the 
long-term.7 
In reality, however, these three features were included in all Estonian, Latvian, and 
Lithuanian VOA broadcasts during the early 1950s. Of course news about the United States 
and other parts of the world were included over the VOA broadcasts, but significant attention 
was given to news that directly related to the Soviet occupied Baltic republics as well as 
political and cultural developments within the Baltic diasporas. The VOA naturally felt 
compelled to include speeches and statements by prominent American politicians, but on a 
regular basis, Baltic diplomats, exile leaders, and Baltic Americans were featured over the 
Voice of America. The regular referencing of the non-recognition policy and the statements 
given by leaders over VOA attempted to boost the morale of Balts residing in the Soviet 
Union and remind them that the West did not forget them. 




 The importance of symbolism must also be put into the broader context of how 
Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians residing in the Soviet Union could listen to the VOA. 
According to contemporary reports, local security forces in Kaunas and Vilnius were ordered 
on 1 April 1951 to confiscate all radio sets that happened to run on batteries.100 Throughout 
the entire region, there was a shortage of radio tubes and batteries. As soon as the broadcasts 
began, the Soviet Union began aggressive jamming campaigns against the VOA Baltic 
broadcasts. Based on monitoring reports near the Eastern border of Estonia, near Leningrad, 
and the Polish-Lithuanian border, only three-quarters of the Baltic language broadcasts were 
understandable.101 
 Under conditions where the very supplies need to listen to shortwave radio, such as 
batteries and radio tubes were in short supply, where listeners were forced to listen to the 
radios clandestinely for fear of being arrested, and where the radio sets had to combat 
jamming on a regular basis, it is reasonable to assume that it made very little difference 
whether or not the radio broadcasts that informed Baltic listeners to world events, American 
news, and developments within the Baltic diasporas were under the banner of the Voice of 
America or Radio Free Europe. 
Anecdotally, on 14 August 1951, three young Lithuanians who had fled to Sweden in 
a fishing boat stated that they had regularly listened to VOA Lithuanian broadcasts in 
Klaipeda and that they felt well informed about the international situation. When asked 
whether or not VOA was widely known throughout the country, they replied that knowledge 
of VOA broadcast in Lithuania is spreading quickly due to word of mouth. Two interesting 
points that the informants made though, were that VOA Lithuanian programs were of great 
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importance to the country since the Russian language is not as general as might be expected 
after the long Soviet occupation. Secondly, is the fact that Lithuanians feel that they have not 
been forgotten.102
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DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS OF BALTIC POLITICAL ACTIVISM 
 
While most constituent requests to meet with the President of the United States are 
declined, citing scheduling conflicts, President Harry S. Truman met with a delegation of 
prominent Lithuanian Americans on 29 October 1946 at the White House.1 Although the 
delegation primarily consisted of members of the American Lithuanian Council, other 
Lithuanian organizations were represented in the delegation to Washington. During the 
fifteen minutes that the Lithuanians were allotted, Truman and the Lithuanians discussed the 
two most important issues for Lithuanian Americans in the immediate postwar years – the 
plight of displaced persons in Europe and what the political future would hold for Lithuania. 
According to the meeting’s records, Truman expressed his concerns for the displaced persons, 
citing his encounters with Lithuanian refugees that he had during his recent trip to Germany.2 
Truman also reaffirmed his belief in the principles of justice for all nations, large and small. 
When questioned about the future of the Baltic States, the President conceded that there had 
been “difficulties of the period of transition from war to peace,” but he reassured the 
Lithuanians that “American policy regarding the Baltic States did not change, cannot change, 
and will not change.”3 
The 29 October meeting represented a small portion of Truman’s daily schedule and 
the important American newspapers barely covered the event.4 For Lithuanian Americans, 
however, the meeting with the President not only received widespread coverage in their own 
press, but also was a teachable moment where they discovered that they did have access to 
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centers of political power in the American federal government.5 There were no additional 
meetings with Truman and appearances with future American Presidents were few and far 
between, but written correspondences with the White House and regular meetings with the 
State Department would become the norm throughout the following decades. 
Constituent meetings and correspondences can rightly be described as symbolic in 
nature. Indeed, meetings between Baltic constituent groups and American officials had very 
different objectives and policy implications than the meetings between the exiled diplomats 
or CIA-sponsored organizations and American officials. Nevertheless, over the course of the 
1950s the symbolic would become increasingly important, not only in maintaining the 
credibility of American policy towards the Baltic republics, but in ensuring that the Cold War 
maintained domestic support. Internally, policymakers were quite successful in maintaining 
the artificial barrier between “East European exile residing in the United States” and “ethnic 
American.” From the perspective of the American public and members of Congress, this 
artificial barrier was very easily blurred. As a result, components of American foreign policy 
crept into the domestic debate and the symbiotic relationship between American officials and 
Baltic refugees deepened. 
This chapter will examine three areas where the activities of Baltic exiles in the 
United States assumed the role of political constituents and influenced the anti-communist 
debate in the United States. First, the celebration of anniversaries, where the statements of 
leading Balts, American politicians, and the rallies associated with important anniversaries 
for the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians bolstered the anti-communist sentiment in public 
spaces. Second, publishing periodicals and books, in both the English language where the 
writings of Baltic academics and thinkers established a monopoly on credible information 
about their homelands. Third, vigorously establishing contacts with the United States 
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Congress, where concurrent resolutions were passed and Estonians, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians became a small but important voting bloc in domestic American politics. 
This chapter will also examine the impact that these public activities of the Estonians, 
Latvians, and Lithuanians had on the creation of a cohesive discourse defining what it meant 
to be a politically active Balt during the Cold War. I will argue that while maintaining an 
identity as an exile was an important component for relations within the individual diasporas, 
the growing importance of an identity as a constituent in the United States allowed for a 
flexibility in maneuvering the political and social contours of the United States during the 
Cold War and a greater level of effectiveness. 
First, however, it is important to understand the role that anti-Communism as well as 
American foreign policy had on American domestic politics during the early Cold War period. 
It is also important to highlight the blurring phenomenon between exiles and constituents that 
existed exclusively within the United States. In a period of increasing global tensions, best 
exemplified by the Korean War, the mainstream political debate was not between socialists 
and anti-communists, but between parties that differed in how best to maintain anti-
communist sentiments in the United States. The domestic impact of American policy towards 
the Baltic republics played a small, but not insignificant component in this political dynamic. 
 
Anti-Communism, American Foreign Policy, and Ethnic Anti-Communism in Domestic 
Politics 
 Anti-communism as a political idea in the United States was not an inherently Cold 
War phenomenon. In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, there was great concern that 
new immigrants and the burgeoning labor movement would expose the United States to a 
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domestic communist threat.6 World War II, however, offered American communists a respite 
and worked towards discrediting the anti-communist movement. Some anti-communists felt 
that their influence was waning due to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration. Indeed, many 
thought that the New Deal exposed Roosevelt to be, at best, a communist sympathizer. The 
most significant reason for anti-communists being discredited during the early 1940s was the 
idea that failing to denounce them would threaten the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union 
– the alliance that was seen as the only hope of creating a peaceful post-war world.7 
 The defeat of Nazi Germany ended war in Europe, but for portions of the American 
public, it did not create a perception of establishing a peaceful post-war world. The failure of 
American-Soviet cooperation in the postwar period and Stalin’s insistence on establishing a 
political, economic, and military sphere of influence across half of Europe rejuvenated anti-
communism as a mainstream political idea in the United States. From World War II until the 
outbreak of the Korean War, anti-communist Americans of all political and social stripes 
were able to establish a broad agenda to combat communism despite differing political 
positions on a number of different issues.8 Although they shared a broad agenda, there were 
continual disagreements about how best to start a civic debate to combat communism in the 
United States. 
 For instance, all anti-communists believed that the American public should be 
educated about the true nature of communism. However, there was disagreement about the 
proper method in doing so. Liberal anti-communists held the opinion that an objective 
discussion of communism’s record was sufficient, while conservatives thought that anti-
communism must be placed within a broader debate including the religious and moral 
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imperatives of American democracy.9 According to historian Richard Gid Powers, “The 
public’s debate on the Communist issue was none too genteel – it was messy and sometimes 
frightening – but it was probably the only way a great, unsophisticated, none-too-educated 
democracy could ever grapple with such an awesomely complex issue.”10 
 Anti-communist activities manifested themselves in a number of ways during the late 
1940s and 1950s. Magazines and other periodicals were published as a means of educating 
the American public about the dangers of communism. Rallies and conferences of anti-
communist grassroots organizations provided a very public face to anti-communism’s 
growing importance in the country. In addition, the political atmosphere allowed for the 
United States Congress to begin holding hearings on communist activity, such as the 
reconstitution of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in 1947.11 
 Anti-communism’s bipartisan nature began to fray when McCarthyism began to 
define mainstream anti-communism from 1950-1954. McCarthy’s hearings on the 
Government Operation Committee’s Subcommittee on Investigations helped to redefine what 
anti-communism represented. Instead of exposing the true nature of the Soviet Union and 
highlighting the positive attributes of American democracy, anti-communism soon 
represented the stereotypes that the phenomenon’s opponents hoped to create – a movement 
that was fraught with conspiracy theories and lies.12 Although anti-communism never 
completely recovered from Joseph McCarthy’s legacy, its opponents never were able to 
entirely remove the visceral role that anti-communism would play in domestic politics during 
the Cold War.  
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The 1952 Presidential Election offer a clear example of how deeply engrained anti-
communism had become in the fabric of American politics during the 1950s. Although 
Dwight D. Eisenhower had supported most of Truman’s foreign policy initiatives, including 
its policy of containment, Truman’s handling of the Soviet Union and communism became 
an important component of the campaign. The Republican Platform accused the Democratic 
Party, which had controlled the White House since 1933, that containment was an amoral 
policy, that concessions at Yalta were responsible for the geopolitical situation in Eastern 
Europe, that Truman had “lost” China, and that the Americans had lost the initiative in the 
fight against communism in Korea.13  
Grassroots anti-communist activities continued to operate despite the negative 
attention it gained during McCarthyism and indeed it managed to survive and flourish on a 
much smaller scale throughout the 1950s. One faction within the anti-communist coalition of 
the 1940s that became more prominent in the 1950s was the ethnic anti-communist. On one 
hand, ethnic anti-communism is a very specific term that refers to ethnic groups in the United 
States during the Cold War whose homelands fell under a communist regime.14 On the other 
hand, the phenomenon is quite complex and encompasses a number of elements ranging from 
émigré politics and relations with homelands to specific lobbying activities directed at centers 
of political power. Perhaps the most important element of defining ethnic anti-communism is 
that it is predominantly an American phenomenon.15 
Eastern European refugees residing in the United States were able to assume a 
number of identities dependent on the audience for their message. In relations with fellow 
émigré members, refugees portrayed themselves as fellow exiles who were fighting for the 
                                                            
13 See: Athan G. Theoharis, The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945-1955, (Columbia, MO: University 
of Missouri Press, 1970). Starting in the late 1940s and culminating in the 1952 Election, the Republican started 
to make inroads in Eastern European ethnic constituents claiming that the Roosevelt’s Democratic Party had 
failed in bringing peace to Eastern Europe. 
14 John Radzilowski, “Ethnic Anti-Communism in the United States” in Ieva Zake ed. Anti-Communist 
Minorities in the U.S.: Political Activism of Ethnic Refguees (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 2.  
15 Ibid., 3.  
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liberation of their homelands. In relations with State Department officials refugees attempted 
to portray themselves as either exiles who were useful in waging the Cold War or as a 
domestic interest group. To members of Congress, refugees were considered an important 
voting bloc. Finally, to the broader American public, refugees attempted to portray 
themselves as loyal to the United States and supported the country in its policies against the 
Soviet Union. 
The convergence of interests between the American public, American policymakers, 
and refugee groups in the United States allowed for refugees to reasonably argue that they 
were able to maintain their loyalty to their homeland while demonstrating American 
patriotism. As a result, when it came to the domestic debate about American policy towards 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union a conflict emerged between the desire of American 
policymakers to maintain strict boundaries between exile activities and the activities of ethnic 
Americans, and the perception of both groups’ activities in the United States. Estonians, 
Latvians, and Lithuanians were perhaps the easiest refugee groups to uphold this strict 
boundary between exile and ethnic American. The non-recognition policy made it clear that 
there were official relations between at least a handful of Baltic exiles who had no desire to 
assimilate into the United States – the officially accredited diplomats. Nevertheless, for even 
the Baltic refugees, the line between exile and ethnic American blurred. 
An example that highlights this blurring is evident in the long-standing policy that 
exiles that were associated with the FEC were forbidden from participating in the domestic 
American political debate. This fact, however, did not prevent Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, Chair 
of the Free Lithuania Committee from drafting a letter to the New York Times’ editor on 18 
June 1952 on the 1952 Republican Platform. He wrote: 
As a political exile now enjoying the hospitality of this great country, it is not my 
intention to meddle in in its internal policy and in the relations between the two 
political parties. But it was a great satisfaction to the Lithuanians to note the 
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Republican Party in its foreign policy plan took into consideration the fate of the 
Baltic States. 
 
We never dreamed that the United States should have declared war on the Soviet 
Union because of her aggression our countries. But we firmly believe that the part of 
Europe which has been enslaved and in the wake of subsequent events will be 
liberated.16 
 
While Sidzikauskas provided a caveat that he was an exile and not supposed to “meddle” in 
American internal policy, the act of writing to the New York Times in praise of the 1952 
Republican Platform was indeed an act of engaging in the American domestic debate. For the 
bulk of the New York Times’ readership, whether or not Sidzikauskas was an exile or not was 
secondary to the fact that Lithuanians were supportive of the Republican Platform’s position 
on Eastern Europe in 1952. 
 As was the case with other anti-communist groups during the late 1940s and 1950s, 
Baltic anti-communism was based on creating very public symbolic demonstrations opposing 
the Soviet occupation of their homeland. Conferences, rallies, and meetings with American 
officials were organized to celebrate important anniversaries and advance their own foreign 
policy agendas. Publications, such as pamphlets, newsletters, and monographs, were 
distributed to inform the American public about the dangers of communism based on their 
own personal experiences with Soviet oppression. Finally, relationships were built with the 
United States Congress in order to diversify their options in fighting for Estonian, Latvian, 
and Lithuanian independence. 
The U.S. Congress eventually became a more reliable partner to Baltic refugees and 
ethnic activists than the White House or State Department.  In spite of the relatively small 
electoral footprint that Baltic exiles were able to exert outside the historic Lithuanian 
communities across the country, the larger East European community in the United States 
adopted the Baltic cause very easily. The annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
                                                            
16 VACLOVAS SIDZIKAUSKAS,.  "Soviet Invasion of Baltic States." New York Times (1923-Current file),  
July 18, 1952,  http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 17, 2011). 
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represented a worst-case scenario and a cause that all East Europeans could rally behind.  
Additionally, for every elected official like Senator Glenn H. Taylor, Senator from Idaho, 
who justified the annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as a response by Soviet Russia 
to reclaim breakaway areas integral to the Russian state, comparing it the potential reaction 
by the American federal government should a state secede from the Union, there existed a 
plethora of politicians who were either ideologically in sync with Baltic Americans and/or 
were willing to politicize the USSR’s domination in East Europe.17 
 Baltic domestic anti-communist activities not only added to the tapestry of American 
political life, but also played an increasingly important role in the formulation of American 
foreign policy towards the Baltic States. Recent literature on the Cold War in the United 
States cite that domestic policy was not just important in foreign policy in terms of electoral 
politics and economic development, but also in limiting the number of acceptable choices 
that policymakers had towards a certain situation or a certain region.18 This was certainly the 
hope of Baltic refugees living in the United States with regard to whether or not the United 
States was willing to continue the non-recognition policy.  
 Yet, another important component of the relationship between domestic and foreign 
policies was the active use of politically engaged factions of the American public to bolster a 
particular foreign policy initiative of the United States. The State Department had no interest 
in reconsidering the non-recognition policy since it was a useful rhetorical tool against the 
Soviet Union in international forums.  At the same time, there was perpetual risk that the 
inherently exclusionary policy as it related to the territorial Baltic republics and the symbolic 
nature of continuing to accredit Baltic diplomats would lose its viability as the years passed. 
By being willing participants in the anti-communist activities of the Baltic refugees, 
                                                            
17 Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York City, New York, 1960), 197. 
18 Craig and Logevall, 3. They argue that by 1949 the United States had successfully contained the Soviet 
Union but that “foreign policy was still dominated by political grandstanding and an alarmist militarism.” They 
continue for “much of the Cold War, the domestic variable predominated over the foreign one.” 
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American policymakers not only facilitated in blurring the line between Baltic exile and 
Baltic American, but began the process of blurring the line between foreign and domestic 
policies related to the Baltic republics. 
 
The Commemoration of Holidays and Anniversaries  
 Baltic refugees continued to celebrate the independence days of their home countries 
as well as commemorating the anniversaries of the June 1941 deportations of Estonian, 
Latvian, and Lithuanian citizens by the Soviet Union just as they had while residing in DP 
camps before 1948. Local and national organizations held assemblies, passed resolutions, and 
organized exhibitions on independence days as well as on 14 June. Commemorating these 
important dates should not only be seen in the context of providing a sense of continuity 
between Baltic life in Europe and Baltic life in the United States, but must also be seen in the 
context of domestic politics in the United States and events in the Baltic republics during the 
Stalinist period. 
 An important contribution to the anti-communism movement by Baltic refugees was 
the belief that they had a unique insight into the motives and actions of the Soviet Union 
through their firsthand encounters with Soviet occupying forces from 1940-1941 and again 
from 1944 onwards. Baltic refugees focused on exposing the truth about the communist 
regime to the American public by recounting their memories of Soviet occupation.19 In 
addition to the annexation that occurred in 1940, the deportation of tens of thousands of 
civilians in 1941 represented a chilling example of the brutality, totalitarian, and arbitrary 
nature of the Kremlin.  
 Deportations, however, were not just recent historical events that were worth 
commemorating to influence American public opinion about the dangers of communism. The 
                                                            
19 Ieva Zake, “Multiple Fronts of the Cold War: Ethnic Anti-Communism of Latvian Emigres” in Zake, Anti-
Communist Minorities in the US, 129. 
 
 245 
Soviet Union continued the practice of mass deportations after 1944 and actually accelerated 
the practice until the early 1950s. Consisting of two periods of deportations, the first in 1944-
1945 and again from 1947-1949, an estimated 80,000 Estonians, 100,000 Latvians, and 
260,000 Lithuanians were arrested or deported.20 While Balts living in the free world 
generally had a difficult time receiving information about events in their homelands, contacts 
with partisan movements and the smuggling of information provided sufficient information 
about the deportations that were currently taking place in the Baltic republics. 
 The Baltic exiles naturally viewed the deportation of hundreds of thousands of their 
fellow citizens to Northern Russia, Siberia, and Central Asia as an existential threat to the 
future of the independent Baltic States that they were fighting for. As a result, the 
commemoration of the 1941 deportations provided Balts with the possibility of trying to 
influence the American public and their elected officials to establish new policies that could 
curtail future deportations in the Baltic republics. This was namely through offering Baltic 
deportations as a useful means for the State Department to rally against the Soviet Union in 
the United Nations General Assembly and for attempting to persuade the United States 
Senate to ratify the 1948 Genocide Convention.21 
 Baltic exiles, however, were not the only ones to utilize important Baltic holidays to 
promote foreign policy agendas. While much of the State Department’s implementation of 
the non-recognition policy was important for the Baltic refugees, discrete policy issues – such 
as the decision to forego RFE broadcast in favor of VOA broadcasts, and to a lesser extent 
American-Soviet relations, it was important to make sure that the American decision not to 
                                                            
20 Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 358. For a description of the justification 
and manner in which people were executed see 73-99. 
21 See: Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The United States an the Genocide Convention (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1991). The UNGA began discussing the issue of genocide in 1946 and decided to sponsor an international 
legal instrument concerning it. Drafting of the convention was completed in 1948, but it was not until 1951 
when enough countries had ratified the convention to bring the conventino into effect. Despite President Truman 
and the State Department’s support for the treaty’s ratification, it was not until February 1986 when the Senate 
ratified the convention. Throughout the early Cold War years, the Genocide Convention became an important 
political objective for Eastern European American Constituents. 
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recognize the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States became widely known among a broad 
segment of both domestic and international audiences. Thus, a key component of 
implementing the non-recognition policy was the drafting of national day messages by the 
State Department or White House that were sent to the Baltic representatives in the United 
States; responding to certain resolutions that the State Department received from various 
Baltic organizations; and allowing officials actively to participate in rallies and assemblies 
that commemorated the deportations, annexation, or national holidays.22  
 The two most important political means of commemorating the Baltic independence 
days and anniversaries of the annexation and 1941 deportations occurred through the holding 
of public rallies and the writing of resolutions that were submitted to American officials 
asking for American assistance in stopping the deportations and perceived genocide that was 
taking place in the Baltic republics.  The decision by the State Department as well as elected 
officials to participate in the rallies and begin correspondences with the organizations that 
passed symbolic resolutions implies that these public anti-communist activities were 
perfectly acceptable with respect to American foreign policy. Although the State Department 
had certain criteria that had to be met concerning contacts with Baltic organizations in the 
United States, the seemingly arbitrary nature of these relations from the perception of 
outsiders coupled with the dual identities of leading Baltic exile figures had the effect of 
blurring the line between exile activities and constituent activities occurring in the United 
States. 
 Across the United States, wherever there were large numbers of Estonians, Latvians, 
or Lithuanians residing, local and national organizations that represented their interests held 
rallies, exhibits, or festivals that commemorated important dates or activities related to their 
                                                            
22 See Paul A. Goble, “The Politics of a Principle: U.S. Non-Recognition Policy Before, During, and After the 
Recovery of Baltic Indepdence,” in Hiden, et. al. The Baltic Question During the Cold War, 46. Goble claims 
that a close study of the national day messages reveal them to be a quite sensitive barometer of American 
government attitudes towards the Baltic republics. 
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ancestral homelands. In remembrance of Latvian Independence Day on 18 November, 
Estonian Independence Day on 24 February, and Lithuanian Independence Day on 16 
February, the gatherings held in large cities, such as Chicago, New York, Boston, and 
Indianapolis featured speeches from prominent Baltic exiles that were employed by the FEC, 
their exiled diplomatic representatives, and on occasion elected officials.23 
 Perhaps the Baltic rally that received the highest profiled during the 1950s was the 
annual Baltic States Freedom Rally that occurred in New York City annually, starting in June 
1952. The Baltic States Freedom Rally was the product of efforts by the Baltic States 
Freedom Committee (BSFC). In a March 1952 joint meeting of the Estonian, Latvian, and 
Lithuanian Consultative Panels, it was decided that three FEC sponsored panels should pool 
their efforts to commemorate the annexation of their homelands in 1940 as well as the 
deportations that took place in 1940 and 1941.24 The rationale behind the panels’ decision to 
create the BSFC was not only to demonstrate to the FEC that there were collaborative efforts 
among the three Baltic panels, but also to create a very visible rally in New York City to 
protest the Soviet Union and educate the American public about Soviet atrocities in the Baltic 
republics.25 Vaclovas Sidzikauskas of the Lithuanian Panel was appointed Chairman of the 
BSFC and organizing a rally that would take place in June became one of the highest priority 
activities of the Baltic Consultative Panels throughout the spring of 1952. 
 Leading up to the Baltic States Freedom Rally that was to take place in New York 
City to commemorate the twelfth anniversary of the annexation and eleventh anniversary of 
the deportations, New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey issued a proclamation that 13 June 
1952 would be declared as “Baltic States Freedom Day” in New York State claiming that the 
                                                            
23 See Fund Memo #578 on Baltic Activities in 1951 “Folder: B801.4 Consultative Panels” Records Relating to 
the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 2, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the 
Department of State, NAII. 
24 Unnumbered Fund Report on Baltic Activities in March 1952. “Folder: B801.4 Consultative Panels” Records 
Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 2, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of 




United States “has quite properly declined to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic States 
into the Soviet Union.”26 Throughout the day on 15 June, Baltic exiles handed out leaflets to 
the public throughout New York City and held an organized protest against the Soviet 
delegation to the United Nations with signs condemning the “lawless invasion of the Baltic 
States.”27 The day’s events culminated in a rally at Town Hall where Estonian, Latvian, and 
Lithuanian folksongs were sung and the official messages of John Foster Dulles, W. Averell 
Harriman, and President Truman were read. Truman declared: 
The Government and the people of the United States feel an instinctive and profound 
sympathy for the enslaved people of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, coupled with 
revulsion at the acts of the occupying power whose forcible incorporation of the 
Baltic States we have never recognized. 
 
We pay tribute to the determined endeavors of the diplomatic and other 
representatives of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on behalf of their homelands. We 
shall not forget our Baltic friends. 
 
We extend through you to them, wherever they may be, our heartfelt hope that they 
may have the fortitude and patience to live through the grinding tyranny now imposed 
upon them to enjoy once again independence and freedom within the community of 
free nations.28 
 
The White House’s willingness to draft a statement for the Baltic States Freedom Rally 
declaring that the United States continued to not recognize the Soviet annexation and imply 
that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would regain their independence partly due to the efforts 
of Balts living in the United States not only added to the expectations of Balts in the United 
States that the Americans were working towards the liberation of their homelands, but it gave 
the appearance that American policy interests and Baltic exile interests were aligned in the 
public’s eyes. 
                                                            
26 "Baltic Freedom Day Proclaimed." New York Times (1923-Current file),  June 14, 1952,  
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 17, 2011). 
27 Undated Lithuanian Fund Memo “Folder: Li801.4 Committee for a Free Lithuania” Records Relating to the 
Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 11, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the 
Department of State, NAII. 
28 "BALTIC GROUPS HERE HOLD FREEDOM RALLY." New York Times (1923-Current 
file),  June 16, 1952,  http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 25, 2011). 
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 The positive experience in 1952 convinced the three Baltic panels to reconstitute the 
BSFC during a joint meeting on 6 March 1953.29 Similar to the 1952 Baltic States Freedom 
Rally, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians met in New York City where declarations 
supporting the non-recognition policy and condemning deportations were read to the five 
hundred participants.30 The internal State Department debate about the extent of cooperation 
between the American officials and the BSFC offers insight into the manner that 
policymakers dealt with events that were seen to be privately organized in the public’s 
perception. 
 R.G. Johnson of the Baltic Desk relayed a memorandum to Emmet J. Hughes, 
Administrative Assistant to President Dwight D. Eisenhower on a recommended statement 
that the White House should issue to the BSFC. Johnson stated that the “BSFC was set up, in 
association with the National Committee for a Free Europe, primarily to coordinate the 
interests of various organizations of Americans of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian origin in 
an annual rally to commemorate the two principal tragedies in the recent history of the three 
Baltic States.”31 The State Department’s recommended statement reinforced the themes that 
the United States continued to recognize the existing diplomatic missions of the Baltic States; 
condemned the deportations that were occurring; and that the Baltic States would regain their 
freedom in the future.32 
 In retrospect, it was certainly not surprising that the State Department would 
recommend that the White House should issue a statement of support to an activity that was 
                                                            
29 Fund Memo #656 Monthly Report for March 1953 1 April 1953 “Folder: B801.4 Consultative Panels” 
Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 2, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, 
Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
30 Fund Memo #739 Report for July 1953 1 August 1953. “Folder B801.4 Consultative Panels” Records 
Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 2, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of 
the Department of State, NAII. 
31 R.G. Johnson to Emmet J. Hughes “Memorandum for the White House” 3 June 1953 “Folder: B801.1 Emigre 
Organizations Abroad” Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 2, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 
69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
32 “Message to the Baltic States Freedom Committee” from Eisenhower, “Folder: B801.1 Emigre Organizations 
Abroad” Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 2, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, 
Compartment 25, Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
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an officially sanctioned event of the FEC. Although Johnson attempted specifically to 
segregate the BSFC’s activities from those of Baltic American organizations by claiming that 
the BSFC was merely “coordinating the interest” of their activities, it is clear that there were 
no State Department objections to FEC sponsored exiles participating in events that were 
targeted towards a primarily domestic audience. In fact, one of the most successful aspects of 
the FEC’s Baltic activities was harnessing the domestic political potential of Estonians, 
Latvians, and Lithuanians in the United States. Throughout Eisenhower’s first term, the 
BSFC was reconstituted annually and eventually became more elaborate by including a larger 
number of speakers, larger audiences, and greater media coverage.33 
 The State Department recognized that 1950 was an important year for American 
policy. It marked the tenth anniversary of the incorporation of the Baltic States into the 
Soviet Union and more importantly, the tenth anniversary of the United States’ decision to 
not recognize the annexation. Leading up to the anniversary during the summer of 1950, the 
State Department and the White House began to receive numerous letters from individual 
Balts residing in the United States and resolutions from organizations demanding that the 
United States reaffirm its policy towards the Baltic States.34 Additionally, the exiled Baltic 
diplomats as well as the most important Baltic organization in the country at the time, the 
ALT, requested audiences with President Truman to commemorate the long-standing non-
recognition policy and the anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
Lithuania and the United States.35 
                                                            
33 For instance in 1954, the attendance increased by 50% and not only included the reading of submitted 
statements of American politicians by the BSFC, but included live speeches by politicians and the passing of 
official resolutions. 
34 There are over 200 such constituent letters filed in the State Department’s Central Decimal File 1950-1954, in 
class “860B” NAII. in addition to numerous such letters Located in the Truman White House Central File See: 
Folder 472: Miscelleneous, Box 1356. Folder 314: Miscellaneous” Box 314. HSTPL. 
35 On 11 July 1950, Pius Grigaitis of the ALT wrote to Truman requesting a meeting on 27 July – 
commemorating the day that the United States granted de jure recognition to the Lithuanian government. 
“Folder: B711 Foreign Relations with the United States” Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 
1, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
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 The possibility of meetings between the President and prominent Balts in the United 
States would not have only elevated the position of the Balts in the eyes of their fellow exiles, 
but also in American anti-communist circles. The meetings would also have provided the 
President the opportunity to very publicly make it clear to the American people as well as to 
international audiences that the United States supported the aspirations of small nations that 
had been the first victims of Soviet aggression. The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June, 
however, brought about important national security questions related to meetings with the 
Baltic exiles. As it was clear that there was no confusing the exiled diplomats as private 
American citizens, the meeting between an American official and the Baltic diplomats was 
downgraded to the level of Assistant Secretary of State. On 27 July 1950, Assistant Secretary 
of State for European Affairs George W. Perkins met with the three Baltic diplomats to 
discuss the non-recognition issue as well as the deportation issue.36  
 The idea of a meeting between an ALT delegation and the White House proved to be 
an even more contentious debate. Under Secretary of State James E. Webb assumed the 
responsibility of making the decision about a possible meeting between any American 
official, let alone the President, within the Korean context. He argued to the White House: 
While the question of receiving a delegation of American citizens of whatever lineage 
is primarily an internal matter, an audience such as the one proposed by Dr. Grigaitis 
would probably be regarded by the Soviet Government as an interview granted by the 
President to unofficial representatives of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In view of 
this it is suggested that the same policy considerations guiding the Department with 
respect to the appointment requested by the official Baltic representatives with the 
Secretary are valid as well in the present case insofar as a foreign policy aspect is 
concerned.37 
 
                                                            
36 Memorandum of Conversation, George Perkins, Povilas Žadeikis, Jules Feldmans, and Johannes Kaiv, “Aide 
Memoire left by Baltic representatives with Assistant Secretary Perkins on 27 July 1950” “Folder: B711 Foreign 
Relations with the United States” Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 1, RG 59, Stack Area 
150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
37 On 20 July 1950, James E. Webb to Matthew Connelly (White House) “Baltic-American delegation’s request 
for audience with the President on 27 July.” “Folder: B711 Foreign Relations with the United States” Records 
Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 1, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of 
the Department of State, NAII. 
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The following day, a letter was sent to Grigaitis apologizing for the inability of the President 
or a senior ranking State Department official to meet with the a Lithuanian American 
delegation, although a scheduling conflict was used as an excuse and not the underlying 
foreign policy considerations.38 Precedent was established that the State Department would 
utilize written correspondences to reaffirm American non-recognition policy on Baltic 
national holidays and deportation commemorations. 
 Every year the State Department would receive hundreds of letters from Estonian, 
Latvian, and Lithuanian organizations informing policymakers about their organization’s 
meeting commemorating either independence day or the anniversaries of the annexation and 
deportations as well as the organization’s passed resolutions. While the Public Views and 
Inquiries Section of the State Department would occasionally respond to a handful of 
correspondences, it eventually became policy that the Baltic Desk would handle 
correspondences with the most important Baltic Organizations in the United States: the ALT, 
ALA, and ENC. 
 One representative example of this phenomenon was the 17 February 1954 letter 
addressed to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles from Vaino Riismandel on behalf of the 
Estonian National Committee commemorating the 36th anniversary of Estonian independence. 
Riismandel informed Dulles that “Estonians all over the world and Americans of Estonian 
descent are gathering on February 24th in tribute to this steadfast adherence to the principle of 
non-recognition, in devotion for an uncompromising fight against communist imperialism, 
and in firm belief in the reestablishment of a free and independent Estonian state.”39 
Riismandel continued, “The hope for the day of liberation is the source of strength to every 
                                                            
38 Vedeler to Grigaitis, 21 July 1950, “Folder: B711 Foreign Relations with the United States” Records Relating 
to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 1, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the 
Department of State, NAII. 
39 Vaino Riismandel to John Foster Dulles, 17 February 1954, Central Decimal File, 1950-1954, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State, NAII. 860B.424/2-1754. 
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Estonian, be he in the communist dominated Estonia or the free shores of this country.”40 In 
response, Vedeler thanked the ENC for their support of the American liberation doctrine and 
reaffirmed the non-recognition policy. 
 Ultimately the decision whether or not to respond to a constituent letter was entirely 
at the discretion of State Department policymakers. On a regular basis letters would merely 
be filed and marked as not requiring a response. The decision to respond to the constituent 
letters of important Baltic organizations was an active policy decision by the State 
Department’s Baltic Desk. While the State Department was able to utilize constituent 
responses publicly to restate official American policy towards the Baltic States on national 
holidays and anniversaries, the Baltic constituents gained the most from regular 
correspondences with the State Department. 
 Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians regularly republished the responses they 
received from the State Department or the White House in their native language publications 
as well as their English language publications. For their fellow exile audiences, these 
publications were often used to elevate one organization’s standing within the broader 
diaspora by claiming that they had direct access to American policymakers. For the broader 
American audiences, these publications were often used to reinforce the Baltic claims that 
they had a unique perspective about the Soviet Union and were one of the most important 
pieces of the patchwork of American communism during the 1950s. 
 The regular nature of State Department correspondences to Baltic organizations to 
reaffirm the non-recognition policy increased Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian sensitivity to 
perceived changes in American policy while providing them with significant leverage over 
the State Department when it came to the sacrosanct nature of the non-recognition policy. 
Baltic organizations viewed many components of American foreign policy through the prism 




of how it might impact on the American view towards the Baltic republics. In the event that 
there was a perceived change in any American posture towards the Soviet Union or if there 
was the slightest delay in an expected response from the State Department, there was a 
possibility that it could become a political problem, particularly during a period where the 
United States was seen to be actively promoting the liberation of the Soviet bloc and that the 
non-recognition policy was fundamentally important to a future democratic Eastern Europe. 
 As a result, the symbiotic relationship that developed between the prominent Baltic 
organizations during the 1950s and the State Department created a situation where there were 
broad constraints placed upon policymakers concerned with the Baltic republics. Even if 
international events had warranted a reassessment of the non-recognition policy and even if 
the policy no longer made sense in light of future developments, there was significant 
bureaucratic inertia behind the policy as well as significant domestic pressure placed on 
policymakers through the political activism of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian 
organizations. 
 
Publications and the Monopolization of Information 
 Baltic exiles engaged in a plethora of publishing activities once they arrived in the 
United States. The influx of refugees expanded the number of Baltic language publications 
not only by increasing the target audience’s size, but also by improving the quality of the 
publications in terms of staffing and content. Baltic publishing, however, was not exclusively 
targeted towards their own communities. A number of publications in the English language 
were created with the establishment and/or expansion of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian 
national organizations. Baltic language publications were important in preserving the 
Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian languages; deepening cultural developments while in exile; 
and expressing political disagreements within the diasporas. The English language 
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publications were important in that they demonstrated a certain level of solidarity among the 
three nationalities to non-Baltic audiences and expressed the Baltic exiles’ political agenda 
while residing in the United States. 
 Latvians and Lithuanians residing in the United States were the most prolific in 
publishing periodicals directed towards a broader American audience. Perhaps the main 
reason where there were very few Estonian publications in the English language was the 
relatively small size of the Estonian American community and the lack of a sizable historic 
community in the United States. The Lithuanian National Council of New York sponsored the 
Lithuanian Bulletin and was a quarterly publication started in 1943. The Bulletin essentially 
acted as a clearinghouse of information for the American, German, and neutral-controlled 
media during World War II to provide information on the plight of occupied Lithuania.41 In 
the context of the political consolidation of the Lithuanian American community, the ALT 
assumed control of the Lithuanian Bulletin in January 1947 and focused its attention on 
issues that were most pertinent to the Lithuanian community, such as the fate of Lithuanian 
DPs, the Genocide Convention, and atrocities committed by the Soviet Union.42 
 During the same time period, the Latvian Information Bulletin, provided similar 
information to an American audience about the historic and contemporary developments in 
Lithuania. Started by the Latvian Embassy in Washington in 1937, the Bulletin was a public 
diplomatic initiative that rapidly turned into a lobbying mechanism for Latvians living in the 
United States to influence American public opinion about their country after the 1940 
annexation. However, there were clear differences between the Lithuanian Bulletin and the 
Latvian Information Bulletin. Since the Latvian publication continued to be the official 
publication of the exiled Latvian diplomatic mission, there was no way that it could be 
confused as a constituent publication like the Lithuanian publication. However, the 
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publications’ information was rather similar, had similar audiences, and were presumably 
interpreted the same way by their readers. 
 The State Department and the FEC also played an important role in facilitating 
English language publishing by Baltic exiles. The State Department advocated that prominent 
Baltic exiles produce a White Book on Genocide in the Baltic republics that would play an 
important role in the event of the United States seeking to bring charges of genocide against 
the Soviet Union in the United Nations General Assembly. Since the FEC and State 
Department decided against using the Baltic Consultative Panels for radio broadcasts, 
officials decided that there should be close cooperation between the Baltic Consultative 
Panels and the FEC’s Free Europe Press. 
 The genesis of an idea of a Baltic White Book on Genocide was during a joint Baltic 
Consultative Panel meeting in November 1951.43 The White Book was to address the 
massacres and deportations of Baltic citizens by the Soviet Union from 1940 onwards and 
feature the stories of well known Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians who were targeted for 
deportation.44 Throughout 1951 and 1952 all three Consultative Panels worked on the project 
and reached out to all segments of their diasporas for documents and personal accounts. The 
White Book’s preparation included the collection of as many eyewitness affidavits as 
possible concerning Soviet genocidal acts. 
 In January 1952, Vedeler of the Baltic Desk forwarded a memo to the Policy Planning 
Staff on the proposed Baltic White Book on Genocide and its merits concerning American 
interests. Vedeler argued that if the White Book were both factually accurate as well as 
properly presented that it would be a “helpful contribution to the task of informing and 
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alerting the free world with regard to Soviet practices.”45 For the State Department, the White 
Book had potential importance since its contents would be useful in building a genocidal case 
for “possible presentation at an appropriate time in the United Nations.”46 
 The long-term publishing project and perhaps the Baltic Panels greatest legacy was 
the Baltic Review. In March 1952 the three Baltic Panels made the decision to reconstitute the 
old Baltique Revue that had first been published in 1940.47 The Baltic Review was a 
collaborative journal published occasionally by the three Baltic Panels through the Free 
Europe Press. An important component of the Baltic Review’s collaborate nature was the 
rotating editorship based on nationality. That is, to ensure that one nationality would 
dominate the publication’s content, each volume would feature an editor that would be rotate 
among the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. Throughout 1952 and 1953, the three Baltic 
Panels coordinated what their vision for the journal would be with the Free Europe Press 
leading to the inaugural volume being published in December 1953. 
 The inaugural issue explained the origin and purpose of the Baltic Review. While 
acknowledging that the journal hoped to continue the work of Revue Baltique, its editors 
described its two objectives: 
The main objective of this Review is to inform the Western World of the Communist 
social, economic, and political system, propaganda and strategy, to acquaint the free 
world with the sacrifices and struggle of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian 
peoples for the restoration of their independence, and to reveal the devious methods 
and processes of Soviet aggression and occupation. These methods and this strategy 
have as their aim the suppression of freedom, the extermination of peoples, and Soviet 
domination of the world. 
 
Finally, and most important for the future, while promoting mutual cooperation 
among Baltic exile organizations, the Review will foster the idea of federation among 
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Eastern and Central European nations in order that they may be included, after their 
liberation, in a united Europe.48 
 
The Baltic Review’s two main audiences were the broader American public who would find 
the publication in their libraries, schools, and research institutions as well as the State 
Department. A careful reading of the publication’s articles during its first few years reveal a 
specific political agenda that its authors hoped to impart upon both the American public and 
policymakers.  
The Baltic Consultative Panels hoped to educate the American public about the true 
nature of the Soviet Union by exposing the Soviet Union as a nation whose values were 
antithetical to the conservative and religious nature of the United States. Simultaneously, the 
Panels hoped to show upon American policymakers that there was indeed a high level of 
cooperation among the three Baltic nationalities that was actually a historical phenomenon; 
that Baltic exiles thought that the United States should charge the Soviet Union with 
genocide in the United Nations; and that the Baltic Panels supported the American policy of 
liberating the Soviet bloc. 
The Baltic Review’s December 1953 volume began by reminding its audience that the 
Baltic States were among the first victims of “Soviet Russia’s aggression and her plans for 
world conquest” and that the “Baltic peoples form an important part of the anti-communist 
front” due to their geopolitical situation, Western culture, and Christian traditions.49 The 
editorial staff believed that studying the Baltic example and keeping the international 
community informed on developments within the Baltic republics was important because 
“what happened to them could happen to the whole world.”50 Two prominent themes that the 
Baltic Review wished to share with international audiences on how the Soviet presence had 
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demonstrably changed Baltic society for the worse include discussing the standard of living 
trajectory; the educational system; and the risk of Soviet inflicted genocide. 
Aleksander Kütt, a prominent exiled Estonian economist, analyzed the deterioration 
of the Estonian living standard as a result of the Soviet occupation in March 1956. Kütt’s 
article began by arguing that before World War II, Estonia should be seen as a country that 
did not quite have the standard of living as the Scandinavian countries or the United 
Kingdom, but was still higher than most other West European nations.51 A comparison was 
also made to the growth of real wages in the United States by stating that from 1932-1939, 
Estonian wages rose 13 per cent per annum, which compared favorably with an American 
wage growth of 29 per cent from 1939 to 1953.52 Before the Soviets arrived in 1940, Kütt 
claimed that Estonian farmers had been prosperous and its industrial work force had obtained 
near universal employment.53 
Using resources made available from the Soviet Estonia media and statistics compiled 
by the Mid-European Studies Center, Kütt outlined the transformation process required to 
integrate the Estonian economy into the Soviet economy and the implications for wages and 
economic freedom in Soviet Estonia.  Although Soviet authorities gradually increased food 
prices in an effort to reduce the Estonian living standard until the German Army arrived in 
1941,54 it was the postwar policy of maintaining wages while fluctuating the cost of goods 
that ultimately had a negative impact on wages in Soviet Estonia.55 Kütt concluded that real 
wages in 1952 were 27.3 per cent of its level in 1939.56 As to economic freedom, Kütt was 
concerned that the rapid industrial transformations that were taking place in Estonia were 
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existential threats to its economic freedom. The decision to mandate all factories to work 
three shifts instead of one, the construction of new production plants, and the continuously 
rising working norms to fulfill the Five Year Plans were undermining the ability of Estonian 
citizens to pursue their own economic interests.57 Additionally, the fact that Estonian 
economic output was being redistributed through the wider Soviet Union and to nations that 
the Soviet Union had trade agreements with was eroding the economic development of 
Estonia as an economic unit.58 
It was important to draw comparisons with the economic standards of Western 
Europe and the United States to emphasize the similarities between Baltic economic 
conditions before 1940 and the changes that were ultimately made by the Soviet Union after 
the annexation. From the perspective of Estonians living in the free world, their home 
country was on a similar economic trajectory as the rest of Europe and the United States, but 
the Soviet annexation brought a foreign economic system that was ultimately detrimental to 
the nation’s development. Drawing such comparisons bolstered the argument that the Soviet 
Union was a grave threat not only to small nations, but powerful ones such as the United 
States. 
In the same issue, a former lawyer in Latvia who wished to remain anonymous wrote 
about the differences between the Latvian educational system and the changes that the Soviet 
Union imposed on the way that Latvians were educated.59 The article attempted to undermine 
Soviet propaganda that the Soviet educational system was superior to the old Latvian system, 
through a detailed comparison of Latvia’s educational system during the interwar period with 
what was known about the educational system in the 1950s.60 The author argued that the 
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Soviet educational system was actually inferior to the old Latvian system due to the school 
system’s administration as well as the importance of meeting economic and ideological 
objectives rather than traditional educational goals. 
The author criticized the elementary school system’s inability to maintain discipline 
among Latvia’s youth or to have students complete the compulsory seven years of primary 
education. According to accounts from the Latvian Communist Party’s main publication, 
Cina, the Minister of Education Vilis Samson revealed that there had been great 
“deficiencies” in the ability to halt the increase of hooliganism in schools and that many 
students are leaving school prematurely.61 The author claimed that the main reason for 
children not completing their education was that the Soviet system had overloaded students 
with work outside of regular school assignments without any compensation.62 Finally, the 
author described the strong ideological nature of the Soviet educational system. The article 
cites an editorial from Riga in 1955 that states “schools… must educate our young generation 
in the spirit of fierce Soviet patriotism, selfless loyalty to the Communist Party and Soviet 
Government.”63 This manifested itself in the textbooks that were used in elementary school 
as well as entire regiments of study at the university level. The author concluded that the 
Soviet Latvian educational system was incompatible with traditional Latvian values as anti-
religious propaganda was taught simultaneously with communist doctrine.64 
The heavy emphasis placed on the anti-religious nature of Soviet education tied in 
neatly with the conservative and religious anti-communists in the United States who argued 
that the best way to combat communism in the United States was to directly associate the 
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Soviet Union with an assault upon traditional religious values that were mainstream in 
American culture. The author clearly states that “Communist education is anti-religious 
education. The children are taught basic sciences in the schools which are not compatible 
with faith in God.”65 The discussion of communism as anti-religious fitted neatly within the 
message that religious anti-communist Americans were promoting during the 1950s.66 
In June 1954, the Baltic consultative panels issued a special edition of the Baltic 
Review that addressed the issue of genocide in the Baltic States. The date was significant as 
June was the month that Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians living in the West 
commemorated the Baltic deportations. In addition to detailing specific acts of deportation 
and genocide in the Baltic republics, the editors hoped to make it clear that the Soviet Union 
was actively trying to conceal its activities in the Baltic republics from the international 
community.67 The editors called to light the lack of access to the Baltic republics by the 
international press as well as the Soviet Union’s ratification of the Genocide Convention in 
1954. 
Contrasting the time when all major newspapers and information services had 
permanent representatives in the independent Baltic States, the Baltic Review questioned why 
the Soviet occupied Baltic republics had been completely closed off to the outside even 
though a few foreign reporters have been allowed to travel in the rest of the Soviet Union.68 
By detailing the history of Soviet statements on access to the Baltic republics since their 
incorporation, three conclusions were reached. First, the Kremlin was preparing an attack 
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against the West and the Baltic region had become extremely important strategically.69 
Second, the Soviet Union had deported the entire populations of the Baltic republics to 
Siberia and the Baltic republics were being repopulated with foreigners.70 Finally, the authors 
concluded that until the Baltic republics were opened to foreign visitors that there was no 
possibility that there could be coexistence between the Soviet Union and the West.71 
On 3 May 1954, Vishinsky, serving as the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, 
deposited ratification documents of the United Nations Genocide Convention with the 
Secretary General. The Baltic Review criticized the reservation that the Soviet Union made to 
the Convention, stating that in the event of a disagreement, parties should not be summoned 
before the International Court of Justice. In essence, the Soviet Union refused to accept the 
jurisdiction of an international court and Soviet ratification of the Genocide Convention was 
merely a ploy to protect itself from accusations of genocide.72 The authors argued that the 
Soviet ratification was merely an act of propaganda and that it was up to the international 
community to prevent the Soviet Union from “escaping indictment.”73 
The Baltic Panels’ intentions of focusing on Soviet genocide in the Baltic States were 
two fold. First, they cited that the events in the Baltic republics not only as a “grave and 
agonizing threat” to the three Baltic nations, but they also “threatened also the existence of all 
nations in the future.”74 Increasing the general public’s knowledge on genocide in the Baltic 
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republics not only was supposed to increase sympathy for the Baltic cause but also to serve as 
a reminder to Americans that vigilance and accurate information about Soviet atrocities was 
essential to defeating the Soviet Union. The second goal, however, was to convince 
policymakers that it was in their interest to levy charges of genocide against the Soviet 
Union.75 However, the Baltic Review also sought to impress upon policymakers that Baltic 
exiles fully supported the American policy of liberation and were actively engaged in 
liberating their homeland. 
As an FEC sponsored publication and where one of the FEC’s objectives in its 
dealing with exile groups was to foster a sense of cooperation within each exiled diaspora, 
and in the case of the Baltic republics, to foster a sense of pan-Baltic cooperation, the Baltic 
Review published material that sought to the deep roots of Baltic cooperation. In addition to 
recounting the journal’s origins, dating back to 1940, the first edition featured an article 
written by Sidzikauskas that gave the history of Baltic cooperation during the interwar period, 
starting with Jonas Sliupas’ pamphlet “The Lithuanian-Latvian Republic and the Union of the 
Northern Nations” and ending with the 1934 Baltic Entente.76 Sidzikauskas took care to 
conclude that “The inherent constructive characteristics of their peoples, their achievements, 
their policy in the past and their determined resistance to the Communist domination at 
present, the three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, will undoubtedly become a 
sound and progressive element of tomorrow’s free and united Europe.”77 
Ultimately by the very nature of the Baltic Review, its impact proved to be rather 
limited. Until it ceased publication in 1971, it was mainly sent to newspapers, magazines, 
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libraries, public officials, and influential people around the world.78 Its largely scholarly-type 
articles meant that the journal was used as a source for information about the Baltic republics 
to be distributed by other means as opposed to a source that the general public would find 
accessible. Nevertheless, it represents the epitome of Baltic exiles establishing a monopoly 
on factual information about the Baltic republics within the United States. The source 
material that its authors used was either assembled by scholars associated with the FEC or 
media sources directly from the Soviet Union and other places in Europe that were initially 
published in the Baltic languages, Russian, German of Sweden. 
Although other media outlets in the United States had the capability of providing 
accurate reporting on events in the Soviet Union, access to the Baltic republics by the foreign 
media was limited and the marginal nature of the Baltic republics reduced the interest that the 
American press had on Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The contacts that the Baltic Panels had 
with fellow exiles in Europe who had access to Baltic sources, coupled with the resources 
that the FEC had to obtain information in the Soviet Union, allowed Baltic exiles to 
consolidate their role as the most reliable source of information on events in their home 
countries. In the context of anti-communist literature in the United States during the 1950s, 
the publications of Baltic exiles contributed by clearly articulating what the Soviet 
occupation had done to all facets of life in traditionally Christian and democratic countries. 
Their literature served as a warning to Americans about the international threat that the 
Soviet Union posed. 
The influence that Baltic exile literature had on influencing policymaking decision in 
the United States is difficult to assess. The greatest reason is that various government 
departments either explicitly or implicitly endorsed the initiation of such writings. The Baltic 
White Book on Genocide was important insofar as it provided the State Department with a 
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powerful and concise compilation of affidavits recounting Soviet atrocities in the Baltic 
republics. Its direct influence, however, was minimal in the sense that the decision to charge 
the Soviet Union with genocide was ultimately an American decision. The Baltic Review’s 
regular claims that cooperation among the three nationalities after liberation was a foregone 
conclusion, the experiences that American officials had with the presumed leaders of post-
liberation Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian exiled politicians tempered such expectations. 
Nevertheless, the Baltic Review was a clear example of cooperation among the three Baltic 
nationalities and this cooperation ultimately filtered into some aspects of Baltic life in the 
United States. Similarly, long editorials in exile publications supporting American liberation 
efforts did not increase the level of commitment that the Baltic exiles had in fighting for the 
liberation of their homelands. Throughout the early Cold War, Baltic exiles placed their 
hopes in the American government for the eventual liberation of their homeland and every 
aspect of their willingness to cooperate with policymakers is a testament to this fact. 
 
Baltic Constituents and the United States Congress 
 Although Baltic exiles in the United States placed most of their faith in the State 
Department and the President to liberate their home countries, they eventually began to turn 
to the United States Congress to help push their political agenda. East Europe’s status 
became an important aspect of American domestic politics. Democratic operatives had been 
concerned about Republican plans to garner East European Americans’ votes, particularly 
Polish Americans, as early as the 1944 Presidential elections.79  It was not until the influx of 
hundreds of thousands of primarily Baltic and Polish refugees in the late 1940s and the 
failure of the Yalta Agreements to produce a favorable political environment in East Europe 
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that the Republican Party truly gainerd a potential political weapon against the Democrats.  
The 1952 General Election began the Republican onslaught against the Democratic Party 
over its record during the early years of the Cold War establishing its effectiveness as a 
political argument.  Nevertheless, the precursor to 1952 occurred when the Republicans 
regained both the House and Senate in 1946. 
 Although the Democratic defeat was attributed to domestic problems that plagued a 
Truman administration that seemed to abdicate any sort of leadership during the period, many 
new Republican members of Congress represented the anti-communist wing of the party.80  
While preparing for the 1948 general election, Truman successfully repaired his relationship 
with the voters at large by rallying them against the 80th Congress. Truman’s shift towards 
pursuing a vigorous anti-Soviet foreign policy prevented the Republican Party’s new anti-
communist wing from swaying Eastern European ethnic groups and held them within the 
Democratic tent.81 
 In 1951 the Republican Party began directly exploiting disaffected East Europeans.  
The Republican National Committee created its Ethnic Origins Division, led by former 
Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss, in an attempt to place Yalta at the center of the 
Republican foreign policy agenda.82  Through exploiting Yalta, Republicans assailed the 
seemingly bipartisan strategy of containing the Soviet Union.  The outbreak of the Korean 
War and revelations of FDR’s secret wartime diplomacy helped Republicans to promote a 
policy of liberating East Europe from Soviet tyranny.  In 1952, John Foster Dulles gave a 
speech in Buffalo, New York that officially inserted liberation into the Republican Party 
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Platform.83  Dwight D. Eisenhower’s election as president and his fellow Republicans’ 
overall success in 1952 was attributed to a plethora of reasons ranging from the Korean War 
and the Republican hardline against communism to the appeal of Eisenhower’s personality.   
 East European exiles in general, and Balts specifically, found a political home in the 
Republican Party due to the perception that Roosevelt and the Democratic Party had indeed 
“sold-out” their homelands at Yalta. However, the Baltic exiles had a strong sense of realism.  
Some Latvians were concerned that politicians that promised too much were politically 
irresponsible, opportunistic, and that such wild promises could be inimical to the Latvian 
cause.84 Lithuanians and Estonians attempted to use the general election to leverage both 
political parties to support self-determination for the Baltic States.85 
 Committees to investigate communist activities became a favorite pastime for 
Congress during the Cold War. Although Ray Madden (D-In.) organized a congressional 
investigation focusing on the 1940 Katyn Massacre already in 1951, the most publicized 
committees were not created until the 1952 Republican takeover.86 In the Senate, Joseph 
McCarthy’s Government Operation Committee’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
overshadowed Albert Jenner’s (R-In.) work on the Judiciary Committee’s Internal Security 
Subcommittee. In the House, the most important committee was the Committee on Un-
American Activities (HUAC).87  Another highly publicized body was Charles J. Kersten’s 
(R-Wi.) 1953 select committee to investigate the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. 
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 Kersten was a Milwaukee lawyer who won his first election to the House of 
Representatives in 1946 in the predominantly Democratic 5th Congressional District.  He was 
defeated after serving one term, but returned to the House in 1950. While Kersten was 
applauded for his fiscal positions, he was best known for his anti-communist posturing and 
regular denunciations of a “bankrupt” Democratic foreign policy.88  Kersten belonged to a 
class of congressmen such as Senator Alexander Wiley, chairman of the Foreign Relations 
committee, Senator William Knowland, and McCarthy. Their motivation for the liberation of 
East Europe had more to do with ideological conviction rather than electoral considerations.89 
 Before the 83rd Congress, Kersten’s crowning legislative achievement was an 
amendment to the Mutual Security Act during the summer of 1951.  The Mutual Security Act 
authorized $7.5 billion in foreign economic and military aid. On 17 August 1951, Kersten 
stated that the act would “mean nothing more than an armaments race. So we must begin to 
move in the direction of the eventual liberation of the Eastern nations of Europe.” Kersten’s 
amendment not only provided for funding to create the Volunteer Freedom Corps (exile 
armies for East European nationalities), but to possibly aid underground resistance 
organizations in the region.90  Although Eisenhower and the State Department made it known 
that it was undesirable for Congress to deal with such matters, it only bolstered Kersten’s 
credentials with East European exiles. 
 While some have referred to Kersten as merely one of Joe McCarthy’s cronies,91 and 
was allegedly influenced by “fringe exile groups,” he was one of the most ardent advocates 
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of the Republican Party’s liberation policy.92  Kersten was not only loyal to his large Polish 
American constituency, but defended virtually every East European nationality that found 
refuge in the United States.93 Therefore it is not surprising that when Stephen Bredes, an 
attorney from Brooklyn and member of the American Lithuanian Council (ALT) approached 
Kersten with the idea of creating a congressional committee to investigate the Soviet 
annexation of the Baltic States, Kersten eagerly accepted and worked towards making such a 
committee a reality.94 
 On 26 March 1953, Kersten and an ALT delegation visited the White House and left 
President Eisenhower a memorandum calling for the American ratification of the Genocide 
Convention; clarification of what Eisenhower truly meant by liberating East Europe; and the 
need for a congressional investigation into the 1940 Soviet-rigged elections in Lithuania.95  
As was standard protocol, the memorandum to President Eisenhower was forwarded to the 
State Department for analysis. On 1 April, State Department officials forwarded comments 
on the memorandum back to the White House. Since the State Department failed to find any 
policy objections to such a committee, Kersten and the ALT were free to move forward.96 
 Kersten submitted H.R. 231 to the House Rules Committee on 7 May calling for the 
creation of a select committee to be authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete 
investigation and study of the seizure and forced “incorporation” of Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia by the Soviet Union in 1940.97  On 4 June, Kersten, along with ALT Secretary 
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General Pius Grigaitis and Lithuanian American Information Center (LAIC) Director Mary 
Kizis, scheduled an appointment with the State Department’s Baltic desk to update 
policymakers on H.R. 231’s progress and to seek State Department assistance for the 
forthcoming investigation into the rigged elections. Kersten described the benefits that the 
investigation would have on the making of foreign policy.  The investigation would not only 
enlighten the American people on the Baltic States’ fate, but it would keep alive the story of 
the methods that the Soviets had used to commit aggressive actions and serve as effective 
international propaganda, “particularly as a means to puncture the Soviet peace offensive.”98 
 The State Department was most concerned with a provision in H.R. 231 that allowed 
committee members to travel to Europe in order conduct interviews and gather evidence.  
Throughout the second half of 1953, American diplomats led a concerted effort to minimize 
any potential conflicts that could erupt with American allies in West Europe due to the 
December 1953 Bermuda Conference.  The State Department had learned during the early 
Katyn Massacre Investigations, that there were constitutional issues with members of 
congress holding official hearings in certain countries.  The French and the British refused to 
allow foreign legislatures to hold formal hearings in their jurisdictions. Requesting 
permission to hold hearings was an irritation that the State Department had hoped to avoid.99 
 The 1948 Displaced Persons Act and subsequent 1950 amendments had permitted a 
significant number of Baltic exiles to immigrate to the United States.100  Nevertheless, 
significant numbers of Balts still resided in Europe, including the most important Lithuanian 
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worldwide organization in the 1950s: the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania 
(VLIK).  The apparent inability of Kersten and his colleagues to travel to Europe to hold 
formal hearings could have potentially undermined Kersten and ALT’s work.  Serious 
discussions took place about the role that Baltic groups played in the United States, 
particularly the FEC affiliated Committee for a Free Latvia (CFL); Committee for a Free 
Estonia (CFE), and Free Lithuania Committee (FLC) should play.101  It was decided that the 
bulk of the investigation should involve significant assistance of Baltic exile organizations 
and their diplomatic representatives.102 
 On 27 July 1953, the House passed H.R. 346 calling for a committee to be 
“authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of said 
seizure and forced incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia by the USSR and the 
treatment of the said Baltic peoples during the following said seizure and incorporation.”103 
While Baltic organizations, particularly the Lithuanians, had been successful for years in 
having statements inserted into the Congressional Record on behalf of their homelands, for 
the first time the exiles were able to directly influence proceedings that had the possibility of 
playing an active role in what they had hoped would be the liberation of their homelands. 
 Over the following year, the Select Committee’s two major activities would consume 
the time of Kersten and his staff, as well as the Baltic exiles.  During late 1953 and 1954, 
Committee members and staff investigators were responsible for deposing witnesses, 
gathering testimony, and collecting documents relevant to the Soviet takeover of the Baltic 
States and subsequent forced population displacement.  This work’s result was ultimately a 
556-page report that detailed the history and implications of the relationship between the 
                                                            
101Memorandum of Conversation on 4 June 1953 “Proposed Investigation of the Forced Incorporation of the 
Baltic Republics into the Soviet Union” in File “B900 - Congressional Investigation 1953,” Box 3, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State, Baltic Lot File 1940-1961, NAII. 
102 Barbour to the Under Secretary of State for European Affairs, on 18 June 1953, in File “B900 - 
Congressional Investigation 1953,” Box 3, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Baltic Lot File 1940-
1961, NAII. 
103 Creation of Select Committee,  H.R. 346, 83rd Cong. (1953). 
 
 273 
USSR and the Baltic States. In addition, the Committee held hearings in Washington, New 
York, Detroit, and Chicago from 30 November through 11 December 1953. 
 Due to the apparent success of the Baltic Select Committee, the House passed H.R. 
438 in 1954, expanding the Committee’s mandate beyond the Baltic States to explore 
Communist aggression in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, East 
Germany, Russia, and other non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union.104  Hearings for 
the renamed Select Committee, now called the House Select Committee on Communist 
Aggression, however, were held in London, Berlin, and at the American Consulate in 
Munich.  The State Department not only removed any policy objections to testimonies being 
gathered abroad, but also received funding to hold such hearings.105  The additional hearings 
not only increased Kersten’s reputation for fighting on behalf of the captive nations, but also 
elevated the situation of the Baltic States to the center of the debate on the situation in East 
Europe.  
 The Select Committee’s primary objective was to obtain a large volume of reliable 
information detailing the manner in which the USSR incorporated the independent states.  
The congressmen’s inability to travel to the Soviet Baltic republics to conduct an 
investigation into the events that transpired from 1940-1941 resulted in a high-reliance on 
Baltic exiles to provide the empirical data.  For the first time during the Cold War, the Baltic 
exiles were central to an overt activity conducted by the American government.  The non-
recognition policy allowed American officials to conveniently marginalize unofficial exiles 
and their organizations through dealing directly with the diplomatic representatives of the 
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three countries.  The scope of what the Select Committee was trying to accomplish, however, 
far exceeded the capacities of the aging diplomatic corps.  
 Collecting information and actively aiding in the Select Committee proved to be a test 
case for the Baltic exiles’ capacity to effectively cooperate and work together.  A signature 
characteristic of Baltic exiles groups in the 1950s was incessant disagreements within each 
national group and a basic unwillingness to cooperate with the two other respective 
nationalities.  In fact, basic disagreements within Baltic nationalities and the ineptitude of the 
State Department to foster rapprochement became a primary reason for the continued 
marginalization of exile groups in American foreign policy.  An analysis of what kind of 
information was gathered and how it was collected by the Baltic exiles for the Committee 
represents a high point in Baltic cooperation, yet it is also very representative of the inherent 
limitations of rapprochement within first generation exiles. 
 Following H.R. 346’s passage, the Lithuanian Ambassador Povilas Žadeikis, Estonian 
Consul General Johannes Kaiv, and Latvian Chargé d’affaires Anatole Dinbergs mailed 
letters to Kersten informing him that they were available to provide any information that the 
Committee might need from them.  Representative of the relationship between the diplomats 
and the larger diasporas, their activities were somewhat autonomous due to their rigid 
conceptions of their relationship to their homelands and the governments that they had once 
represented.  In addition to participating in the formal congressional hearings on the Soviet 
annexation, the diplomats were responsible for providing the Select Committee with a 
plethora of government documents and diplomatic papers. 
 The documents that the diplomats provided offer insights into a shared historical 
trajectory among the three nations, and more importantly for the Select Committee, the 
shared experience of Soviet aggression.  Not only were the independent republics’ 
constitutions submitted, but copies and translations of the 1920 Peace Treaties between 
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Soviet Russia and the three Baltic nations; non-aggression treaties concluded in 1926 and 
1932; protocols renewing the non-aggression treaties; and the 1939 Mutual Assistance 
Pacts.106 
 Although the Baltic diplomats might have been the highest profile exiles to participate 
in the Select Committee’s activities, compared to other organizations, they played a relatively 
minor role.  National organizations such as the ALT, the American Latvian Association 
(ALA) and the Estonian National Committee in the United States (ENC), as well as the CFE, 
CFL, and FLC played the most important role.  The level of involvement and cooperation 
with Kersten, and the quantity of material provided was directly proportional to the size of 
the exile communities residing in the United States.  During the following year, ALT played 
a central role in gathering data from over 1,000 witnesses who had experienced the Soviet 
takeover of Lithuania. Additionally, the ALT submitted a list of more than 18,000 
Lithuanians who were deported to Siberia.107 Despite the fact that Latvians represented the 
greatest number of postwar exiles of the three nationalities,  the greater Lithuanian 
community’s ability to assimilate Lithuanian exiles necessarily meant that the ALT played 
the most important role in the Kersten Committee.  After all, it was the relationship between 
ALT and Kersten that prompted the establishment of the Committee in the first place. 
 As early as 12 June the National Committee for a Free Latvia began collecting data 
that could have been potentially used for the Kersten Committee if H.R. 346 passed.108  
Unlike the Lithuanians, who allowed the ALT to play a central role in organizing material for 
the Committee, the ALA and the CFL decided during a meeting on 11 July 1953 that the CFL 
would play the major role of collecting documents and delegating responsibilities to smaller 
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Latvian organizations.109 Throughout the rest of the year, the CFL conferred with the ALA 
and the Latvian Legation in Washington to obtain all of the necessary documents for 
submission to the Select Committee. Additionally, the American and Canadian based Latvian 
language presses were informed of the committee. Information was so widely spread on the 
investigation, that American consulate officers in Canada became inundated with inquiries by 
Latvian exiles on how they could participate in the investigation. 
 Possibly the most significant Latvian contribution to the investigation was Alberts 
Jekste’s film My Latvia. It depicted the Soviet annexation of Latvia in grim detail.  Jekste had 
been a director of a film company since 1928 in Riga and captured footage of events in the 
city during June and July of 1940.  He fled the country in April 1945, eventually immigrating 
to Baltimore in February 1952 after being classified as a DP.  On 1 December 1953, Jekste 
testified before the House Select Committee to describe what he had seen in Riga during the 
annexation and the film footage that he had managed to capture.110  
 Unlike the Latvians and Lithuanians, the Estonian exile diaspora’s center was located 
in Sweden and not the United States.  Of the three nationalities, the Estonians suffered from 
the highest level of intra-fighting that was primarily a result of competing organizations in 
Sweden, relatively weak institutions in the United States, and a lack of cooperation among 
exiled diplomats.  In preparing material for the Select Committee, the CFE played a pivotal 
role in the successful acquisition and dissemination of information.  On 14 August 1953 
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Acting Chairman of the Committee, Adolf Perandi, informed Kersten that Estonians had 
established a special commission (with significant impetus by the CFE) that would streamline 
the efforts of the major Estonian organizations in the free world: the CFE, Estonian World 
Council, and Association of Estonian War Veterans.111  Within the year, this organization 
became formalized as the Estonian Joint Committee for Cooperation with the Select 
Committee. Eventually it increased its scope of the cooperation to include organizations in 
Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and World Organization of Free Estonians (VEKO) 
in Stockholm.112 
 Altogether, roughly 1150 pages of personal statements from 208 individual 
testimonies were filed by the Estonian exiles residing in the United States, including 
translations from Estonian into English. Per the Select Committee’s request, the Estonians 
gave priority to documents that directly related to the staged elections that occurred in July 
1940, but also included a large number of eyewitness accounts of atrocities committed by 
Soviets in Estonia immediately following the annexation. By the middle of 1954, the 
Estonian Joint Committee and Kaiv’s office had yet another 500 pages of statements and 
documents to be submitted to the committee. 
 Acting on its own initiative, the Estonian National Council in Sweden (ERN), an 
organization that continually attempted to undermine the position of Kaiv and other leading 
Estonians in the United States, submitted its own collection of documents to the Select 
Committee in September and December 1953. Altogether ERN President August Rei 
submitted 393 pages of material to the American Embassy in Stockholm for transfer to 
Kersten in Washington. The ERN’s documents ranged from a selection of literature on the 
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annexation, occupation, and Sovietization of Estonia to statements of leading Estonian 
figures in the interwar period who had fled Soviet Estonia for Sweden.113 
 The only significant collaboration among the three nationalities for preparing 
documents and information for Kersten’s investigation occurred between the CFL, CFE, and 
LFC. An important reason for the continued sponsorship of the National Committees for a 
Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was the hope that the organizations could foster a sense 
of unity among Baltic exiles. Not only were the committees expected to foster a sense of 
unification within each individual diaspora, officials also hoped they could initiate closer 
cooperation among the three nationalities. Of the many symbols of Baltic cooperation during 
the 1950s on behalf of the FEC, the two most important were the eventual publication of the 
Baltic Review, an English-language journal with a rotating editorship and the Baltic States 
Freedom House located in New York. On 17 February 1953, the Baltic States Freedom 
House’s formal opening coincided with the celebration of Estonian and Lithuanian 
independence days.114 
 While in New York, Select Committee staff members Will Allen and Richard Walsh 
conducted the majority of interviews at the Baltic States Freedom House during the second 
half of September in 1953. The manner that the interviews were conducted at the facility is 
very much representative of the activities that occurred at the House during the 1950s. 
Although individual members of the Baltic National Committees cooperated on several 
levels, very few events were held that took on a decidedly Baltic nature. If the Latvians 
wanted to use the space, they were able to without any interference from the other two 
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nationalities. Similarly, with the interviews, Allen and Walsh conducted testimonies on a 
strictly national basis.115 
 The State Department’s involvement went well beyond the tacitly endorsing the 
Select Committee. Throughout the Select Committee’s mandate, the State Department 
provided assistance on three discrete levels. First, Secretary of State Dulles was personally 
involved with the Select Committee. Second, current and former senior diplomats, who had 
played a role in formulating American policy towards the Baltic States in 1940-1941, offered 
their testimonies and advice to the Select Committee. Third, the Foreign Service provided 
material assistance to the Select Committee during informal visits abroad. 
 The first round of the Select Committee’s testimony occurred from 30 November -11 
December 1953.  Secretary Dulles was the first witness. The Secretary broke his testimony 
into three main parts evoking the past, the present and the future.  Dulles forcefully argued 
that the Baltic States had become entitled to American recognition through maintaining 
internal economic and political stability and had demonstrated that despite their “meager 
natural resources,” the people had achieved a high level of economic and cultural well being. 
Soviet Russia cynically denied the Baltic States the freedom that they had initially earned in 
1920 through the aggressive acts of 1939 and 1940.  In closing, Dulles evoked the memory of 
Old Testament nations that had been oppressed for thousands of years only to rise again.116 
He concluded: “Some may think that it is unrealistic and impractical not to recognize the 
enforced incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. We believe, 
however, that a despotism of the Soviet type cannot indefinitely perpetuate its rule over 
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hundreds of millions of people who love God, who love country, and who have a sense of 
personal dignity.”117 
 Immediately following the first round of testimonies in Washington, State Department 
Baltic desk staff members began contacting former American diplomats who had been 
stationed in the Baltic States in 1940 to assist in the Select Committee’s report.  John C. 
Wiley, the former Charge d’affaires to Latvia, was the most important diplomat involved. On 
4 December 1953, Assistant Secretary Thurston Morton wrote Wiley asking: “The 
Committee is interested in your recollections of events and changes in the daily lives of the 
Baltic peoples in 1939 and 1940, witnessed by you personally.  Your letter should not refer to 
actions performed or reports made in your official capacity as a Legation officer.”118  In all, 
State assisted the Select Committee in obtaining written or oral testimonies from eleven 
American diplomats that had been assigned to the embassies on Riga and Kaunas, as well as 
the Consul General in Tallinn.119 
 The information received from the diplomats went well beyond the official Foreign 
Service correspondences sent from the Baltic States to the State Department during 1940.  
Head of the “Russian Section” at the Embassy in Riga, Bertel E. Kuniholm described the 
“nervousness” felt throughout the three Baltic countries once the August 1939 Molotov-
Ribbentrop negotiations commenced. He described that although there was no immediate 
pressure placed on Latvia through the negotiations, it was understood that “German-Soviet 
rapprochement could mean only one thing: the final act in the sell-out of Poland.” Being in 
close proximity to this focal point of potential conflict naturally made Latvian officials 
uneasy. Kuniholm continued by disclosing that the American government was unwilling to 
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assist in evacuating non-American members of his staff, knowing fully that should the Soviet 
military occupy Latvia, they would be arrested “en bloc.” Instead, Kuniform secured an 
additional month’s salary for his staff and assisted in moving them to Sweden.120  
 Despite the State Department’s misgivings, Kersten made two highly publicized trips 
to Europe over the course of his committee’s investigations. In September and October 1953, 
Kersten traveled to West Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and France to meet various 
Baltic leaders who resided in Europe. Kersten had successful and uneventful meetings with 
Mykolas Krupavičius , President of the VLIK in Reutlingen, Germany; and with Pope Pius 
XII in Rome, and collected a variety of documents useful for the investigation. During his 
meeting with the head of the Lithuanian Diplomatic Services Abroad, Stasys Lozoraitis Paris 
quickly complained to interlocutors at the American Embassy in Paris that Kersten’s 
‘entourage’ was dismissive and quick to stop certain people from approaching the 
congressman.121 Although the Embassy’s First Secretary Landreth M. Harrison stated that 
Kersten had made a “very favorable impression on the émigré leaders,”122 Harrison 
personally intervened to calm the concerns of Lozoraitis over the event. The fact that the 
Secretary was personally involved in the investigations mandated that the State Department 
had to intervene in the matter.  
 Kersten’s second trip to Europe was significantly more ambitious, as it was under the 
mandate of the expanded Communist Aggression Committee. This time, the hearings held in 
Munich, Berlin, and London during a six-week period of time covering May, June, and July 
of 1954 received significantly greater private backing from both the State Department and the 
CIA. On 9 July 1954, Edward O’Connor, the committee’s staff director told Allen Dulles that 
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“without the Agency’s help, the committee’s overseas effort would have been like a “hay-
wagon with only three wheels on it.”123 
 After two years of intense research by the Select Committees staff and the Baltic 
exiles’ efforts, the Congress published three voluminous reports. The First Report in 1954 
published the Hearings that took place before the Select Committee in late 1953. It 
documented the testimonies of individuals including Secretary of State Dulles; former 
President Herbert Hoover, the Baltic exile diplomatic representatives accredited to the United 
States; leading Baltic exiles; and private American citizens who had experiences with the 
Baltic States while they were independent or experiences with communist tyranny while 
being held captive by North Koreans.  On one hand, the witnesses described, in intricate 
detail, the techniques the USSR employed to undermine the political, economic, and social 
independence of the three Baltic States.124 
 The Second Interim Report published the testimony of 112 witnesses interviewed in 
the committee’s six-week European trip in 1954.  While offering a sample of the experiences 
that the witnesses had under Soviet rule in Eastern and Central Europe, the report offered 
some insight into how communism took over countries and how the Soviets were successful 
in consolidating their power.  The litany of preliminary findings that the Select Committee 
presented sought to discredit the Soviet overtures of peaceful coexistence. The Select 
Committee stated that “treaties, mutual-assistance pacts, nonaggression pacts, or covenants 
were never respected by the Soviets and the United States was seen as the main roadblock to 
the Soviets’ plan for “world conquest.”125 The capstone Third Interim Report returned the 
Select Committee’s focus to the Baltic republics.  The 537 page document entitled “The 
Baltic States: A Study of Their Origin and National Development; Their Seizure and 
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Incorporation into the USSR,” presented a detailed history of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
from their legal status within the Russian Empire through the Soviet annexation in 1940.126  
The study was prepared jointly between the Library of Congress’ Mid-European Law Project 
and the Legislative Reference Service, based almost exclusively on documents and 
testimonies provided by Baltic exiles.  While the empirical data was strictly based on the 
experience of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the focus was clearly to use these countries’ 
experiences to demonstrate precisely the willingness and the capability of the Soviets to 
annex territory and subjugate independent peoples. 
 Much of American foreign policy in the 1950s that attempted to hasten the liberation 
of East Europe and the destruction of the USSR was based on the utilization of East 
European exiles and ethnic Americans residing in the United States (or in Europe).  Although 
there were few covert radios and no clandestine paramilitary operations, the quality of the 
Select Committee’s investigations was entirely contingent on the level of cooperation and the 
quality of information that Baltic exiles provided. Like the radio broadcasts in which the 
exiles participated, the results of the Kersten investigations was decidedly mixed from the 
perspective of American policy makers, Baltic exiles, and for members of Congress. 
 Foreign policy makers had specific goals in mind when they approved of, and actively 
participated in Kersten’s investigation. The most realistic expectation was to utilize the 
results of the Committee in the propaganda campaign against the USSR. The highly 
publicized investigations not only raised the awareness of average Americans to the situation 
in East Europe, the testimonies given to the committee were used in American efforts abroad. 
Most notably, the Voice of America covered the Kersten proceedings as they had happened. 
Many of the Eastern European broadcasting languages for VOA and RFE adapted parts of the 
committee’s findings for regular broadcasts behind the Iron Curtain.  
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 Policymakers’ more ambitious goal was to utilize the Select Committee’s findings in 
the United Nations to charge the USSR not only with territorial aggression, but also 
genocide. The hierarchy of policy considerations, however, never permitted the American 
mission at the UN to move forward with such allegations. The American government had 
always been reticent about charging the USSR with aggression against the Baltic States for 
fear that a negative reaction in the General Assembly would undermine the non-recognition 
policy. As late as 1955, Kersten’s advocates continued to press the State Department to move 
forward in the UN. The official line continued to be that “the Department did not agree that 
to seek actions in the UN ‘naming the USSR as an aggressor against the nations enslaved by 
communism’ would be useful in bringing about a clear indictment of the USSR for its 
policies of aggression and subversion. This position’s basis included the extreme 
unlikelihood of obtaining majority support for such action.”127 Additionally, such a move 
would have “seriously adverse implications for the present positive propaganda values” 
gained through public and covert media outlets.128 The dissemination of My Latvia through 
the USIA was viewed as being equally effective as pursuing formal actions against the USSR 
in the UN.  
 Like many of the Baltic exiles’ activities during the early Cold War, the policy 
effectiveness for the Select Committee resulted in a mixed record. On one hand, the ALT was 
successful in persuading Charles J. Kersten to consider creating a congressional committee to 
investigate the 1940 fixed elections. The ALT was even successful in persuading the 
Congress, White House, and State Department to participate in the Select Committee’s 
proceedings. The fact that the Baltic exiles were able to influence the direction of the Select 
Committee and the information that it used to reach its conclusions demonstrates a significant 
                                                            
127 State Department Memo to Legion of Estonian Liberation, Inc. in Oregon, on 18 July 1955, in Folder “B500 





amount of leverage over politicians. On the other hand, the 26 March 1953 appeal to the 
White House explicitly connected the necessity of congressional investigations into the fixed 
elections with the desire of moving the Baltic debate to the floor of the United Nations 
General Assembly. The inability of the exiles to convince State Department bureaucrats to 
take the Baltic case to the United Nations clearly represents the limits of Baltic groups to 
influence policy makers. 
 Since the creation of the UN, Baltic exiles, particularly the diplomats, attempted 
either to lobby the UN directly or get the Americans to bring the Baltic plight before the 
General Assembly. In 1947 and 1948, the three Baltic diplomats in the United States 
composed joint letters to the respective presidents of the UNGA protesting “against the 
suppression of the independence and enslavement of our countries by the USSR.”129 By 
1950, the State Department’s Baltic Desk moved forward with language on a proposed 
American statement on behalf of the UN on the Baltic States, “calling upon the UN to take 
cognizance of the fact that the Baltic republics have endured wave after wave of arrests and 
deportations by Soviet authorities since August 1940.”130  The heightened international 
tensions due to the Korean War, however, resulted in a decision by State that it was 
“inadvisable to have this item placed on the agenda at the General Assembly at this 
session.”131 Continued Baltic activism on the UN issue continued after the conclusion of the 
House Committee, but for the State Department, the primacy of non-recognition prevented 
any realistic chances that the exiles had in furthering this part of their agenda. 
 The State Department’s decision to avoid discussing the Baltic States in the UN 
during the Korean War was representative of its Baltic policy’s implementation when 
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international tensions created crises. On 11 July 1950, ALT requested a meeting with 
President Truman to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Soviet annexation. The White 
House contacted the Baltic Desk for policy guidance and replied that the State Department 
had a “desire not to disturb unnecessarily our relations with the Soviet government during 
this critical period.”132 The meeting with ALT was ultimately rescheduled. American 
policymakers’ unwillingness to further increase tensions during wartime over East Europe 
exposes the inherent contradiction between American rhetoric of rollback and the 
implementation of such a policy.  This case also demonstrates the clear limits of the 
usefulness of the Baltic case for the United States. While raising the Baltic issue was an easy 
rhetorical tool during peacetime, it clearly remained a sensitive issue in American-Soviet 
relations. 
 There are two additional significant points that can be drawn from the active Baltic 
participation in the Select Committee’s investigation. First, Baltic organizations were granted 
the ability to learn how lobbying members of congress could be beneficial to their own 
agenda. Despite the failure of Congress and the Balts to push the State Department to 
confront the Soviet Union more aggressively, a closer relationship was in its nascent period 
that would prove to be mutually beneficial. Second, the vast amounts of information that 
Baltic exiles provided to the Select Committee helped to create a truly Baltic historical 
narrative of exile. Notwithstanding futile efforts at Baltic cooperation during the interwar 
period, flourishes of cooperation between exiled diplomats and American-backed National 
committees, and the lumping together of the three countries by the Americans, during the late 
1940s and early 1950s, there was little shared experience of the three individual nationalities. 
The creation of the Interim Reports can be seen as a small step towards unifying the historical 
memories of the three exiled diasporas. 
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 While the Lithuanians had always been successful at having significant holidays and 
events added to the Congressional Record, the relationship between Lithuanian Americans 
and Congress was primarily based on representatives and the votes of their constituents. 
Activism on behalf of the Select Committee slowly began a process of transforming this 
relationship into one of shared interests and partnership.  The transformation was even more 
dramatic for the Latvians and Estonians. Since there had never been large Estonian or Latvian 
communities in the United States and the assimilation process of the former Displaced 
Persons had not yet been completed, the experience of participating in the Select Committee 
elevated the communities from their initial position of extreme marginality to one that placed 
them in the center of the American anti-Communist struggle. 
 The American Government’s failure to act decisively amidst the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution forever bankrupted the idea that the United States would actively promote East 
Europe’s liberation and a policy of gradualism was soon adopted. An implication of this shift 
in policy was a reassessment about the usefulness of East European exiles to the conduct of 
American foreign policy.133  Notwithstanding this setback, Baltic exiles continued to pursue 
their activist agenda of promoting the continuation of the non-recognition policy, rejecting 
peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union, and gaining access to the exile-led activities that 
the Americans continued to sponsor -- namely cooperation with the FEC. In the decades that 
followed 1956, partnership with members of Congress, not the White House or State 
Department via the exiled diplomatic missions, would be the most viable path for successful 
Baltic exile activism. The Select Committee served as an important learning experience in 
which Baltic exiles were introduced to essential constituent activities such as Congressional 
lobbying and introducing their narrative to the American polity. 
                                                            
133 Although George F. Kennan was a proponent of using East European exiles as actors in the Cold War, he 
often expressed concerns about sustaining unity among the exiles. He concluded: “I am skeptical about the 
wisdom of getting ourselves hooked to the ambitions of noisy, skeptical, immature, and extremist exile figures.” 
Quoted in Scott, 200. There were more instances of failed policies using exiles than successes. 
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 The Baltic exiles’ historical memory of the 1930s and World War II was necessarily 
complex. On one hand, the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were among the first peoples 
to experience military aggression by a neighboring country in Europe. For the majority of 
Balts, World War II was a war of several occupations, deportations, forced-.conscription, and 
genocide. Political leaders and community leaders, such as professors, shop-owners, 
physicians, and teachers, who were fortunate to escape to the West represented the political, 
economic, and social elites of the independent interwar republics. On the other hand, what 
was it that those who escaped really represented? The Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian 
governments had slipped into right-wing authoritarian dictatorships during the 1930s.134  
 Complicating matters further, the issue of collaboration with the Nazis from 1941-
1944 could have played an impact on Baltic credibility during the hearings. Private 
exchanges between prominent Baltic exiles and Jewish Americans, such as the one between 
Alfreds Bilmanis and David Berkingoff in 1947 demonstrated the tensions between several 
historical narratives concerning World War II’s legacies that remain irreconcilable135. For 
Baltic exiles, World War II represented a personal and collective struggle to survive both 
Nazi and Soviet atrocities, while for Jews, personal and national survival was not a legitimate 
excuse for any type of collaboration. The Soviet Union’s rise as the United States’ 
preeminent threat in the late 1940s meant that the Baltic historical narrative arguing that the 
Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were the first peoples oppressed by the Soviet Union in 
World War II became more important than the Jewish historical narrative that some Balts had 
been collaborators in the Holocaust. This is most evident in the noticeable lack of any 
discussion of collaboration during the Congressional investigations. The committees’ 
mandates had been specifically to address the issue of Soviet aggression and any evidence 
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that might undermine the narrative, which members of Congress were trying to pursue were 
conveniently not addressed. This is one instance where there was a high-level of 
synchronization between Baltic exile and Congressional interests. 
 In the Third Interim Report, the three most important historical events studied were 
the individual countries’ declarations of independence and recognition by the international 
community; the 1940 annexation by the Soviet Union; and the 1941 deportations. Although 
the report treated each nation as an individual case study, the political agenda of the Select 
Committee necessitated drawing parallels among the three experiences.  
One of the most important acts of commemoration that were practiced by Baltic DPs 
revolved around the Summer 1941 Deportations.136 Naturally, this practice traveled with the 
DPs to wherever they settled in the western world. The three most significant 
commemorations for Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians while in exile were celebrations of 
independence days; commemoration of the July 1940 annexation and subsequent American 
non-recognition; and commemorating the June 1941 deportations.  
 When describing the events leading to the independence and international recognition 
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1918-1919, the Select Committee concluded that the 
“Relatively small armies of the three respective Baltic States, poorly equipped, but under 
determined leadership and motivated by the great inspiration of national independence, 
succeeded in defeating the large Red Russian Army.”137  The Select Committee was careful 
to demonstrate that the events that surrounded the takeover of the three countries were a 
concerted effort by the Soviet Union to exploit Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania simultaneously. 
Finally, specific attention was paid to NKVD Order #001223, calling for the destruction of 
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all elements of the population likely to resist the plans for Sovietization, climaxing with the 
13-14 June 1941 deportations that occurred in all three countries.138 
 Throughout the investigations, little attention was paid to the less positive attributes of 
the Baltic governments during the 1930s. On 5 December 1953 in New York, President 
Herbert Hoover testified before the Select Committee on the political situation in Estonia and 
Latvia when he visited the countries in 1938. Hoover stated: “The contrast was enormous 
[compared to Soviet Russia] and I should say that those three states had made more progress 
from the very low beginnings they had 19 years before than probably had ever been made by 
any series of states on record.”139  Hoover continued by stating that the three nations had 
“good governments” and “magnificent leadership.” He was most struck by Latvian President 
Kārlis Ulmanis who had long ties to the United States and had studied at the University of 
Nebraska. 
 Baltic exiles claimed that their homelands were democratic and prosperous during the 
interwar period. Chairman of IBM’s Board of Directors Thomas J. Watson bolstered this 
argument with his testimony. Watson traveled to the region in 1938 as President of the 
International Chamber of Commerce. Watson described an almost idyllic society in Latvia. 
He testified, “Everybody appeared to be happy, well-dressed, and well-fed… I found that 
they were doing an outstanding job in agriculture. They were developing industries… The 
stores all looked prosperous. We stayed at a very good hotel; everything was up to date. I had 
no occasion to complain about anything while we were in the country. The people were very 
courteous.”140 Speaking generally about the situation in Estonia and Latvia, Watson 
concluded, “They were a contented [sic] people, happy, and prosperous.”141 
                                                            
138 Ibid., 7. 
139 Hearings on H.R. 346, Day 5, Before the Select Committee to Investigate the Incorporation of the Baltic 
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140 Hearings on H.R. 346, Day 1, Before the Select Committee to Investigate the Incorporation of the Baltic 
States into the USSR, 83rd Cong. (1953) (testimony of Thomas J. Watson), 4. 166.  
141 Ibid. 170. 
 
 291 
 The Baltic peoples’ historical narrative, bolstered by the testimony of respected 
American citizens about how they perceived life in the interwar nations ultimately served the 
exiles well.  Not only was it made clear to the international community that the Baltic States 
were victims of Soviet aggression, but a viable case was made to the American public that 
there were shared values between Americans and Balts, such as an appreciation of 
independence, diligence, and spirituality.  Although the issue of Nazi collaboration would 
appear again in the late 1970s and early 1980s through accusations made primarily against 
Latvians by the U.S. Justice Department’s Immigration and Naturalization Services and 
several non-governmental activists and Jewish organizations, the predominant story of the 
Baltic States was of independent states that suffered the ultimate expression of Soviet 
aggression and genocide.142 
 The Select Committee had a very limited impact on American foreign policy during 
the 1950s.  Kersten’s activism ultimately had little impact on his career in electoral politics. 
Although Kersten remained popular with his Polish-American constituents in his district, his 
close association with the most fervent anti-Communists in the Congress made him 
politically vulnerable. Republicans in the 1954 elections lost control of the Congress 
primarily due to public dissatisfaction with McCarthyism, and Democrat Henry S. Reuss 
swept Kersten out of office.  In 1955 Kersten served as a White House Consultant on 
Psychological Warfare, but came back to Milwaukee shortly thereafter to return to his private 
law practice. The Select Committee, however, proved to be highly significant for Baltic 
Americans. Much of the historiography that addresses the controversial Liberation Policy 
during the 1950s focuses on the implications that pursuing such a policy had on American 
foreign policy, American domestic policy, and the promises not kept to the Soviet satellite 
states. Little has been written to address the significance that the policy had on groups that 
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were responsible for being willing participants in the half-hearted American attempts at 
liberating East Europe: the East European exiles.  
 Throughout the early 1950s, Balts in the United States were in a marginal position 
due to their relatively small numbers.  Though the Select Committee had a very limited 
impact on American foreign policy during the 1950s, Kersten presented them with an 
opportunity to play a central role in shaping policy. Baltic exiles were quite successful at 
navigating the policy guidelines established by individuals such as Kersten because for one 
thing, there was virtually no ideological disparity between Kersten and the Baltic exiles.  
 
Conclusion 
 The activities of Baltic exiles in the United States were not exclusively focused on 
formulating foreign policy objectives of American policymakers. Indeed, there was some 
acknowledgment that there were limits on how much impact their activities would play in 
influencing elite policymaking opinion and the limits that American policymakers would 
have on the situation in the Baltic republics. An equally important focus of Baltic political 
activism during the late 1940s and 1950s was on the broader American domestic audience. 
While the State Department maintained strict divisions between American citizens of Baltic 
descent and Baltic exiles, elected officials as well as the general public did not necessarily 
make such distinctions. As a result, Balts living in the United States worked towards 
monopolizing all information pertaining to their homelands and gradually diversified their 
contacts with American officials, namely through the United States Congress. 
 McCarthyism ultimately tempered the American appetite for engaging in virulent 
anti-communist activities, but there remained a majority of Americans who were 
ideologically sympathetic towards those who continued to hold strong anti-communist 
positions throughout the first half of the 1950s. As a result, Estonians, Latvians, and 
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Lithuanians actually had a rather understanding audience in the United States when they held 
rallies commemorating their annual days of independence, and anniversaries of the 1940 
annexation and 1941 deportations. Publications, such as the Baltic Review, ensured that 
mainstream thinking about the plight of the Baltic States continued to focus on the radical 
changes that the Soviet Union had forced upon the three former independent nations. The 
hope was that this would maintain a level of alertness in the United States to the persistent 
communist threat. Although the results were decidedly mixed, the public face of Baltic 
political activism constitutes an important component in the anti-communist fabric of the 
United States during the 1950s. 
 While Baltic exile politics abroad were predominantly characterized by a persistent 
state of dysfunction, Baltic constituents worked towards presenting a unified force against 
communism in the United States. The Baltic National Committees sponsored by the FEC 
might have been ineffective in creating a unified pan-Baltic anti-communist base throughout 
the world, but on a number of technical issues, such as the Baltic Review, they were 
successful in laying the groundwork for future pan-Baltic cooperation within the United 
States. Within each ethnic community in the United States, the politics of exile did not 
encumber the ability of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians to work within their individual 
communities on projects such as holding rallies, publishing material, and lobbying the United 
States Congress. Indeed, the only way that they were able to achieve the most minor 
influence with members of Congress was to give the impression that they were a unified 
voting bloc in congressional districts throughout the country. Participation in the Kersten 
Committee not only represented a high point in Baltic influence in the United States 
Congress, but laid the groundwork for future Baltic constituent activities. 
Nevertheless, Baltic political activism in the United States was not exclusively about 
changing the direction of American foreign policy. The most important policy concern for the 
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Baltic exiles was not about changing policy, but maintaining the American non-recognition 
policy. The political activism also created opportunities for the exiles to elevate their own 
standing in American society and eventually create a shared sense of history that transcended 
the national narratives, creating a Baltic narrative. The actions of the State Department and 
Truman and Eisenhower administrations concerning the Baltic States make it clear that in 
spite of the non-recognition policy outside pressure was crucial to maintain the policy as the 





1956 REVOLUTIONS AND REAPPRAISAL OF POLICIES 
 In April 1956, rumors began to grow within the Baltic exile community as well in 
diplomatic circles about a drastic change in Soviet policy concerning Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. Stockholms Tidnigen reported on 5 April 1956 that their sources in London 
revealed that the Kremlin had started to consider liberalizing its policy towards the Baltic 
republics and transform them into so-called People’s Republics – the equivalent of satellite 
status.1 Throughout the month various other European newspapers reported on the topic, 
culminating with the Hamburg paper, Das Ostpreussen Blatt stating: “It is a fact that the 
leading personalities of the Communist Congress in Moscow to enact the so-called 
restoration of independence to the Baltic States, as proposed by the omnipotent Politburo.”2 
 The idea of a liberalized Soviet position towards the Baltic republics provided hope 
for those who sought to reduce Cold War tensions. Such a policy would have allowed for an 
opening for Baltic nationalism after more than a decade of severe oppression that was a 
period characterized by deportations and restrictions on all facets of life. In addition this 
could provide an opportunity for other national minorities within the Soviet Union to demand 
for independence. The transformation of the Baltic republics into people’s democracies 
would have been proof positive that Khrushchev’s rhetoric of peaceful coexistence could be 
matched by actual deeds.3 
 For many Baltic exiles, however, such a change in the Kremlin’s policy towards the 
Soviet Union represented two sets of challenges. First, Baltic exiles argued that the in reality, 
a shift in the Kremlin’s policy did not demonstrably change the relationship between the 
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Baltic States and the Soviet Union, but instead would provide the Khrushchev with a major 
propaganda victory.4 Even worse, they viewed the establishment of Baltic people’s 
democracies as a way for the Soviet Union to consolidate its rule even further in Eastern 
Europe and in international organizations by strengthening the outward appearance of the 
Warsaw Pact and adding three pro-Soviet seats to the United Nations.5 Second, a 
fundamental change in the legal relationship between the Soviet Union and the Baltic 
republics would necessarily mean a reassessment in American policy towards Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania. The very real possibility of abandoning the non-recognition policy would not 
only limit the prospect of the United States assisting in the liberation of the Baltic republics, 
but would affect the standing of Baltic exiles living in the United States as well as potentially 
undermining their standing with compatriots living behind the Iron Curtain. 
The optimism in Spring 1956 about the possible liberalization of Soviet policy 
towards the Baltic States was quickly tempered by the realities surrounding the suppression 
of revolution in the satellite states in October and November 1956. The June 1956 workers’ 
riots in Poznań not only resulted in the ascension of Władysław Gomułka as First Secretary 
of the Polish Communist Party but sparked sympathy protests in Hungary that October, 
which gave way to a full-scale uprising in Hungary.6 The suppression of the Hungarian 
Revolution on 28 October 1956 not only exposed Khrushchev’s rhetoric of peaceful 
coexistence as being entirely hollow, but it immediately raised questions about the American 
inability to follow through on its policy of liberating the Soviet bloc.  
                                                            
4 The June 1956 edition of the Baltic Review featured an article that argued several points about how the change 
in the Baltic States’ status would not truly change the relationship with the Kremlin and would provide 
Khrushchev with a major propaganda victory. The article argued on the political front that “As long as the 
Baltic States are controlled by the Communist Party, they will never be free from the Kremlin’s control.” On the 
economic front, since the satellite countries are generally not permitted any economic dealings with Western 
Europe, the Baltic economies would remain oriented towards Moscow. Finally, on the social front, little would 
change in working conditions or media communications. See Baltic Review June 1956, “Kremlin Tactics in 
Converting the Baltic States into Satellites: Soviet Strategy and Tactics Since 1940.” 
5 Ibid. 15. 
6 See: Pawel Machcewicz, Rebellious Satellite: Poland 1956 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009). 
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Rumors that the Baltic republics would be transformed ultimately proved to be untrue. 
As a result, Baltic exiles were never forced to confront policy changes in the United States 
due to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania becoming people’s democracies. However, the 
aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution did create major policy questions within the State 
Department concerning the entire Soviet bloc. This chapter will examine the three main areas 
of policy discussion towards the Baltic republics after 1956. First, the continuation of the 
private-public network, where the question of whether or not the United States should 
continue to directly support Baltic exile activity became a central debate. Second, the 
importance of Baltic diplomatic missions, where a number of aging exiled diplomats 
representing nations that were becoming mere memories of the past were becoming less 
important. Third, the continuation of the non-recognition policy, where policymakers 
questioned its value since it was implicitly clear that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were not 
going to regain their independence in the foreseeable future. 
This chapter will also examine some of the reactions from prominent Baltic exiles 
within the United States and abroad. I will argue that Baltic exiles raised legitimate criticism 
with the State Department as well as other American interlocutors concerning their policy of 
building relations with certain groups of Baltic exiles. The failure to liberate Hungary 
undermined American credibility internationally and had possibly negative implications for 
the historical development of the Soviet bloc, but its biggest blowback was that it undermined 
American credibility with those that had worked the closest with the United States to bring 
about the liberation of the Soviet bloc – the Eastern European exiles. I will also argue that 
Baltic disappointment in the State Department after 1956 paved the way for the 
diversification of Baltic political activities in the 1960s and beyond.  
First, however, it is important to understand the implications that the Hungarian 
Revolution had on broader American foreign policy interests in the Soviet bloc. Not only did 
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the Hungarian Revolution temper American expectations in the region, but also raised serious 
policy debates about how best to pursue American regional interests whilst maintaining its 
values in combatting Soviet oppression. The role of the FEC in the Hungarian Revolution and 
the resulting change in policy directives is analyzed below. 
 
The Perceived Failure of Radio Free Europe and the Establishment of New Directives 
 Since November 1956, perhaps the two most important questions concerning 
American-Hungarian relations were: did RFE broadcasts urge Hungarian citizens to fight the 
Red Army? and Did RFE broadcasts promise military assistance from the West?7 A 
voluminous amount of literature has criticized the role of American broadcasts in the 
Hungarian Revolution’s descent into violence.8 While this historical debate continues, it is 
often obscured, partially due to the continued classification of documents from the period as 
well as the emotional nature of the topic.9 What is true is that the “Hungarian debacle” 
permanently changed the perception of RFE not only to the listeners and broadcasters, but 
also the policymakers who oversaw its policy directives.10 
 The FEC, CIA, State Department, Council of Europe, as well as the United Nations 
conducted reviews concerning the role of RFE broadcasting during the Hungarian Revolution. 
While, RFE was generally cleared of any wrongdoing,11 the internal FEC and State 
Department reviews were actually quite critical. The FEC’s Office of the Political Advisor 
conducted the most rigorous internal review that covered 70% of all non-news broadcasts 
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during the period. Letter grades were assigned to all broadcasts and only 171 of 308 
broadcasts received the grades “A” or “B,” while 56 programs were judged to be at the “D” 
or “F” level.12 The State Department argued that the broadcasts had not caused the uprising 
nor promised American aid, but that “over-zealous Hungarian employees of RFE” 
encouraged the revolutionaries and supplied tactical advice.13 
 Although the reorganization of the Hungarian Broadcasting Service in 1957 improved 
the quality of Hungarian broadcasts, personnel shuffles on the American side proved to be a 
detriment to the FEC. American successors were less knowledgeable about Eastern Europe 
and were less capable managers.14 Equally important was the decision by the State 
Department to reassert its control over RFE policy guidance.15 Although the State 
Department had always cleared the policy guidelines that had developed, the Office of East 
European Affairs sought to bring all RFE operations under the umbrella of the State 
Department and involve State Department officials in daily broadcasting.16 The establishment 
of the Committee on Radio Broadcasting Policy (CRBP) as an interagency organization 
consisting of the State Department, CIA, and USIA worked towards redefining RFE’s 
purpose in 1957.  
 While acknowledging that the ultimate goal was to promote freedom from 
communism, RFE’s new objectives, which were deemed more realistic, were “to foster an 
evolutionary development resulting in the weakening of Soviet controls and the progressive 
attainment of national independence.” Simultaneously, RFE sought to promote national 
communist regimes that would be able to exercise a greater degree of independent authority 
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over its own affairs.17 In an attempt to ensure that RFE would not be culpable for any future 
uprisings in the Soviet bloc, the guidance also explicitly stated that it was “neither feasible 
nor desirable that the United States run the risk of instigating either local or general hostilities 
by encouraging popular resistance.18 
 Interestingly, the CRBP sought to extricate the American aspects from RFE and 
argued that RFE would be more effective by being more European. RFE was supposed to 
broadcast information from the perspective of Europeans and in a European context, while 
the VOA was to remain the exclusive medium from broadcasting information about the 
United States. The debate over establishing an RFE European Advisory Committee, which 
had been first advocated by the Council of Europe, was yet another means of trying to 
remove the American footprint from the broadcasting. 
 Ironically, while RFE was trying to reduce American influence over its broadcasts to 
the satellite countries, the late 1950s saw the rapid increase in American influence in the 
administration of the radio. In what Johnson describes as the “Doldrums at RFE after 1956,” 
the State Department’s demand for more control over RFE was just one component of the 
general decline that the FEC suffered from until the early 1960s. Fervent anti-communists on 
the American political right criticized RFE for being too soft on communism and financial 
mismanagement.19 In addition, RFE lost a significant amount of credibility in the media and 
among anti-communist movements primarily located in Europe. 
 Before resigning as FEC President in 1958, Lt. General Willis D. Crittenberger 
drafted a letter to other members of the FEC articulating problems about the idea of the 
European Advisory Group. Crittenberger described the difficulties at the Polish Radio Desk 
where its head, Jan Nowak, threatened to walk off the job with his entire staff unless the FEC 
                                                            
17 Puddington, 118. 
18 Ibid. See Also Johnson, 123. 
19 Johnson, 126. 
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showed the willingness to discuss the status of two elder Polish exiles who were seeking 
pensions from the FEC.20 
 The Sudeten German Association of Land Groups also levied criticism against the 
idea of the European Advisory Group in a thirteen-page document entitled “American Cold 
War Propaganda in Twilight.” The pamphlet was assumed to be distributed among influential 
German politicians as well as important non-communist groups in an attempt to further 
damage the FEC’s credibility.  The Free Europe Exile Relations branch was accused of 
directly funding the National Committees and the ACEN, which are mere propaganda 
agencies and all of their members were “yes men.” The Free Europe Press was accused of 
being “made up of average writers and has done such harm by causing many arrests of 
innocent peoples in Czechoslovakia and Hungary through its methods of obtaining 
information and through the balloon operations.”21 Finally, the Free Europe University in 
Exile was an “amateurish organization which is dying out.”22 
 The period immediately following the Hungarian Revolution can be characterized as a 
period of general decline for Radio Free Europe. The realities of Hungary necessarily meant 
that the strategic goals of radio broadcasting had become more modest. The growing 
bureaucratic jostling resulted in increased staffing turnovers on the American side. An even 
greater staffing problem, however, was the necessity of replacing an aging cadre of exile 
broadcasters. Some had died and some were approaching retirement age.23 Throughout the 
1950s, Eastern European governments had become more efficient in preventing the 
emigration of dissidents and as a result the pool of qualified broadcasters became smaller at 
                                                            
20 Lt. General Willis D. Crittenberger to FEC “Opposition to European Advisory Group” on 21 April 1958 
Folder: Free Europe Committee, 1958. Box 53: Free Europe Committee Budget, CD Jackson Papers, DDEPL. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid.   
23 Puddington, 127.  
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the same time that higher standards were expected from the radios.24 By the end of the 1950s, 
there had been a growing concern among policymakers as well as exile broadcasters as to 
whether or not there was any utility in “gray” broadcasting behind the Iron Curtain. This 
fundamental question not only would impact FEC sponsored radio broadcasts, but also every 
other facets of the organization’s operations. 
 
Reassessment of FEC Exile Relations 
 In November 1958, the FEC sought to clarify its relationship with its sponsored exiles 
in a document describing the function of the European Advisory Board. The Free Europe 
Exile relations assisted exiles in three main ways. First, by promoting the interest of those in 
the free world to assist in the peaceful restoration of independence to the exiles’ home 
nations; second, by sustaining the morale of all exiles through supporting the efforts of a 
select few; third, by helping in providing information about life behind the Iron Curtain as a 
means of combatting communist influence in the free world.25 In addition, the document 
attempted to offer greater separation between the exile national committees and any notion of 
political or diplomatic recognition by the United States Government. The FEC reiterated that 
that no national committee had the status of a government-in-exile. What was new, however, 
was the assertion that “it is not the purpose of the Committee to support the ambition of any 
émigré group to restore, in any sense, the status quo ante bellum in any East European 
country.”26  
 From the perspective of the exiles that cooperated with the FEC, however there was 
an implicit acceptance that the national committees would be an important component in 
reestablishing democratic institutions in Eastern Europe after liberation had taken place. It 
                                                            
24 Ibid, 128.  
25 1 November 1958 Memo: “Proposed European Advisory Committee” Folder: Free Europe Committee, 1958. 




was significant that the FEC absolved itself from supporting national committees that would 
be used to restore governments representing the interwar period in the Soviet bloc should the 
political conditions for such a transformation become reality. It was representative of a 
changing belief that political transformation in the former Soviet bloc would consist of a 
gradual evolution as opposed to rapid revolutions or Western interventions. It was also 
representative of the FEC’s (and by default the State Department’s) interest in reducing the 
ambition of its relationship with the émigré groups in which they sponsored.27 
 The 1960 budget prepared by FEC President Archibald S. Alexander detailed the 
fundamental changes that were about to take place in the FEC’s dealing with Eastern 
European exile groups. Alexander’s number one priority was to reorient the FEC’s exile 
support. He observed that the FEC would spend over one million dollars to support the 
national committees, the ACEN and other exile groups.28 Alexander claimed that such an 
expenditure was not only beyond the budgetary capabilities of the FEC, but also was not 
essential to accomplish the FEC’s program aims. Therefore, he proposed to reduce 
expenditures by $335,000 and reorganize the structure of FEC exile relations.29 
Going forward, the FEC directed the majority of exile activities towards the ACEN to 
allow drastic cuts to be made to the budgets of individual national committees. To achieve 
this goal, four policy changes were made. First, deserving exile council members who were 
no longer able to contribute to effective work would be granted small stipends for their prior 
activities. Second, sixteen of the most effective national committee members would become 
                                                            
27 As early as 1955, American officials began to seriously reconsider whether or not the United States wanted to 
pursue revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe. NSC 5505/1 “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite 
Vulnerabilities,” passed on 31 January 1955 called for “evolutionary rather than revolutionary change” in the 
satellites. This only deepened the contradictions between stated American policy towards the satellitesin 1955-
1956 and the reality of the American position. After Hungary 1956, there were no illusions that the United 
States could rollback communist influence in Eastern Europe so policymakers could no longer justify the 
expenditures associated with Emigre national councils. 
28 27 January 1960, ‘Proposed Budget for Executive Committee and FEC Board of Directors’ Folder: Free 




delegates to the ACEN and would only receive a salary for their activities with the ACEN. 
Third, separate office space and staffs for individual committees would be eliminated and the 
remaining exiles associated with the FEC would share new office space. Fourth, support for 
individual national programs would be trimmed from $122,200 per year to $51,400 where a 
portion of the saved funds could be utilized for ad hoc publications in the future.30 
The FEC hoped that the ACEN would be a cumulatively more effective body in 
organizing the political potentials of the exiles than the individual national committees. 
Through reducing the scope of the national committees and streamlining exile efforts through 
the ACEN, officials assumed that through reassessing the relationships with certain exiles 
would increase the body’s overall quality through assessing an exile’s ability to possess 
several key attributes. Exiles were sought who had the ability to understand the problems that 
the West faced at the end of the 1950s and had the flexibility to meet new international 
conditions with new programs. Exiles should ideally have a minimal amount of stature with 
other exiles as well as diplomats, politicians, educators, and journalists. Most importantly, 
exiles should have been able to rise above the intermittent strife that had dominated exile 
politics through the entire decade.31 
The Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian national committees were not immune to the 
FEC’s restructuring of exile relations. The FEC’s 1959 operating budget for Baltic operations 
was $134,200. The proposed 1960 operating budget was reduced to $58,200, or a 56% 
reduction.32 Ironically, the already minimal activities that the Baltic National Committees had 
in relation to the FEC’s overall agenda meant that the long-term impact that the funding cuts 
had on the national committee’s future activities was decidedly mixed. On one hand, the 
number of exiles that received direct funding from the FEC was slashed. In 1959, five 
                                                            
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. For a comparison, the Albanian funding was decreased by 59%, the Bulgarian funding was decreased by 
72%, the Czechoslovak funding was decreased by 74%, the Hungarian funding was decreased by 62%, the 
Polish funding was decreased by 40%, and the Romanian funding was decreased by 65%. 
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Estonians, four Latvians, and Eight Lithuanians were directly sponsored by the FEC. The 
proposed reorganization of the national committees meant that only two Lithuanians, one 
Latvian and one Estonian would be affiliated with the ACEN. On the other hand, the Baltic 
language publications as well as the Baltic Review continued to be published into the 1960s, 
which meant that Baltic committees continued to have a level of autonomy despite the 
prominent role that the ACEN would assume. 
The revised ACEN was supposed to be a streamlined representational organization 
that consisted of a general committee and secretary general that would keep the issue of 
Eastern Europe alive in world opinion, but also keep the international community informed 
on developments in the Soviet bloc and build relations with anti-communist organizations 
internationally.33 In reality, the ACEN continued to function as it had during the post-1956 
period. Formal meetings were held regularly where declarations were made, rallies were 
organized surrounding important anniversaries, and resolutions were passed that were then 
forwarded to UN delegates.34 In the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution, the 
representative nature of the ACEN among all Eastern European nations began to decline. The 
developments within Hungary and the rehabilitation of relations between Kadar and the 
United States were naturally important developments in the region. This phenomenon was 
compounded by the fact that the most active ACEN delegates after 1956 were Hungarians.35 
                                                            
33 The General Committee would establish policy, improve existing programs, and have the ability to employ 
and dismiss the Secretary General and other officials. The Committee consisted of nine voting members, one 
from each of the nine captive nations, and one observer representing each of the four international groups 
represented (International Peasant Union, International Centre of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, Socialist Union 
of Central and Eastern Europe, and Christian Democratic Union). In an attempt to change the deliberative nature 
of the ACEN, regular plenary sessions were abolished and special plenary sessions were to be organized if 
international developments warranted. 
34 1 July 1963 Memorandum for the Record: Subject: The Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN). 
Folder: Free Europe Committee Budget, 1963. Box 53: Free Europe Committee Budget, CD Jackson Papers, 
DDEPL. 
35 An analysis of the correspondences that the ACEN participated in after 1956 in addition to the topics 
discusssed during General Committee meetings during the same period of time demonstrates that the majority of 
time was devoted to what should be done concerning Hungary going forward. In essence, issues pertaining to all 
other nationalities represented in the ACEN were squeezed out of debates and discussions. Refer to Minutes of 
General Committee Meetings, Folders: Minutes of General Commitee Meetings, 1957; Minutes of General 
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Throughout the ACEN’s existence, its relationship with Estonian, Latvian, and 
Lithuanian exiles had always been contentious. Due to the relatively small number of Baltic 
exiles compared to larger nationalities such as the Poles, Hungarians and Czechoslovaks and 
the importance that the FEC placed on satellite countries, issues that were directly related to 
the Baltic republics were simply crowded out. The fact that ACEN delegates had 
predominantly been leading diplomats and politicians of Eastern European governments 
during the interwar period gave a certain amount of legitimacy for the satellite nations, but 
was seen as a potential liability for the Baltic republics as it related to the non-recognition 
policy. The preeminent position that Hungary played after 1956 further diminished the 
importance of the Baltic issue within the ACEN and resulted in the Baltic national 
committees continuing their comparatively small activities under the FEC’s umbrella. 
The consolidation of exile activities by the FEC represented one component of a 
broader American policy to reassess the various covert relations that developed during the 
late 1940s and 1950s between American officials and exile organizations. The growing 
concerns of communists engaging in subversive activities against the VLIK in 1955, in 
addition to the inability of the Lithuanian Diplomatic Corps and the VLIK to reconcile their 
differences resulted in a reappraisal of the wisdom in continuing to support the Lithuanian 
exile organization financially. Throughout the spring of 1955, the State Department, CIA, 
and VLIK members held discussions about the possibility of transferring the organization 
from Reutlingen, Germany to the United States.36 
The official rationale for the transfer of VLIK from Germany to the United States was 
presented to Vedeler on 9 March 1955 in a meeting with a VLIK delegation that had visited 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Committee Meetings, 1958; Box 61 & FEC Correspondence Folders 1956-1961, Box 3 Assembly of Captive 
European Nations Collection IHRC. 
36 References to meetings with the CIA are noted on documents related to various meetings between the State 
Department’s Baltic desk and Lithuanian diplomats. “Folder: Li801.1 Emigre Organizations”  Records Relating 
to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 10, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the 
Department of State, NAII. 
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the United States. The delegates argued that due to pressure in the United States that all 
Lithuanian activities towards the liberation of Lithuania should take place in America. They 
continued by noting that the “intellectual competence among the Lithuanian exiles is 
concentrated in the United States” and that the “atmosphere in Europe is not considered so 
favorable as that in the United States to useful activity on behalf of the liberation of 
Lithuania.”37 Despite some of the arguments that could be used to oppose such a transfer, 
such as that there was already a sufficient organizational structure for the liberation of 
Lithuania through the Free Lithuanian Committee and the ALT, all interested parties agreed 
that a move to the United States was the best situation going forward. 
In May 1955, VLIK made the decision to begin the moving process to New York.38 
There was considerable expense involved in the move and the organization would enter into a 
transitional phase where three members of the VLIK Executive Council would remain in 
Europe.39 During the process, however, the VLIK underwent a transformation from 
exclusively an exile organization that sought to liberate its homeland to a small but important 
constituent organization in the United States. The beginning of this transformation occurred 
at the VLIK’s annual meeting in New York from 24-27 November 1955. During the meeting 
it was agreed that the Committee, which had formerly been composed of only Lithuanian 
citizens, should also allow Americans of Lithuanian descent to serve as members of the 
Committee.40 
                                                            
37 Memorandum of Conversation, “The Question of the Transfer of VLIK to the US” on 9 March 1955 “Folder: 
Li801.1 Emigre Organizations”  Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 10, RG 59, Stack Area 
150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
38 Memorandum of Conversation, Žadeikis and Vedeler on “Transfer of VLIK Committee from Germany”  27 
May 1955 “Folder: Li801.1 Emigre Organizations”  Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 10, 
RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Povilas Žadeikis to Howard Trivers (Baltic Desk) 5 December 1955 “Folder: Li801.1 Emigre Organizations”  
Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 10, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, 
Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
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Although the transfer reduced the Lithuanian exile presence in Central Europe 
considerably, it served to strengthen the political cohesiveness of Lithuanians residing in the 
United States. VLIK did play an important role in maintaining contacts with Lithuanian 
partisan figures during the 1940s and the early 1950s, but as time went on, its self-appointed 
position as the central exile organization for Lithuanians became a divisive issue in 
Lithuanian politics. Over time, the VLIK’s political agenda diminished and the organization 
began to build better relationships with the other Lithuanian organizations as well as the 
exiled diplomatic missions. Ultimately, a powerful Lithuanian presence in the United States 
would be a more important political development than a diverse political diaspora scattered 
throughout the West. 
 
The Fate of the Non-Recognition Policy 
 During the 1940s and first half of the 1950s, the non-recognition policy was the non-
negotiable component of American policy towards the Baltic republics. It helped to frame all 
policy concerns towards the Baltic republics ranging from whether or not to accept Soviet 
officials who originated from the Baltic republics to deciding how and what kind of 
psychological warfare would be deployed against the Baltic republics. The non-recognition 
policy also served as a powerful reminder to the international community that the United 
States was rhetorically opposed to Soviet territorial aggression. It also served as a rallying 
call for all Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian exiles who sought American assistance in 
liberating their homelands. The events of 1956 offered American policymakers perhaps the 
first real opportunity to assess the centrality of the non-recognition policy to American 
interests in the Baltic region. 
 Based on available State Department and Eisenhower Administration material, 
however, there were never any serious discussions within the John Foster Dulles’ State 
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Department or the White House about abandoning the non-recognition policy. While there 
was certainly bureaucratic inertia behind the non-recognition policy within the State 
Department, it is very likely that the decision not to question the policy came directly from 
Secretary Dulles. On 2 February 1956, Thomas A. Donovan, a State Department official in 
the Office of Eastern European affairs had a telephone conversation with Representative Don 
Hayworth (D-MI) about the status of Latvian blocked assets in the United States. Over the 
course of the conversation, Hayworth asked “How long will the funds be blocked?” Donovan 
responded, “For the foreseeable future. The policy not to recognize the Soviet seizure of the 
countries… was made when Mr. Hull was Secretary of State, and had been continued by later 
Secretaries.” He added “Since non-recognition of the Soviet claims in the Baltic was of 
personal interest to Secretary Dulles, I saw no likelihood that the policy would be modified in 
the present conditions.”41 
 Indeed, as early as January 1957, Eisenhower and Dulles continued to use the 
incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union as an important 
rhetorical tool in describing the nature of the Soviet Union to the American public. During 
Eisenhower’s address before Congress on 5 January 1957 where he sought congressional 
authorization to use the United States military to protect the sovereignty of Middle Eastern 
nations and declared that force would not be used for any aggressive purposes, the President 
explicitly mentioned the Baltic republics: 
Remember Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania! In 1939 the Soviet Union entered into 
mutual assistance pacts with these then independent countries; and the Soviet foreign 
minister, addressing the Extraordinary Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet in October 
1939, solemnly and publicly declared that “we stand for the scrupulous and 
punctilious observance of the pacts on the basis of complete reciprocity, and we 
declare that all of the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the Baltic countries 
                                                            
41 2 February 1956, Memorandum of Conversation, “Talk with Representative Haworth of Michigan about U.S. 
Policy on Latvian Assets in the United States.” Representative Hayworth and Thomas A. Donovan. Central 
Decimal File, 1955-1959, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, 611.60C221/2-258. Dulles was not just 
instrumental in the 1952 Republican Platform, which explicitly mentioned the Baltic States incorporation into 
the Soviet Union, but rhetorically used the non-recognition policy on numerous occasions during Eisenhower’s 
first term. See Kersten Committee Testimony. 
 
 310 
is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs.” 
Yes in 1940, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet 
Union.42 
 
Although the State Department was largely responsible for drafting Eisenhower’s speech, the 
fact that Eisenhower and Dulles did meet on two separate occasions to discuss the speech’s 
content and the equal role that the Soviet crackdown in Hungary played in the speech, 
suggests that the continuation of the non-recognition policy emanated from the Secretary of 
State’s office.43 
 An important component of implementing the non-recognition policy was issuing 
statements commemorating the national anniversaries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. By 
1955, the number of constituent and exile requests for letters clarifying American policy on 
the national holidays and the deportation anniversaries resulted in the Baltic Desk deciding 
that separate letters to the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian were becoming too time 
consuming and a poor utilization of resources.44 During the annual review process in January 
1957 about letters of congratulations to not only the exiled diplomats but to Baltic 
organizations, State Department officials acknowledged the sensitivity of the issue given 
events of the preceding year. Elbrick of the Office of European Affairs wrote to Dulles 
stating “A number of American citizens of Baltic origin have expressed concerns to the 
Department… They feared that the U.S. might be losing interest in the fate of the Baltic 
peoples. The omission of an anniversary statement this year could, therefore, give rise to 
undesirable and unwarranted speculation as to a possible change in our long-standing policy 
                                                            
42 Dwight D. Eisenhower Address Before Congress on 5 June 1957. 
43 Eisenhower placed the Hungarian crackdown in the context of the role of the United Nations to protect the 
rights of small nations. According to records in the Speech Series of the John Foster Dulles papers, there were 
thirteen drafts of the 5 January speech and the Baltic States are first references in the third draft on 22 December 
1956. This suggests that it was decided early on in the drafting process that reference to the Baltic republics 
should be included. See: Draft Presidential Correspondence and Speech Series of the John Foster Dulles Papers 
and White House Memoranda Series of the John Foster Dulles Papers, DDEPL. 
44 7 February 1955, Barbour (EUR) to Secretary Dulles “Proposed Statement on the Thirty-Seventh 
Anniversary of the Declarations of Lithuanian, Estonian, and Latvian Independence” “Folder: B815 Holidays, 
Anniversaries and Charities”  Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 2, RG 59, Stack Area 150, 
Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
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on this subject.”45 In the aftermath of the Hungarian Uprising, the State Department honored 
the Balts “continuing courageous determination to regain their national rights of which they 
have been so cruelly and unjustly deprived.”46 
 The continued use of the Baltic States by senior American officials to describe the 
nature of Soviet foreign policy and the decision to send congratulations letters to 
commemorate the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian declarations of independence 
demonstrated that the United States still wished to maintain the non-recognition policy in 
principle, but these acts did not clarify what continued non-recognition would mean for other 
aspects of American policy towards the Soviet Union. NSC 5811: “United States Policy 
toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations of Eastern Europe” in May 1958 clarified the 
implications of the non-recognition policy for broader policy concerns.  
 An appendix to NSC 5811 described the special policy considerations that officials 
should consider when faced with a policy intrinsically linked to Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania. 
First, the United States should continue its policy of non-recognition towards the Soviet 
annexation and maintain diplomatic relations with the exiled missions that were established 
in Washington and New York by the last free governments of the Baltic States.47 Second, 
the document outlined what constituted contacts with the Baltic States.48 The non-recognition 
policy still precluded American contacts of an official nature with the Baltic republics, but 
endorsed the idea that the non-recognition policy should not inhibit the travel of American 
                                                            
45 25 January 1957, Elbrick to John Foster Dulles “Proposed Statement on the Thirty-Ninth Anniversary of the 
Declarations of Lithuania, Estonian, and Latvian independence. “Folder: B815 Holidays, Anniversaries and 
Charities”  Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 2, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, 
Compartment 25, Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
46 John Foster Dulles Statement of the Thirty-Ninth Anniversary of the Declarations of Lithuanian, Estonian, 
and Latvian Independence” 26 January 1957. “Folder: B815 Holidays, Anniversaries and Charities”  Records 
Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 3, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of 
the Department of State, NAII. 
47 NSC 5811 Appendix, Page 2. Baltic States “Folder: B890.2 Policy” Records Relating to the Baltic States, 
1940-1961. Box 2, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department of State, 
NAII. 
48 A major component of the non-recognition policy during the 1940s and the 1950s was that the United States 
would establish zero contacts within or around the Soviet occupied Baltic republics. 
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citizens to the Baltic States as a tourist or other personal reasons, such as holiday or religious 
groups.49 Within the broader context of American policy towards Eastern Europe where 
cultural exchanges were becoming more important, the contact between private American 
citizens and Baltic citizens was seen as a reasonable compromise between the exclusionary 
nature of the non-recognition policy and the desire to expand American culture into the 
Soviet Union.50 
 NSC 5811 also clarified American broadcasting policies towards the Baltic republics 
in a manner that reflected the changing role of Radio Free Europe as well as Voice of 
America to the United States. The NSC argued that the United States should encourage the 
circulation of any American informational media in the Baltic States and that broadcasts 
should be designed to maintain an interest among Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians in 
developments in the free world generally, and in the United States specifically.51 In addition, 
American sponsored broadcasts should “avoid making public statements which could 
reasonably be interpreted as inciting the Baltic peoples to open revolt or indicating that this 
country is prepared to resort to force to eliminate Soviet domination.”52 Exiled leaders should 
be discouraged from using American broadcasting facilities to reduce the chance that such 
public statements are broadcast.53 
 Finally, the document codified the use of the non-recognition policy by American 
officials in both the domestic and international arenas. The NSC confirmed that the United 
States government should reiterate its policy towards the Baltic republics publicly on 
appropriate occasions. Such statements were important since they were thought to boost the 
                                                            
49 NSC 5811 Appendix, Page 3. “Folder: B890.2 Policy” Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-1961. Box 
2, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
50 For a detailed analysis of cultural exchanges and interactions in the Soviet bloc see: Richmond Yale, 
Practicing Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Odyssey (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 42-127. 
51 NSC 5811 Appendix, Page 3: “Folder: B890.1 Basic Studies” Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940-
1961. Box 2, RG 59, Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25, Records of the Department of State, NAII. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. The one exception was that the accredited exiled diplomats should be allowed to send messages on 
anniversaries or other special occasions. 
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morale to Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians around the world and they demonstrated that 
the United States did not condone aggression against smaller nations.54 American officials 
were also encouraged to use the record of Soviet relations with the Baltic republics as an 
example “illustrating the readiness of the Soviets to disregard clear objections under existing 
treaties where such action appears to serve their purposes.”55 
 Although there were small changes made in defining the content of contacts with the 
Baltic republics and how American broadcasts in the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian 
languages were to be presented, the broad changes made to American policy towards Eastern 
Europe after 1956 did not change policy towards the Baltic republics substantively. So long 
as the non-recognition policy remained useful to American foreign policy interests in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union its continuation was secure. The recognition that change was 
not envisaged in the region, however, reduced the ability of the United States to promote the 
expansion of a non-recognition doctrine internationally. 
 
Reducing Diplomatic Missions Abroad 
From the beginning of the non-recognition policy, the State Department supported the 
aspirations of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian diplomats who lived in the Free World to 
continue their work. The release of blocked funds to finance Baltic diplomatic missions in 
Western Europe and throughout the Western hemisphere was perceived to serve American 
interests in the areas that the missions served. During World War II, the missions were 
important to curtail the influence of Nazi Germany in South America. During the early Cold 
War, the missions provided psychological warfare benefits by promoting anti-communist 
attitudes and the greater the number of Baltic missions internationally, the more viable was 
American non-recognition policy viewed.  
                                                            




By the late 1950s, it became apparent to the State Department that exile Baltic 
diplomatic activity financed by frozen Baltic friends would have to be streamlined. Although 
the investment of frozen assets helped in allowing Baltic missions to remain fiscally solvent 
through the 1950s, Estonian and Lithuanian expenses were exceeding the interest earned on 
the principal.56 The American government emphasized that the Baltic diplomatic missions in 
Washington and New York were self-financed. The necessity to use American government 
funds to support the Baltic diplomatic missions would have severely undermined the entire 
non-recognition policy. As a result, the State Department began to look for ways to 
drastically cut the annual budgets of the missions. Simultaneously, there were demographic 
and political problems that plagued certain missions abroad. Nearly twenty years after the 
annexation of the Baltic States, many of the exiled diplomats were aging and there were very 
few viable replacements for elderly diplomats. The governments where many Baltic 
diplomatic missions functioned also began reassessing the value of accrediting Baltic 
missions in their country. 
In 1959, the British disclosed to the Americans that the British government provided 
12,500 pounds sterling per year from “secret funds” to maintain the Estonian, Latvian, and 
Lithuanian missions in London.57 Due to austerity measures in the United Kingdom, the 
British foreign office made the decision to withdraw the subsidy. The meeting with the 
Americans was to inquire whether the Americans felt whether it would be more “humane” to 
tell the diplomats that upon their death the funding would cease or take a more gradual 
                                                            
56 Information from 1959 allows us to evaluate the success of the investment plans in preserving the principal of 
the funds. In preparing the 1960 budgets, Estonian assets were figured at $551,921; Latvian assets at $8,06 
million, and Lithuanian assets at $1,833 million. The invested assets were earning $19,454 for the Estonians, 
$136,375, and $45,878 for the Lithuanians. As a result, the net drain on Estonian assets was $47,536, $6,200 for 
the Latvians, and $90,979 for the Lithuanians. See: 4 December 1959 East Europe Memorandum for State Files 
“Level of Baltic States Deposits in Federal Reserve Bank” “Folder: B402 Annual Budgets” Records Relating to 
the Baltic States 1940-1961. Box 1 RG 59 Stack Area 150, Row 69, Compartment 25,  NAII. 
57 Memorandum of Conversation “Elimination of British Subsidy for Maintenance of Baltic States 
Representation in London” 19 January 1960” “Folder: B702 Recognition” Records Relating to the Baltic States, 




approach to winding down the Baltic missions in London.58 Although American officials 
were concerned about upsetting the Baltic diasporas, their primary concern was whether or 
not the United States would be forced to incorporate the Baltic missions in the United 
Kingdom in the annual budgets that the State and Treasury Departments approved for the 
Baltic missions in the United States.59  
The challenge of adding the missions in the United Kingdom to the Baltic budgets 
was exacerbated by rumors that the Baltic diplomats were contemplating their presence in 
Latin America. Anticipating that the Baltic diplomats were seeking to expand their presence 
throughout Latin America in their 1960 budgets, in October 1959, the State Department 
initiated a detailed study of the overall effectiveness of the Baltic diplomatic missions to date, 
and the advisability and possibility of encouraging additional Baltic representatives in the 
region. There were naturally some very important political considerations that had to be 
accounted for, such as the willingness of Latin American nations to accept official 
representatives of the interwar Baltic Republics.  
Despite these considerations, there were some more fundamental factors directly 
related to the activities of the Baltic representatives, resulting in the conclusion that “while 
additional Baltic States representation could be of some advantage in Latin American 
countries, past experience would indicate that this advantage would be very moderate and 
would require ideal circumstances which would be hard to find.”60 What precisely was the 
advantage desired? According to the American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro: “the embassy 
doubts that the present diplomatic representatives in Rio de Janeiro exercise considerable 
influence in combating the spread of Communist influence in Brazil.”61 
                                                            
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Henderson from Kohler to Henderson, 13 October 1959 “Question of Encouraging Additional Baltic States 
Representation in Latin America “Folder: B403 Annual Budget” Records Relating to the Baltic States 1940-




Such problems were not just limited to the Baltic diplomats in Brazil. Of the eighteen 
missions that were funded from frozen assets under American custodianship, only half were 
actively conducting consular duties, and were moderately participating in political, cultural, 
and social activities. The American embassy in Montevideo stated that although the 
representative in Uruguay was important in demonstrating the Uruguayan government’s 
attitude towards the Soviet Union, the Baltic representation was seen of being “of very minor 
value.”62 
There are three main reasons for the growing ineffectiveness of Baltic diplomatic 
missions to the United States. First, the passing of time had a dramatic effect on the ability of 
missions to play an active role. During the late 1940s and early 1950s as there existed a large 
number of individuals carrying Baltic passports that needed consular assistance in Europe as 
displaced persons and latter in settling in Western nations. By 1960, it was harder to justify 
their continued existence and the diplomats assumed a more symbolic role. Inherently related 
was the age of the Baltic diplomats. In the U.S. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro’s assessment of 
the Lithuanian Chargé’s effectiveness, the memo stated: “that he is ill and lives in a resort at 
a considerable distance from the city.”63 
Of course it would have been easy to locate within the vast Baltic community 
qualified people to serve as honorary consular representatives. The preference, however, was 
to select individuals that served as representatives of the prewar governments as they would 
have an “air of legitimacy.”64 The purpose of increasing the number of Baltic diplomats was 
to promote anti-Communist interests, that would be defeated if there was a “a person in 
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failing health who spends most of his time in seclusion in the countryside.”65 Further, the 
legitimacy of missions was based on the use of frozen Baltic funds. It was calculated that a 
full-time diplomatic post would cost $8,000-$10,000 per year.66  At this rate, it was 
determined that Estonian and Lithuanian funds in 1960, at present annual spending would be 
exhausted within fifteen years. Such a situation would force the “U.S. government to be faced 
with the choice of permitting Estonian and Lithuanian posts throughout the world to close, or 
financing their continued operation with U.S. funds.”67 
Finally, the expansion of the operation of unofficial organizations, such as the ACEN 
and local Baltic organizations proved to be more effective in combating communism. Before 
unofficial organizations of recent East European immigrants could be created, the network of 
Baltic diplomats had been particularly useful in demonstrating Soviet aggression. When 
projecting this attitude forward, the State Department stated: 
It must be kept in mind, however, that the above functions can also be performed by 
unofficial organizations of Baltic States nationals, in regions where a Baltic 
community exists, and by international bodies such as ACEN. Experience in the U.S. 
and abroad suggests that the officers of these Baltic societies are more active than 
local Baltic States diplomatic and consular representatives in promoting various anti-
Communist national causes.68  
 
As a result, the 1960 approved budgets did not include expanded Baltic missions to Latin 
America. 
Even if the State Department had approved the expansion of more Baltic missions 
throughout Latin America, political changes in the early 1960s throughout the region altered 
the diplomatic landscape that had permitted them to continue functioning during the 1950s. 
Nowhere was this more pronounced than in Brazil during the short but eventful presidency of 
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Janio da Silva Quadros (January-August 1961).69 As a result of establishing diplomatic 
relations with both Fidel Castro’s Cuba and the Soviet Union after assuming the presidency, 
the Brazilian Foreign Minister Afonso Arinos was instructed to inform the Latvian and 
Lithuanian legations as well as the Estonian consul that official relations between the 
Republic of Brazil and the Baltic diplomatic missions were being severed. On 11 March 1961, 
Arinos had memoranda delivered to the Baltic diplomats stating: “I have the honor to inform 
you that the Brazilian Government has today decided to terminate its relations with the 
legations. Under these circumstances, the Brazilian government will not recognize the official 
activities of the Legations of Lithuania, Estonia, or Latvia.”70 Although the Brazilians 
permitted the diplomats to continue residing in Brazil, it was a major blow to the viability of 
Baltic diplomatic missions in the region.71 
 On 4 April 1961, Baltic constituents throughout the United States asked the State 
Department whether or not there was some sort of pressure that the United States was willing 
to apply to the Brazilian government over their new position towards the Baltic missions.72 
Following the State Department being informed about the situation, the American 
Ambassador in Brazil met with Arinos to reiterate the American position towards the Baltic 
republics and to stress that the “United States strongly favors the continuation of diplomatic 
relations with the representatives of the Baltic nations by all the governments of the Free 
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World.”73 The State Department sympathized with Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians 
living in the United States over the situation, but made it clear that the “withdrawal or 
maintenance of diplomatic recognition by Brazil is a matter of sovereignty of that 
government.”74 
 The unwillingness of the United States to apply pressure upon the Brazilian 
government over the loss of several Baltic diplomatic missions is representative of the 
attitude that the State Department had towards exiled diplomats at the beginning of the 1960s. 
From 1940 until 1960, Baltic diplomatic missions operating in any country that was willing 
to allow them to continue functioning were an international expression against Soviet 
aggression against small nation states. By the end of the 1950s, American ambitions on 
promoting Baltic missions had been reduced to the point where there was general 
acknowledgement that they were important only so in so far as they allowed the United States 
some semblance of legitimacy in maintaining the non-recognition policy. As the Cold War 
assumed more global dynamics and Baltic independence was not seen on the horizon, the 
limited funds frozen in the United States were to be used exclusively to maintain the 
Lithuanian and Latvian legations in Washington and the Estonian Consulate General in New 
York. Simply, the political and financial burdens of expanding Baltic missions in the Western 
hemisphere or Europe were more than the State Department was willing to carry. 
 
Conclusion 
 In 1948, senior American policymakers and the thousands of Eastern European exiles 
who fled from their homelands shared a vision of the future where Soviet hegemony in the 
people’s republics had ended, the Baltic republics would be allowed to reassert their 
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independence, and the Soviet Union would become a more pluralistic society. For American 
officials in the State Department and the CIA, the exiles constituted a unique weapon in not 
only trying to cause disturbances within the Soviet bloc, but were also a useful political 
resource to curtail Soviet sympathies in the West. For the Eastern European exiles, the United 
States was the one nation that had the political, economic, and military tools capable of 
liberating their homelands.  
 The State-Private Network that established American sponsored psychological 
warfare activities against Eastern Europe; promoted exiled organizations abroad that did not 
quite constitute exile governments; and significantly added to anti-communist sentiment at 
home and abroad was symptomatic of the symbiotic relationship that developed between 
Eastern European exiles and the United States. The covert nature of many programs 
exacerbated tensions within exiled diasporas, as various exile organizations began competing 
with each other over access to important American financing. The concept of plausible 
deniability prevented American officials from issuing clear policy directives for the exile 
organizations that they sponsored, which allowed exile organizations greater latitude in 
pursuing their own agenda.   Finally, there was no realistic policy about how Soviet 
hegemony in Eastern Europe was supposed to end. 
 After the Soviet Union obtained the atomic bomb, it became the basic policy of the 
United States to avoid a direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Simply, a 
nuclear war between the two superpowers was unimaginable. Short of war, there were very 
few ways that policymakers or exiles who could realistically believe that political change in 
Eastern Europe could be reached in the 1950s. Those that believed that American 
psychological warfare and anti-communist rhetoric would facilitate significant political 
change overestimated the ability of the United States to control events in the region and 
underestimated the Soviet Union’s willingness to intervene militarily to suppress uprisings in 
 
 321 
its sphere of influence. Both the American and Soviet responses to the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution clarified their attitudes towards the region. The Soviet Union refused to tolerate 
radical political change within its sphere of influence and the United States refused to 
intervene in the affairs of a satellite country. As a result, it was unrealistic to believe that the 
relationship between the exiles and their American contacts would continue unchanged. 
Candid assessments by Baltic exiles about the American government and American officials 
about their sponsored exile organizations shed light on the mutual dissatisfaction with the 
status quo. 
 As early as 1955, Estonian exiles began criticizing the way that the State Department 
handled their relationship with the broad spectrum of Estonian exiles around the world. In 
May, Aleksander Warma, a leading member of the ERN wrote to the State Department 
reflecting on the tumultuous relationship that had been ongoing between Estonian groups in 
Sweden and the State Department. Warma expresses a sense of having great difficulties 
understanding why the United States had such a negative attitude about organizations like the 
ERN that had “activized [sic] great masses of anti-Communist refugees inciting them to do 
incessant national and political activities and that their local sections and hundreds of other 
organizations work at preserving their national culture and traditions, which ought to be of 
great importance for the future liberation of these countries and the reintroduction of 
democratic traditions and free cultural forms.”75 
Warma levied criticism against the American decision to establish organizations of its 
own, where refugees were on American government payrolls. He argued, “exiles employed in 
these organizations are estranged from and lose contact with the political organization of their 
exile countrymen.”76 He also pointed on the contradiction that most of the American support, 
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provided to émigré groups, has been to organizations that had been largely based in the 
United States. Refugee organizations in Europe were closer to their homelands and had 
“incomparably” better resources to collect valuable information and data and to inject 
information and material into the Soviet Union. The only stated drawback of the 
organizations in Europe, particularly Sweden, was that in official foreign policy circles, it 
was not desirable to have exile activities happen in their country. Warma warned that it was 
very possible that the European organizations that had been successful at organizing 
thousands of people would eventually disintegrate and from his view on American foreign 
policy – “this would mean a loss of tens of thousands of voluntary allies, helpmates, and 
practical anti-Communist fighters whose organized force would disperse and tire when their 
central organizations ceased to exist.”77 
Warma concluded by offering a positive agenda for the Americans to develop 
relations with the exiles. He argued that the American State Department should propose a 
package that would be similar to the Marshall Aid for European reconstruction after World 
War II. He suggested that there was no need for the American officials to dictate to exiles 
exactly what should be accomplished, just as American officials did not carry out the entire 
reconstruction of Western Europe. In summary, Warma made the point that “this was left 
entirely to their own creative power and administrations of the concerned countries… Would 
it not be right and natural to employ the same tactics regarding the exiles?”78 
 It was unrealistic for Warma to think that the United States would put together a large 
aid package for exile organizations in a manner similar to Marshall Aid money for Western 
European nations, but his criticism does provide insight into ways that prominent exile 
organizations that lacked American sponsorship viewed the State Department, FEC, or CIA. 
The ERN was just as anti-communist as any other Estonian exile organization and 





represented a large number of prominent Estonians in the country with the largest community 
of exiled Estonians. Yet, because of limited American resources and contacts with Estonians 
in the United States who did enjoy good relations with the ERN, the ERN never had the 
possibility of earning American support. 
 During negotiations over the 1964 ACEN budgets, the FEC assessed the work that the 
ACEN had accomplished since the FEC’s restructuring of exile relations. FEC officials 
criticized the attitude that many of the ACEN delegates had over the years. They claimed that 
the ACEN had become “a residual symbol of East European opposition to Communist 
domination, but there is very little to indicate that it is widely known or highly regarded in 
Eastern Europe itself.”79 On the ability of the ACEN to maintain high quality exiles: 
Since ACEN’s membership is made up of men who last served as ministers, 
diplomats and officials in their own countries between ten and twenty – in some cases 
every twenty-five years ago, it is a group which has an unavoidable orientation 
toward the past. Since the group has not been refreshed by new membership (and is 
unlikely to be to any significant extent) it will, over time, inevitably decline. It is thus 
not an asset which can be maintained indefinitely.80 
 
Finally, on the usefulness of the ACEN’s propaganda, they argued that “ACEN tends to harp 
on the past and to concentrate on negative themes. Much of what it says adds up merely to 
the assertion that Communism is bad.”81 
 The fact that the ACEN continued to pursue the same agenda that they had before 
1956 and the general acceptance by American officials that its utility was fading 
demonstrates the asymmetry in the relationship. For the United States, the political situation 
in East Europe was a serious foreign policy problem only so far that it provided a buffer to 
the Soviet Union and posed a security threat to American interests in Western Europe. During 
the 1950s, while the Cold War’s central argument was over the postwar situation in Europe, 
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Eastern Europe also became an important symbol that outlined Soviet aggression. For the 
exiles, changing the political status of their homelands so that they could return and assume 
their old political positions was their central motivating factor during the 1950s. 
 While the failure to liberate Eastern Europe was a small blow to American prestige 
and gradually undermined American credibility among those behind the Iron Curtain who 
thought the United States might liberate them, the exiles that had cast their lot with the 
Americans during the 1950s suffered the hardest blow from the hollowness of American 
liberation rhetoric. Not only had they placed their faith in American willingness to help 
liberate their homelands, but they devoted their careers and potential credibility with their 
peers by being willing partners in the State-Private network. The continued Soviet presence 
in Eastern Europe after 1956 did not demonstrably change the lives of East Europeans, the 
American public, or American policymakers. However, it did force Eastern European exiles 
who believed that they would be returning home sooner, rather than later, to face the fact that 
they may never be able to return home and that some level of assimilation into American 
culture should occur. 
By the end of the 1950s, the major source of misinterpretation in the American-Baltic 
relationship was a sense of rigidity in the main objectives of American diplomats as well as 
Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian exiles. Any policy that could be conceivably related to the 
Baltic republics were judged not on their merits, but on how they could impact the non-
recognition policy. The most important aspect of American dealings with Baltic exiles was 
that no decision could undermine the non-recognition policy. For the Baltic exiles, the search 
for political continuity with interwar Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian governments framed 
virtually every argument that they made in attempting to cooperate with the Americans. This 
dynamic caused significant tensions between the would-be partners. 
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 The non-recognition policy provided American politicians an easy to understand and 
powerful symbol to use when describing the virtues of the United States and the destructive 
nature of the Soviet Union. The policy also provided Baltic exiled diplomat the tools 
necessary to continue their work. In retrospect, the non-recognition policy provided Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania the legal and political arguments to claim that the Soviet annexation 
was illegal once they had reclaimed their independence in 1991.82 However, during the late 
1940s and 1950s, the non-recognition policy, by its very nature, was an exclusionary policy.  
Although the State Department and the FEC argued that budgetary constraints 
prohibited Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian involvement in RFE broadcasts, the non-
recognition policy provided the political cover for the State Department to exclude Baltic 
exiles from utilizing all tools at the FEC’s disposal. Contacts with Estonian, Latvian, and 
Lithuanian exile organizations that might have been useful proxies to engage in 
psychological warfare in Europe were shunned since there was the threat that a government-
in-exile might undermine the non-recognition policy. Indeed, close relations with unofficial 
exiles were limited because of the non-recognition policy. Finally, the non-recognition policy 
contributed to isolating the Baltic republics in the international community during the 1950s. 
While the Soviet Union significantly reduced contacts with the Baltic republics during the 
1950s, the official policy of disallowing any contacts between Americans and Balts amplified 
the occupied republics’ segregation from the rest of the world. 
Meanwhile, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian exiles were at least successful in 
establishing a level of political continuity between the interwar republics and prominent exile 
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organizations during the early Cold War. Although the Estonian exile governments failed to 
garner the recognition of the international community, the existence of the government 
allowed both the political discussions and the conflicts between Estonians residing in exile to 
continue throughout the Cold War. Latvian and Lithuanian political traditions were kept alive, 
most notably through the existence of the VLIK and (insert Latvian exile organization in 
Europe). The continued accreditation of Baltic diplomats provided a clear case of diplomatic 
continuity to the interwar republics. 
The quest for political continuity, however, undermined the ability of Baltic exiles to 
work effectively with the Americans. The insistence that broadcasting over VOA would 
undermine the political legitimacy of the exiles and the continued push for Baltic language 
RFE broadcasts frayed relations with Americans and eventually constricted their ability to 
reestablish communication lines with their home countries. The issue of establishing 
governments-in-exile provided the State Department the pretext to ignore the political 
demands of important exile organizations outside the United States. Finally, the concept of 
political continuity meant that the exiles generally refused to try to establish traditional 
contacts with their occupied homelands. Denying the legitimacy of the Soviet government 
was essential to upholding the exile’s political legitimacy and any contacts that could be 
misconstrued as providing legitimacy to the Soviet government were avoided. 
Political continuity also inhibited cooperation among the three Baltic diasporas while 
in exile. American policymakers viewed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as a bloc of nations 
that had the same historical background; shared the same political position in the Soviet 
Union; and all three shared the non-recognition policy. To an extent, the State Department 
hoped that the three exiled diasporas would be willing to work together to fight towards the 
liberation of their homeland. In reality, most Baltic exiles were primarily concerned with 
fighting their own political battles rather than engaging with the other two exiled nations. The 
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only success of deep Baltic cooperation during this period was the cooperation among the 
three FEC sponsored committees, best exemplified by the reestablishment of the Baltic 
Review. 
If the ultimate goal of Baltic exiles and the United States was to work towards the 
eventual liberation of Eastern Europe, neither the non-recognition policy nor the quest for 
political continuity were successful. Although both issues helped to frame the Baltic question 
during the early Cold War, contacts between those who exclusively defined themselves as 
exiles had exceptionally marginal contacts with the United States. Baltic émigrés who were 
able to maintain a semblance of legitimacy within their diasporas while being able to present 
themselves as American constituents had a far greater ability to frame American policy 
questions towards Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
Unlike the ERN and the VLIK who were refused meetings with American centers of 
political power because they were exiled organizations pursuing the establishment of 
governments-in-exile, American based organizations, such as the ALT, ALA, and ENC were 
regularly granted audiences with senior State Department officials and occasionally with the 
President of the United States. Members of Congress viewed such organizations as important 
constituent groups, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest. The major distinction was that 
American citizenship was an important factor for American policymakers in deciding 
whether or not to grant an audience with an organization. The ability to vote was also an 
important attribute for Members of Congress who sought patronage with Estonians, Latvians, 
and Lithuanians. The naturalization of an American citizen, however, was not a disqualifying 
factor for maintaining a semblance of legitimacy within the exiled communities. It was 
natural that many exiles would begin the process of slowly assimilating into the countries 
they had moved to, particularly as the years went by. 
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Baltic constituents in the United States were engaged in the same objective of fighting 
for the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that Baltic exiles residing outside the 
United States pursued. Like the exiles, however, the Baltic constituents were no more 
successful in liberating Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Unlike the exiles, constituent 
organizations immediately began a process of dialogue with policymakers instead of being 
completely unable to establish any sort of communication lines. The relationships that the 
constituents built over time with Members of Congress as well as the State Department meant 
that they were able to create a framework to limit the scope of acceptable policy decisions by 
government officials. 
The pressure that Baltic organizations directly placed on the State Department 
through letter writing campaigns and regular meetings with State Department officials, in 
addition to indirect pressure through relations with Congress and other anti-communist 
organizations, resulted in the non-recognition policy slowly being transformed from an 
obscure foreign policy debate to a central domestic policy debate as it related to the status of 
Eastern Europe as the Cold War continued. Although there were no plans to abandon the 
non-recognition policy during Eisenhower’s second term, the structural relationships between 
Baltic organizations, other Eastern European organizations, and elected officials began to 
crystallize, which would prove difficult for future administrations to consider changing 
policy.. The consolidation of Baltic political activities in the United States based on the 
transfer of organizations such as the VLIK to the United States only strengthened the political 
potential that Baltic constituents possessed. 
Although the continuation of the non-recognition policy did not have any 
demonstrable impact on the political situation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania during the 
Cold War, it was an important rallying call for Baltic constituents in the United States. It 
provided a realistic policy objective for organizations to push officials to continue regardless 
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of the international climate of various periods during the Cold War. The non-recognition 
policy ultimately played a minor role in American diplomacy during the Cold War, but it was 




THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES 
 On 17 July 1959, President Eisenhower signed into law the Captive Nations Week 
Resolution designating the third week of July as “Captive Nations Week.”1 The law not only 
provided an avenue for Eastern European constituents and their elected officials to organize 
rallies and protests to condemn the actions of the Soviet Union in July 1959, but also 
established a precedent where all future administrations would declare the third week in July 
as Captive Nations Week.2 The establishment of Captive Nations Week was an important 
step towards the transformation of Eastern European exile politics from being a small yet 
important component of foreign relations to a mainly domestic political phenomenon. In 
Eisenhower’s original declaration he asked Americans “to recommit themselves to the 
support of the just aspirations of these peoples and to observe Captive Nations Week with 
appropriate ceremonies and activities.”3 
 The parades and rallies orchestrated by Captive Nations Week committees across the 
country allowed all Eastern European Americans the ability to display their solidarity to the 
American people as well as to Soviet observers. Although the events might have exposed 
Soviet sensitivities to, at times, their tenuous standing in Eastern Europe, Captive Nations 
Week had no demonstrable positive impact on American policy in its relations within the 
Soviet bloc. In fact, when Kennedy was elected, his ambassador to Yugoslavia, George F. 
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Kennan, attempted to dissuade Kennedy from issuing a Captive Nations Week declaration 
arguing that such declarations were “foolish and gratuitously offensive to Moscow”4 
 If the changes in American policy towards exile groups after 1956; acceptance that 
only gradual change in the Soviet bloc could be realistically expected; and the attempts to 
transfer the political focus of émigré groups away from the realm of foreign relations to the 
domestic sphere demonstrated that the United States felt that the political situation in Eastern 
Europe was a settled issue, events surrounding the Berlin situation in 1961 confirmed this 
new reality. High-stakes brinksmanship by American president John F. Kennedy and Soviet 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev concerning the status of Berlin and the possibility of a separate 
East German-Soviet peace treaty resulted in the construction of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 
1961.5  
 The Berlin Wall not only ended the greatest existential threat to Walter Ulbricht’s 
regime in East Germany - the constant flow of East Berliners to West Berlin, but also 
symbolically represented the reality of the Cold War in Europe for more than a decade. The 
proximity of Soviet and NATO forces in Berlin increased the likelihood of a total military 
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. From the outset of the Cold 
War, the United States had sought to avoid such a situation and Berlin forced American 
policymakers to recognize the realities of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Kennedy 
conceded “it seems particularly stupid to risk killing millions of Americans… because 
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Germans want Germany to be unified… If I am going to threaten nuclear war it will have to 
be for much bigger… reasons than that.”6 Through tacitly accepting the Berlin Wall’s 
construction, the United States shifted the focus of the Cold War away from Europe to the 
developing world and recognized the existence of a fragile peace in Europe held together by 
American hegemony in Western Europe and Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. 
 1961 was also an important year of reassessment for politically active Baltic 
constituents in the United States. Organizations such as the ALA, ALT, and the ENC were 
particularly successful in unifying the political interests of Estonians, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians in the United States. The methods used to promote their goal of fighting for the 
liberation of their homeland, however unrealistic the goals might be, were ultimately 
unsuccessful. As a new generation of émigrés grew into their political consciousness during 
the early 1960s, complaints were levied against the national organizations for being overly 
concerned with maintaining institutional stability at the expense of allowing dissent and 
vigorous debate to occur.7 
 In an attempt to streamline the political efforts of Balts represented by the ALA, ALT, 
and ENC and to demonstrate that the large organizations were able to change directions when 
necessary, the leaders of the three organizations began initial discussions about establishing 
an organization that would help to consolidate Baltic political efforts on 28 April 1961.8 
Throughout 1961, the JBANC’s activities involved little more than correspondence between 
the Chairman of the ENC, Julius Kangur, President of the ALA, Peter Lejins, and ALT 
President Leonard Šimutis about a host of issues that concerned all three Baltic nationalities 
                                                            
6 W.R. Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall: ‘A Hell of a Lot Better than a War,’ 75. 
7 Ieva Zake, American Latvians, 42. 
8 Bruno Albats and Visvaldis Klīve. ALA 35: 1951-1986. (Riga: Amerikas latviešu apvienība, 1986), 46. 
 
 333 
and addressed concerns that prominent members of each organization had about deepening 
cooperation with the other two Baltic communities.9 
 Representatives of the ALA, ENC, and ALT met for the first time on 19 November 
1961 in Chicago to organize the structure and the political agenda of a new joint Baltic 
organization. During the meeting, it was acknowledged that the Lithuanians had the most 
well established organization of the three Baltic nationalities and there were inherent 
concerns that one nationality would dominate the new organization.10 To assuage such 
concerns, a compromise was reached over the new organization’s chairmanship. The Joint 
Baltic American National Committee (JBANC) chairmanship started each August and would 
rotate on an annual basis in the following sequence: “first - Latvians, second - Lithuanians, 
third - Estonians.”11 In addition, all major initiatives that the JBANC sought to begin would 
have to gain the explicit approval of the three national organizations. 
 The 19 November meeting was also significant as it established the basic platform of 
this Baltic umbrella organization for the 1960s. The JBANC created a broad lobbying 
platform directed at all centers of political power in the United States. Contacts with the 
White House would focus on ensuring that American Presidents continued to declare the 
third week in July as Captive Nations Week. Baltic constituents persisted in lobbying the 
FEC as well as the State Department to start Baltic language broadcasts of RFE. Pressure was 
maintained on members of Congress to pass resolutions on behalf of the Baltic republics, 
most importantly to try to force the American government to take the Baltic cause before the 
UN. Finally, regularly press events were held to keep the Baltic cause alive before the media. 
                                                            
9 Issues ranged from how the organizations should react to the ongoing crisis in Berlin to an inflammatory 
article written by C.I. Sulzberger in the New York Times in July 1961. Additionally, there were debates about 
where the JBANC’s first meeting should take place. See: “Folder: Joint Baltic Committee Correspondences 
1961” Box 39, JBANC Collection, IHRC. 
10 Minutes of 18 November JBANC Meeting in Chicago, 4. “Folder: JBANC Minute Minutes 1961-1971” Box 
39, JBANC Collection, IHRC. 
11 Ibid, 11. 
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 The JBANC’s first press conference at Willard Hotel in Washington DC on 12 
December 1961 demonstrated the level of professionalism that the committee sought as a 
serious lobbying organization in the nation’s capital. 600 invitations were sent out to 
members of the press as well as to prominent figures in Washington to “outline a new 
approach” by an organization that “represents more than one thousand organizations and 
more than one million citizens of Baltic origin or descent.”12 During the press conference, the 
JBANC announced that they were issuing a press release to the State Department urging the 
United States to charge the Soviet Union with genocide before the United Nations.13 
 The professionalism of Baltic lobbying was not limited to the East Coast. In February 
1961, Senator Thomas Kuchel and Representative Glenard P. Lipscomb of California 
introduced resolutions before the House and the Senate requesting that the United States 
“bring up the Baltic States question before the United Nations and ask that the United 
Nations request the Soviets to withdraw all Soviet troops… and return all Baltic exiles from 
Siberia.”14 In August 1961, Baltic constituents in California took advantage of the Kuchel-
Lipscomb Resolution and established Americans for Congressional Action to Free the Baltic 
States. 
 On issues that involved decision-making by a small number of policymakers with 
little oversight, such as the FEC and CIA’s control over RFE broadcasts, Baltic-lobbying 
organizations had very little success. The insular nature of such organizations deflected any 
domestic pressure from policy considerations. Baltic constituents were significantly more 
effective in pressing members of Congress to sponsor resolutions on behalf of the Baltic 
States. Such resolutions ranged from reaffirming America’s position of non-recognition to 
                                                            
12 JBANC Press Event Invitation, Folder: Joint Baltic Committee Correspondences, 1961, Box 39, JBANC 
Collection, IHRC. 
13 James K. Anderson “U.S. Asked to Help Free Baltic Nations” Detroit Daily News, in Folder: Joint Baltic 
Committee Correspondences, 1961, Box 39, JBANC Collection, IHRC. 
14 The Kuchel-Lipscomb Resolution (S. Con. Res. 12 and H. Con. Res. 153) February 1961, RFE/RL Corporate 
Record Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Box 153 Folder 9. 
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requesting the President to charge the Soviet Union with genocide in the Baltic States. The 
opening statement of the House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs’ hearings on “Conditions 
in the Baltic States and in Other Countries of Eastern Europe” from 17-18 May 1965 offers 
insight into Baltic lobbying effectiveness with the Congress. The chairman stated that “there 
are over seventy resolutions introduced in the House which are related to the status of the 
Baltic countries.”15 In most cases there were matching Senate concurring resolutions.  
 The ability of Baltic constituents to influence enough members of the House of 
Representatives to sponsor over seventy resolutions was an impressive, if not unrealistic feat. 
Concurrent resolutions, however, are not legally binding. Thus, the resolutions by themselves 
had little influence in American politics outside of electoral considerations. The true policy 
implications of the relationship between Baltic constituents and the United States Congress 
rest with the relationship between members of Congress and the State Department. As a 
matter of protocol, members of Congress would request policy guidance from the State 
Department on all resolutions that might influence the direction of American foreign policy. 
Consequently, State Department officials were compelled to acknowledge and comment on 
over seventy congressional resolutions dealing with the Baltic republics. 
 One such example revolves around S.Con.Res 33, which was submitted by Senator 
Frank Lausche of Ohio on 19 March 1963. The resolution called on the President to bring the 
Baltic question before the United Nations and to call on the UN to force the Soviet Union to 
withdraw troops from the Baltic States; return all exiles from Siberia; punish those who 
committed crimes against the Baltic peoples; and conduct free elections in the Baltic States 
                                                            
15 Congressional Record: 17-18 May 1965 Subcommittee Hearings on “Conditions in the Baltic States and in 
Other Countries of Eastern Europe” The resolutions include: H.Con.Res 14, 25, 26, 40, 41, 43, 51, 68, 69, 75, 
76, 82, 87, 96, 99, 105, 106, 118, 119, 134, 135, 138, 159, 166, 168, 170, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 293, 
294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302, 303, 307, 318, 336, 353, 356, 357, 363, 365, 366, , 368, 369, 371, 372, 
374, 376, 390, 394, 395, 397, 398, 399, 404, 416, 417, 418, 421, 422, 423. 
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under direct UN supervision.16 Throughout Spring 1963, the State Department received 
letters from not only Chairman J.W. Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
but from the co-sponsors of the resolution and Baltic constituents seeking guidance and 
asking for State Department approval of the resolution. 
 The State Department’s responses highlight the inherent contradictions in American 
policy towards the Baltic republics throughout the Cold War, but particularly in the early 
1960s. In what became pro forma letters, the State Department’s policy guidance consisted of 
two arguments. First, Assistant Secretary of State Frederick G. Dutton reaffirmed the basic 
framework of American policy towards the Baltic States: 
 The Department is in full sympathy with the desire to see the Baltic States freed of 
 alien rule and restored to independence. In this connection it should be pointed out 
 that self-determination for the Baltic peoples is firmly established United States 
 policy and one that this government has never failed to keep on record before the 
 world. We have consistently and emphatically withheld recognition of the illegal 
 annexation of those peoples and their territories by the Soviet Government. 
 
Second, Dutton routinely made the case that taking the Baltic case before the United Nations 
would undermine the credibility of the non-recognition policy: 
 Unfortunately, an overwhelming majority of United Nations members do recognize 
 the incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR. They would construe any formal 
 proposal to have the General Assembly call on the Soviet Union to withdraw form the 
 Baltic States and to permit United Nations - supervised elections as a move primarily 
 designed to embarrass the Soviet Union rather than to alleviate the plight of the Baltic 
 peoples. Therefore, such a proposal would not be likely to commend widespread 
 support. A United States move on behalf of the Baltic States in this form would, by its 
 probable failure, be more likely to set back than to further their cause.17 
The State Department’s continued refusal to take the Baltic case to the United Nations 
demonstrated the limits that the Congress had in influencing the direction of foreign policy. 
However insular decision-making in the State Department might be, its bureaucracy was not 
totally immune from domestic pressure. The sheer volume of correspondences that officials 
                                                            
16 Tear sheet of S.Con.Res 33 19 March 1963, 88th Congress 1st Session in Folder: POL - Political Affairs and 
Religion, Baltic States, Box 3689 Subject Numeric File, 1961-1963. Records of the Department of State, RG 59, 
NAII. 
17 Frederick G. Dutton to J. W Fulbright 15 April 1963 Folder: POL - Political Affairs and Religion, Baltic 
States, Box 3689. Subject Numeric File, 1961-1963. Records of the Department of State, RG 59, NAII. 
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had to make concerning Congressional resolutions sent a strong message that the Baltic 
States had vocal and persistent supporters not only in the American public, but also in the 
halls of Congress. Being rebuked by the State Department only reinforced the disappointment 
that Baltic constituents had in the Department going back to the 1950s. As resolutions were 
rejected by the State Department, inevitably, another resolution would be sponsored. 
Ironically, instead of squashing the domestic pressure, the official State Department position 
only increased sensitivities in the Baltic American community to any changes in American 
policy that could have an impact on the non-recognition policy. 
 There remains the question whether or not Baltic Americans were right to be 
concerned about the possibility that the United States would shift its policy towards the Baltic 
republics? Throughout Dean Rusk’s tenure at the State Department, he established the Open 
Forum Panel, an avenue for policymakers to stimulate new ideas for the future conduct of 
American foreign relations.18 During the Open Forum Panel of 1967, the future of the non-
recognition policy was addressed. The Panel suggested that the United States adopt a more 
flexible Baltic policy. The proposal opened by stating: “Realistically, we must reckon with 
the fact that the Soviet Union will not liberate the Baltic States, or grant them any change in 
status.”19 The author continued by arguing:  
 while our current policy of not recognizing the incorporation of the Baltic States into 
 the USSR may satisfy certain domestic political considerations, it hampers our 
 attempts to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Every manifestation of our 
 Baltic policy is interpreted by the Soviets as a direct cold war initiative, inconsistent 
 with our efforts to deal with substantive issues by negotiation.20 
 
 Although the document conceded that domestic political considerations would 
preclude the State Department from moving towards any recognition of the Soviet 
                                                            
18 Dean Rusk to John M. Leddy (EUR) 30 October 1967, POL 17-4 Latvia, Folder: POL-Political Affairs & 
Religion, Latvia. Box 3900 Subject Numeric File, 1967-1969. Records of the Department of State, RG 59. 
NAII. 
19 “Policy Proposal: That We Adopt a More Flexible Baltic Policy” Attached to Rusk to Leddy Memo. Folder: 
POL-Political Affairs & Religion, Latvia. Box 3900 Subject Numeric File, 1967-1969. Records of the 




incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, it did contend that the State Department 
could “permit it to wither away.”21 The author offered six main ways that the State 
Department could “hasten the withering process.” The six policy changes would fall into 
changes in the way that the State Department executed its policy and changes in the way that 
the State Department would interact with Baltic Americans. 
 The most important structural change in the State Department would have been 
changing the title of the Department’s Baltic Desk Officer and expanding its duties to include 
additional segments of Eastern European affairs.22 Second, the State Department could 
increase official American travel to and expand contact with the Baltic States. It was argued 
that all American embassy personnel in Moscow below the Ambassadorial level should 
increase contacts with officials and everyday citizens in the Baltic republics.23 Finally, the 
State Department should continue to oppose the suggestions from constituents or members of 
Congress to introduce the Baltic States issue into the United Nations.  
 The Open Forum Panel proposal also sought to radically alter the relationship 
between the State Department and members of the Baltic American community. Most 
importantly, it argued that the United States should stop recognizing émigré diplomatic 
representatives of the Baltic States with the death of the current representatives.24 Given that 
all of the diplomats in 1967 were commissioned as diplomatic officers by the interwar 
governments, it was logical to assume that at some point there would be no Estonians, 
Latvians, or Lithuanians who possessed such credentials. Thus, it was logical to not extend 
                                                            
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid. The alternative option would be to transfer the responsibility of Baltic affairs to the office of Soviet 
Union Affairs.  
23 Ibid. The logical outgrowth was then to include the Baltic capital cities on the itineraries of American 
exchange exhibits or performing arts tours, as well as permit American student exchangees to attend universities 




diplomatic credentials beyond the current diplomats.25 In the short-term, the State 
Department was urged to consider dropping the sending of messages commemorating the 
national days of the three Baltic States. Such letters were naturally sensitive for the Soviet 
Union regardless of how innocuous the text happened to be. Finally, the State Department 
should not allow American foreign policy to become “frozen” in order to satisfy a small but 
vocal group of émigré organizations that sought to get the United States to support the 
restoration of Baltic independence. As a result, the State Department should avoid responding 
to Baltic émigré groups whenever possible. 
 Rusk asked for the Open Forum Panel Baltic Policy Proposal during the process of 
drafting the 1967 letters to the Baltic diplomats, commemorating the anniversaries of the 
nations’ independence. It appears that Rusk seriously considered the proposal’s suggestion as 
he asked John M. Leddy of the Office of European affairs what the policies of European 
allies happened to be towards the Baltic republics, implying that American policy could 
eventually converge with the policies of European allies.26 Leddy responded on 13 November 
1967 strongly repudiating the suggestion that the United States should alter its policy of 
national day messages: 
 Such a change at this time would be regarded as an indication of a major shift in our 
 policy by the many American citizens of Baltic descent and their Congressional 
 supporters and would be particularly unfortunate in view of the recent 50th 
 anniversary of the October Revolution and of the forthcoming 50th anniversaries of 
 the independence of the Baltic States. 
 
 We consider it inadvisable at this particular sensitive time to change our basic letter in 
 any way that is likely to be attacked as a unilateral concession to the Soviet Union 
 having no demonstrable advantage to the United States and repudiating a traditional 
 principle of our policy which has been given support at the highest levels.27 
                                                            
25 The author acknowledged that the situation is probably at least 10 to 15 years away since one of the 
representatives was in his 70s, while the other two are considerably younger, in their 40s and 50s. 
26 Dean Rusk to John M. Leddy (EUR) 30 October 1967, POL 17-4 Latvia, Folder: POL-Political Affairs & 
Religion, Latvia. Box 3900 Subject Numeric File, 1967-1969. Records of the Department of State, RG 59. 
NAII. 
27 John M. Leddy to Dean Rusk 13 November 1967, POL 17-4 Latvia, Folder: POL-Political Affairs & 





As a result, on 14 November 1967, Rusk wrote to the Baltic diplomats commemorating them 
for the forty-ninth anniversary of independence and reaffirmed the continued American 
policy of non-recognition.28  
 The non-recognition policy continued to be the main framework for analyzing all 
positions towards the Baltic republics were analyzed through. Commemoration letters 
continued to be sent by Rusk during the last years of the Johnson administration and became 
standard procedure in William Rogers’ State Department. American Baltic policy, however, 
did not necessarily remain entirely frozen. Changes in attitude concerning several important 
issues occurred during the late 1960s that would have been inconceivable during the 1950s 
particularly in the area of cultural exchanges. 
 In 1968, the American Embassy in Moscow received a telegram from the State 
Department noting that an American scholar had applied for a grant to do research in Vilnius, 
Lithuania. Richmond Yale, the American officer in Moscow in charge of cultural exchanges 
broached the topic of allowing cultural exchanges to take place in the Baltic republics with 
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson. Thompson agreed with Yale that the time had come to 
allow such exchanges with the Baltic republics to start.29 Later, when Yale served as Deputy 
Director at the State Department for Soviet and East European Exchanges, he consulted with 
the JBANC and asked what their opinion was on permitting a greater number of cultural 
exchanges with the Baltic republics. The JBANC delegation agreed with Yale’s argument but 
refused to go on the record in support in order to prevent any political issues within the Baltic 
American community.30 
                                                            
28 Dean Rusk to Arnolds Spekke, 14 November 1967, POL 17-4 Latvia, FolderL POL-Political Affairs & 
Religion, Latvia. Box 3900 Subject Numeric File, 1967-1969. Records of the Department of State, RG 59. 
NAII. 
29 Richmond Yale, Practicing Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Odyssey, 114. 
30 Ibid. The first non-academic cultural exchange took place in 1973 when the José Limón Dance Company 
traveled to the Baltic capitals. 
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 The State Department would probably have initiated mainstream cultural exchanges 
to the Baltic republics without the approval from Baltic lobbying organizations such as the 
JBANC. However, it is clear that the State Department realized that any sudden changes in 
American policy, such as cultural exchanges, without any input from Baltic constituents, 
would have created political problems not only for the State Department, but also for the 
President. The difficult question of whether or not American bureaucrats merely used 
constituent concerns as a justification for an augmentation in policy or whether or not the 
pressure brought to bear by the constituents forced a change in policy is only of secondary 
importance. The fact that the State Department contacted Baltic constituents about changes in 
cultural exchanges is demonstrable proof that the constituent concerns remained a small, but 
important component in the making of foreign policy. 
 At the most ambitious level. the persistent lobbying by Baltic constituents during the 
1960s placed clear limits on the ability of American policymakers to reconsider the basic 
tenants of American policy towards the Baltic States. As the United States moved towards a 
policy of detente with the Soviet Union during the Nixon administration, the maintenance of 
a rather antiquated, yet confrontational policy towards a relatively settled political issue in 
Eastern Europe seemed paradoxical to a basic hope of reducing tensions with the Soviet 
Union. There was every reason to believe that some quid pro quo over the Baltic issue could 
result in the ability to improve its standing not only with the Soviet Union, but improve its 
bargaining position. 
 It could also be argued that the Baltic question by the late 1960s had become so 
unimportant in international politics that it cost the United States very little to maintain the 
policy. There is some evidence that Soviet sensitivities towards the Baltic States were 
exaggerated. Alexandr Kokorev of the Soviet Embassy in Washington had lunch with 
Edward Hurwitz of the State Department on 1 February 1973. During the lunch, the issue of 
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the Baltic States came up and Kokorev stated that the matter “did not play any real role on 
US-Soviet relations.”31 However, if the State Department was completely immune to 
domestic pressure on the non-recognition policy, it would have been quite easy to allow the 
policy to whither away. Although the non-recognition policy had essentially been 
transformed into a domestic political issue, it could eventually have international implications 
in the future and its continuation was ensured by the activities of Baltic constituents during 
the 1960s. 
 At the very least, lobbying activity provided the Baltic American community the 
opportunity to cooperate with each other. Even after a generational change had taken place in 
the community and there were no reasonable expectations to return to Estonia, Latvia, or 
Lithuania in the foreseeable future, political activism was an additional justification for the 
communities to continue preserving the cultural heritage of the Baltic republics. There 
remained the hope that the Baltic republics would regain their independence from the Soviet 
Union. This continued rejection of Soviet dominance in the Baltic region provided a rationale 
for Baltic Americans to continue to preserve the cultural traditions of the interwar republics. 
While the political continuity that the first generation of exiles hoped to preserve had been 
discredited, the continuation of the non-recognition policy provided the political and legal 
justification to Baltic constituents to continue their struggle to fight for the independence of 
the Baltic States. 
 The first generation exiles played no role in explicitly fostering the non-recognition 
policy throughout the 1950s. This framework was important in the making of American 
foreign policy and served an important rhetorical tool to both the Truman and Eisenhower 
                                                            
31 Memorandum of Conversation Alexandr Kokorev and Edward Hurwitz 1 February 1973 Box 1613 Subject-
Numeric File, 1971-1973. Records of the Department of State, RG 59, NAII. Whether or not this is an accurate 
representation of Soviet sensitivities to the Baltic question remain in doubt. While the Soviet Union certainly 
did not allow the Baltic question to hamper negotiations with the United States during the early 1970s, the 
reaction to the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 in the Human Rights Basket demonstrates that the Soviet Union was 
indeed sensitive to the issue. 
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administrations. For all of the flaws in the first generation of exiles, ranging from their 
inability to cooperate with each other to their primary objective of preserving their political 
legitimacy so they could reclaim their positions in future independent states, they were 
fundamental in the establishment of a vivid Baltic constituent community in the United 
States. 
Perhaps the greatest legacy of the first generation of exiles was to allow a second 
generation to develop that continued to perceive themselves as a unique group of ethnic 
Americans who had a singular political mission towards the home countries, which they had 
fled as small children. American policymakers had believed that after the exiles they had 
established relations with from 1948-1952 grew old and passed away then the continued 
implications of the State-Private network with exile groups would fade. In reality, as the 
Baltic question appeared to become more settled throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Baltic 
constituents became more vigorous in their lobbying efforts and were critical in preventing 
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